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1 A New Era of Civil Society and State in 
East Asian Democracies *1
David Chiavacci and Simona A. Grano
Contemporary East Asia is marked by new and diversifying interactions 
between civil society and the state, which merit renewed scholarly attention 
(Cliff et al. 2018; Morris-Suzuki and Soh 2017; Ogawa 2018). In particular, the 
present volume focuses on various forms of entanglement and contention 
in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, as these three countries represent the 
fully consolidated democracies of the region (Cheng and Chu 2018). The 
impacts of globalization and the 2008 f inancial crisis have, in recent years, 
led to protest movements and political backlashes across the globe (Della 
Porta 2017; Rodrik 2018). East Asia’s ‘mature’ democracies have witnessed 
their own share of protests and conflicts. In spring 2014, the Sunflower 
Movement occupied the parliament in Taiwan for weeks and organized mass 
demonstrations that forced the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) government to 
make concessions regarding the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement with 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Ho 2015; Rowen 2015). In South Korea, 
a mass protest movement and nationwide demonstrations with millions of 
participants sustained over several months during the period 2016-2017 led 
to the enforced resignation and impeachment of President Park Geun-Hye 
(Shin and Moon 2017; Turner et al. 2018). Even in relatively ‘quiet’ Japan, the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster and security policy initiatives of the current 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration have resulted in the emer-
gence of new social movements and mass demonstrations of a magnitude 
not witnessed in decades (Chiavacci and Obinger 2018b; Machimura and 
Satō 2016; Oguma 2013).
* The editors thank the Swiss Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences, the Swiss National 
Science Foundation, the Taiwanese Ministry of Education, and University of Zurich for their 
generous support, which made the publication of this volume possible.
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Such large, progressive protests against conservative establishments 
that featured on the front pages of Western mass media are only the tip of 
the iceberg in the changing relationship between civil society and state in 
democratic East Asia, however. All three societies studied in this book have 
in fact reached a novel era of post high growth and are now established 
democracies, which has led to new social anxieties and increasing normative 
diversity. These, in turn, have repercussions on the relationship and interac-
tions between civil society and the state marked by surprising new avenues 
of cooperation and complex areas of contention. Moreover, the present book 
does not merely focus on progressive protest movements but attempts to 
reach beyond the classic dichotomy of state vs progressive civil society by 
including novel cases of so-called conservative countermovements.
Nevertheless, these developments are embedded in specif ic East Asian 
institutions and path dependencies. To gain a better understanding of the 
East Asian context, we will start with a short overview of the developmental 
state and its implications for the path of the three East Asian countries and 
their economic success story.
Developmental State as Success Model of High Growth and 
Global Rise
While not completely concurrent in their development, the three cases 
studied in the book are united by their strong state settings. Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan represent three prime examples of developmental states 
in which fast-paced economic development was realized through state-led 
macroeconomic planning and intervention. In fact, the whole theoretical 
model of the developmental state and its building blocks (such as industrial 
policy or developmentalism as the dominant national ideology) are based 
on studies and theoretical considerations about the political economy in 
these three East Asian economies (Amsden 1989; Cumings 1984; Johnson 
1982; Wade 1990; Woo-Cumings 1999). Despite relinquishing their ties as 
colonies of Japan after World War II, South Korea and Taiwan share with 
their former colonial master an institutional path dependency from the 
total war (later 1930s up to 1945), in which the Japanese empire mobilized all 
the resources of its economy and society. During this period, the economy 
came under strict state control and was fully geared to support the aggres-
sive expansion wars of the Japanese empire. The formerly liberal political 
economy of laissez-faire capitalism was transformed into a system of total 
war, which constituted the foundation of the strong planning states after 
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the war when economic growth became the main national goal in all three 
countries. Moreover, all three became United States (US) protectorates in 
the post-war era, and they were part of a region that was traumatized by 
several large-scale conflicts during the Cold War era. Consequently, regional 
insecurity forced their conservative establishment to succeed in their plans 
for economic development, and their bilateral security alliances with the 
US provided these three countries with crucial technological and economic 
support as well as preferential access to its markets.
High economic growth and rapid industrialization were the two top 
national priorities of the bureaucratic, economic and political elites in all 
three countries. The respective conservative establishments proved to be 
extremely successful in achieving these goals and in leading their respec-
tive countries to join the ranks of advanced industrial economies. By the 
late 1990s, these three East Asian economies had succeeded in becoming 
clear winners in globalization, modelling themselves as export champions 
and breaking the f inancial, economic and technological predominance 
of the West. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan embodied the core of those 
high-performance economies, which constituted the ‘East Asian miracle 
of economic growth and public policy,’ as it was called by the World Bank 
(1993) in its highly influential and controversial study sponsored by the 
Japanese government (for a retrospective view, see Page 2016).
Most importantly, the East Asian model did not merely propagate growth 
per se but ‘shared growth’ (Campos and Root 1996). On the one hand, 
state elites spurred private interests and encouraged business leaders to 
contribute to high growth. On the other hand, conservative establishments 
successfully mobilized workers and citizens for the national project of 
developmentalism by promising that the whole population would get its 
fair share of the growing pie, bringing increased purchasing power and 
prosperity. Economic development and shared growth introduced mass 
consumerism but also guaranteed stable life courses and general upward 
mobility, which lasted for decades and created new, large middle classes. The 
East Asian model of development also included a productivist welfare regime 
(Choi 2013; Holliday 2000), in which the welfare state was minimized and 
subordinated to economic progress. Social inclusion was achieved through 
shared growth rather than through comprehensive welfare states and social 
redistribution between social classes. Thus, developmentalism created a 
‘developmental citizenship’ (Chang 2012) or a system of ‘welfare through 
work’ (Miura 2012), in which social inclusion was based on individual 
contribution to and shared benef its from the realization of high national 
growth.
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However, in all three countries, national development was not only a 
success story of harmonious economic growth and rising wealth. This path 
was also marked by intensive social and political conflicts. In Japan, the 
social contract of shared growth was only established in the 1960s after 
severe and violent disputes concerning the pillars and ideological orientation 
of Japan after the collapse of the expansionist politics implemented up to 
1945 (Chiavacci 2007). In fact, the post-war conflict cycle came to an end 
as late as the mid-1970s when the idea of shared growth f inally gained 
undisputed hegemony and became common consensus (Chiavacci and 
Obinger 2018a). In South Korea and Taiwan, economic development under 
authoritarian regimes led to increasingly self-conf ident and politically 
active middle classes that demanded greater political participation. It was 
in the 1980s, with the emergence of a more urban-based and cosmopolitan 
middle class, that both countries witnessed their f irst collective organized 
movements for political liberalization and then democracy. This increasing 
pressure and political uprising of citizens eventually led, in the second half 
of the 1980s, to the repealing of martial law and political democratization 
(Hsiao 2019: 27; Kim 2000). In both countries, however, developmentalism 
and shared growth remained the basic social contract after democratization 
for years to come.
In recent years, however, the three countries reached a fundamental 
turning point after their rapid economic development and compressed 
modernization came to a rather sudden end. A number of shocks ushered 
all three democracies into a new phase of post high growth.
The Era of Post High Growth
The most fundamental shock in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan has been the 
abrupt change from a path of rapid economic growth to sluggish economic 
development. In democratic East Asia, Japan was the f irst to undergo such 
a transformation. The bursting of the speculation bubble in the stock and 
property markets of the early 1990s marked the beginning of a stop-and-go 
period in Japan’s economic trajectory that resulted in economic stagnation 
in the past decades, as well as in heated public debates and political discus-
sions about the so-called lost decades and the urgent need for structural 
reforms (e.g. Funabashi 2015). Growth f igures for South Korea and Taiwan 
over the same period are signif icantly higher; nonetheless, they have also 
been experiencing slower growth, de-industrialization and restructuring 
since the Asian f inancial crisis of 1997, which marked a turning point in 
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their development and led – in particular, in South Korea – to deregulation 
(London 2018: 230-233). This trend was further reinforced after the 2008 
f inancial crisis, which had a curbing impact on all three economies, with 
especially harsh influences on their respective export industry. The global 
f inancial crisis resulted in decreasing growth rates in South Korea and 
Taiwan, which began their downward descent towards Japan’s low levels of 
economic growth (Ito 2017: 9). However, compared to what was happening 
in numerous advanced economies of the West, in which growth was even 
lower and unemployment f igures were much higher, democratic East Asia 
was not faring too badly after the 2008 financial crisis. Even Japan’s economic 
expansion, when measured in terms of GDP per capita growth, compared 
to that of most other advanced industrialized economies has not fared so 
poorly. However, such phases of economic stagnation in democratic East 
Asia in all three countries led to a breakdown of the former model of shared 
growth acquired by a strong state.
What undermined the previous social contract was not slower eco-
nomic growth per se, but the fact that this was accompanied by social 
diversif ication processes and new social insecurities. In recent years, 
income inequality has been increasing in all three economies (Solt 2019). 
In addition, especially in Japan and Taiwan, real wages are stagnating 
(ILO 2018: 123). In Japan and South Korea, labour market deregulation 
and neoliberal reforms have resulted in a signif icant increase in f lexible 
non-standard employment with no career opportunities and low salaries 
(Chiavacci and Hommerich 2017; Kim 2018; Shin 2018; Shin 2019). The 
dominant self-view in Japan changed in the f irst half of the 2000s from 
the former narrative of a general middle-class society marked by fairness 
and equality of opportunities and of outcomes into one of a gap society 
featuring growing social division, inequality and poverty (Chiavacci 2008). 
Similarly, debates in South Korea revolve around questions regarding 
the ongoing contraction and fundamental fragmentation of the middle 
classes into winner and losers, which are undermining social cohesion and 
leading to new anxieties (Koo 2019; Yang 2018). Likewise, Taiwan was able 
to achieve both growth and equality in the process of national develop-
ment until the 1980s but has, in recent years, been facing an increasing 
imbalance and rising low-income employment that are undermining 
citizens’ trust in the government and its capacity to achieve a fair society 
(Chang 2017; Ku and Hsueh 2016: 354-355). Consequently, all three East 
Asian democracies are prime examples of the current challenges to shared 
or inclusive growth in East Asia, as highlighted in a recent report by the 
World Bank (2018).
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Moreover, existing problems gained new momentum. The earlier prior-
itization of economic growth as well as fast industrialization had triggered 
the creation of environmental protection movements in all three countries 
because of the rampant pollution and environmental degradation caused 
by rapid economic development (Broadbent 1998; Eder 1996; Grano 2015; 
Hsiao 1999; Lee and So 1999; Nakazawa 2001). In Japan, anti-pollution move-
ments had started in the 1960s and forced the conservative establishment 
in the early 1970s to implement far-reaching adaptations in its policies. 
Environmental civil society actors and organizations in South Korea started 
primarily as anti-pollution movements and gained influence from the 1980s 
onwards. In Taiwan, the environmental movement became a key player in 
the island’s political transition, starting from the mid-1980s, as the emergence 
of anti-pollution protests accelerated the loosening of political control 
(Grano 2015: 42-48; Ho 2006: 27-85; Hsiao 1999: 31-54). Once established, 
environmental awareness never completely disappeared from the public 
and political agenda in all three countries. Furthermore, as will be further 
discussed below, global warming and the Fukushima nuclear disaster of 
2011 breathed new life into environmental civil society organizations and 
movements across East Asia.
At the international level, the rise of the PRC has been rapidly tilting 
the regional power balance, contributing to rising economic and political 
insecurities in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. For instance, all three 
economies have benef ited greatly from China’s economic high growth 
and transformation. Investment and companies from all three countries 
played a central role in China’s industrialization and ascendance. At the 
same time, however, the rise of the PRC presents numerous challenges to 
the regional advantage and economic leadership of Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan. Even though China’s ascendance has likewise presented Western 
states – especially the US, as the dominant world hegemon – with novel 
insecurities resulting in a political backlash and increasing international 
tensions, the geopolitical vicinity in the case of East Asian democracies 
renders the PRC a factor for more serious consideration by the three countries 
under study. In view of the PRC’s global might as well as its increasingly 
bold policies and claim to regional leadership that represent far more than 
mere economic challenges embodying de facto national security concerns 
(especially in the case of Taiwan and its uncertain political future), the 
political authorities and populations in all three countries have several 
reasons to be concerned.
Moreover, it is not only the growth gap difference with the PRC that is 
a source of anxiety, but also the fact that demographic development is at 
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a fundamental turning point in all three countries, reinforcing the view 
that national development has reached its peak and has now started its 
downward spiral. All three East Asian democracies are faced with rapid 
aging due to their late and compressed f irst demographic transition, which 
presents a huge challenge (Obe 2019). Regarding this transformation, Japan is 
again the precursor. Until 1990, its proportion of elderly people (aged 65 and 
older) was still low compared to Western advanced industrial economies but 
increased rapidly in the subsequent years and turned Japan into the oldest 
society worldwide by the mid-2000s (see Figure 1.1). Demographic models, 
which are very accurate compared to economic or political prognosis, show 
that South Korea and Taiwan will follow this path of drastic demographic 
transformation in the coming years (Suehiro and Ōizumi 2017). In South 
Korea and Taiwan, the inescapable process of fast aging has started in the 
2010s. Their demographic transformation will be even faster than that 
of Japan and will convert both countries into super-aged societies with 
over a f ifth of their total population aged 65 or older in the mid-2020s (see 
Figure 1.1).
In fact, previous high growth rates in democratic East Asia were connected 
to the f irst demographic dividend of a fast-growing population and an 
increasing proportion of working-age people. Some authors identify an 
opportunity for a second demographic dividend with aging that may lead 
to rapid capital accumulation in East Asia (Mason and Kinugasa 2008). 
Nevertheless, debates about future development, in all three countries, 
are dominated by rapidly increasing proportions of aged and dependent 
people linked to questions regarding the future f inancing of the welfare 
systems. The economic slowdown of democratic East Asia compared to the 
still dynamic PRC almost represents a type of natural law and structural 
inevitability. For nations that have, for decades, def ined their identity and 
pride primarily through the prism of their economic success stories and rel-
evance, such outcomes are very bleak indeed. Moreover, rapid demographic 
change has already resulted in the transformation of Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan into new immigration countries (Bayok et al. 2020; Fielding 2016). 
While all three East Asian democracies were non-immigration countries 
par excellence with no signif icant inflows up to the late 1980s, they have 
become new and important immigration countries with a signif icant net 
inflow that is starting to change the population’s composition and is another 
challenge for national identity.
Finally, it has to be noted that all three countries have become fully 
consolidated democracies that have already experienced several changes of 
ruling parties. In all three, the formerly tight-knit conservative establishment 
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has lost elections to more progressive opponents, which has led to a signif i-
cant change in power structures (for an overview, see Table 1.1).
It is not only the progressive side of civil society that has become better 
organized and more diverse, however. Conservative countermovements, 
which have risen as a backlash to more progressive governments and 
influences, have likewise gained momentum in the past decade and are now 
well established in all three countries. These conservative civil organiza-
tions and networks testify to the increasing normative diversity, which 
has arisen as a reaction to the advancement of progressive social ideas 
such as, to name but one example, same-sex marriage in Taiwan. Taiwan’s 
conservative movement to defend the threatened traditional morality 
regarding the issues of abortion, same-sex marriage and gender equity in 
education is an intellectually fascinating case of a countermovement that 
is often neglected by scholars of Taiwan’s civil society. Likewise, attempts 
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to legalize same-sex partnerships in Japan and South Korea have led to 
conservative backlashes.
Overall, these fundamental transformations have led to a reconfiguration 
of the playing f ield between the state and civil society that is marked by new 
Table 1.1  Change in power between conservative and progressive governments 
in democratic East Asia, 1988-2018
Japanese Prime 
Minister
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Source: Own compilation.
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forms of entanglement and contention as well as a new salience of social 
movements and political protests. Moreover, the former social contract 
of shared growth is under extreme pressure and the developmental state 
now appears to be an increasingly outdated model that is no longer able to 
successfully steer national development. In fact, it has been sidelined by 
a wave of neoliberal policies introduced by conservative establishments 
themselves that have weakened the previously successful social contract 
of shared growth.
New Relation State vs Civil Society
The present volume introduces a comparative perspective in identifying and 
discussing similarities and differences in East Asian democracies based on 
in-depth case studies. The contributions in our volume focus on three areas 
of entanglement and contention between civic agency and state control: 
(1) environmental issues, (2) identity politics, and (3) neoliberalism and 
social inclusion. These are highly topical issues that allow us to gain a fuller 
understanding of the most recent sociopolitical and regional developments.
Environmental Issues
The three papers in the f irst section focus on the issue of how civil society 
tackles environmental issues. As mentioned above, developmentalism, high 
economic growth, and rapid industrialization have led to high levels of pol-
lution, which has sparked outrage and created important citizen movements 
in all three countries, resulting in the amendment of state policies in some 
areas. As an important issue that can no longer be overlooked globally, 
climate change has likewise reinvigorated civic activism against global 
warming in all three East Asian democracies. Moreover, the Fukushima 
nuclear disaster reinforced anti-nuclear movements, intensifying the level 
of contention (Chiavacci and Obinger 2018b; Grano 2014, 2016, 2017; Kim and 
Chung 2018; Machimura and Satō 2016).
Simona Grano’s chapter deals with the political repercussions of the 
widespread discontent regarding the previous KMT administration in 
Taiwan and the ensuing change in ruling party in 2016. Popular discontent 
regarding several ‘secondary’ issues once again prompted the progressive 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to revert to its early pro-environmental 
and social justice rhetoric to attract more voters. In the 2016 national elec-
tions, the DPP once again included in its ranks several former civil society 
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leaders, activists and academics with strong environmental and social 
engagement that trace their origins to the galaxy of progressive social 
movements. This chapter explores whether more than three years after 
the start of the new administration, concrete results have been achieved 
by these activists or whether they have become, once again, quieter after 
having been re-integrated into the ranks of the ruling party. The chapter 
consolidates research on recent interactions and conflicts between the 
state trying to exert more inf luence across several f ields – in this case 
the environmental one – and newly emerging or well-established social 
movements under two different political administrations (the Ma Ying-jeou 
and Tsai Ing-wen administrations) to pinpoint key differences.
The second chapter by Mary Alice Haddad addresses a fundamental 
puzzle: East Asia is a region still dominated by developmental states that 
favour business and constrain advocacy organizations, and yet Japan has 
been leading the world in high emissions standards for decades, and South 
Korea and Taiwan have both embarked on major green initiatives that 
involve not only green business development, but also new national parks, 
widespread energy conservation, and comprehensive recycling efforts. 
This chapter discusses how environmental organizations are networking 
with one another to make and empower allies within the government and 
business to effect pro-environmental changes. Focusing on the issue of the 
environment, it argues that non-profit organizations (NPOs) play important 
roles in developing the coordinating networks that facilitate policymaking 
in challenging and diverse political contexts. Haddad’s chapter begins by 
discussing three specif ic types of networks commonly created by NPOs in 
East Asia to improve environmental policy: hub-and-spoke, horizontal, and 
vertical. It then discusses three ways that these networks influence policy: 
(1) facilitating peer-to-peer information sharing; (2) piloting new projects 
and disseminating best practices; and (3) empowering allies within the 
government. The chapter concludes by arguing that East Asia is a particularly 
good region to study how advocates and the networks they form are able to 
influence policy because of the challenging and diverse political contexts 
they face.
Finally, in the last chapter in this section, Tobias Weiss analyses the 
emergence of a countermovement in reaction to the rise of the movement 
against nuclear power in Japan since the 1970s. He traces the emergence 
of the conservative countermovement in the historical perspective and 
analyses the organizational and social basis, mobilization processes, and 
framing and political influence of the groups involved. Weiss then attempts 
to pinpoint the political impact of the Fukushima 2011 nuclear disaster on 
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the movement. His chapter shows how the countermovement was able to 
survive a period of intense contestation, preserving its resource basis and 
retaining signif icant influence on the policymaking process due to support 
from large parts of the conservative establishment.
Identity Politics
National identities are the key issues addressed in the second section of 
our volume. National identities in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have 
been interwoven with economic success stories and the ensuing increase in 
affluence and wide-ranging social inclusion. In recent years, however, these 
societies have been confronted with sluggish economic growth while at the 
same time facing the impending threat epitomized by the rise of the PRC. 
Both developments are fundamentally changing regional dynamics and have 
led to growing social anxieties in all three countries. Moreover, the growing 
influx of immigrants further impacts the question of national identity. 
Against this background, the f irst two contributions in section two analyse 
the recent upsurge in ultra-conservative and ultra-nationalistic movements.
Naoto Higuchi discusses in his chapter how Japan perceived the rise of 
nativist demonstrations and hate crimes from the late 2000s, which led the 
parliament to enact the country’s f irst anti-racism law in 2016. The aim of 
his chapter is to examine the pro-establishment nature of Japan’s nativist 
movement. Although the movement often criticizes the ruling conservative 
establishment, it should be regarded as indirectly linked to the establishment 
in two ways. First, Japanese nativism is a variant of historical revisionism and 
the emergence of nativist violence is a ‘by-product’ of the rise of historical 
revisionism among the conservative establishment in post-Cold War Japan. 
Although the nativist movement and the conservative establishment are 
not directly associated with each other, the former took full advantage of 
the discursive opportunity that the latter offered. Second, the general public 
favour the nativist movement as part of the conservative establishment. 
The movement bridges sympathy with conservatism and antipathy towards 
neighbouring countries.
In his chapter, Ming-sho Ho analyses the rise of conservative religious 
movements in Taiwan, which are becoming increasingly active in the 
country’s political arena, as a backlash to recent progressive activism in a 
variety of f ields. Taiwan’s conservative movement to defend the threatened 
traditional morality and sexualities is an intellectually fascinating case of 
countermovement yet an oft-neglected aspect of Taiwan’s civil society. This 
chapter locates its origins in the preceding change of Taiwan’s Christian 
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community. Protestant and Catholic leaders pioneered the opposition to 
gender equity and pluralism, and over the years, they gained support from 
other religions. Ho analyses the contestation over the issues of abortion, 
same-sex marriage, and gender equity in education. On the whole, the 
conservative movement has largely failed to turn back the clock. However, 
its presence was powerfully felt and had the potential to usher in a new 
political alignment that moved beyond the pre-existing cleavage.
Taking a similar perspective, Dafydd Fell and Tommy Kwan analyse the 
relationship between the mainstream and the ‘new movement’ parties 
in Taiwan in recent years. Since democratization began in the mid-1980s, 
Taiwan’s party system has been dominated by two parties, the KMT and the 
DPP. Smaller parties have at times played an important role, however, bring-
ing diversity into the system, emphasizing different marginalized issues, and 
representing neglected communities. These small parties tended to be those 
that split off from the mainstream parties, while alternative social movement 
parties struggled to be electorally relevant. The picture changed only recently 
with the rise of two different types of movement party, the New Power Party 
as well as the Green Party and Taiwan Social Democratic Party Alliance. In 
their chapter, Kwan and Fell examine the relationship of these new players 
with a mainstream party, the DPP. Were these parties better off working in 
alliance with the main parties or preserving their autonomy? The authors 
also offer some thoughts on why these parties adopted such strategies and 
how the relationship affected the development of these alternative parties.
In the f inal chapter of this section, David Chiavacci discusses immigrant 
advocacy groups’ influence in Japan’s immigration policy. Japan has been a 
new immigration country for three decades. However, its immigration policy 
has been marked by ideational and institutional fragmentation. This resulted 
in a deadlock without bold reforms and immunized state actors to external 
pressure. Even powerful business association, despite being core members of 
the conservative establishment, have struggled to impact immigration policy. 
Against this backdrop, civil advocacy has been surprisingly influential. 
While civic groups have generally not been included in decision-making 
bodies, they have altered the perception of immigration. Moreover, civic 
activists have cooperated closely with international organizations and 
foreign states, which gave them a voice indirectly through third parties. 
By analysing reforms combating human traff icking, this chapter identif ies 
factors that resulted in decisive indirect influence of civic advocacy in this 
exceptional case. This allows us to gain a differentiated understanding of 
the limited, yet still sometimes signif icant, influence of civic activism on 
Japan’s ‘strong’ state in immigration policy.
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Neoliberalism and Social Inclusion
The third section of our volume grapples with questions concerning neoliberal 
reforms and social inclusion in East Asia. The guiding principle of developmen-
talism involves a significant amount of state intervention in markets through 
industrial policies and bureaucratic leadership rather than a comprehensive 
welfare state. However, in recent decades, neoliberalism, as it has been shaped 
in the United Kingdom or the US, appeared to be more successful in generating 
economic growth and thus rose to prominence in East Asia. Even though 
neoliberal policies include the state’s activation and co-optation of civil society 
(Hundt 2015; Maeda 2012), they continue to undermine social inclusion, result-
ing in a backlash and new antagonistic civic activism against state policies.
Against this background, Akihiro Ogawa’s argument in his chapter 
builds on long-term research at SLG, an NPO in eastern Tokyo, which was 
established under the 1998 NPO Law. Incorporated as an NPO in 2000, 
SLG is one of the largest civic society organizations promoting lifelong 
learning in Japan. Over nearly two decades, SLG successfully offered more 
than a hundred innovative courses to the local community. However, SLG 
faced a state of crisis and risked dissolution in 2018 due to the municipal 
government’s decision to cut its funding. In his chapter, Ogawa argues that 
SLG was a successful case of neoliberalism-oriented public administration, 
pursuing decentralization and reduced costs. He claims, however, that SLG 
was not conducive to encouraging independent, citizen-oriented activities. 
His chapter documents current discussions at SLG, which reflect the reality 
of the Japanese civil society landscape, in which NPOs are central.
In his contribution, Jin-Wook Shin turns to South Korea. His chapter 
examines the changing patterns of South Korean social movements from the 
1960s to the 2010s in terms of their constituents, their communication and 
mobilization structure, and the way in which they influenced institutional 
politics. Some long-term trends that require particular attention include 
the extension of participants from cultural elites and organized activists 
to a huge number of ordinary citizens; a shift of the structure of the f ield of 
social movements from the inter-organizational ties of committed activists to 
highly decentralized networks of organizations, communities, and individu-
als; and a change in the way social movements affect institutional politics 
from the moralized acts of cultural elites through the disruption as well as 
negotiation by movement organizations to large-scale protest actions of 
individual citizens influencing public opinion and party politics. In response 
to such changes, the South Korean state and civil society now have the task 
of innovating their ideas, action repertoires, and mutual relationships.
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The examination of local/national trajectories of social movements for 
homeless people in Japan is the topic in Mahito Hayashi’s contribution, 
the third chapter in this section. Hayashi argues that such ‘pro-homeless’ 
activism has fundamentally improved the Japanese welfare state. Japan’s 
welfare-providing programmes are prone to exclusion. State-led high growth 
historically allocated resources for capitalist expansion, not for people’s 
welfare. This persistent tendency hit the homeless the most. In turn, this 
has given pro-homeless activism signif icant potential and capacities. First, 
pro-homeless activism has predominantly taken local forms, improving 
welfare provision at welfare off ices. Second, in the late 2000s, activism 
won improvements at the national level as it reframed homelessness as a 
national problem of not only the ‘outsiders,’ but also the ‘insiders’ of society. 
Third, the wholesale inclusion of the homeless/poor has evoked their re-
marginalization. Today, neoliberal/neoconservative forces are advancing 
undeserving-poor discourses and anti-poor politics to cancel out movements’ 
prior successes, which paradoxically testif ies the power of pro-homeless 
activism to open up the welfare state.
Finally, Celeste Arrington discusses legal mobilization in the f ield of 
disability policy in South Korea. Since the 1990s, South Koreans have gained 
better access to the courts as a channel for pursuing social and policy change. 
In particular, Koreans with disabilities began using the courts to challenge 
discrimination, enforce their rights, augment other tactics and influence 
policymaking. Through qualitative comparative analysis of recent legal 
mobilization by Koreans with disabilities, Arrington investigates factors 
that influence when and why people mobilize the law. Drawing on sociolegal 
and social movement theories, her chapter shows that explanations focused 
on evolving legal opportunity structures – encompassing procedural rules, 
statutes, and legal interpretations – can only partly explain the changing 
patterns in legal mobilization. Explanations should also consider the ‘support 
structures’ for legal mobilization: lawyers, advocacy organizations, and 
funding. This research demonstrates the importance of considering the 
interaction between institutional and extra-institutional activism and 
reveals how legal mobilization has contributed to changes in how disabled 
people’s organizations interact with the state in Korea.
Concluding Remarks: Three Key Findings
This book investigates the novel dynamics at play in Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan by analysing the role (and respective interests) of the most important 
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actors after the recent reconfiguration of state-civil society relations and 
the interplay of various stakeholders, social organizations and agencies at 
the local and national levels. Overall, we think that the different chapters 
of this book crystallize three key f indings that testify to the increasing 
complexity of state-civil society relationships in East Asian democracies.
First, civil activism and movements have become better organized and 
more influential in East Asian democracies. Although their organizational 
base and resources are generally still quite limited, civil society actors 
have consciously worked to increase their influence in the policymaking 
process. They have built large, proactive policy networks and utilized them 
strategically to impact policymaking practices. These networks include 
relational webs among themselves as well as links to national policymakers 
and political parties (see chapters in this volume by Grano, Haddad, Kwan 
and Fell, and Hayashi). In this context, more progressive administrations 
that did not belong to more traditional conservative establishments that 
were heavily present in the past in all three countries have in recent decades 
presented activists with opportunities to become more vocal and effective 
in attaining their goals. Civil society actors, however, have not been able to 
achieve all their goals during these windows of opportunity. Cooperation 
with progressive administrations and parties has in fact sometimes been 
marked by friction (Grano, in this volume). Nevertheless, civil society actors 
have started to gain important experience in policymaking. Moreover, these 
networks include links to academic and juristic specialists and international 
actors, which are of crucial importance to gain expertise for policymaking 
despite having limited resources and to build stronger leverage on the 
conservative establishment (see chapters in this volume by Arrington as 
well as Chiavacci). Beneath the large protest events that received worldwide 
attention, a ‘quiet revolution’ is reshaping and strengthening the influence 
of civil society actors in East Asian democracies.
Second, even though the central state remains strong in East Asian democ-
racies, the developmental state model as the dominant social contract has 
weakened signif icantly. All three polities still feature the centralization of 
power in which national governments and state bureaucracies issue policies 
and directives that are then applied in the localities. Conservative establish-
ments face a period of transition with an uncertain outcome, however, and 
have to adapt to novel challenges such as rising social inequality, a sharp 
increase in elderly population rates, and a rising hegemon – the PRC – in 
the East Asian neighbourhood (see also Yun 2019). In this context, neoliberal 
reforms seem to offer the opportunity to generate renewed growth yet often 
turn out to be a de facto double-edged sword (see Ogawa, in this volume). 
A NEw ERA Of CIVIL SOCIET y AND STATE IN EAST ASIAN DEMOCRACIES 25
Governments have outsourced certain duties to cut costs and rejuvenate the 
economy by enforcing freer market competition. This often results in the 
direct weakening of central states, however, which, in turn, become increas-
ingly dependent on civil society. Moreover, neoliberalism has been identified 
in public discourse as a central factor in rising inequality and social exclusion. 
Therefore, conservative establishments in all three democracies have to f ind 
new arrangements and show renewed consideration for the population (see 
Mahito, in this volume). To remain strong, the state and its conservative 
establishment can no longer rely on quasi-absolute political dominance but 
have to develop abilities and techniques to absorb and integrate civil society 
as a driving force of innovation (see Weiss, in this volume).
Third, all three countries have witnessed the rise of new conservative 
movements (or countermovements) as a reaction to recent progressive 
shifts in society and politics. Furthermore, in contrast to the new right-wing 
populism in many Western democracies (Blee and Creasap 2010; Gross et 
al. 2011), almost none – or very few – of these new movements and actors 
are directed against the conservative establishment and/or adopt a clear 
anti-elitist stance (see also Hellmann 2017; Lie 2019; Wang 2019). Conversely, 
such conservative countermovements are usually somehow connected 
and nurtured by previously dominant conservative establishments (see 
chapters in this volume by Ho as well as Weiss). As a case in point, the 
new radical right movement in Japan featured in Higuchi’s chapter, which 
is the most radical countermovement discussed in the book, still sports a 
pro-establishment nature (see also Higuchi 2018). In this context, it has to 
be noted that the largest conservative countermovement rallies of East Asia 
in recent years were probably the pro-Park demonstrations in South Korea, 
which attempted to impede the enforced resignation and impeachment 
of President Park Geun-Hye (Lee and Brown 2018). This is another strong 
indicator of the increasing maturity and diversity of East Asian democracies 
as the pressed conservative establishments have started to embrace ‘street 
politics’ and social movements’ strategies from progressive civil society.
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This chapter deals with the political repercussions of popular discontent 
towards several secondary issues in Taiwan prompting a mainstream 
political formation like the DPP to revert to its early pro-environmental 
and social justice rhetoric to attract voters for the 2016 electoral tour-
nament; several activists and academics that trace their origins to 
the social movements’ galaxy were drafted by the DPP upon winning 
the elections. The aim of this chapter is to verify whether four years 
later concrete results have been achieved or whether the activists have 
become quieter after joining the ruling party. This chapter consolidates 
research on interactions and conf licts between the state trying to 
exert more inf luence across several f ields and newly emerging/well-
established social movements under the Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen 
administrations.
Keywords: strong states, civil society, environmental governance, EIA, 
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In Taiwan, as in other Asian nations, economic growth and transformation 
has been guided by a strong state that successfully activated and integrated 
private interests and citizens into national projects of ‘developmentalism’ 
and shared growth. As a consequence of this rapid economic development, 
a middle class has emerged, marked by greater claims for political participa-
tion, social equality as well as greater attention for quality-of-life concerns, 
such as better environmental protection and sustainability.
While many formerly strong states have seen a decline in their respective 
ability to successfully steer economic development and guarantee stable 
growth, several countries in East Asia have matured into fully modern 
societies with highly educated populations and stable work prospects. As 
a result, across Asia the well-established modernization model in which a 
strong developmental state single-handedly managed economic growth and 
then shared the fruits of its hard work with the population is increasingly 
being questioned by citizens; these, owing to new social and economic 
conflicts and rising social inequality, demand more political participation. 
In accordance with other parts of the world, these developments have 
created a new middle-class identity with citizens increasingly prone to 
voice their demands in politics by forming civil society organizations and 
actively participating in their countries’ political life. Likewise, more people 
focus on issues such as environmental protection and other quality-of-life 
‘postmodern concerns,’ which shatter the previously unquestioned attempt 
to achieve economic growth at all costs.
Since 1987, when the KMT regime lifted martial law, Taiwan has under-
gone immense changes becoming a stable democracy where citizens’ claims 
are increasingly vocal. In the past decade, and especially during the second 
Ma Ying-jeou administration (2012-2016), civic mobilizations related mostly 
to what Taiwanese perceived as a rapid increase of cross-strait relations and 
closeness with the Mainland.
On 16 January 2016 Taiwan held its second last round of national elections, 
which included both presidential and parliamentary contests,1 with the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), winning back the presidency and 
also the majority of the legislature. Taiwan’s third peaceful power turnover 
signif ied an important loss for the KMT, whose eight-year presidency (2008-
2016) created widespread disappointment among citizens, particularly over 
the closer economic and political ties with the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). The latest elections have presented a golden opportunity for the 
1 Voters were called to directly elect their president for the sixth time since 1996. Secondly, 
in a separate set of ballots, the 113 seats in the Legislative Yuan were elected.
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DPP to ride the wave of popular discontent and turn dissatisfaction in its 
favour, by championing several ‘secondary’ issues such as environmental 
protection2 and social justice (especially popular among younger voters) 
that were previously advocated by smaller political formations like the 
Green Party of Taiwan (GPT) or by social movements.
This explains why in the 2016 electoral tournament the DPP enlisted 
several former NGOs’ leaders, activists as well as academics with a strong 
environmental and social engagement that trace their origins to the social 
movements’ galaxy3; to name but a few: previous Green Party chairperson 
Chen Man-Li, also former president of the Homemakers United Foundation; 
Prof. Wu Kuen-Yuh of National Taiwan University, a toxicologist often invited 
to give his professional opinion in regards to several EIAs4 involving polluting 
enterprises; Prof. Tsai Pei-hui, previous Secretary General of the organization 
Taiwan Rural Front, involved in several ecological campaigns of the past, 
such as f ighting Taiwan’s eighth petrochemical complex and advocating 
for land justice issues; Chen Chi-chung and Lawyer Chan Shun-kuei, who 
has lent his expertise and professional background to green activists on 
several occasions in the past. In the end, with the DPP’s landslide victory 
these individuals have indeed been elected and Lawyer Chan has been 
nominated Vice-Minister for the Environment (he has meanwhile stepped 
down in December 2018), Chen Chi-chung has f irst become Deputy Minister 
2 The DPP had vowed to put an end to environmental deterioration since at least the 1990s with 
several activists joining its ranks during those years, hoping to bring about positive results and 
more stringent regulations (Grano 2015: 49; Ho 2005a: 412). However, after the DPP began its ascent 
to ‘institutionalization’ scoring more than one-third of seats in the Legislative Yuan election 
of 1992 it gradually assumed a more cautious approach towards environmental movements, 
which came to be considered as an obstacle to economic development. This turnabout angered 
activists who established a new political organ in 1996, the Green Party of Taiwan (GPT), with 
the aim of capturing the sympathies of those who felt betrayed by the DPP change of position 
towards environmental problems (Ho 2003: 701-706).
3 As stated by Fell the problem of the DPP attracting social activists draining social movements 
of their human capital is not new. Even a political formation such as the Green Party faced 
this problem several times since many of its members believe that there is more that they can 
achieve for the environment if they are elected with a better-established party, as was the case 
with Edgar Lin in the 1990s (Fell 2016: 74).
4 Taiwan’s EIA Act was formally enacted in 1994 modelled after the United States’ own EIA Law 
(Ho 2004: 238). The introduction of such a system was a direct consequence of the sociopolitical 
situation of the country, with bureaucrats in need of a showcase to appease popular requests 
for increased participation. In principle the EIA stipulates how developmental projects of a 
certain size should be planned and reviewed, which requirements should be met and what are 
the f ines and punishments for violators. In reality it does not always function as it should and 
there has long been talk of reforming it (Grano 2015: 174-175; Ho 2004; Lai 2017).
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and then, in January 2019, Minister of Council of Agriculture while Chen, 
Tsai and Wu have become members of the Legislative Yuan in charge of 
different sectors (e.g. food safety and public health [Wu], environmental 
protection, ecology and renewable energies [Chen]; land-related issues [Tsai]).
By following the shift of these civil society actors who have been elected 
with DPP, from individuals sympathetic to more visible acts of conten-
tion to legislators integrated in the ranks of the ruling party, this chapter 
shall pinpoint the effects of this incorporation of civil society actors into 
governmental echelons, for the country’s environmental governance system 
and its eff icacy.
With the increased institutionalization of social activists, formally en-
listed in the DPP’s ranks, environmental protesters seem to have shifted once 
again their modus operandi from more contentious acts, which had become 
quite common during the last four years of the Ma Ying-Jeou administration 
(2012-2016) – such as streets protests and occupation of public spaces5 – to 
more formal policy channels.
Barely one year after the new administration had taken over, optimism for 
the new government inside Taiwan had already been dampened by a series of 
factors ranging from a persistent economic recession, job insecurity, sluggish 
wages and a massive decrease of tourists from the Mainland (incidentally 
the f irst thing the taxi driver complained about, as I set foot in Taipei in 
September 2016). At the same time the Xi Jinping administration presents 
numerous challenges for Tsai, given her refusal to publicly acknowledge the 
1992 Consensus, in the unequivocal way Beijing would want her to; in 2017 
Taiwan suffered a series of blows on the international stage, such as not 
receiving an invitation – in its status as observer – to the WHA Assembly 
in May in Geneva (for the f irst time in nine years); China requiring airlines 
to replace ‘Taiwan’ with descriptions such as ‘Taiwan, Province of China’ 
in 2018; and inducing seven countries to sever relations with Taipei in less 
than four years.6
The present chapter shall concentrate on state-civil society relationship 
under both the KMT as well as the DPP administration with a focus on 
5 For instance, the Sunflower Student Movement (Taiyanghua Xueyun) was a 24-day occupation 
(18 March-10 April) of Taiwan’s legislature, to protest against the attempt on the part of the ruling 
Kuomintang (KMT) to pass the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) with Mainland 
China for which protesters maintained a ‘clause by clause’ review was needed.
6 Since President Tsai Ing-wen came to off ice in 2016 seven countries have severed ties with 
the Republic of China, switching their diplomatic recognition to the PRC. The latest is Kiribati, 
following Solomon Islands, El Salvador, Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, Sao Tome and 
Principe and Panama.
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the latter tenure’s implementation of green policies. It will likewise briefly 
analyse the recent rise of a ‘pro-nuclear’ countermovement, as a backlash 
against the DPP’s current goal of phasing out nuclear energy by 2025. This 
last example moves beyond the classic dichotomy of state vs ‘liberal’ civil 
society showing that ‘conservative’ countermovements can also rise up 
in response to the latest wave of more progressive activism, which was 
responsible for bringing the DPP to the government.
Taking on Carter’s (2007: 164-165) framework for assessing the different 
impacts environmental movements can have, the present chapter will 
def ine which effects these pressure groups wish to achieve and whether 
these coincide with what they have been able to accomplish in reality. 
Carter’s four categories of analysis for assessing the types of impact of the 
environmental movement are: (1) sensitizing impacts, such as changing 
public agenda or public opinion; (2) procedural impacts, such as movement 
access to decision-making bodies; (3) structural impacts, such as changes 
in institutions and alliance structures; and (4) substantive impacts, such as 
closing a polluting plant or enacting new legislation.
I f ind Dafydd Fell’s adding of a f ifth category of external impact, the 
category of political impacts (5), such as the influence on election results (as 
quoted in Fell 2017: 9) extremely useful and will also feature this category 
in my chapter.
Theoretical Background and Methodology
In the 1990s, when for the f irst time after the lifting of martial law activists 
became involved in politics, many held high hopes that, by working within 
the system and ranks of the ruling party they could actually be more ef-
fective in precipitating a positive change for the environment; such hopes 
became even stronger after the DPP was able to gain the presidency in 2000, 
concretely opening up several policy channels to social activists.
Specif ically, many scholars of social movements in Taiwan believe that 
the emergence of various social groups that the state did not suppress, 
actively started to challenge the country’s authoritarian rule in the 1980s 
while at the same time creating a set of collective action repertoires and a 
so-called public sphere that dissidents and activists could use to facilitate 
the organization of political structures (Hsiao 1999; Wu 1990; Haddad 2015).7 
7 Clearly, environmental protests at that time were closely linked with anti-authoritarian 
positioning and eroding one-party rule.
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This theory – the Theory of Political Opportunity Structures (POS) – focuses 
on the relationship between political environment and social movements 
(Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1991) or, in other words, on state capacity as a variable 
in explaining the policy impact of social movements (Ho 2005b: 345). It 
maintains that the most important incentives and possibilities for starting 
new phases of contention and activism are a direct consequence of changes 
in political opportunities related to the current system (Tarrow 1994: 87).
The Theory of POS can be defined as ‘specific configurations of resources, 
institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization 
which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances 
and constrains them in others’ and it provides a suitable framework for 
understanding the transformative nature of the environmental movement 
in Taiwan. The nature of the political structure, authoritarian or democratic, 
comprises a set of incentives to either encourage or diminish social acts of 
resistance to political action and authority. Theory of POS maintains that 
open political systems diminish incentives to social mobilized protests 
through the opening of less risky avenues for political influence (as in the 
case of Taiwan during the 1990s, when activists were de facto incorporated 
into the government), whereas closed authoritarian regimes encourage, 
to a degree, challenging groups that manifest their discontent with active 
mobilization as the only viable mean of political persuasion.
In the case of Taiwan, when taking on a comparative perspective between 
the Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2016) and Tsai Ing-wen (2016- ) eras, we can devise 
several points, which seem to verify the hypothesis that during the more 
‘repressive’ phase activists were more visible and active than they currently 
are (as of November 2019), during what is perceived by many as a more 
‘open’ and ‘friendlier’ mode of administration towards civil society with 
wider availability of policy channels to express discontent. Examples will 
be provided throughout the chapter. Country-specif ic institutions and 
contexts do shape recent protests and conflicts and in the case of Taiwan 
it is a well-established fact that civil society actors are more vocal when the 
KMT is at the government, probably because of the stronger sense of kinship 
they historically share with the DPP and the perception and conviction 
that the latter is more willing to listen to the plight of the so-called third 
force (disan shili).
However, it will be worth remembering that to become ‘institutionalized’ 
(part of the government) does not automatically result in a higher rate of 
success; in fact, such hopes have been crushed once before during the f irst 
DPP national incumbency (2000-2008) when numerous activists were indeed 
included in the government’s structure (Ho 2003: 694-695) and yet failed to 
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create any long-lasting influence (Lyons 2009; Tang and Tang 1997), such as 
achieving the enactment of new legislation.
As far as the methodology is concerned, the present study uses data from 
newspapers, interviews and f ield observations to study environmental 
social activism-state relations under two different ruling parties in Taiwan, 
the KMT and the DPP, during the Ma Ying-jeou and the Tsai Ing-wen eras.8
The author carried out a series of interviews with several informants 
within a period of three weeks in September 2016 and then conducted follow-
up research in the summer of 2017 (via an email questionnaire) to compare 
the DPP administration’s planned policy goals and aims with their actual 
implementation one year later. In 2016 I carried out f ifteen interviews with 
a total of ten informants within a period of two weeks. Further interviews 
on an individual basis were carried out with two informants in March and 
April 2018 via Skype.
The focus is on three main issues: nuclear power, EIA system reform, 
and air pollution.
Social Movements and the State under the Ma Ying-jeou 
Administration
The unprecedented social activism which Taiwan witnessed under the Ma 
administration, which culminated in the Sunflower Student Movement and 
the occupation of the Legislative Yuan in March 2014, did not come out of 
nowhere (Ho 2019; Lin and Wu 2016). After eight years of DPP rule (from 2000 
to 2008) during which several activists were incorporated in governmental 
tasks, and social movements rather than standing in opposition to the state 
had become part of it, the relationship between the two became increasingly 
tense; the ruling party, confronted with the daunting task of managing 
the country, gradually became more lenient towards big businesses and 
less friendly towards its former allies (civic movements) and their plights 
(Ho 2003; Jobin 2010). By the end of the DPP mandate many social activists 
were deeply disappointed with their former political ally (Fell 2017: 3). This 
sense of disillusionment towards what the DPP had accomplished, coupled 
with several scandals involving former President Chen Shui-bian’s family 
8 The present article will only analyse this clearly def ined period of observation (2008-2019); 
this choice is dictated by the fact that it is diff icult to predict what is going to happen in 2020, 
with the presidential elections and what impacts these shall have on the environmental sphere, 
especially on the phasing-out or continuation of nuclear energy.
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in corruption issues, led to the DPP’s loss of the presidency for the next 
eight years.
In fact, as pointed out by Fell (2017: 3) after the KMT won the national 
elections in 2008, having gained almost total control over many local 
administrations from 2005 onward, it felt suff iciently strong to ignore the 
various plights of protesters. For instance, the KMT administration opted 
for a highly ‘developmentalist’ approach to land disputes and energy issues, 
such as the controversy surrounding NPP-49 or the Huaguang Community 
and the Dapu cases (Chen 2017: 97). Furthermore, the privileged access 
to decision-making bodies that social movements’ activists had reached 
under the DPP (category 2, procedural impacts) was completely shut off 
after 2008, pushing activists to seek for more radical ways to make their 
plights visible.
Dissatisfaction with the way social movements’ requests were handled 
is what pushed activists to the streets and led to the occupation of the 
parliament in 2014 and to the subsequent loss of both local (Nine in One) 
as well as national elections (in 2016) on the part of the KMT as well as to 
the freezing of the country’s fourth nuclear facility, due to popular pressure. 
However, social movements were also able to achieve some victories under 
the KMT administration such as in 2010, when Ma Ying-jeou himself issued 
a statement regarding the cancellation of a national project regarding the 
construction of a controversial petrochemical complex, the Kuokuang 
Petrochemical Plant, in Changhua County (Grano 2015: 92; Ho and Shieh 2011).
Many of the successes achieved by social movements, such as blocking 
controversial projects like NPP-4 and Kuokuang (category 4, substantive 
impacts) or getting public opinion enraged (category 1, sensitizing impacts) 
over specif ic topics have not resulted in concrete legislation (Fell 2017: 13) 
though; the case studies illustrated in the next sections will attempt to 
pinpoint whether social movements have been able to pressure the DPP 
into passing important pieces of legislation on behalf of environmental 
protection from 2016 onward.
In the next few sections this chapter will present concrete examples of 
transformations and policies that in some cases have and in others have not 
been achieved, thereby helping to pinpoint whether this outward questioning 
of strong states more frequently occurs when conservative parties are ruling 
and less so, whenever a more ‘progressive’ party is.
9 NPP-4 stands to indicate the country’s fourth nuclear power facility, eventually never 
completed but on which US$9 billion were spent within a timeframe that lasted more than two 
decades. For more on NPP-4 controversial history see: Ho (2014) and Grano (2017).
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Social Movements and the State under the Tsai Ing-wen 
Administration
In September 2016, when I went to Taipei for three weeks, the Tsai ad-
ministration was at the beginning of its tenure, which had effectively 
started in May of that same year. Several activists had been incorporated 
in the government and far-reaching policy goals and attempts to improve 
the regulation system in place for ecological safeguarding were on many 
legislators’ agenda.
One of the first individuals I chose to interview was Tsui Su-hsin, Secretary 
General of Green Citizens Action Alliance (GCAA),10 whom I had interviewed 
several times in the past and who can be ascribed to the more ‘independent’ 
wing of environmentalists, at times wary of cooperation with bigger political 
formations, such as the DPP (Ho 2014; Grano 2017: 159).
When asked whether she thought that the DPP administration would 
be a good partner for social movements to cooperate, she told me that the 
DPP is very skilled at communication and was certainly going to open up 
several policy channels for activists as well as actively involve many of them 
in off icial positions.
Since the beginning of its tenure the DPP has in fact once more opened 
up several policy channels for activists (category 2, procedural impacts) that 
had been closed during the Ma administration.
On top of electing some environmental activists in key positions of 
responsibility, the Atomic Energy Council invited two of them to join their 
committee, one from Homemakers United Foundation and the other one 
from Taiwan Environmental Protection Union. Tsui’s own organization has 
been invited to join the committee for the reduction of greenhouse gases, 
as well as the committee for energy and carbon use reduction. Many other 
organizations are participating to several off icial committees providing 
advice and counselling. GCAA currently also cooperates to amend the 
Electricity Act (Dianye Fa) with the Environmental Jurists Association 
(EJA)11 (Huanjing Falüren Xiehui). However, Tsui was also wary of the past 
and moderately cautious (Interview Tsui 2016):
10 GCAA of which Tsui is Secretary General has, since 2015, established a new association 
called The Alliance for the Transformation of Energy (Nengyuan Zhuanxing Tuidong Lianmeng), 
with membership from various environmental organizations, which seeks for methods to save 
energy by, for instance, upgrading all the generators of the country, among other things.
11 The EJA has two goals: it offers advice on administrative litigation in regard to environmental 
issues (huanjing xingzheng susong) to environmental groups and other concerned citizens, such 
as those who are touched by an eviction order resulting from land seizure for a developmental 
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We are still not sure about the attitude of the new government, since they 
might invite us and then ignore our opinion as the former government did. 
We are still observing. So far, their attitude is acceptable for they involve 
us actively and try to maintain their electoral promises. But I think we 
will have to wait at least one year to start making a serious evaluation 
and establish trust.
Original Policy Goals under the Tsai Ing-wen Administration
Given the current administration’s commitment to phasing out Taiwan’s 
dependence on nuclear power (10% of total power generation in 2018) 
by 2025, the development of the ‘Green energy plan,’ one of the f ive key 
industries which Tsai pledged to rejuvenate and support, is an urgent 
task. In order to maintain Taiwan’s competitiveness, providing affordable 
and reliable energy sources is a major concern of investors in several key 
industries. Therefore, the Tsai administration has already signed several 
contracts with foreign and domestic companies for wind farms and solar 
projects. In March 2016 the Executive Yuan announced an eight-year NT$50 
billion ($1.65 billion) infrastructure plan for green energy investment. The 
ambitious goal is to expand renewable energy from less than 5% of supply 
in 2016 to 20% by 2025.
Among the most pressing concerns that all of my interviewees had 
pinpointed in September 2016 as urgent environmental matters for the 
current administration to solve, are: the reform of the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Law; the revision of the Electricity Law12; the improvement 
of soil, air and water pollution in the country’s most contaminated areas 
of south and central Taiwan; solving the country’s need for energy while 
meeting more stringent environmental standards and increasing renewable 
energies; the yet unresolved issue of nuclear waste; toxic waste and garbage 
abandoned all over the island; and the lack of a fully functioning safeguard 
system for rare and wild species of animals and plants.
More specif ically, when directly asked, four of my interviewees, Chan 
Shun-kuei, Chen Man-li, Frida Tsai (Tsai Pei-hui) and Tsui Su-hsin have 
replied that the most pressing issue to be solved in terms of environmental 
project. Their second goal is to help legislators and assist them in amending environmental laws 
or pressuring administrative agencies for adjustments after winning a lawsuit.
12 The revisions aim f irst of all at integrating small power providers of Photovoltaic panels in 
the national grid. Furthermore, the idea is to create different levels of tariffs: cheap (agriculture 
and f ishing); medium (private household); high (industry); very high (commercial) (Interview 
Ho 2016).
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damage is the lethal air pollution in central and southern Taiwan, where 
residents are affected by the emissions of the heavy industry (Interview 
Chan 2016):
In the past the government paid less attention to concrete health risks 
and to epidemiological surveys. Preliminary results are now available 
and lead us to foresee such problems. A good case in point is the small 
village of Dalinpu, in the coastal areas surrounding Kaohsiung, where 
20,000 residents, surrounded by thermal power stations, steel mills and 
petrochemical plants could be left with no choice but to emigrate as they 
undergo an immense risk of getting cancer; according to any international 
standard the pollution situation is unbearable.
Former Vice-Minister Chan Shun-kuei further believes that land-planning 
violations, among other things, also lead to air pollution. In fact, it is his opin-
ion that Taiwan’s most pressing problem is an out-of-control land-planning 
system whereby agricultural land is covered with industrial factories, which 
in turn create more pollution in areas that should strictly be devoted to 
agricultural use.13 Sorting out the many land-planning violations should also 
ensure that the industry would be confined to specif ic areas and not, as it is 
now, equally spread out (just like the pollution it produces) all over the island.
The second aim of this study, as mentioned above, is finding out whether such 
grand goals for a better environmental protection and sustainable Taiwan are 
currently anywhere nearer to being realized three years later or whether they 
remain unfulfilled promises now that state-civil society interactions seem to 
have once again become more ‘cooperative’ under a DPP incumbency. To this 
avail, one year after the first f ieldwork, specifically in the summer of 2017, I 
sent out a questionnaire to the same legislators and social movement activists 
interviewed the previous year in 2016. I also used Skype to further interview two 
of my informants in 2018 in regard to the latest changes and transformations.
13 At the moment there is a situation by which residential, industrial and agricultural use 
land are completely mixed up, so that wastewater from industrial discharge as well as irrigation 
water for agriculture are also mixed together; containing air pollution, water pollution and 
soil contamination with heavy metals has thus become extremely diff icult under the present 
system.
 Additional problem is the surface area where it is permitted to construct residential housing 
in urban areas for which the reward is exorbitant for land developers and builders making land 
hugely expensive so that low income family are slowly but relentlessly pushed to the outskirts 
of cities, and making traff ic congestion situation also more serious as public services are not 
able to keep up with the fast growth of residential community in certain areas, such as Neihu 
(Interview Chan 2017).
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During this follow-up phase I asked what was, so far, the biggest positive 
change achieved on behalf of the environment under the current adminis-
tration. One of the interviewees pinpointed it in the different institutional 
positioning of the central government vis-à-vis the environmental protection 
sphere, as shown in the respect and support that Lin Chuan, the former premier, 
credited to the former Vice-Minister of the Environment Chan (Interview Zhang 
2017).14 He hinted that rather than looking for concrete achievement in what 
was still an early phase, the important change to be highlighted was the greater 
attention to the ecological environment paid by the current administration.
In fact, in these same interviews in 2017, two of my interviewees made 
positive assessment in terms of the actual will to improve the situation but 
lamented a lack of systematic ability in terms of achieving concrete actions. 
Both Lawyer Zhang Yu-yin as well as Tsui Su-hsin commented that, in spite 
of the ‘No nuke homeland’ ( feihe jiayuan) slogan, the current administration 
had failed to provide concrete and structural solutions to diminishing the 
quota of electricity derived from nuclear and had also at times backtracked 
on its grand goals. In the words of Zhang Yu-Yin (Interview Zhang 2017):
Let us take recent events of the summer of 2017 as an example. Even the 
f irst unit of NPP-2, which had already been stopped, has quickly been 
reactivated in the midst of a so-called summer energy crisis [xiatian 
gongdian chijin]. Six months after it was shut down for annual main-
tenance, the No. 1 reactor at the second nuclear power plant located in 
New Taipei City resumed operation last Saturday with the approval of 
the Atomic Energy Council.
Backlash from Pro-nuclear ‘Conservatives’
Under the ‘nuclear-free homeland’ policy launched by the DPP, Taiwan’s six 
operable power reactors shall be decommissioned as their 40-year operating 
licenses expire.15 Shortly after taking off ice, the DPP government passed 
an amendment to the Electricity Act, passing its phase-out policy into law.
To phase out nuclear energy the government’s plan is to increase its 
share of renewable energies from 4.7% to 20% by 2025 (Our Island 2017). 
14 Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) Vice-Minister Chan Shun-kuei resigned in 
October 2018, in disagreement with the new Premier William Lai who was, according to Chan, 
trying to sway the EIA system.
15 Unit 1 of Taiwan’s oldest plant, Chinshan, has been taken off line in 2018 and will be decom-
missioned, while the operating license of unit 2 is due to expire in July 2019.
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Several activists think that the plan is unrealistic in many of its goals. For 
instance, the increase of solar energy which should rise from the current 
1 GW to 20 GW (equivalent to 7.4 times the current capacity of NPP-4) de 
facto would require an area of 30,000 hectares – bigger than the entire Taipei 
city area – to be covered with PV panels. Two of my interviewees proffered 
doubts (Interview Zhang 2017; Interview Tsui 2016).
The government furthermore suffered a setback in its anti-nuclear policy 
when in November 2018 the Taiwanese electorate was called to vote for local 
elections coupled with several referenda on various issues. One of these 
referenda saw a pro-nuclear alliance victorious with voters rejecting the 
government’s plan to phase-out nuclear power with 59% of voters in favour 
of keeping nuclear energy in the mix and 41% against. Specif ically, voters 
agreed to remove legal provisions set by the DPP mandating that Taiwan 
be nuclear-free by 2025.
Despite the result of the referenda the Tsai government has stated that it 
shall proceed with its plan to phase out the use of nuclear energy. This has led 
to outrage from pro-nuclear advocates who are presently attempting to push 
for three more referenda. The f irst calls for the extension of the operating 
permits for these four nuclear reactors whose permits were originally set 
to expire between 2021 and 2025; these being the reactors at the Guosheng 
Nuclear Power Plant in New Taipei City and at the Ma-anshan Nuclear 
Power Plant in Pingtung. The second referendum calls for the resumption 
of work on Gongliao Nuclear Power Plant No. 4, controversial even among 
pro-nuclear supporters because of observations that its construction has 
been chaotic; and third pro-nuclear supporters call for a referendum on the 
current storage of nuclear waste materials on Orchid Island (Hioe 2019a).
Substantive Impacts in the Making: Amending Taiwan’s Air 
Pollution Control Act
Like many governments the Tsai administration faces the two-pronged 
dilemma of f ighting air pollution as well as wanting a nuclear free homeland 
and for these reasons it plans to increase its quota of electricity derived 
from natural gas and has therefore already built three stations in Taoyuan, 
which should serve to increase the production capacity of natural gas 
of the Ta Tan Power Plant (Datan Dianchang). In this specif ic case the 
geographical proximity to some precious coral reef on the nearby coast, 
once again make concerns such as ecological safeguarding and generating 
electricity, collide.
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Lawyer Zhang stressed that the Tsai administration so far has attempted 
to do many good things for energy generation and transformation but he 
fails to see any structural change.16 This in fact, is what he regards as the 
country most urgent need in the environmental sphere, namely energy 
transformation, especially given that the government is trying to substitute 
the 10% of electricity currently derived from nuclear energy with renewable 
energies, such as in the above mentioned case of the Ta Tan Power Plant), or 
PV panels or in the offshore wind turbines in Changhua (Interview Zhang 
2017).
At the beginning of its tenure the DPP government charged former Vice-
Minister Chan with two fundamental tasks: modifying the Air Pollution 
Control Act (Kongqi Wuran Fangzhifa) and other air pollution control-related 
regulations; and putting the EIA system (the law and related rules and 
regulations) through a complete overhaul. If successful, these would be 
the f irst concrete substantive impacts and successes (category 4) achieved 
under the DPP national tenure on behalf of the environment.
The Taiwan Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) held three 
public hearings on draft amendments to the Air Pollution Control Act (in 
August 2017. On 21 December 2017, Taiwan’s Executive Yuan publicly an-
nounced an action plan to cut air pollution and foster renewable energy. New 
‘hazardous air pollutant standards’ to tax companies emitting stationary 
pollution have been launched at the end of 2017.
In total the EPA has identif ied 29 air pollutants to be taxed, including 
heavy metals emitted by coal-f ired power plants and by petrochemical 
facilities. The new standards will regulate companies such as Taiwan Power 
Co., Formosa Plastic Group and CPC Corp., Taiwan. As of June 2018, legislators 
have in fact passed the third reading of draft amendments to several articles 
such as article 9 of the Air Pollution Control Act.17 Under the law emissions 
standards for cars over ten years in age have been raised, and if a driver’s 
vehicle fails an emissions inspection or does not have their vehicle inspected, 
their license plate will be confiscated. Furthermore, the bill has set the target 
to create air quality control districts (kongqi pinzhi weihuqu) in which older 
vehicles will be prohibited from being driven in and violators could face a 
16 Original Chinese phrase: (muqian weizhi, Tsai zhengfu you shitu zai nengyuan zhuanxingshang 
zuo yixie shiqing, dan wo hai kanbuchu Tsai zhengfu zai chuli nengyuan gongdian de jiegou 
wentishang, you shenme juda de zhuanbian).
17 Article 9 allows emission allowances to be obtained for stationary sources of air pollution 
through trades and auctions or by reducing the emissions of mobile sources; it thus encourages 
companies to obtain emission allowances by buying used cars to speed up the replacement of 
older cars.
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f ine of between NT$500 to NT$60,000 (Lin 2018b). The amendments state 
that the total amount of air pollution shall be determined by the Taiwan 
EPA, which must consult with the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), a 
provision that sparked outrage among civic society echelons, before f iling 
to the Executive Yuan on a stage-by-stage and zone-by-zone basis after the 
establishment of a checking system for pollution source emission quantities 
and an emissions trading system.
Vice-Minister Chan in 2017 told me that the biggest goal that the current 
DPP administration had reached in the two years since taking off ice, was 
securing the participation and involvement of chief executives and senior 
leaders in several press conference and happenings regarding the strategies 
to cap air pollution. In fact, he was of the opinion that the Environmental 
Administration alone cannot achieve much; in his view there needs to 
be cooperation between various involved actors such as the big industry, 
energy providers, the traff ic bureau and others. The control of air pollution, 
in his opinion, represents the most pressing issue for Taiwan and for the 
DPP administration. Again, so far, a common observation among many of 
my informants deals with the positive orientation and commitment of DPP 
politicians towards the actual safeguard and protection of the environment. 
As Vice-Minister Chan resigned in 2018, he did so out of disagreement with 
former Premier William Lai (who has meanwhile also been replaced) whom 
he considered too close to the business sector.
Other legislators elect shared similar positive opinion in regard to the 
constructive interest shown among DPP politicians towards the environ-
mental sphere and the party’s cooperation with social movements. In the 
words of Chen Man-li (Interview Chen 2016):
We are now the ruling party, and if I criticize harshly without previously 
understanding the issue at stake, my attitude is nothing but showing off 
and will not lead to the solution of a problem. By the way even when I 
was in the Homemakers United Foundation, I was not so harsh. And now 
as politician, I am still not a radical. Some NGO experts, individuals, or 
governments come to me for help and my assistants will earmark their 
appeals into various categories: environment, social welfare, labour, 
renewal energy, and sustainable development. Now that I am a legislator 
whenever I encounter any case pertaining to one of these f ive categories, 
I will submit my questions, amend, or create the laws in the parliament, 
and establish a bridge between the NGO and the senior administra-
tive department which is more influential in that case, in order to do 
something concrete.
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However, while legislators-elect are still very much positive in regard to the 
DPP’s commitment towards environmental protection, activists from the 
more ‘independent’ fringe, who have not become part of the government, 
remain sceptical (Interview Tsui 2018)18:
So far, the fulf ilment of their (the DPP) electoral promises is not satisfac-
tory. There are no concrete policies formulated and enacted yet. I can 
see that the environmental sphere is not their priority. As result, NGOs 
for environmental protection are not satisf ied and continue holding a 
series of demonstrations.
After the 2016 national elections, which brought several new actors on the 
political scene, activists have begun to look around for more suitable allies. 
As Kwan and Fell (in this volume) state, even though Taiwan’s political life 
since the country democratized has been dominated by the KMT and the 
DPP, smaller political formations have at times played a crucial role by 
bringing diversity into the system and by emphasizing neglected issues 
and communities.
Tsui, for instance, thinks that members of the New Power Party are a better 
and fresher option for NGOs to ally with, since they are more independent 
and objective than candidates elected with DPP such as Chen Man-Li19 but 
at the same time they too are interested and concerned about issues that 
pertain to ecological safeguarding, such as air pollution and the problem of 
coal-f ired power stations (some members of NPP come from southern and 
central Taiwan) (Interview Tsui 2016). Furthermore, the above-mentioned 
cabinet reshuffles which brought Lin Chuan to resign and William Lai to 
temporarily assume off ice as premier (Lin 2017a) have reinforced prejudices 
among activists that other parties than the DPP might be better suited as 
partners, given that William Lai was more sympathetic towards economic 
development, obstructing space for environmental reforms (Lin 2018a).
However, on 9 April 2018, the country’s legislature approved several 
amendments to Taiwan’s Air Pollution Control Act, placing tighter emissions 
18 I am grateful to Professor Ming-Sho Ho for the following comment: ‘I think there’s a com-
plexity of ecology among Taiwan’s environmentalists. Radical or moderate is just one way to 
understand the differences. It also involves difference of priorities, such as air pollution versus 
no nukes.’
19 A thing that instantly struck a chord with me as when I asked Chen for a mid-term assessment 
on the DPP’s accomplishment so far, in June 2017, she declined to answer with the explanation 
that she is now: ‘part of the DPP government’ (wo shi minjindang, xianzai wufa zhendui Tsai 
Ing-Wen zhengfu zuo pinglun, hen baoqian) (Interview Chen 2017).
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restrictions on old cars, two-stroke scooters and diesel trucks (Everington 
2018); in June 2018, when the contentious bill was finally passed such concrete 
achievements represent the f irst substantive impacts (category 4) in the 
realm of environmental protection reached under the Tsai administration.
Substantive Impacts in the Making: Reforming the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Law
In the past few years, due to an increase in the availability of legal chan-
nels, such as the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Law (Huanjing 
Yingxiang Pinggu Fa), environmental groups have gained more influence 
to f ight economic interests. At the same time the EIA Law has been often 
criticized for being either too lenient towards big corporations’ interests 
or a mere obligatory channel for projects of a certain size without real 
effectiveness in the past (Ho 2004).
As the DPP was running its electoral campaign in 2014, Lin Chuan, the 
previous premier, organized a think tank where he invited several social 
activists, in order to share their views on urgent reforms needed. One of 
the invitees was lawyer Chan Shun-kuei, who shared his ideas on how 
to amend the EIA system. After Tsai won the election, lawyer Chan was 
invited to join the administration as Vice-Minister of the Environmental 
Protection Administration. As mentioned, he later resigned at the end of 
2018 in disagreement with then premier, William Lai (meanwhile replaced 
by Su Tseng-chang).
During an interview with the author, Chan remarked how one of the main 
conflicts between industrialists and environmental activists revolves around 
the EIA Law, which he had hoped to solve during his tenure. Industrialists 
consider it as a stumbling block for development and particularly fear the 
f inal veto power to a project (Interview Chan 2016).
I asked industrialists what the main problem with the EIA was and 
discovered that what they feared most was the lengthy procedure of the 
environmental evaluation and its lack of eff iciency, which increased risks 
and costs. On the other hand, activists and concerned residents often 
think of the EIA as tilted towards development and business interests.
My concrete proposal is to increase the pace of the assessment while at the 
same time drawing new stringent standards to protect the environment, 
which will allow us to refuse cases in the early stages, thereby increasing 
the veto percentage from the current 5% to 10%.
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Changes to the EIA have been in planning since the new administration 
came along but former Vice-Minister Chan has been working on a total 
overhaul of the system for many years now, in his previous capacity as a 
lawyer.
On 2 May 2017 the Environmental Protection Administration commu-
nicated that it planned to amend the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Enforcement Rules and the Standards for Determining Specif ic Items and 
Scope of Environmental Impact Assessments for Development Activities. 
Furthermore the EPA, under Chan’s guidance, drafted a social impact as-
sessment (SIA) standard by which to gauge the social impact of controversial 
projects of a certain size, which until this point had never been legally 
included in the EIA system. The legal community in Taiwan has long been 
vocal on the need for such an impact to be taken into consideration; specif i-
cally, such a system would be geared at quantifying the damage suffered by 
the people living in the place where the project is being planned. Primary 
goals of SIA implementation are to prevent forcible relocation and more 
respectful treatment when a development concerns the indigenous land.
A few university professors are also involved in helping to create such 
a standard for assessing the social impact of these projects, such as Chou 
Kuei-tian and Ho Ming-sho, who are contracted to formulate a technical 
guideline to be used in SIA.
Taiwan’s legal scholars are divided on whether to implement a SIA in 
the current EIA framework, but the EJA was quite enthusiastic about it.
Environmental lawyers from the EJA among others convened a forum 
in June 2017 to call for higher f ines and stricter criteria; the draft proposes 
increasing f ines by a factor of ten, with the maximum fine reaching NT$15 
million (US$497,892) (Lin 2017b).
Taiwan’s environmental activists on the other hand are actually divided 
over the EPA’s EIA reform promoted by Chan, considering allowing certain 
urban development projects to be exempt from an EIA evaluation a step 
back (Taipei Times 2017).20 The EPA position at the time was that the amend-
ments to EIA legislation include tighter restrictions for certain items, while 
previously exempt projects would now require assessments. However, some 
20 In the case of urban development, for instance, the EPA’s draft exempts the development of 
communities, renewal of old communities, exhibitions, fairs, exhibition venues, underground 
shopping streets, high rises, hotels, nursing institutions, social welfare institutions, integrated 
industrial and commercial areas and shopping centres from undergoing an environmental assess-
ment. The main reason adduced is that urban planning reviews already include environmental 
protection measures and requirements with regards to landscaping, traff ic impact, sunlight 
and wind shear, which would overlap with EIAs.
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items would be exempted because these items are already regulated by other 
laws, such as the Urban Planning Act (Dushi Jihua Fa) (Taipei Times 2017).
As explained to me by former Vice-Minister Chan in 2017, the plan to 
reform the EIA foresaw the end of the f irst phase of the changes to the EIA 
system to be reached by the end of August 2017. In the unpublished draft, 
the EPA identif ied development projects that should undergo a strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA), which would need to be ratif ied by the 
Executive Yuan instead of being stalled in ministries (as it now the case); the 
second phase should be achieved within the next four years; for the third 
stage it would require another ten to fifteen years, allowing Taiwan’s own EIA 
system to become like the US model (Interview Chan 2017). Developments that 
involve massive land exploitation would have to undergo an EIA and agencies 
that oversee developers are to be held accountable for EIA procedures under 
the amendment; the agencies would be required to account for the developers’ 
reports, rather than just delivering the documents to the EPA (Interview Chan 
2017). The draft amendment to the Environmental Impact Assessment Act 
was promulgated on 20 September 2017, but given that Vice-Minister Chan 
subsequently resigned the future of the process is unclear even though the 
f irst phase of the reform has been achieved (Interview Chan 2018).
In October 2018 the EPA announced revisions aimed to enhance the cred-
ibility of the EPA among several agencies, allowing it to f ilter development 
and reach a more eff icient review process. The EPA is already trailing this 
process by reviewing the ecological impacts of the Taiwan government’s 
ambitious plans to expand offshore wind power and solar power installa-
tions. The screening led the EIA Commission to approve only two of seven 
sets of offshore wind power projects off Changhua County on Taiwan’s 
west coast. Further information has been requested for the remaining 
sites. According to Chan, the developer and the responsible government 
agency – the Ministry of Economic Affairs – had not provided suff icient 
data to support their proposals to alleviate potential impacts on marine 
ecology, notably the endangered Taiwan white dolphin.
To sum up, the legal framework for improving air pollution and environ-
mental assessment procedures – Chan’s key objectives – is in place and some 
concrete achievements have been reached in terms of implementing new sets 
of regulation for both air pollution as well as the transformation of the EIA 
system. Nuclear energy is a much more complicated matter which, traditionally, 
has epitomized an ideology-laden issue opposed by the DPP and supported 
by the KMT. Thus, who will win the elections next year will have important 
repercussions on the continuation of the usage of nuclear energy in the current 
energy mix and in the extension of the shelf life of soon-to-be expired reactors.
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Conclusion
With the help of f irst-hand interviews this chapter has tried to establish 
whether the blossoming of civic society questioning the state more frequently 
occurs when conservative parties are ruling and, less so, whenever a more 
‘progressive’ party is; this has been done through the analysis of two concrete 
case studies: air pollution regulations and the EIA system.
The strong dirigisme of the previous KMT administration and at times 
illiberal behaviour have had an empowering effect on Taiwanese civil society 
throughout the last decade, with activists becoming stronger whenever 
the KMT was in power and weakening in visibility whenever the DPP has 
been ruling.
The latest administration, whose full effects and influences on both 
the environmental sphere as well as on civil society will be easier to gauge 
at the end of Tsai’s tenure, has de facto incorporated several civil society 
actors who have been active in trying to change the system from the inside.
Even if civil society’s visibility has diminished this does not automati-
cally mean that activists are less effective or incapable of influencing the 
system. A less hostile relationship between such important groups, state 
and civil society, might actually represent a positive outcome, which would 
allow activists to achieve a transformation of the system from within. In 
fact, by appointing key technical f igures in key positions of power of the 
environmental hierarchy, the DPP has shown good chances of achieving 
long-sought solutions to many environmental problems still affecting the 
country.
Those motivating factors, which brought people to vote for the DPP 
in the 2016 elections, such as transitional justice, fairness, inclusiveness, 
protection of disadvantaged groups and quality-of-life concerns, continue 
to be important issues among the general population. In the case of Taiwan, 
social inclusion and equality were not achieved through a redistribution of 
resources but rather an increase in purchasing power, new mass consumer 
lifestyles and a general intergenerational social upward mobility through the 
widening and proportional growth of the higher social classes. In the past 
few years due to saturation through mass consumerism and the limitations 
regarding upward mobility, the previously cohesive model of social inclusion 
and equality is beginning to crumble, while citizens demand for more justice 
and fairness in many areas.
Furthermore, in the case of Taiwan more than in other Asian states, 
the rise of a political and economic heavy weight such as Mainland China 
is increasingly disrupting and influencing Taiwan’s internal dynamics, 
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pushing its politicians to reposition themselves and their policies and raising 
questions of national identity and sovereignty. In practice these issues will 
make it more complicated for the current administration to be successful 
on all fronts.
However, at least on the environmental sphere, even though further and 
continuous monitoring is needed for a comprehensive evaluation when 
compared with the positive orientation and talk of goodwill by many legisla-
tors last year, in 2018 concrete plans for action were drafted and presented 
by the EPA (namely the revisions to the EIA) and achievements identif ied 
regarding the amendments to the Air Pollution Control Law.
Finally, when comparing what green activists have been able to achieve 
under the two different administrations studied in the present chapter, 
environmental movements during the second Ma tenure (2012-2016) man-
aged to fulf il categories 3 and 4 (structural impacts, such as changes in 
institutions and alliance structures, and substantive impacts, such as closing 
a polluting plant or enacting new legislation) by changing and forming new 
political alliances (e.g. SDP-GPT)21 and by achieving the closure of polluting 
plants, most notably NPP-4 after the Sunflower Student Movement; and 
most notably categories 1 and 5 (sensitizing impacts, such as changing public 
agenda or public opinion, and political impacts on election results); these 
two categories are closely linked to each other as often by influencing public 
opinion one can consequently sway electoral results as happened during 
both the local (Nine in One) elections of 2014 as well as for the national 
(presidential) elections of 2016. In both cases the KMT suffered major losses 
with the DPP eventually gaining the country’s presidency.
Two things radically changed thanks to the ability of impacting and 
changing public opinion on part of social movements: (1) popular opinion’s 
stance towards both tighter relations with China and (2) public support of 
nuclear energy.
For both issues public support was quite high during the f irst Ma ad-
ministration and became abruptly lower, thanks to social movements’ 
campaigning efforts, during his second administration, leading to substantial 
policy changes (substantive impacts) and influencing elections (political 
impacts). However, regarding support for nuclear energy, the tide seems 
to have once again changed with the aforementioned referendum of 2018.
The rise of anti-progressive movements and pro-nuclear activists in 2018, 
demanding to extend the operating limits and permits for several of the 
countries’ reactors, originally planned to expire between 2019 and 2021 (Hioe 
21 The Social Democratic Party (SDP) ran together with the GPT in the 2016 national campaign.
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2019b) has reinvigorated progressive civil society, with two demonstrations 
in April 2019 opposing nuclear energy.
Category 2 (procedural impacts), on the other hand, namely movement access 
to decision-making bodies, seems to have been taking place only when the DPP 
is in power with its opening of several privileged channels for social activists.
In fact, the DPP has consistently been open in inviting and including 
social activists in its ranks and in creating ad hoc committees for them 
to participate in; however, in the f irst two years of its administration the 
party had performed less than ideally in category 4 (substantive impacts), 
such as enacting new legislation and achieving more concrete actions. This 
has started to change with the aforementioned passing of the bill on air 
pollution and the revisions to the EIA during the f irst half of 2018 when the 
DPP achieved some concrete results.
Thus, so far, we can say that during the f irst two years of Tsai’s term the 
relationship between DPP state and social activists was more cooperative 
and civil than with the previous administration but had remained neverthe-
less stuck at a more ideological level of theoretical commitment; however, 
precipitating concrete and real policy changes and other more substantive 
impacts, to be fair, needs time and while a few timid steps have been taken 
in this direction, a more balanced reading of the current achievements of 
the Tsai administration will be only possible after the end of her tenure.
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3 Working with and around Strong States
Environmental Networks in East Asia
Mary Alice Haddad
Abstract
East Asia is a region dominated by developmental states that favour 
business and constrain advocacy organizations, yet Japan has been leading 
the world in emissions standards for decades, China has recently become 
the world’s largest producer of photovoltaic panels and a world leader in 
renewable energy, and Korea and Taiwan have both embarked on major 
green initiatives that involve green business development, the creation 
of national parks, widespread energy conservation and comprehensive 
recycling efforts. This chapter discusses environmental organizations’ 
networking strategies to f ind allies within governmental and business 
echelons in order to affect pro-environmental changes. Focusing on the 
issue area of the environment, it argues that non-profit organizations play 
important roles in developing the coordinating networks that facilitate 
policymaking in challenging and diverse political contexts.
Keywords: China, Japan, East Asia, civil society, non-profit organizations, 
networks, environmental policy
East Asia is a region characterized by developmental states that have 
prioritized economic growth and worked closely with business interests 
in order to create the world’s most vibrant economic region. The region’s 
rapid economic growth has come at a terrible environmental and social 
cost as intense pollution spread in the wake of rapid industrialization. First 
in Japan, then in the ‘Asian Tigers’ of South Korea and Taiwan, and most 
recently in the much larger China, citizens in each place have organized and 
successfully demanded relief. In East Asia today, whether they are located 
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in China, Japan, South Korea or Taiwan, environmental organizations have 
found creative ways to work with and around their governments. The result 
is a region containing a political paradox: strong, pro-business governments 
that promote extensive environmental policies.
This chapter aims to shed light on one explanation for this paradox – 
organizational networks. As one of their most effective responses to working 
within a political context of strong states, environmental organizations 
in the region have created policy-relevant networks that simultaneously 
work with and around their states. Through these networks, both formal 
and informal, environmental activists in the region have found ways to 
leverage their scarce resources by sharing information and coordinating 
their advocacy efforts. They are able to pilot new projects and disseminate 
best practices. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, they are able to utilize 
these networks to cultivate and empower allies inside the government at 
both the local and national levels.
The patterns and behaviour of these networks and their members help 
us understand not only how citizens in East Asia have fundamentally 
transformed the growth-f irst politics of the earlier developmental state 
period, the focus of this volume, but also how citizens more broadly can be 
effective actors even in hostile and diverse political contexts. Environmental 
advocacy in East Asia is a ‘hard case’ for political advocacy. The political, 
legal, and social environment in which these advocates operate is especially 
hostile, so their ability to influence policy is particularly impressive. Thus, 
environmental advocates in East Asia can offer models of success that 
should be useful to activists everywhere.
A Brief History of Environmental Politics in East Asia
Across East Asia the environment was one of the f irst issue areas around 
which citizens in the region were able to organize politically and made 
successful demands of their states. Environmental activism across the 
region followed directly from pollution caused by rapid industrialization – 
residents living near industrial facilities found their health and livelihoods 
threatened by polluting companies and demanded redress. In all cases 
this activism began in non-democratic political contexts, although it has 
matured, diversif ied and strengthened over time.
Environmental advocacy in the region began in Japan, which was the 
f irst country to industrialize. As in all countries, initial efforts took on the 
classic NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) form, where local residents protested 
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the pollution of a particular industrial plant that was polluting their com-
munity – these early advocates were not part of any national movement, they 
did not promote broader ideological goals, and they were not members of the 
elite. East Asia’s f irst environmental advocates, in all cases, were farmers and 
fishermen who saw their children die, their wives get sick, and their crop and 
fishing yields collapse. Under Confucian political philosophy, a core political 
and social tenant shared by all the societies in the region, individuals are 
entitled to the right of subsistence, and governments lose their legitimacy 
if that right is threatened (Tu 1998, 1999). As a result, the states in the region 
have recognized that failing to deal with the environmental challenges 
constitutes an existential threat.
Japan’s earliest environmental advocates were located in small, rural 
mining towns – the Ashio mine in Tochigi prefecture, Sumitomo’s mine in 
Ehime and Hitachi’s mine in Ibaraki. When industrial production exploded 
in the 1880s, residents quickly found that the sulphur and other heavy 
metals emitted from the smokestacks was polluting the soil and nearby 
streams, decimating crop and f ishing yields, and causing serious health 
problems for residents. Although culpability was initially denied, company 
and government off icials found a technical solution to the problem (higher 
smokestacks) by the early 1900s and compensated victims, so protests 
disappeared (McKean 1981). The next set of environmental protests erupted 
as pollution spread as a result of Japan’s next surge – industrial expansion in 
the 1950s. In the 1960s, communities like Minamata rose up and demanded 
that the government force companies to halt their polluting practices. By 
then Japan had democratic institutions, so these victims were able to take 
perpetrators to court, and Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leaders were 
pressured as citizens across the country voted opposition party candidates 
into city and prefectural government off ices (McKean 1981; Upham 1987). 
By 1970 the LDP in Tokyo was feeling the pressure and worked closely with 
industry to get ahead of the rising citizen discontent, eventually passing such 
extensive environmental legislation that the 1970 Diet came to be known 
as the Pollution Diet. The ambitious emission goals set Japan on a course 
to become a global leader in environmental policy and Japanese f irms on 
route to market leadership in green technology.
For South Korea and Taiwan, the period of industrial expansion occurred 
two decades later, so their environmental protests began in the 1980s. Unlike 
in Japan, which was able to resolve the disputes without signif icant politi-
cal change, South Korea and Taiwan’s environmental movement merged 
with the pro-democracy movements in both countries. Advocates had 
recognized that the core problem was related to governance – the close 
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government-business relationship of their authoritarian governments was 
not prioritizing the needs of the people in their policies. Unlike in Japan, the 
ruling party and business in South Korea and Taiwan were not able to get 
ahead of the problem, and both countries saw their decades-old military rule 
overthrown by peaceful democratic/environmental populist movements by 
the end of the decade (Lee 2000; Ku 2011; Reardon-Anderson 1997).
In China, the story is just now unfolding. China’s industrial expansion 
exploded with its admission into the World Trade Organization in 2001. 
By mid-decade China’s environmental problems were starting to become 
a concern globally (Economy 2004), and by the end of the decade envi-
ronmental protests were spreading across the country as citizens in small 
rural communities as well as giant cosmopolitan cities were demanding 
that the government address their pollution problems (Economy 2011). Now, 
China is actively seeking to follow the Japanese model whereby the single 
ruling party works with business to get ahead of the problem, rather than 
the Taiwanese and South Korean path in which they fail to do so and end 
up out of power (Haddad 2015).
In all four countries, and indeed in much of the world, there has been a 
dramatic expansion in environmental organizations and advocacy in the 
last two decades as a result of the expansion of the global environmental 
movement and the spread of information technology, which has signif i-
cantly sped the rate of information transfer and facilitated the creation and 
maintenance of organizational networks. A few pivotal events helped spur 
this growth. The 1992 establishment of the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change during the Earth Summit in Rio raised the prominence 
of climate change, inspiring many countries and activists to push for the 
creation of national and local plans to adapt and mitigate its effects (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998).
These initial efforts were strengthened in the 1998 Kyoto Protocol, which 
established legally binding obligations for countries that ratif ied it. The East 
Asian location of that 1997 Conference of Parties ensured record-braking 
NGO participation, and the beginning of many national and regional 
environmental networks in East Asia (Reimann 2003; Cheng 2014; Lee 
2013; Tiberghien and Schreurs 2007). The Olympic Games have also offered 
symbolic and commercial opportunities for the national governments of 
China (Beijing, 2008), South Korea (Pyeongchang, 2018), and Tokyo (2020) 
to compete for the ‘greenest’ Olympics.
Even more than crafted political opportunities, the planet itself has 
forced everyone in the region – businesses, governments, and citizens – to 
acknowledge the deadly effects of climate change. Typhoons (Mei and Xie 
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2016), river and coastal flooding (Arnell and Gosling 2016), and droughts and 
dust storms (Zhang and Zhou 2015) have all increased their scope, frequency, 
and intensity in recent years. By far the single most politically influential 
disaster in the region was the Triple Disaster (earthquake, tsunami, and 
nuclear disaster) on 11 March 2011 in Tohoku, Japan (Samuels 2013). The 
nuclear meltdown in Fukushima focused global attention on the unsustain-
ability of current energy consumption patterns as well as the political 
corruption that has supported those energy systems. The Fukushima disaster 
reinvigorated anti-nuclear movements around the region (Grano 2015; 
Aldrich 2012; Chiavacci and Obinger 2018; Harris and Lang 2015), some 
of which combined with other social and political movements targeting 
pro-business governments (Ho 2019; Harris and Lang 2015).
Whether spurred by industrial pollution, political opportunism, natural 
disasters or artistic inspiration, all of the chapters in this volume document 
East Asia’s rising civic activism. In democratic and non-democratic states 
alike, we have seen a common pattern of pro-business developmental states 
engage in policies that rapidly expanded industrial development with hor-
rif ic environmental consequences, generating widespread civic protests 
that result from the threats to life and livelihood caused by pollution, and 
governments are responding to citizen demands. However, although activism 
is rising, repression is rising, too. In China, advocates are frequently jailed 
when they become too outspoken (Radio Free Asia 2016). In South Korea, 
political lobbying is illegal, and Japan’s free press is being repressed by a 
hostile administration (Fackler 2016, 2017).
Nevertheless, citizens across the region are working with and against 
their governments to promote a better environment for their communities 
and the world (Harris and Lang 2015). The remainder of this chapter will 
examine one way in which organizations are pursuing this goal – networking 
with other organizations to assist and pressure governments to develop and 
implement better policies.
Methodology
This chapter emerges from an inductive examination of advocacy in East 
Asia working in the environmental policy realm. As part of a broader project 
that investigates multiple advocacy strategies, this chapter examines the 
behaviour of environmental organizations and the networks that they 
create in order to generate insights into the patterns of network formation 
and the effects of those networks on policymaking and outcomes. It is 
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particularly interested in broader insights that can be gained concerning 
civic activism across political regime types that might be applicable in 
other parts of the world.
The research presented here is based on two primary sources: f ive months 
of f ieldwork in East Asia and an original database of environmental organiza-
tions in the region. I conducted research trips to Beijing, Seoul, and Taipei 
in 2010, with trips to Tokyo and Beijing in 2011 and 2015. The bulk of the 
research presented here was gathered from interviews conducted with 
nearly a hundred advocates, journalists, government off icials, business 
people, grassroots volunteers and academics. In each city I reached out 
to environmental policymakers inside and outside of government as well 
as grassroots advocates and artists. I used a combination of cold contacts 
and snowball-type sampling to gather a diverse a range of advocates and 
policymakers.
The typology of networks was conceptualized by the author after analys-
ing the processes through which advocates sought to influence policymakers 
as they worked to craft environmental policy in their own localities and 
countries. Through a close examination of the interactions of advocates 
and policymakers, the f low of f inancing to non-governmental organiza-
tions, policy tracing from problem def inition through policy formation 
and execution, the author was able to identify patterns in the formal and 
informal networks among advocates and policymakers.
The examples given below are chosen because they offer good illustrations 
of the typologies conceptualized. Because all of these data were collected 
as part of an inductive research process, none of the evidence presented 
here is intended to test any particular hypothesis or theory. Rather, the 
cases here are introduced to begin to develop a better theory about how 
civic organizations in challenging and diverse settings can work with one 
another to collaborate and pressure governments to change policy.
Typology of Environmental Networks in East Asia
This section will describe three types of networks that environmental ad-
vocates create in order to promote pro-environmental policy and behaviour 
change: (1) hub-and-spoke networks, in which a non-profit creates a ‘hub’ 
that connects smaller organizations to one another around a policy area; 
(2) horizontal networks in which the non-profits facilitate the connection 
of a wide variety of actors – governmental, non-profit, and private – to one 
another; (3) vertical networks in which the non-profits connect local and 
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central government off icials in ways designed to enhance the political 
power of pro-environmental off icials in their negotiations with other parts 
of their own government.
The key features of all three types of networks is that they bring diverse 
sets of people together in ways that help promote the development of 
long-term personal relationships that can facilitate formal and informal 
collaboration related to policymaking and implementation. All three types 
of networks can be found across all the places in East Asia and, I suspect, 
across the world. The examples are drawn from different countries rather 
than a single country in order to help the reader understand that the types 
of networks are found all over. The types of networks as conceptualized are 
neither country nor region specif ic.
Hub-and-Spoke Network: Non-profit Organization as Funder/
Coordinator
A hub-and-spoke network is one where a single organization forms the ‘hub’ 
though which other individual and organizational ‘spokes’ connect. The 
‘spokes’ often have very little way to connect to the other ‘spokes’ except 
through the hub. A key characteristic of the hub-and-spoke networks in East 
Asia (and likely elsewhere) is that they hub organizations are often GONGOs 
(government-organized non-governmental organizations) (Hasmath et 
al. 2019). GONGOs are frequently established with government funds, receive 
most of their income from the government and are led by former government 
off icials. This means that facilitating government-NGO coordination and 
collaboration is core to their mission, in contrast to advocacy NGOs, which 
have a mission that does not presume government collaboration. Thus, one 
of the most important roles of these ‘hub’ organizations is to help serve as a 
channel from the NGO community to governmental policymakers.
A hub-and-spoke network can be created in a number of different ways, 
and I will discuss two distinct variations here. The f irst is one is hub-as-
funder, where the network is formally institutionalized with a funding 
organization located at the centre of the network and member/recipient 
organizations joining that network. The power of the groups is very hier-
archical in this arrangement – the funder has the money and the recipient 
organizations are the ones implementing the environmental agendas, but 
they are dependent on the funding organization. In this model the hub 
organization is usually set up to be the primary means through which the 
member organizations can access policymakers.
66  MARy ALICE hADDAD 
A second model is hub-as-organizer. In this model, the hub organization 
creates opportunities for members to come together and connect with 
relevant policymakers. Similar to the f irst type, there would often be little 
opportunity for members to connect without the assistance of the hub. 
However, in this model the hub organization rarely funds the members 
directly but merely introduces them to one another and may also introduce 
them to funders. Similarly, the member organizations are usually highly 
diverse in their power/resources, so the network is a highly heterogeneous 
and relatively un-hierarchical type of network, in contrast to the hub-as-
funder model. In this model, governmental organizations and funders are 
often members themselves. Thus, the hub organization serves more a role of 
matchmaker to help the funders, policymakers and relevant governmental 
organizations/people meet each other rather than creating an arrangement 
where the NGO groups have to go through the ‘hub’ organization in order 
to access policymakers or funders. In some cases, once introduced, ‘spoke’ 
organizations are able to break off and form new networks of their own.
Hub-as-Funder
Perhaps the most archetypical hub-as-funder network that I found in 
my research was created by the China Association for NGO Cooperation 
(CANGO), which is a GONGO operating in Beijing whose main mission 
is to promote the development and support of NGOs in China. CANGO 
has a strong focus on environment and sustainable development. Like its 
counterparts elsewhere in the region, it seeks to build and sustain networks 
that will enhance the capacity for environmental organizations in China.
One of the main ways it promotes environmental agendas is by funnelling 
money that is collected from foreign organizations to local NGOs. Indeed, 
CANGO was originally the China International Technology and Cooperation 
Exchange Organization, which was the branch of the Chinese government 
that helped implement off icial development assistance (ODA) that was 
given to China by foreign governments. When the pattern of international 
aid shifted such that (a) aid was often given directly to organizations rather 
than going through the government, and (b) donations often came from 
international NGOs rather than foreign governments, CANGO broke off from 
the off icial implementing agency to form its own NGO in 1992, although it 
retains very strong ties to the government.
Most non-profit organizations in China (and most places in the world) 
tend to be very small, with few if any professional staff. As a result, their 
capacity to design and implement projects as well as to f ind funding for 
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those projects is extremely limited. CANGO helps increase the capacity of 
these groups through a variety of capacity-building initiatives, including 
workshops on fundraising, budgeting, etc. It works with multiple organiza-
tions by helping them with project development, implementation, and 
assessment.
For example, the Green Commuting Network was formed in 2007 to 
connect Chinese NGOs that were working to develop more environmentally 
sustainable commuting behaviour, and by 2009 the network included 20 
NGOs from across the country. Members of the network promote green 
commuting campaigns, participate in annual conferences and take part 
in volunteer management workshops. The Green Commuting Network 
also engaged in research, gathering commuting data in seven cities in 2011. 
Separate but concurrent with the Green Commuting Network, CANGO 
established a Green Commuting Fund in 2009. The fund helps support 
green commuting initiatives around the country and also enabled the f irst 
voluntary domestic carbon credit trading in China.1
It should be noted that international organizations can also form 
these types of hub-as-funder networks around a local branch off ice or a 
particular project. In these networks the international organization acts 
as the hub-as-funder, and the participating local NGOs participate in co-
development and project implementation. Examples include the Yangtze 
Wetland Conservation Network (where the hub was WWF China and local 
NGOs form the spokes).
Hub-as-Coordinator
The organization that perhaps best exemplif ies how to create networks 
where the hub organization performs a coordinator role is the Institute 
for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), which is based in Kanagawa 
with branch/aff iliated units in Tokyo, Kansai and Kitakyushu within Japan 
as well as in Beijing, Bangkok and New Delhi. It was formed in 1998 as 
part of an initiative of the Japanese government. Its mission is to conduct 
‘practical and innovative research for realizing sustainable development 
in the Asia-Pacif ic region.’2 To this end it has seven different research 
themes ranging from climate and energy to sustainable cities. Each of the 
1 For more about these initiatives, see CANGO’s annual reports, http://www.cango.org/
upload/f iles/Annual%20Report%202013.pdf (24 February 2018).
2 See the ‘About Us’ page on the IGES website, http://www.iges.or.jp/en/outline/index.html 
(24 February 2018).
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focal themes has a team of in-house and external researchers working on 
particular projects, and they publish policy reports and working papers 
with titles such as ‘Designing Adaptation Finance for the Green Climate 
Fund: Challenges and Opportunities Drawn from Existing Multilateral 
Funds for Adaptation.’3
In addition to their research and policy participation, IGES is very active 
in facilitating peer-to-peer learning and dissemination of best practices 
across the region. Through its regional centres it hosts events that bring 
together a wide range of different types of participants that are all concerned 
with particular issues. For example, the annual High Level Seminar on 
Environmentally Sustainable Cities brings together local municipal leaders 
with direct experience developing and implementing environmental policy 
at a local level (e.g. sanitation district heads, transportation off ice directors, 
and mayors), NGO activists working on these issues in the region, academics 
and also funding agencies (e.g. JICA, the organization that disburses most 
of Japan’s development aid).
There are several important characteristics to notice about the networks 
that IGES helps to form and maintain:
– Members of the network come from all sectors of the 
economy: non-profit, for-profit, government, academic, etc.
– The connections formed with one another are generally 
informal. Some of the networks are membership based and 
have requirements for participation, but most do not.
– The power structure of the network is horizontal – despite 
the very different levels of power and resources among the 
participants in the network, each has relatively equal mem-
bership status and participates on an equal basis for the most part.
– The coordinating organization – IGES – is not a primary 
funder of the organizations in the network. For the most part, 
IGES f inances the network itself, helps maintain communica-
tion, hosts conferences, etc., but it does not generally give 
funding to member organizations to carry on their missions.
This last point is a very important one. Funding organizations, for example, 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), frequently participate in 
the networks that involved international groups, and the events create the 
opportunity for organizations and governments seeking funding to solicit 
3 Full text of the working paper, http://enviroscope.iges.or.jp/modules/envirolib/upload/4171/
attach/IGES_Working_Paper_CC-2012-04.pdf (24 February 2018).
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funds and pitch proposals. However, IGES does not itself offer members 
funding, so it is able to serve as an impartial coordinator and facilitator, 
signif icantly reducing the power asymmetry that would exist if it were 
serving as both coordinator and funder of its members.
Horizontal Network: Fluid, Web-like Networks with No Centre
Because environmental organizations are frequently all-volunteer or have 
very few professional staff, they form networks in order to increase their 
capacity to carry out projects and also to advocate for policy change. These 
types of networks are usually characterized by their high level of flexibility 
– it is easy to join and easy to leave. It is easy to remain connected but not 
active, or to shift from being not particularly active to highly active and 
then back to not very active again. Networks are a method to connect with 
like-minded individuals and organizations. Networks can also provide 
political cover for individual organizations that may be engaged in work 
that is controversial or challenges the status quo, since it is the network 
that is taking the action, not any particular organization.
Horizontal networks can be as informal as an email list set up after a 
conference or as formal as an organization with annual dues. They are 
highly diverse in form, but, as with the above, I will highlight two distinct 
types below: event-focused networks and issue-focused networks. The key 
characteristic of the first type is that they are short-term, focused on creating 
a network of individuals and organizations to ease coordination around a 
particular event. After the event, it may be that the network re-forms with 
a different purpose and continues to expand. More frequently, the network 
disbands after the event, although once it has formed, it is relatively easy 
to reactive or re-engage the participants in order to support other events 
in the future. The key characteristic of the second type of network is that 
the members are drawn together because of interest in a particular issue.
Event-Focused Networks
Perhaps one of the best-known environmental NGOs in Japan is the Kiko 
Network (Kiko Nettowaku – kikō is the Japanese word for ‘climate’). It began 
as a horizontal event-focused network, the Kiko Forum, which grew and 
eventually institutionalized into an issue-focused network organization. 
Since 1995, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
has held annual Conferences of the Parties (COP) meetings. The third of 
these (COP3) was held in December 1997 and was the conference that f irst 
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adopted the Kyoto Protocol. In the late 1990s, it was not yet standard practice 
to hold a ‘shadow’ conference that gathered the NGO community together 
at the same time as governmental leaders were also meeting. Kiko Forum’s 
efforts to mobilize the NGO community prior to the COP3 meetings in 
Kyoto contributed to the creation of the ‘meetings in conjunction’ that has 
now become standard practice with all of the major intergovernmental 
conferences (e.g. COP, G8, WTO etc.).
Starting in early 1997, the Kiko Forum began mobilizing the NGO com-
munity both within Japan and around the world to connect the organizations 
working on environmental issues to share information, arrange meetings, 
and raise public awareness prior to and during the COP3 meetings in Kyoto. 
It was very successful, not only enabling the NGO community to participate 
actively in the COP3 meetings, but also by establishing a model that other 
groups could follow. Following the meeting, the Kiko Forum disbanded and 
formed a more permanent NGO, called Kiko Network, or Kiko-Net.4 Although 
it is now a registered non-prof it, it remains very small by international 
standards. Although it has a membership of about 700 organizations, it has 
only about ten staff members – six in Kyoto and four in Tokyo (Reimann 
2003).
More typical than event-based networks that institutionalize into their 
own organizations are networks that form around particular events and 
then disband when the event is over. One example from China is the group 
of NGOs that networked together to promote the 26 Degree campaign, 
which began in Beijing in 2004. This campaign aimed to get everyone, but 
particularly large hotels and businesses, to keep their air conditioners set 
to 26 (as opposed to 22 or 20) degrees in the summer. Partnering with a 
number of international NGOs with off ices in Beijing (e.g. WWF), a group 
of local Chinese environmental groups (including Global Village of Beijing, 
Green Earth Volunteers and Friends of Nature) got together to run a very 
successful campaign that not only raised public awareness in Beijing, but 
also resulted in significant carbon emissions savings, and, ultimately, a shift 
in local and national public policy that required government off ices to keep 
their air conditioners set at or above 26 degrees, and set that temperature as 
the standard for hotels, restaurants, and off ice buildings. The network that 
they formed was significantly based on the personal network already existing 
among the leaders of these groups, and it remained ad hoc, dissolving once 
the campaign f inished.
4 Koko Network homepage (in Japanese, English page also available, http://www.kikonet.
org/ (24 February 2018).
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Issue-Focused Networks
Issue-focused networks bring together lose associations of organizations 
which have similar interests. The issue might be air pollution, garbage, 
f isheries management, etc. Many of the most enduring of these networks 
are organized around rivers. Rivers are themselves network systems, so 
perhaps it is only natural that organizations located in different towns and 
cities along the same river, even if they are in different countries, frequently 
form networks among their organizations.
Sometimes these networks seek to join together multiple organizations 
and local governments to mobilize support for changes in national policy 
(see Waley 2005). More frequently, they are focused on local environmental 
issues, and use their network connections to gain support to f ight their local 
NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) battles (Litzinger 2007). Grano’s chapter in 
this volume shows how these local NIMBY fights can grow to form national 
political movements, and Weiss’s chapter demonstrates how networks of 
organizations with different issue foci (e.g. women’s rights and environment) 
can combine to demand political change from the ruling party.
A successful example of an issue-focused network that transformed into 
a national non-prof it organization is Wetlands Taiwan. The organization 
originated in the mid-1990s from a grassroots NIMBY battle against the 
expansion of the Tainan Industrial Park on Taiwan’s south-eastern coast. As 
similar NIMBY battles were fought across the country against the expansion 
of industrial parks and the degradation of the surrounding environment, 
similar efforts in other localities joined together. Now Wetlands Taiwan 
is a network of regional associations which focus on protecting particular 
wetlands. While the Tainan association remains the strongest (the or-
ganization’s headquarters is there), the other associations and the national 
network work closely with local residents, local organizations, local and 
national governments on conservation issues. They disseminate relevant 
local and international news pertaining to wetland conservation, host 
lectures, organize activities such as bird watching tours inside the protected 
areas, and work with local and national policymakers on issues related to 
wetlands conservation.
Vertical Networks
When NGOs form vertical networks, they are frequently acting as a match-
maker or policy broker, introducing lower-level bureaucrats to higher-
level bureaucrats, connecting local governments to corporate investors, or 
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enabling civil servants to encounter international actors that the lower-level 
policymakers would otherwise have no way to meet. In some ways the 
relationship is somewhat similar to the hub-and-spoke model above, but 
in these models (a) the ‘spokes’ have very different status and power, and 
(b) the NGO/GONGO does not remain the hub, but rather uses its network 
to facilitate new relationships among actors that might not have been 
previously connected. Once the new links are made, the NGO will remain 
connected to all parties, but it will usually step back, enabling the ‘spokes’ 
to create the architecture and purpose of the new, policy-relevant network.
The largest environmental organization in East Asia is the Korea Federa-
tion for Environmental Movements (KFEM). It has 80,000 members and 52 
regional organizations. It was intimately involved with Korea’s democratiza-
tion movement (Kim 2000; Ku 2011; Lee et al. 1999), and has been active in 
the global environmental movement since its inception. It is active in a wide 
range of environmental issues, and its federated organizational structure, 
combined with its f ive specialized institutions (including a research institute 
and a legal assistance centre) enable it to connect local concerns directly 
with allies in the national government and international environmental 
organizations. Sometimes this is done with a specific purpose in mind – such 
as blocking the Saemangeum project component of the Four Major River 
Project. In other cases, the organizations work to connect relevant actors 
together around issues of concern, such as food safety. The goal in these 
cases is not necessarily to influence policy directly, but rather to facilitate 
favourable change by connecting policy actors that might have diff iculty 
f inding one another together (Interview KFEM 2011; Ku 2011; Lee 2000).
Modes of Network Advocacy
The three types of networks described above – hub-and-spoke, horizontal, 
and vertical – are the formal and informal institutional structures that 
facilitate network advocacy. Each of the actors within the network engage in 
their own advocacy efforts independently – for example, lobbying legislators, 
engaging in public protests, legal advocacy, writing policy papers, grassroots 
education, cultivating connections with policymakers, etc.
However, the policy-relevant networks that the NGOs have created are 
not merely the sum of these individual actors’ efforts. I am arguing here 
that the networks themselves exert a somewhat independent, or more 
precisely, interdependent effect on the policymaking process. In particular, 
these networks help interested policymakers work around institutional 
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collective action problems. As a result, the networks can have a catalytic 
effect on other forms of advocacy. This section attempts to describe three 
effects that the networks exert on policy: information exchange, ally em-
powerment and citizen engagement. In all cases, the central feature of the 
network’s effectiveness in influencing policy is the ways that it is able to 
reduce the institutional collective action problems found in environmental 
policymaking.
Information Catalyst: Easing Coordination Problems and Lowering 
Transaction Costs
The networks described above act as a catalyst for policy-relevant knowl-
edge creation and dissemination. As mentioned above, the environmental 
organizations in East Asia are miniscule compared to their counterparts in 
North America and Europe. For example, in 2017 The Nature Conservancy 
(founded in 1915) reported total net assets of $6.2 billion, gained $1.1 billion 
in revenue, carried out 472,790 conservation activities and events, and 
had 46,650 members and 3,500 fulltime staff. The Nature Conservancy has 
permanent off ices in 50 US states and 29 additional countries. In 2017 it was 
involved in projects located in 72 different countries around the world (The 
Nature Conservancy 2018).
In contrast, one of the oldest and largest environmental organizations 
in East Asia is the Wild Bird Society of Japan. While it is almost as old 
(founded in 1934) and has similar membership levels (45,000) as The Nature 
Conservancy, it is a tiny fraction of its size and influence. The Wild Bird 
Society of Japan has only seven regional branches inside Japan with no 
international off ices and just $10 million in income (Wild Bird Society Japan 
2018) – in other words, fewer than 10% of the off ices and 1% of the income 
as compared to The Nature Conservancy. And, The Wild Bird Society is 
one of the biggest environmental groups in the region. The vast majority 
of environmental organizations in East Asia depend largely on volunteer 
labour and have fewer than ten staff members (Haddad 2017).
As a result of their comparatively small size and low level of profession-
alization, East Asia’s environmental organizations do not have the resources 
individually to (a) f igure out which knowledge is the most policy relevant, 
(b) generate that knowledge, and (c) disseminate the new knowledge to 
relevant policymakers. Additionally, bureaucratic structures often put up 
barriers between different ministries and between central government 
and local government off icials. Finally, all actors – governmental, NGO and 
private – have limited resources. Without these networks, all of the policy 
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actors are forced to work rather independently – trying to identify relevant 
problems, generating policy solutions, testing those solutions, and then 
disseminating best practices. Without the networks, these actors cannot 
be very eff icient. Limited resources mean that no single actor can do much. 
Limited coordination results in both redundancies in efforts and gaps in 
coverage. Limited exchange slows the adoption of policies and practices 
that work, even once they have been developed and ref ined.
NGO-generated networks can help policy-relevant actors work around insti-
tutional barriers to be significantly more efficient in the way that they deploy 
resources to generate new policy-relevant knowledge and then disseminate that 
knowledge once it has been created. There are numerous areas of environmental 
policymaking where this can be seen, but perhaps the most obvious is the ability 
to find relevant sites to conduct local pilot projects and then enable the results 
of those pilot projects to be disseminated to others – national government 
policymakers within the same country, local governments in foreign countries 
or international NGOs that can spread the information to governments and 
environmental organizations around the world. These networks enable peer-
to-peer knowledge generation and sharing in ways that would be impossible, 
or at least significantly more difficult, without the networks.
The KitaQ System Composting5 is an excellent example of how one 
environmental GONGO worked with a variety of actors governments to 
(a) identify a good pilot site, (b) carry out the pilot project, (c) facilitate 
peer-to-peer learning about the pilot, (d) replicate the pilot project elsewhere, 
and (e) disseminate information about the successful project for widespread 
adaptation – currently eleven cities in f ive countries.
The composting project began in Kitakyushu, Japan, as part of the city’s 
efforts to reduce household solid waste. Working with experts from the local 
university and city residents, and funded by the local and national govern-
ments, activists and city off icials developed an urban-friendly composting 
system that they thought was replicable. The Institute for Global Environ-
mental Strategies, a Japanese GONGO with a branch off ice in Kitakyushu, 
with funding and assistance from the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency, facilitated a connection between the off icials in Kitakyushu and 
Pusdakota, a local environmental NGO located in Surabaya, Indonesia. The 
project was piloted from 2005 to -2007. Over the course of the period, the 
city, with a population of three million, saw a reduction of 350 tons (23%) in 
the solid waste collected annually. There was also a dramatic improvement 
in the hygiene and aesthetics of the city streets as abandoned lots were 
5 KitaQ System Composting homepage, http://kitaq-compost.net/ (15 May 2017).
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transformed from informal garbage dumps to public green spaces that 
utilized the compost generated for gardening. Through the activities of 
the city, IGES, local NGOs and additional corporate sponsors, the compost-
ing system has now spread to nineteen additional communities.6 IGES 
(in collaboration with others) continues to develop policy tools for easy 
implementation by other municipalities as well as hosting conferences that 
are specif ically designed to bring together communities with experience in 
the system and those that are thinking about implementing it.7
It would be tempting to ascribe the success of the KitaQ System Composting 
to IGES exclusively. There are ways that the experience of developing, refining 
and disseminating the system could be seen as analogous to the process 
followed by most development programmes emerging from large development 
banks such as the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank. I would like 
to argue here, though, that while IGES and the Kitakyushu city government 
were important actors, utilizing the advocacy strategies commonly used for 
policy advocacy – for example, pilot projects, policy papers, public information 
sessions, press coverage, engagement with local leaders, etc. – the network 
created by IGES exerted a somewhat independent catalytic effect on the 
outcome. The network dramatically expanded the number of communities 
considering adopting this policy solution; communities that would never have 
been reached by IGES or Kitakyushu without the network that they had created.
Furthermore, the network created a comprehensive policy feedback 
loop that enabled the piloted composting system to be ref ined, tested in 
new areas, further ref ined, etc. by multiple communities at the same time. 
Finally, most of the people involved in the programme were ordinary citizens 
volunteering their time. They were supported by a small number of paid staff 
at the NGOs, local government off ices and national development agencies, 
but most of the people who were engaged in developing, implementing, 
ref ining and disseminating the projects were volunteers.
The network acted as a catalyst for information exchange by increasing 
(a) the number of actors involved, (b) the quantity and quality of feedback 
about the system and policy implementation, and (c) the scope of further 
dissemination. The network was not just an add-on or a communication 
method; it took on a life of its own and acted in ways that was more than 
the sum of its component parts.
6 See the Surabaya case study, http://kitakyushu.iges.or.jp/publication/Takakura/Sura-
baya_Experience_Full.pdf (15 May 2017).
7 See the IGES composting page, http://www.iges.or.jp/en/archive/kuc/compost.html 
(15 May 2017).
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An important feature of the networks created by these NGOs is the way 
that they continue to grow in unexpected ways, which are often comple-
mentary to the original policy goal. In October 2015 the cities of Kitakyushu 
and Haiphong, Vietnam, became one of three pioneering twinning cities to 
collaborate in a City-to-City Cooperation (C3) programme sponsored by the 
international NGO Clean Air Asia to reduce air pollution.8 Where did this 
seemingly odd partnership originate? Perhaps at the Networking Meeting for 
Local Governments: Creating Low-Carbon and Sustainable Cities sponsored 
by IGES and held in Siem Reap, Cambodia, in March 2012. At that meeting 
IGES staff presented information about the Surabaya composting pilot, 
where both the NGO Clean Air Asia and representatives from Haiphong were 
participants. In 2014 Nippon Steel, Sumikin Engineering, Amita, and NTT 
Data Institute Management Consulting presented a low-carbon development 
plan for Haiphong, which was modelled on the Surabayu example.9 That 
same year Kitakyushu and Haiphong formalized a sister city relationship.10 
One year later the two cities were collaborating on clean air initiatives, 
branching out into and expanding an entirely different NGO-facilitated 
network. They went from composting to clean air in the space of three 
years. Allies expanded from a couple of NGOs and two local governments 
to additional international NGOs, several national funding agencies and 
numerous corporations from both countries.
Empower Allies: Overcome Bureaucratic Barriers and Furnish Allies 
with Resources
One of an advocate’s most powerful strategies is to cultivate influential 
policymakers. One of the best ways that NGOs can do this is to form personal 
connections with early and mid-career bureaucrats and support those 
individuals as they gain experience and power. Connecting these off icials 
to others in the NGO network can be one of the most important methods 
through which these sympathetic insiders can be empowered. The NGO-
created network enables these lower- and mid-level public servants to bypass 
the layers of bureaucracy that inhibit communication with central govern-
ment officials. The networks also connect these policymakers to individuals 
8 Clean Air Partnership page of Clean Air Asia, http://cleanairasia.org/cities-clean-air-
partnership/ (15 May 2017).
9 See http://asiangreencamp.net/eng/pdf/68.pdf (15 May 2017).
10 Kitakyushu city information about sister city agreement, http://www.city.kitakyushu.lg.jp/
english/f ile_0049.html (15 May 2017).
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and organizations they would never otherwise be able to encounter through 
their day-to-day operations. In the end, the new relationships that are 
formed through the network can significantly enhance the capacity of these 
policymakers to enact effective and far-reaching policies.
Here is a description of how the process worked in one case in China, 
as described by Barbara Finamore, Senior Attorney and Asia Director, 
China Program of the Natural Resource Defense Council (NRDC) (Interview 
Finamore 2015):
The f irst really big project that we did was energy eff iciency in Jiangsu. 
We went to a conference in Chongqing hosted by the Demand-side 
Management Center set up by the Asian Development Bank. The head 
of the Jiangsu power company was the head of that collaborative project, 
and I kept up with him for years. First, we did the demand-side manage-
ment project. For that project the utility companies pay customers to be 
more eff icient. It was very successful and got the attention of the central 
government. It took ten years, but eventually the central government 
extended the rules nationwide.
So, we kept in touch. We brought people down to Jiangsu. We brought 
people from California. We brought California off icials to China. We 
brought Jiangsu off icials to California. We brought central government 
off icials to California. We brought Governor Schwarzenegger to China 
because California was a leader in demand-side management because 
of their energy crisis. There can be a gap in the connection, but it is still 
there, and now he [my Chinese contact] is very important.
There are people who sat through all those meetings, who were very 
quiet, but who sat in all the meetings who move up the administrative 
ladder, and now those people are running the regulation companies. 
They’re not quiet anymore.
[Interviewer: It seems like you’re not just empowering allies by giving 
them information, but you’re also empowering them by helping them to 
make political connections. Can you expand on that?]
We brokered a memorandum of understanding between the California 
public utility commission and the Jiangsu utility to cooperate on energy 
eff iciency. We brought the California off icials over to Jiangsu – they’re 
sister provinces. The MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) had two 
parts – the f irst was government to government, and the second included 
the NRDC as implementers. I helped found the China-US Energy Efficiency 
Alliance ten years ago – that alliance is now helping other communities 
form these kinds of agreements.
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NGOs can serve a critically important role in improving and promoting 
policy development by building networks across bureaucratic divides that 
impede policymaking through purely governmental procedures. Govern-
mental bureaucracies can often be rigid, making it diff icult for like-minded 
policymakers to find each other and work together. NGO-generated networks 
can help connect these dots by bringing these off icials together. Since 
off icials (and sometimes NGO professionals) move around, these personal 
networks remain dynamic, sometimes being activated, sometimes go-
ing dormant, waiting for the time when the connection can be usefully 
employed. Sometimes, as was the case for the China-US Energy Eff iciency 
Alliance, the network itself can become institutionalized enough to become 
an independent organization.
Engage Citizens: Raise Awareness, Motivate Volunteers, Spur 
Engagement
The f inal and most obvious way that NGO-created networks act as policy 
catalysts is the ways that they can engage citizens. When organizations are 
connected through a network, they can dramatically expand their reach. They 
can spread the word about particular issues. They can coordinate volunteer 
activities. They can motivate the public to become more politically engaged.
The 26 Degree Campaign is a highly successful example of how environ-
mental organizations with few resources can network together for a huge 
policy impact. In 2004 Sheri Liao, founder of Global Village, floated the idea 
for the campaign to her NGO colleagues in the city. She described the origin 
of the idea to me during an interview in Beijing in 2015 (Interview Liao 2015):
I think I got the idea when I was in the US. I would go into a supermarket 
in the summer time, and I would have to wear a sweater. I’d think, ‘This 
is ridiculous!’ At the time I hoped that China would not do this kind of 
thing. But then I found that China was following the same path. So, I 
discussed it with some NGO people, and we came up with the idea of 26 
[degrees] in summer and 20 [degrees] in winter.
The small group met several times to discuss their plan of action. They 
collaborated to put together a report that documented how much energy 
would be saved if people set their air conditioners higher. Hotels and large 
businesses, especially, were setting the thermostats very low – 17 or 19 
degrees – because businessmen were expected to wear jackets, even in 
the summer, so the room temperature needed to be cool for them to be 
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comfortable. The NGO leaders used their good relationships with the press 
to gain a lot of coverage of their f indings. An energy shortage that sum-
mer helped fuel interest in the issue. Beijing factories experienced power 
rationing during peak hours, and Beijing was the last of the major cities to 
face power cuts, which had spread across most of the electricity markets in 
the country.11 Journalists began to spot-check hotels and publish what they 
found in their newspapers. Friends of Nature mobilized volunteers to go 
into public spaces such as shopping malls, hotels and businesses and record 
the temperature, and violators would be written up by the organization and 
also by the press (Interview He 2015; Interview Liao 2015; Interview Wang 
2015; Interview Yang 2011).
In 2005, the campaign gained momentum – more organizations joined 
the campaign, it gained greater press coverage, and the Beijing mayor, 
always concerned about local pollution, also got involved. By this time the 
idea had caught the attention of the central government, and Premier Wen 
Jiabao announced that government off ices and meeting rooms would not 
have temperatures set below 26 degrees, and in July the Beijing municipal 
government sent a directive to all corporations in Beijing urging them to 
save energy by adopting the 26 degree standard in all restaurants, hotels, 
off ices, banks and other public areas.12
Although the excitement around the campaign has waned, the network 
has expanded. By 2015 Friends of Nature was coordinating more than 50 
volunteers in Beijing and collaborating with NGOs in 30 other Chinese 
cities to crowdsource temperature readings on a variety of buildings and 
share the data on WeChat. Their efforts were not just a collaboration with 
other NGOs and the press but also businesses – for example, HSBC helped 
to fund their efforts (Interview Wang 2015). The campaign’s success was a 
direct result of the event-based network created by the NGOs. That network 
enabled the organizers to coordinate their use of resources to develop 
high-quality research. They were able raise public awareness through their 
collaboration with the press.
Residents of Beijing knew that their air was bad, but most had not made 
the connection between the temperature of their homes and off ices and 
the quality of the air they were breathing. The network created a frame-
work whereby citizens could be motivated to action and then engage in a 
11 Financial Times article about the power cuts, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7d831806-d144-
11d8-99cf-00000e2511c8.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true#axzz4hF54XH8E (16 May 2017).
12 See the Friends of Nature report about the campaign, http://www.fon.org.cn/uploads/
attachment/47111361524307.pdf (16 May 2017).
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productive way to help solve the problem. The network enabled profitable 
and productive collaborations with businesses to reduce emissions. It framed 
its grassroots activities in ways that were digestible for policymakers and 
convince high-level off icials to change government policy. The network 
enabled all of these actions – it had an independent, catalytic effect on 
citizen engagement.
Conclusion
This chapter has described three types of networks that NGOs in East Asia 
commonly build as part of their advocacy strategies: hub-and-spoke networks, 
horizontal networks and vertical networks. These networks in turn enable 
policy actors within and outside of governments at local, regional and national 
levels to overcome institutional collective action problems. In particular, they 
enable diverse actors to work together for the creation and dissemination 
of policy-relevant knowledge. They create a mechanism whereby NGOs can 
empower allies in government by helping them to overcome bureaucratic 
barriers and by connecting them to new resources. The activists are not 
changing the interests of these elite actors; they are changing their ideas. 
Activists working through their networks are able to persuade policymakers 
that certain activities are problems and help them develop productive policy 
solutions to solve those problems (Teets 2018). Finally, networks dramatically 
expand citizen engagement related to the policy area – spreading awareness of 
issues that matter, inspiring individuals to volunteer their time and facilitating 
citizen engagement in politics. They have contributed to the transformation 
of East Asia’s political landscape in the post-high growth period.
These examples, while they originate in East Asia, are likely found in 
other parts of the world. When we study citizen activism as well as the public 
policy related to that advocacy, we should also be examining the networks 
that advocates – located both inside and outside the government – have 
formed and the diverse ways that those networks are affecting both the 
policymaking process and policy outcomes. The networks that non-profits 
create can alter the fundamental structure of policymaking in the places 
where they exist. They can create new patterns that change the flow of policy 
ideas, experimentation, feedback and implementation not only between the 
governmental actors and the objects of the policy (e.g. citizens, corporations) 
but even among the governmental policymakers themselves. These externally 
created networks can fundamentally reshape policy subsystems – how they 
operate at any given point in time and how they evolve over time.
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East Asia is a particularly diff icult political context for policy advocates 
because governments in the region tend to be conservative, pro-business, and 
the legal structures are often hostile to advocacy organizations. Examining 
how civic organizations are working with and against their governments 
in this challenging political context can offer insights that are relevant for 
advocates everywhere.
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4 The Campaign for Nuclear Power in 
Japan before and after 2011
Between State, Market and Civil Society
Tobias Weiss
Abstract
In the chapter I analyse the emergence of a countermovement in reaction 
to the rise of the movement against nuclear power in Japan since the 1970s. 
I trace the emergence of the countermovement in historical perspec-
tive, and analyse the organizational and social basis, the mobilization 
processes, the framing, and political influence of the groups involved. I 
then analyse the political impact of the Fukushima 2011 nuclear accident 
on the movement. I show how the countermovement was able survive a 
period of intense contestation preserving its resource basis and retaining 
signif icant influence on the policymaking process due to support from 
parts of the national bureaucracy and conservative politicians.
Keywords: social movements, Japan, countermovements, civil society, 
nuclear power
The recent wave of conservative movements poses a challenge to researchers 
of civil society. Can civil society be conservative or even reactionary? While 
Heinrich (2005) argues for discerning certain progressive values (for instance, 
adherence to human rights and gender equality) to empirically identify civil 
society actors and organizations, Way (2014) holds that civil society can 
be found in both progressive and conservative sectors of society as long 
as they are organized and distinct from the state and from the market. In 
this chapter I will adapt the latter approach focusing on organized groups 
seeking to preserve existing interests and policies in Japanese nuclear power 
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politics. This approach contrasts prevailing tendencies to focus mainly on 
the progressive sectors of civil society (for similar assessments see Katz 2006; 
Fuchs 2018; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Ho, in this volume).
Observers have asked why a strong movement against nuclear weapons 
(in the 1950s) and an environmental movement (in the 1970s) developed in 
Japan, but the movement against the civil use of nuclear power remained 
much weaker (Avenell 2012). In this chapter I will analyse the campaign 
to promote the civil use of nuclear power as a countermovement (directed 
against the movement against nuclear power) taking place at the intersection 
between civil society, the market and the state. While it is hard to gauge 
its effects on the anti-nuclear movement, by scrutinizing the mobilizing 
structures, framing, and political inf luence of the movement, I aim to 
complement existing explanations of the relatively limited strength of the 
anti-nuclear movement before 2011 and shed light on future prospects for 
Japan’s nuclear energy policy.
Developmental states have been associated with a strong state and a weak 
civil society (Hsu 2012). The category ‘developmental state’ is connected to 
the dynamics of late development analysed by Gerschenkron (1962). The state 
assumes an important role in political economies developing in an international 
environment where other countries have already set the path. Developmental 
state theorists like Johnson (1982) took up this argument and identif ied a 
strong and autonomous national bureaucracy, an economy managed through 
industrial policy and a relatively weak legislative branch as elements typical of 
the developmental state. In this model the state is the main driver for political 
and social change, marginalizing groups that defy its goals of economic growth 
and modernization. Civil society remains weak (Pekkanen 2004: 363).
While hardly anyone would deny the strength of the Japanese state during 
most of the Cold War period and its ability to accomplish developmental 
goals, scholars of Japanese civil society note the blurriness of the boundaries 
between civil society and the state. Garon (1997) argues that the penetration 
of the Japanese state into peoples’ everyday life does not necessarily have 
to be interpreted as one-sided movement. A (social) movement in this view 
can originate within state agencies or outside of it. Movements originating 
within state agencies can be taken up and advanced by social forces outside 
of the state (or market). A campaign according to Garon (1997: 3-20) might 
be managed by state agencies, but it also involves the mobilization and 
collaboration of parts of civil society. Garon emphasizes that, in order 
to understand the emergence and dynamics of campaigns, the relation 
between state and civil society should be conceptualized not as exclusively 
oppositional, but as multilayered and multidirectional.
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Post-war Japan has seen multiple campaigns, for example, the New Life 
Movement (Shin Seikatsu Undō) aimed at ‘modernizing’ the household and 
defining certain gender roles (Gordon 1997) and the Productivity Movement 
(Seisansei Undō) aimed at increasing industrial productivity (Gordon 1998). 
These campaigns were initiated by government agencies or inf luential 
groups within the state or market sectors, but the agents of the campaigns 
were never limited to these sectors. While I would argue that at least some 
campaigns can be seen as countermovements, aiming to deflect or absorb 
challenges to the state or powerful elites, the most active promoters were 
not always bureaucrats or politicians. Even if a campaign might originate 
within the state, the spread of it and its success depended on the resonance 
it was able to produce within civil society. To analyse campaigns, I would 
argue that a focus on the links between state, market and (civil) society is 
important – for instance, on foundations or public policy companies often 
managed in cooperation between private industries and the bureaucracy. 
The success of campaigns might depend not only on the power of the state, 
but also on the dynamics between movements and countermovements in 
specif ic sectors of society.
My main interest here is how the countermovement emerged and how the 
Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, which was perceived by many as a failure 
of the Japanese developmental state, affected the pro-nuclear campaign.1 I will 
start sketching the emergence of the pro-nuclear campaign, as reaction from 
state and nuclear industry to a rising anti-nuclear movement since the 1970s 
using documents and statements from the actors involved. In the following 
section I will analyse the mobilizing structure, the framing and the political 
efficacy of the campaign prior to 2011. In the final section I will trace changes 
after the Fukushima nuclear accident. We can see that a ‘developmental’ 
alliance between companies, the bureaucracy and the conservative party built 
up a strong countermovement, especially in professional circles connected 
to the nuclear industry and local communities hosting facilities. I argue that 
this countermovement adopted a strategy used by company managers in the 
labour struggles from the 1950s on. Before 2011 parts of the movement were 
transformed to non-profit organizations and held significant resources and 
influence on policymaking, deflecting also challenges from sectors of the 
bureaucracy pushing for liberalization of the energy market. Mainly due to its 
strong resource base and political networks the countermovement survived 
the 2011 accident and retained resources and some political influence, even 
though its power over policy making was weakened.
1 I use the terms ‘pro-nuclear civil society,’ ‘movement’ and ‘campaign’ interchangeably here.
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The Pro-nuclear Campaign
The Emergence of a Pro-nuclear Campaign
The emergence of a pro-nuclear campaign in Japan was a reaction to the rise 
of environmental citizen movements in the early 1970s and increasing local 
resistance to the construction of nuclear power plants. The atomic bombings 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had led to the emergence a strong movement 
against nuclear weapons. In 1954 popular opposition to the development 
and use of nuclear weapons surfaced after a Japanese f ishing boat was hit by 
radioactive fallout from a US nuclear weapon test (Utsumi 2012). A housewife 
initiated a petition against nuclear weapons, eventually gathering 30 million 
signatures, and a countrywide social movement against nuclear weapons 
emerged. While this movement must have triggered ambiguous feelings 
among conservative political circles (Arima 2008), the opposition to nuclear 
weapons did not naturally translate into opposition against the ‘peaceful use’ 
of nuclear power for electricity production. It was argued by progressive as 
well as conservative parties that Japan as the only victim of atomic bombs 
had to become a forerunner in the peaceful use of nuclear power (Weiss 
2019a: 193-196, 243-246). In the 1950s, over 600 Japanese companies joined 
the newly established Japan Atomic Industrial Forum (Yamaoka 2015: 235). 
The US embassy together with various Japanese newspapers conducted 
countrywide exhibitions promoting the peaceful use of nuclear power 
under the Atoms for Peace programme. The founding of the Japan Atomic 
Industrial Forum (JAIF), the federation of the nuclear industry, in 1956 
was the precursor of the pro-nuclear campaign starting in the 1970s. The 
JAIF established local atomic forums (genshiryoku kondankai) in Kansai, 
Chūbu and Ibaraki. These forums not only included managers of companies 
aiming to build up a nuclear industry, but also journalists and influential 
regional power holders, for instance, leaders of f ishing cooperatives and 
housewives’ groups (see, for example, HGK 2002: 8). From the start this 
campaign might also have aimed to counter the success of the movement 
against nuclear weapons, but since there was not any substantial opposition 
against the civil use of nuclear power, it is not clear whether we can speak 
of a countermovement before the 1970s.
The Environmental Crisis
In the early 1970s there was a sense of crisis in the long-term ruling party, 
the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japanese business 
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community. Opposition parties had made gains in local elections and had 
taken hold of various local governments. Countrywide protests against cases 
of pollution were on the rise and had forced the conservative government 
to pass stricter legislation for environmental protection (McKean 1981). 
The PR manager of the utility company TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power 
Company) in retrospect decried the ‘anti-company mood’ in Japan during 
this period (Suzuki 1983: 15). At the same time Japan was affected by the 
oil crisis. The oil shock in 1973 caused a strong recession, and policymakers 
worried about the safety of future energy supply. A group of conservative 
intellectuals, under the name Group 1984, published a manifest claiming 
(Group 1984 1975: 99):
The Japan of the 1970s did not make the stupid mistake to start an 
international war over raw materials. But it turned the war about raw 
materials into a civil war. This was an extremely unwise move. The safe 
long-term supply with raw materials can hardly be maintained anymore. 
If we don’t take revolutionary measures here, the Japanese economy will 
face physical annihilation!
This statement is the expression of an at the time widespread belief among 
policy makers and industry managers that ‘the energy question’ would 
decide the future of Japan’s industrial development and that intensive 
efforts would have to be made to aquiesce Japan’s population to accept 
nuclear power plants.
Organizations Connecting State, Market and Civil Society
Three foundations played important roles organizing such ‘revolutionary 
measures’ in nuclear power policy, which included the expansion of nuclear 
power generation and a strategy to achieve public acceptance for it: the 
federation of the nuclear industry, JAIF; the Japan Atomic Energy Relations 
Organization (JAERO); and the Japan Productivity Center (JPC).
Japan Atomic Energy Relations Organization (JAERO)
JAERO’s Japanese name means – when translated literally – ‘Foundation 
for Fostering a Nuclear Culture’ (Genshiryoku Bunka Shinkō Zaidan). It was 
founded originally in 1965 as the Center for Nuclear Power Dissemination 
in Ibaraki, where many facilities of nuclear power research and production 
had been built. JAERO’s off icial history explains the purpose of its founding 
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with ‘special feelings’ (genshiryoku ni taisuru tokushu kanjō) of the Japanese 
populace towards nuclear power (JAERO 1994: 232). The upgrading of its 
activities to a national scale in 1969 can be understood in the context of 
protests against American nuclear submarines and warships entering Japa-
nese harbours, for example, during the ‘struggle of Sasebō’ in 1968. Prime 
Minister Eisaku Satō had bemoaned the ‘nuclear allergy’ of the Japanese 
people (Hook 1984). JAERO’s activities include the targeting of important 
segments of the population with nuclear power PR: scientists, teachers, 
doctors, journalists and the local population near nuclear power plant sites 
(JAERO 1994). JAERO’s off icial history mentions the ‘need to bring together 
various segments of society to promote nuclear power’ (JAERO 1994: 239).
Japan Productivity Center (JPC)
The JPC, the organizational hub of the Productivity Movement (Seisansei 
Undō), organized by a coalition of the conservative labour unions (Dōmei 
federation), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI; since 
2002: Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry; METI) and business fed-
erations, which, from the 1970s, began to play a role in nuclear politics. 
In 1972 it convened the First Industry Conference on the Environmental 
Problem (Daiichi Kankyō Mondai Sangyō Kaigi), bringing together about 
200 business managers, scholars and bureaucrats. Participants called for 
a ‘neutral third-party movement’ (NSH 1972: 63) to check the challenge 
of the environmental movement. The Japan Social Economic Conference 
(Shakai Keizai Kokumin Kaigi) was established as a sub-organization in the 
JPC focusing among other issues on establishing consensus on the nuclear 
power issue. A key person was Hidezō Inaba, an economist, member of the 
Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) and former bureaucrat of the Cabinet 
Planning Board (Kikakuin), the prewar ‘economic general staff’ and centre 
of industrial planning, according to Johnson (1982). From the 1970s, Inaba 
worked to create a ‘neutral third-party movement’ for the public acceptance 
of nuclear power (Ebina 1992: 185). The ‘neutral third-party movement’ was 
essentially a countermovement against the anti-nuclear movement. This 
becomes clear when we look at the social groups targeted by the movement 
and the history of its organizational base, the JPC.
1950s: Countermovement in Labour Politics
The JPC had been established in 1955 during a period of intense labour 
conflict. At that time public and private sector unions organized a large share 
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of workers in the Sōhyō labour federation, mobilizing them for demonstra-
tions, making political demands and supporting the oppositional Japan 
Socialist Party (JSP). The Productivity Movement was initiated by an alliance 
of conservative labour activists in the Dōmei unions (politically supporting 
the right wing of the JSP, which in 1960 split and formed the Democratic 
Socialist Party, DSP), company management and MITI bureaucrats. Inaba was 
among the f irst generation of JPC board members (NSH 2005). The JPC was 
part of a larger drive to curb the influence of Sōhyō and activist unions close 
to the Communist Party. It contributed to making Dōmei the largest labour 
federation in the private sector (as opposed to the public sector, where Sōhyō 
remained strong; see Gordon 1998). The countermovement utilized existing 
hierarchies in the workplace, mobilizing older foremen and workplace leaders 
in ‘informal organizations’ (Suzuki 2003) aiming to isolate ‘leftist’ elements. 
When the campaign succeeded in taking over control of many unions in the 
private sector, the Sōhyō and communist-aff iliated unions began to create 
cultural circles in order to maintain their organizational bases. To counter 
this, companies built ‘independent’ leisure circles (Gordon 1997).
1970s: Countermovement in Nuclear Politics
Inaba’s ‘neutral third-party movement’ was essentially the organization of a 
countermovement modelled after ‘informal organizations’ and ‘independ-
ent leisure circles’ in nuclear politics. In the 1970s the civil use of nuclear 
power became increasingly contested in Japan. Union members, consumer 
advocates, critical scientists, and lawyers cooperated with the opposition 
parties to mobilize protests against the siting of nuclear power plants. 
The time needed to build the reactors increased (Aldrich 2008). In 1974, 
the government’s nuclear policy suffered a major defeat when Japan’s f irst 
nuclear-powered ship was blocked re-entrance into its home port by angry 
f ishermen after a radiation leak (JAERO 1994: 240).
To counter these trends the JPC started mobilizing Dōmei union members. 
The JPC held regular ‘energy seminars’ from 1976 to 1981, inviting union 
members, journalists and academics emphasizing the need for nuclear 
power. It also started organizing ‘grassroots movements’ based on local 
Dōmei and DSP organizations and local business groups, starting with 
a ‘meeting of people in Shimane prefecture for the promotion of nuclear 
energy’ (Suzuki 2016: 598). In the same year Japan’s f irst ‘pro-nuclear citizen 
group,’ Energy and Life-Citizen Group, was founded by a nuclear engineer. 
The founder had worked as consultant for companies and think tanks in 
the nuclear industry and later founded two companies offering services 
92  TObIAS wEISS 
related to the ‘public acceptance’ of nuclear power (Minakuchi 2016). In 
the group’s newsletter he conceded that most of the 300 participants had 
been union members in companies in the nuclear industry (EKSKH 1998). 
In a newspaper article the group was introduced as ‘founded by heavy 
machinery and utility union members and nuclear power researchers’ (AS 
1989b). It aimed to ‘expand the discussion’ concerning nuclear power and 
contribute to a ‘healthy energy development’ in Japan. While this pioneer 
group of the ‘pro-nuclear civil society’ did not survive until 2011, a multitude 
of similar groups appeared from the early 1990s on.
The Regional Base of the ‘Pro-nuclear Civil Society’
Through a subsidy system installed in 1974, JAERO, JPC and other govern-
ment-aff iliated foundations in alliance with utility companies and JAIF 
became suppliers of capital to local and national subcontractor groups. 
Local sub-leaders play an important role in mobilizing members through 
relatively hierarchical, clientelist networks (for details on mechanisms of 
mobilization, see Weiss 2019b). This hierarchical element is also visible 
in the regional atomic forums of JAIF. Dense personal and institutional 
networks managed by local power holders (yūryokusha) allowed the re-
gional nuclear forums to mobilize large parts of the local populations. 
Local atomic forums were in most regions built inside the local chambers 
of commerce (shōkō kaigisho), which were at the same time a support base 
of the LDP (Taguchi 1960). From the organizational structures of JAIF and 
the spatial concentration of other ‘pro-nuclear groups’ it appears that this 
is especially true for regions where nuclear power plants came to generate 
an important share of public and private income like the prefectures of 
Fukui, Fukushima, Aomori and Ibaraki, hosting multiple nuclear power 
facilities.2 For instance, the Hokuriku Nuclear Forum, established in the 
1970s, mobilized a large number of private companies (including newspa-
pers and TV stations) in the three prefectures of Hokuriku and included 
representatives of most universities, some schools, and the agricultural 
and f ishing cooperatives as well as housewives’ federations ( fujinren) and 
young men’s federations (seinendan) of the three Hokuriku prefectures 
(HGK 2002: 3). This encompassing mobilization can probably be attributed 
2 The concentration of multiple facilities in a few locations is connected to the fact that it 
is easier to convince communities already hosting one reactor to accept a new one. Also, host 
communities come to rely on subsidies and tend to accept additional reactors providing resources 
to maintain public income at a high level.
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to top-down calls for mobilization via mid-level local leaders, the prevailing 
mode of organization of conservative associations at that time (compare 
Taguchi 1960). Progressive groups like the prefectural Sōhyō unions were 
not included, however, presumably because they were opposed to nuclear 
power or at least opposed to the conservative organizations at the time 
the forum was set up (HGK 2002: 3, 8). Local volunteers were recruited 
through a ‘nuclear power monitor’ system created in 1978 by the Science 
and Technology Agency. For this programme a number of local opinion 
leaders were handpicked by governments of prefectures where nuclear 
power plants were located to communicate the safety of nuclear power 
and gather people’s opinions (Interview FNRAJG 2017). The system was 
put in place shortly before a reform that increased the frequency of public 
hearings on the building of nuclear power plants (AS 1979).
1980-1990s: Expansion of the Countermovement
Honda (2005: 79-85) notes that with the victory of conservative unionism 
leading to the founding of the Rengō federation (the merger of Sōhyō and 
Dōmei union federations proceeded in the 1980s), the basis of the anti-nuclear 
movement in labour unions was signif icantly weakened. Since the early 
1980s, however, a ‘new wave’ of the anti-nuclear movement had risen. This 
‘new wave’ emerged from a stratum of middle-aged housewives organized in 
consumer groups (JAERO 1994: 133). In alliance with youth groups and older 
activists from the 1960s student movement, they staged protests against a 
test at the Ikata nuclear power plant in 1988 and the building of a nuclear 
fuel reprocessing plant in Aomori in the early 1990s (Suga 2012). On the local 
level, residents’ movements were aided by a series of scandals and accidents 
in the nuclear industry from the 1990s (Yoshioka 2011). They succeeded in 
stopping two construction projects as well as the use of plutonium-enriched 
fuel in one location (Honda 2005). Also, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
international environmental groups gained a foothold in Japan (Mason 1999). 
The international NGO Greenpeace, for instance, staged protests against 
the transport of reprocessed plutonium from Europe to Japan (AS 1992). 
Suga (2012) argues that this ‘new wave’ was the most substantial challenge 
to Japanese nuclear power policy in Japanese history. In this situation the 
countermovement sought to expand its influence to weaken the social 
basis of protest activity.
The local atomic forums had targeted women using existing networks, 
including parent-teacher associations and women’s groups, to screen PR 
f ilms and invite researchers and celebrities to deliver talks directed at 
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female audiences. In Hokuriku the targeting of housewives started in 1979 
(HGK 2002: 8). These groups expanded through the mobilization of female 
employees of the nuclear industry, related businesses and the use of family 
and local networks (Weiss 2019b). Most local JAIF groups organized women’s 
groups under (at least nominally) separate organizations (see Weiss 2019b: 
5-13). The prefectural groups were organized into subgroups on the local town 
and village level. In some towns where plants are located these groups claim 
impressive membership numbers. For instance, the Takahama Women’s 
Net in the town of Takahama, a community with 10,000 residents hosting 
four nuclear reactors, claims to have 1,300 female members (Weiss 2019b). 
If we take the female population to be around 50%, this would add up to 
one-quarter of the female population. While the ‘pro-nuclear groups’ might 
have an interest to inflate their membership, and thus the numbers cannot 
be taken at face value, encompassing mobilization is surely related to the 
strong reliance of host communities on subsidies and economic benef its 
accompanied by the building and operation of nuclear power plants.
The 1990s and early 2000s saw the emergence of various ‘pro-nuclear 
consumer and environmental groups.’ From 1989, JAERO took responsibility 
over the nuclear power monitor system. The dispatch of speakers (kōshi-
haken) for various kinds of events was stepped up. Subcontractors of JAERO 
and other companies and organizations connected to the nuclear industry 
started to conduct regular education seminars for opinion leaders from 
various social strata to educate them about energy issues, radiation and 
related topics. These opinion leaders are then mobilized to spread their 
‘educated opinion’ among followers and the general public on symposia and 
various kinds of events. In 1989 TEPCO alone was dispatching speakers to 
a hundred events per month (AS 1989a). Government agencies, other utili-
ties and semi-private groups sponsor additional symposia, workshops etc. 
Together, the multiple events by various organizations make for a large-scale 
pro-nuclear education campaign.
After an accident in Japan’s fast-breeding reactor in 1995, the monitor 
programme’s scale was expanded (JAEC 1996). Another programme supply-
ing speakers for nuclear power education events had been installed in 1979. 
METI cooperated with businesses to create a programme aimed at building 
up a corps of consumer advocates outside the framework of the pre-existing 
(relatively independent) consumer movement. These consumption life 
advisors (shōhi seikatsu advisor) were recruited mainly among housewives. 
They are trained to mediate between consumer interests and businesses. 
Consumption life advisors are hired by companies. They listen to consumers 
and represent their perspective within the companies, helping to develop 
ThE CAMPAIGN fOR NUCLEAR POwER IN JAPAN bEfORE AND AfTER 2011 95
better products (AS 1980). A foundation was created by MITI to develop the 
curriculum, conduct professional examinations, and certify the education 
of graduates of this new programme. Today about 14,000 consumption life 
advisors are represented in a nationwide network of NPOs and federations 
(NSK 2012). TEPCO, for instance, became a major employer of consumption 
life advisors (Hōgaku Shoin Henshūbu 1999).
In the 1990s, the Ministry of the Environment also created a programme 
to educate a corps of environmental counsellors (kankyō counselor). Similar 
to the consumption life advisors, environmental counsellors are hired by 
companies to mediate in cases of conflict over environmental issues, or 
to lecture about compliance and social responsibility; they also obtain 
employment from public agencies (Kozumi and Sasaki 2010). While only a 
part of all consumption life advisors and environmental counsellors deal 
with nuclear power, both often appear as pro-nuclear speakers in local 
and national advisory councils and as lecturers on events and hearings 
sponsored by the nuclear industry together with direct stakeholders like 
scientists and employees of the nuclear industry (Weiss 2019b).
Within the JPC, an umbrella organization named Energy Think Together 
(ETT) was created in 1990 aiming to ‘think about energy, everybody together, 
and spread the information gained this way’ (ETT 2017). In 1991, an informal 
advisory council f inanced by the Science and Technology Agency and run 
by JAERO was installed to come up with a ‘strategy for public acceptance of 
nuclear power.’ This document, whose main authors were not bureaucrats, 
but think tank employees, journalists and scholars, put housewives in the 
centre of attention of nuclear power PR: ‘Women trust local consumer 
centres. They have a strong interest in the environment. If we can co-opt 
the leaders of such centres, they would make for strong allies’ (GPAHI 1991). 
Various ‘pro-nuclear citizen groups’ emerged promoting ‘environmental 
protection through nuclear power,’ ‘energy education,’ ‘energy from a con-
sumer’s perspective,’ and ‘radiation education’ (for an overview of these 
groups, see Weiss 2019b).
Before 2011: An NPO Boom?
In 2000 the Science and Technology Agency’s radiation monitor programme 
was terminated. Starting around the same time multiple non-prof it or-
ganizations (NPOs) promoting nuclear power began to appear. There had 
been a change in legislation in 1998, creating this new type of association. 
This led to an ‘NPO boom,’ the rise of a non-prof it sector of about 70,000 
organizations (Ogawa, this volume). The nuclear industry apparently saw 
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promise in using NPOs to promote nuclear power. On the national level, 
utilities like TEPCO and Kansai Electric Power sponsored women’s groups 
focusing on consumer issues and environmental protection. An umbrella 
group named Asuka Energy Forum – active in the market areas of TEPCO 
and the utilities of Tōhoku, Hokkaidō, Chūbu, Hokuriku (except Fukui) and 
Chūgoku3 with local women’s subgroups in various nuclear power plant 
locations and smaller cities – was created in 2001 and became an NPO in 
2003. This group claims to have twelve local subgroups, some of them also 
registered as NPOs (Weiss 2019b: 5-13). Kansai Electric Power sponsored its 
own NPO in 2001. Another NPO was co-opted by Denjiren, the federation of 
utility companies. Its activities initially aimed at spreading ideas of recycling 
and waste management in Japan (see Weiss 2019b). From 2007 the group 
became a partner of the government’s search for a nuclear waste disposal 
facility co-sponsoring several workshops. Asuka and the respective local 
groups started to conduct and promote various kinds of activities to attract 
new people to their activities. These activities are at times reflected in the 
names of the local subgroups. One of them, for example, is the Readers Circle 
Aomori, founded in 1995, and another local group is simply called Free Time, 
founded in 1993 (Weiss 2019b). The activities described in Asuka’s newsletter 
range from regular ‘energy cooking’ with celebrities to local ‘energy talks’ 
for women and power plant and facility tours (AEF 2001-2012). Asuka and 
other groups also placed expensive advertisements in newspapers to attract 
new members (Sugimoto 2013a).
Nuclear scientists and technicians also began to found various NPOs 
in the 2000s. A name appearing in multiple groups is that of Akito Arima. 
Arima is a nuclear physicist and became head of Tokyo University in the 
1980s and LDP Diet member and Minister of Education in 1998. During the 
1967-1968 student movement he had been appointed special assistant of 
the president of Tokyo University to handle the measures against revolting 
students. When he became president of Tokyo University in the 1980s, 
he started a drive to collect funds from the private sector to upgrade the 
university’s facilities (AS 2015a, AS 2015b). Arima is in the board of six NPOs 
and other groups engaged in nuclear-power-related activities (Weiss 2019b: 
5-13).4 Other nuclear engineering professors founded similar groups and 
3 Until 2011 the electricity market was split into ten regional utilities, each controlling electric-
ity production, distribution and sale in its area.
4 These are the Radiation Education Forum (founded 1994, NPO in 2000), the Internet Journalist 
Association (2002), and the groups Thinking about the Earth Group (founded 2007, inactive), 
Japan Energy Conference (founded 2012), Japan Energy Policy Forum (founded 2012) and the 
National Nuclear Conference (founded 2014).
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NPOs. Like the NPOs targeting women, they conduct lectures and symposia 
about the effects of radiation and the need for nuclear power and its safety. 
While some of them concentrate mainly on research and academic activities, 
all of them are engaged in nuclear power PR to some extent (Weiss 2019b: 
5-13). The researchers often team up with representatives of the women’s 
NPOs to combine a ‘consumer perspective’ on nuclear power with scientif ic 
knowledge (for example, in the energy talks conducted by Asuka; AEF 
2001-2012). Like the women’s NPOs, they receive subcontracts for PR and 
workshops aiming to f ind a site for a nuclear waste disposal facility from 
the government and the nuclear industry (see below). There are also groups 
organizing journalists, media celebrities, business elites and policymakers 
(on the national level) as well as businessmen and teachers from communi-
ties with nuclear plants. Some of them have NPO status, some not. It appears 
that parts of the groups organized in JAIF forums were transferred to NPOs 
and groups with a more modern appearance.
The various pro-nuclear groups receive substantial amounts of money 
as subcontractors for the government and the nuclear industry, as well 
as donations. Two sources of f inancial support deserve special attention.
(1) Until 2011, utilities in Japan were endowed with regional monopolies. 
The energy prices were proposed based on cost projections by the utilities 
and are subject to permission by METI. In the projection of costs, public 
relations and public acceptance measures were included under the label 
‘development and diffusion costs’ ( fukyū kaihatsu kankeihi) of nuclear 
power plants. Informal meetings, advertisements, facility tours, the dispatch 
of speakers as well as costs of PR facilities can be f inanced through the 
electricity fees. Due to this way of budgeting the utilities have the f inancial 
means for various kinds of activities. There are extraordinary amounts of 
electricity money (denryoku money) available in public relations campaigns. 
A journalist traced the trend of development and diffusion costs over 40 
years and concluded that they were elevated as a countermeasure to the loss 
of trust each time after a major nuclear accident. From 1990 to 2011 these 
costs exceeded €650 million5 per year (Komori 2012a).
(2) In addition to the electricity fee, a rich subsidy system for communi-
ties hosting power plants was installed in 1974. A special budget for these 
subsidies was installed outside of the Diet – the special budget for electricity 
sources (Dengen Tokubetsu Kaikei). The subsidies are distributed by METI 
and the Ministry of Education (MEXT, before 2002 by the Science and 
Technology Agency). Since a change in the electricity law in 2002 (the basic 
5 Euro f igures were calculated using Yen-Euro exchange rates from 2017.
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energy policy law), NPOs and other groups can team up with foundations 
like JAERO or private companies receiving these subsidies as subcontractors 
(see below).
This f inancial environment guarantees a steady f low of money to the 
pro-nuclear campaign. Prior to 2011 ‘pro-nuclear civil society’ groups were 
much better off f inancially than their anti-nuclear counterparts (for details 
on the funding, see Weiss 2019b: 5-13).
Framing of Nuclear Power
Since I have described the framing of nuclear power by the ‘pro-nuclear 
civil society’ in detail elsewhere (Weiss 2019a: 188-239, 279-291), I will only 
give a brief overview here. In general, nuclear power is framed positively by 
all of the groups. Recurring themes are Japan’s reliance on nuclear power 
and its lack of natural energy sources, its dependence on foreign energy, 
the safety and high technological level of nuclear power, the need for a 
stable supply of energy (or a balanced energy mix), the economic benefits 
of nuclear power, for instance, low electricity prices and the economic gains 
from exports. The pro-nuclear groups underline that nuclear weapons and 
nuclear power are completely separate issues. A relatively prominent aspect 
of their framing is also the claim that nuclear power is a green technology, 
serving to limit carbon dioxide production. As described above, many of the 
pro-nuclear groups are based in peripheral regions of Japan, where power 
plants are located. They argue that the building of nuclear power plants 
contributes to regional development, and they underline the integration 
of power plants into the local community emphasizing their contribution 
to national prosperity through electricity production. Another common 
thread is the focus on ‘educating’ the population to overcome ‘irrational 
sentiments’ regarding nuclear power.
The groups run by scientists and political elites tend towards a technical 
and policy-oriented framing. In a newspaper advertisement by the Thinking 
about the Earth Group, which was organized as a ‘national movement 
to establish love for the earth’ before the Tokyo Summit in 2008 (Sankei 
Shinbun 2008) the founder Akito Arima describes the carbon dioxide 
output in tons by various countries and explains that in the future fossil 
fuels will run out. He goes on to explain that carbon dioxide emissions are 
increasing and that new energy sources won’t be ready in time to inhibit 
global warming. Arima then shifts his focus to nuclear power, which he 
presents as the only chance to f ight global warming and prepare for future 
scarcity of fossil fuels.
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Some groups employ more aggressive rhetoric. Members of a gathering 
called ‘Making Statements about Nuclear Power Group,’ consisting mainly 
of former nuclear power technicians and managers, for instance, label 
themselves as ‘worried patriots’ (ukoku no shi) and underline that ‘whenever 
we meet and talk about nuclear power, we express our worries and criticism 
about Japan’s energy policy, the media, and the present situation.’ They aim 
to ‘disseminate our right opinion [tadashii iken] and our right information 
[tadashii jōhō] based on the common understanding that nuclear power 
cannot be disregarded in Japanese energy policy.’ They go on to explain that 
‘nowadays the enemies of nuclear power are actively making statements in 
an organized way, and the pro-nuclear group often remains silent’ (GMHK 
2006).
In contrast to this rather aggressive framing, women’s groups focus on 
everyday life and employ a softer language. In the Asuka newsletter (AEFN 
2001: 1) the chairwoman introduces the group with the following statement:
We are a group of consumption life advisors interested in the energy 
problem. We conducted study groups and have taken part in [nuclear 
facility] tours and visits for a couple of years. […] We realized how im-
portant it is to raise one’s voice as a consumer. From our consumption 
life advisor standpoint, bringing together the three groups of companies, 
the administration and consumers, we want to participate widely and 
disseminate information!
After an ‘energy talk salon’ in Japan’s largest power plant location, Kashi-
wazaki, one member sums up her conclusions (AEFN 2002: 2):
Talking with middle school students I felt that they don’t have a sense for 
saving energy. It is natural for them to have plenty of energy. Even if we 
use as much of it as we want, there are no problems. […] It is an adult’s 
responsibility to learn about the problems of energy and environment, 
which are at the basis of everyday life.
Another member adds (AEFN 2002: 2):
If we think about energy and electricity it is common to think in pat-
terns like pro-nuclear vs anti-nuclear or to assume that saving energy and 
promoting renewables is equal to saving the environment. But since already 
42% of greater Tokyo’s energy supply comes from nuclear power, we cannot 
let go of nuclear power and only increase energy saving and renewables.
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While the language is softer than in the more ‘masculine’ groups of scientists 
(presumably due to the mainly male audience), Asuka members make 
clear that they were surprised to learn that ‘not everything in the news 
is true’ and remind journalists to ‘stick to the truth.’ The newsletter also 
presents the tour report of a ‘wind turbine, which did not move, due to lack 
of wind’ (AEFN 2002: 3). Local people from Kashiwazaki are reported to have 
asked their counterparts from Tokyo, who were invited for this event, to ‘be 
aware that their energy is produced in Kashiwazaki’ and to ‘become able to 
understand nuclear reactors and pluthermal’ (Plutonium-Uranium mixed 
oxide fuel, a measure promoted by the government to reduce the growing 
stock of Plutonium) (AEFN 2002: 2).
Political Influence
It is diff icult to evaluate the pronuclear groups’ inf luence on political 
decisions because their policy preferences usually do not differ very much 
from that of its political allies in state agencies. However, the pro-nuclear 
countermovement also gained a say in policymaking through inclusion in 
government advisory councils (shingikai) and government organizations. 
Through these vehicles it articulated mainly the interests of its major spon-
sors, the nuclear industry, but also of the regions benefitting from financial 
support for hosting nuclear power plants. One of its aims is the preservation 
and expansion of existing financial resources. Continuing reliance on nuclear 
power and upholding the major pillars of nuclear power policy, for instance, 
developing a nuclear fuel cycle, is important for regions heavily engaged in 
nuclear power production and reprocessing like Aomori and Fukui.
Since the beginning of Japan’s nuclear programme in 1954, various parts 
of society have been involved in the local and national forums of JAIF and 
the JAEC, the government’s highest decision-making body in nuclear policy 
before 2011, coordinating related agencies and social groups (Yoshioka 2011). 
With the growth of the countermovement the government created formal 
posts for ‘pro-nuclear civil society representatives,’ some of them also 
equipped with decision-making powers. Since 1998 (when Arima became 
Minister of Education) a female ‘civil society representative’ is chosen at the 
highest level of administration for the Atomic Energy Commission to signify 
the inclusion of energy consumers into the nuclear power administration. 
The first such representative was a free TV moderator, featuring in numerous 
programmes sponsored by the utilities. From 1990 on she was member of the 
planning board of ETT, and from 1994 advisor to the JPC. She was succeeded 
by the leader of a pro-nuclear NPO in 2007. In 2010 the leader of Asuka Energy 
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Forum was chosen as the successor (JAEC n.d.). In 2001, after the end of 
the nuclear power monitor system, the JAEC established a Subcommittee 
for Citizen Participation (Shimin Sanka Kondankai) and packed it with 
representatives of the ‘pro-nuclear civil society’ (JAEC 2009). Asuka’s regular 
‘private’ events in various locations appear to have been conducted parallel 
to the ‘official’ public hearings carried out by the JAEC (Asuka Energy Forum, 
2002-2012). After 2011 it actually turned out that the NPOs were involved in 
mobilizing ‘citizens’ for the JAEC hearings (Weiss 2019b).
The political influence of the pro-nuclear movement can be seen in the 
Basic Energy Policy Law (Enerugī Seisaku Kihonhō) of 2001, which served 
to hedge liberalization plans originating within the state bureaucracy. 
From the 1990s, in the context of a global trend towards liberalization and 
privatization of public services, bureaucrats within MITI started to question 
the monopoly of the electricity companies. A partial liberalization was 
conducted to the effect that businesses were enabled to choose where to 
buy their electricity, but due to the regional monopolies of the utilities for 
private customers and their ownership of electricity grids the effects were 
limited (AS 2014b). To counter further liberalization, LDP politicians close 
to the energy companies drafted a Basic Energy Policy Law in 2001. It was 
criticized by opposition parties as ‘aiming to cement the use of nuclear 
power’ because the drafting followed defeats of the pro-nuclear coalition 
in regional non-binding referenda and it decided that ‘local communities 
have a responsibility to cooperate in the siting of nuclear plants’ (ESK 2002). 
The law was also criticized by a private think tank because ‘the safety of 
the energy supply’ – essentially meaning the use of nuclear power – was 
placed above ‘the market principle’ (AS 2001). It went largely unnoticed in 
the discussion that there was a paragraph included allowing ‘non-prof it 
organizations to take part in public acceptance activities’ (ESK 2002). This 
paragraph served as the basis for a more important role of the ‘pro-nuclear 
civil society.’ NPOs and other groups began to act as subcontractors to the 
JAEC’s public hearings, and METI’s and MEXT’s various social education 
programmes.
In this way the ‘citizen representatives’ in the JAEC’s and METI’s various 
advisory councils were in a position to argue for increasing the programmes 
they themselves benef itted from. An NPO leader, for instance, argued to 
expand a specif ic nuclear power PR workshop program in a METI advisory 
council and later happened become subcontractor for the same program with 
her NPO (Sugimoto 2013a, 2013c). In 2010 the ‘pro-nuclear civil society’ seemed 
powerful as never before. NPOs gained large sums for public enlightenment 
projects such as the search for a nuclear waste disposal site and donations 
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by the nuclear industry (Sugimoto 2013b). The newly elected Democratic 
Party (DPJ) decided to increase the share of nuclear power production from 
about 30 to 50% and public opinion was in favour of nuclear power (Iwai 
and Shishido 2015).
Changes after the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
The Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011 was not only a major environmental 
catastrophe, but also a political disaster for the pro-nuclear campaign. 
During the course of events the countermovement found itself cut off from 
important decision-making bodies for the f irst time in history – if only for a 
short period. In the f irst months after the accident the DPJ government was 
occupied by the immediate countermeasures against widespread destruction 
caused by the Tsunami. Under the DPJ’s Minister of Economy, Banri Kaieda, 
the pro-nuclear movement was able to retain its influence. In early April 2011 
METI announced the building of a ‘wise men group’ (kenjinkai) to discuss 
future energy policy. Akito Arima, a key member of the ‘pro-nuclear civil 
society,’ was to head the commission (AS 2011a). In June 2011 the commit-
tee’s name disappeared from the news. There were rumours in the media 
about arguments between Prime Minister Naoto Kan and Kaieda. A weekly 
magazine reported that an agency of METI had prepared the committee 
to stage a pseudo-discussion and the result (to stick to nuclear power) was 
already decided (Aera 2011). Kan, however, announced that nuclear power 
policy would be discussed from the scratch. He was pressured to step down 
in August 2011 by the LDP and critics within his own party, who threatened 
to block major policy proposals. However, under Yukio Edano, a top DPJ 
politician who became Minister of Economy under Kan’s successor, a new 
committee to decide basic energy policy (Sōgō Enerugī Chōsakai Kihon 
Mondai Iinkai) staffed to one-third with experts sceptical towards nuclear 
power (while the chairman was a staunch supporter) was installed (AS 2011e). 
During Edano’s term the ‘pro-nuclear civil society’ found itself sidelined by 
scholars and policymakers oriented towards liberalization. While Edano 
was in favour of restarting reactors as soon as possible, he took a tough 
position on Kyushu Electric Power (Kyūden), which had become caught 
up in a scandal touching the core of the ‘pro-nuclear civil society.’ Kyūden 
had called on its own employees as well as employees of its subcontractors 
to speak out for the restart of nuclear reactors during a public hearing 
event. Because these smaller companies depend on Kyūden for contracts, 
there was a high chance that such requests would be fulf illed. During the 
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event, which was organized by the JPC, many of these mobilized ‘citizens’ 
voiced their support for a quick restart. However, the call for mobilization 
was leaked and became a major scandal. From mid-2011 similar scandals 
involving other utilities became public. It turned out that METI’s organiza-
tion responsible for nuclear safety and other METI agencies had actually 
requested the ‘pro-nuclear citizens’ to turn out at hearings (AS 2011b). As a 
reaction to Kyūden’s lukewarm handling of the incident, METI under Edano 
blocked a major extension of credit by the Development Bank of Japan to 
the company (AS 2011d).
In 2012, there was substantial inf ighting in the DPJ about energy policy. 
When it became clear that TEPCO was heading towards default due to 
the costs of the accident and that the government had to step in, the DPJ 
was supplied with additional leverage over METI and the nuclear industry 
(Ōshika 2011). The DPJ installed a committee to analyse the f inancial situ-
ation of TEPCO, which criticized the utility’s use of monopoly prof its for 
advertising etc. (AS 2011c). As a follow-up, a committee was appointed 
to check the use of electricity fees in case a utility applied for increasing 
electricity prices. This was an ad hoc measure to change the practice of 
the existing framework without a change of law, which would take more 
time. As a consequence, the utilities’ freedom in calculating the ‘costs for 
dissemination and development,’ one of the pillars of resource supply for 
the pro-nuclear movement, was reduced (Komori 2012b).
The JAEC, the policy body with legal decision-making power in nuclear 
policy and one of the hosts of the ‘citizen representatives,’ got caught up 
in another scandal. In May 2012 it became public that it had conducted 
secret meetings with representatives of the nuclear industry and only the 
pro-nuclear members of one of its advisory councils (AS 2012e). It also became 
a target of pressure for reform and the DPJ built an advisory council to come 
up with proposals for reform. The JAEC was subsequently stripped of the 
power to decide the basic nuclear energy plans, something that had been 
decided every three years before.
The DPJ also installed a minister’s conference to come up with a new 
comprehensive energy strategy. It offered three choices for the long-term 
future of nuclear power: 0, 15, or 20-25%. As part of the policymaking process, 
deliberative polls on the future energy policy were conducted. They were 
outsourced to the PR firm Hakuhōdō, which gathered the opinions of citizen 
via the internet. During the f irst few meetings it turned out that, again, 
employees of the nuclear industry were among the citizens stating opinions 
(they had been picked from the pro-nuclear opinions in the internet). After 
severe criticism, employees of the nuclear industry were excluded from 
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appearing as speakers at discussion events and the distribution of speak-
ers was changed from one-third for every option to a bigger share for the 
0% option, because the overwhelming majority of internet opinions had 
favoured it (AS 2012a). The (unintended) results of the poll conducted outside 
of the framework of the pro-nuclear campaign proved decisive to force the 
new DPJ leadership into a commitment to nuclear phase-out by 2030 (AS 
2012c). While the initial DPJ statement was weakened after protests from 
Japan’s largest business federation in September 2012, the challenge to the 
‘pro-nuclear civil society’ was substantial.
The Pro-nuclear Campaign in the Opposition
During this period former Education Minister Akito Arima gathered his 
allies from the business, science and media communities and founded 
yet another group, the Energy Policy Discussion Group (Enerugī Seisaku 
Kondankai), to make an appeal to Prime Minister Noda in March 2012 (AS 
2012b). ETT also had to descend into opposition and leave its headquarters 
within the JPC to relocate to the private Economic Marketing Centre (Keizai 
Kōhō Sentā) run by the largest business federation. The relocation appears 
to have been a reaction to increased media attention to its activities in the 
wake of the Kyūden scandal. The strongholds of the ‘pro-nuclear civil society,’ 
the prefectures and communities hosting a large number of nuclear power 
plants, were important in influencing the Noda government to back away 
from drastic changes in nuclear policy. When the Minister of the Economy, 
Edano, declared that he envisioned zero dependence on nuclear power in 
the future, while meeting with the governor of Fukui prefecture to discuss 
the restart of nuclear reactors under new ad hoc safety regulations in 2012, 
the governor refused to meet him again and forced Prime Minister Noda to 
publicly commit to nuclear power (MS 2012). When it became public that the 
government was considering reducing the amount of nuclear fuel processing 
in a facility built in Aomori, the prefecture’s governor announced that the 
facility’s nuclear waste would then be returned to where it came from, 
forcing the DPJ to abandon its plan (AS 2012f). After the Vice-Minister of 
the Economy announced that the government was considering stopping the 
development of the fast-breeding reactor Monju, the governor of Fukui and 
the mayor of the host community protested and pushed the DPJ government 
to reverse the decision (AS 2012d).
The pro-nuclear movement was spared more drastic cuts by the second 
major funding source, the special budget for electricity sources (Dengen 
Tokubetsu Kaikei). The DPJ had announced a major revision of energy policy, 
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including a review of the special budget to acquire funds for reconstruction 
after the Tsunami. Before this could be put to practice, however, it suffered a 
crushing defeat in the December 2012 lower house election and was almost 
eradicated as a political force in the subsequent elections. The new LDP 
government cancelled the revision and the pro-nuclear movement returned 
to the advisory councils (AS 2013). However, a legacy of the DPJ’s changes in 
energy policy remains. During the creation of the new Nuclear Regulation 
Authority (NRA) under the umbrella of the Ministry of the Environment 
(also done in 2012 by a cooperation between the DPJ, the LDP and its later 
coalition partner, Kōmeitō), members of the ‘pro-nuclear civil society’ were 
kept out of influential positions (Koppenborg 2020). The NRA since then 
has become a major target of protests by ‘pro-nuclear civil society’ groups 
(see below).
Framing after 2011
After 2011, the framing of the ‘pro-nuclear groups’ has become more ag-
gressive. Arima’s National Nuclear Conference and other groups regularly 
criticise various media programmes and newspapers in their newsletters 
and in ‘off icial statements’ (e.g. EMHK 2019). Former Prime Minister Naoto 
Kan is being depicted by the pro-nuclear campaign as the man who plunged 
the nuclear administration into chaos, as is his party, the DPJ (Weiss 2019a). 
The pro-nuclear campaign, in alliance with conservative media and the 
LDP, was relatively successful in disseminating this framing. The host 
communities of nuclear power plants arguably also helped to frame the 
DPJ government as wavering and irresponsible. The next Prime Minister, 
Abe, was one of the initiators of this narrative. From an early point after 
the nuclear accident he accused DPJ Prime Minister Kan of interfering 
in the management of the accident, overestimating his own competence 
and not listening to experts (Weiss 2019a: 292-294). The Asahi Shinbun, a 
newspaper which had become critical of nuclear power after 3.11, suffered a 
major defeat when it was accused by parts of the media and the pro-nuclear 
campaign of misrepresenting TEPCO and the head of the Fukushima 1 
nuclear power plant, who was a national hero, according to the pro-nuclear 
campaigners (Weiss 2019a: 478-489). They also harshly criticize the NRA 
for ‘not functioning properly’ because the new safety procedure takes too 
long in their eyes; they want the NRA to emphasize the safety of nuclear 
power plants. The pro-nuclear groups’ homepages and newsletters also 
became more active in disseminating information on the negative effects 
and problems of renewable energy (e.g. NEK n.d.). Multiple groups handed 
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petitions to the government calling for a full commitment to nuclear power 
and some have also called for the ending of the limitations put on nuclear 
PR (GKMK 2015). They paint a very dark picture of the future in case Japan 
does not spend more effort to restore nuclear power. In reaction to the 
Fukushima accident, the ‘female’ groups of the campaign increased their 
focus on radiation and food safety, but their framing also resonates with the 
changes towards a more negative framing of the government’s policy in the 
‘male’-oriented groups, while using softer words and less direct accusations, 
warning, for instance, of ‘hasty decisions in energy policy (AEFN 2012).’
A Return to Power?
The LDP government, which was elected in December 2012, proved 
hesitant to restore the ‘pro-nuclear civil society’ to full power in energy 
policy. In METI advisory councils, proponents of liberalization have 
retained inf luence and in 2016 the electricity market for consumers was 
liberalized. This keeps electricity companies under pressure to reduce 
costs and limits the potential for large-scale PR measures, like before 
the accident. As a consequence of the accident, METI aims to separate 
ownership of the electricity grid and electricity production by 2020, a 
reform, which could potentially further undermine the position of the 
utilities and their ability to support the ‘pro-nuclear civil society.’ However, 
at the same time, the government aims to guarantee the prof itability of 
nuclear power by introducing a f inancial mechanism for supporting it 
(AS 2014a).
It is thus unclear, whether the financial basis and political influence of the 
‘pro-nuclear civil society’ will be reduced signif icantly. Despite the changes 
in regulation of the electricity prices, regarding the ‘output side’ – the budgets 
of the pro-nuclear groups – there is no clear trend. A limited number of new 
groups and NPOs were actually founded after 2011. Arima again participated 
in the founding of at least three groups. They, however, appear to be mainly 
regroupings and fusions of older activities under new names (Weiss 2019b). 
The budget available for the ‘pro-nuclear civil society’ suffered some cuts 
after the accident. TEPCO was forced to signif icantly decrease its PR budget 
from about €210 million in 2011 to about €27 million in 2012 (Komori 2012b). 
Some groups were criticized directly in parts of the media for accepting large 
amounts of money from the state and the nuclear industry while claiming 
to be ‘neutral citizens.’ Some groups showed a tendency towards declining 
funding from public and corporate sources in the years immediately after 
the accident. After a few years, however, funding has risen again, while not 
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completely returning to pre-3.11 levels (Weiss 2019b: 5-13). There were also 
internal discussions about whether to continue JAERO’s funding or not, but 
it continues operations (Interview Funakoshi 2015).
After the chairwoman of Asuka, who was also a member of JAEC, was 
severely criticized by newspapers and the DPJ in the Diet for delivering 
propaganda for money, using her public vehicle for private NPO events, 
and conflating her public position with her NPO activities, another NPO 
representative – a radiation researcher – was awarded the ‘citizen position’ 
in the JAEC in 2013. The JAEC was stripped of its most important policy 
competences, which were transferred to METI under Prime Minister Abe, 
but it retains some functions, for instance, evaluating nuclear policy. In 
general, the pro-nuclear movement retained power in organizations less 
affected by scandals and subjected to DPJ reforms. This led to (limited) 
divisions between different government agencies. A MEXT advisory council 
created to decide over the future of Japan’s fast-breeding reactor in 2016, 
for instance, was staffed with supporters of the pro-nuclear movement, 
Akito Arima being the chairman. The NRA had recommended that the 
ministry change the organization running the current fast breeder Monju 
(because it considered the current organization not suitable because of 
past mismanagement). MEXT off icials reportedly were worried that the 
NRA could derail their efforts to continue the development of the nuclear 
fuel cycle (AS 2015c).
Conclusion
The Japanese nuclear industry, in coordination with state agencies from 
the 1970s on, has mobilized stakeholders with a direct or indirect interest 
in nuclear power through monetary and symbolic incentives to form a 
‘pro-nuclear civil society.’ This pattern of building up and supporting a 
countermovement against groups challenging the hegemony of business 
and political elites resembles what has happened in the Japanese labour 
movement. While in terms of policy preferences it is diff icult to separate 
the ‘pro-nuclear activists’ from their sponsors, the pro-nuclear movement 
cannot be simply analysed with a dichotomous conceptualization of ‘the 
state’ versus civil society. First of all, I would argue that the mobilization of 
local and professional communities for nuclear power was a key component 
of the strategy of the nuclear industry and off icials to promote nuclear 
power and check the challenge from the anti-nuclear movement. It is a 
movement directed by a hegemonic developmental alliance mainly focused 
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on mobilizing society to accept and support its aims, but parts of civil society 
took part in the movement and it came to actively employ a ‘civil society 
rhetoric’ and underline its ‘civicness.’
Interestingly, the campaign was enabled by state subsidies and monopoly 
prof its from a sector of the economy which resisted (neo-)liberalization 
efforts to a substantial degree. Contrasting Ogawa’s case study (Ogawa, in 
this volume), because of the movement’s clientelist character, ‘co-optation’ 
rather than ‘co-production,’ might be the more adequate term to describe 
its relation to the state and the nuclear industry. The campaign could be 
seen as a leftover of a fading developmental legacy, but its resilience could 
also point to a continuing pattern of state-society relations. Some of the 
‘volunteer’ programmes and NPOs described in this chapter, for instance, 
were simply refurbishments from older programmes installed under a 
developmental regime.
The movement was able to retain or regain its most important resources, 
namely money and access to political decision-making, via the LDP and 
parts of the bureaucracy in METI and MEXT. Its very core, the foundations 
linking the nuclear industry, bureaucracy and local as well as professional 
communities (for instance, JAERO and JPC), emerged largely untouched from 
the political turmoil following the Fukushima accident. This alone could be 
enough to keep the movement alive. Nuclear scientists, host communities of 
power plants and cadres of the nuclear industry remain active in advocacy 
and the organization of local communities through ‘social education’ and 
the distribution of resources. A key resource, however, might have been lost 
during the accident and the following series of scandals. The legitimacy of 
the pro-nuclear movement has suffered a great deal. While the pro-nuclear 
movement succeeded in framing the DPJ and politicians aiming to overhaul 
nuclear policy as irresponsible and chaotic, public opinion strongly embraced 
nuclear scepticism after the accident (Iwai and Shishido 2015). While the 
aspect of legitimacy cannot be dealt with here extensively, a key question 
concerning the future development of the pro-nuclear movement is: To what 
extent will it be able to overcome its loss of legitimacy?
References
AEF. 2001-2012. Asuka Energī Fōramu Nyūsuretā. Asuka Enerugī Fōramu, no. 1-46. 
http://www.asca-ef.org/public/contents/newsletter/index.html (10 June 2019).
AEFN. 2001. Asuka Enerugī Fōramu Nyūsuretā, no. 1, 20 December.
AEFN. 2002. Asuka Enerugī Fōramu Nyūsuretā, no. 2, 5 October.
ThE CAMPAIGN fOR NUCLEAR POwER IN JAPAN bEfORE AND AfTER 2011 109
AEFN. 2012. Asuka Enerugī Fōramu Nyūsuretā, no. 45, 31 July.
Aera. 2011. ‘Genpatsu Shishu no Scenario: Keisanshō Yabō no Kakuremino Enerugī 
Seisasku Kenjinkaigi.’ 30 May.
Aldrich, Daniel. 2008. Site Fights: Divisive Facilities and Civil Society in Japan and 
the West. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Arima, Tetsuo. 2008. Genpatsu, Shōriki, CIA: Kimitsu Bunsho de Yomu Shōwa 
Rimenshi. Tōkyō: Shinchōsha.
AS. 1979. ‘Genpatsu Kensetsu ni Kōchōkai: Kongo Shinsei no subete.’ Asahi Shinbun, 
23 January, p. 2.
AS. 1980. ‘Kigyō ni Ikase, Shufu no Chie.’ Asahi Shinbun, 24 July, p. 3.
AS. 1989a. ‘Genpatsu Suishin o Kakageru Pasocon Netto Kaikyoku.’ Asahi Shinbun, 
22 February, p. 5.
AS. 1989b. ‘Han-hangenpatsu he Kanmin Kōsei, Kōhō ni 30-oku.’ Asahi Shinbun, 
10 September, p. 3.
AS. 1992. ‘Gaiatsu he no Shisen: Genkai o kanjiru Hankaku Undō: Plutonium 
gap – ka.’ Asahi Shinbun, 1 December, p. 1.
AS. 2001. ‘Shijō genrikatsuyō o: Minkan Seisaku Kikan ga Taian.’ Asahi Shinbun, 
9 November, evening edition, p. 13.
AS. 2011a. ‘Enerugī Seisaku Kentōkai de Kaigisetchi, Kaieda Keisanshō.’ Asahi 
Shinbun, 29 April, p. 6.
AS. 2011b. ‘Genpatsu Shinpo “Yarase”: Kuni no Shiji Nanaken: Daisansha’I ga Saishū-
hōkoku.’ Asahi Shinbun, 10 October, p. 38.
AS. 2011c. ‘Keisanshō, Denkiryō no Arikata Kenshō: Gakushikisha no Kaigi Mōke 
Giron.’ Asahi Shinbun, 18 October, p. 6.
AS. 2011d. ‘Kyūden Tōshi 1000-oku En o Tōketsu: Yarase Konran Chōkika de Seitōgin.’ 
Asahi Shinbun, 21 October, regional morning edition, Kyushu.
AS. 2011e. ‘Sōgō Ene Chōsakai, I’in ni “Genpatsu Hihanha” mo.’ Asahi Shinbun, 
27 September, p. 2.
AS. 2012a. ‘Chōshūkai “Yarase” Hihan: Denryokugaishain ga ‘Genpatsushuishin’-
Iken: Seifu Hikeshi “Hatsugen Kinshi”.’ Asahi Shinbun, 18 July, p. 3.
AS. 2012b. ‘Genpatsu Saikadō o Motomeru Teigen: Zaikaijin ya Daigaku Kyōjura.’ 
Asahi Shinbun, 16 March, p. 7.
AS. 2012c. ‘Genpatsu Zero: Gosan no Seiken, Honmei 15% Shiji Nobizu.’ Asahi 
Shinbun, 23 August, p. 2.
AS. 2012d. ‘Genpatsu Zero Senryaku Guragura, “Monju Hairo” sugu Shūsei, Noda 
Naikaku.’ Asahi Shinbun, 19 September, p. 3.
AS. 2012e. ‘Genshiryoku’i, Mura Taishitsu nao: Suishinha dake de Hikōkai Kaigi.’ 
Asahi Shinbun, 26 May, p. 2.
AS. 2012f. ‘Kodawaru Nishikawa Fukui-ken Chiji: Ōi Genpatsu Saikadō he no 
Handanshōten.’ Asahi Shinbun, 3 June, p. 3.
110 TObIAS wEISS 
AS. 2013. ‘Kasumu Datsugenpatsuron, Enerugī Kihonkeikaku, Giron Saikai.’ Asahi 
Shinbun, 16 March, p. 8.
AS. 2014a. ‘Genpatsu Saikadō o Tou: 2: Itami o Wasureta Mura.’ Asahi Shinbun, 
19 July, p. 7.
AS. 2014b. ‘Katei-muke Denki, Jiyūka he Michi: Denkijigyōhō Kaiseian, Kokkai de 
Seiritsu he.’ Asahi Shinbun, 19 May, p. 4.
AS. 2015a. ‘Jinsei no Okurimono: Watashi no Hansei: Butsurigakusha Arima Akito: 
5: 85sai.’ Asahi Shinbun, 4 December, p. 5.
AS. 2015b. ‘Jinsei no Okurimono: Watashi no Hansei: Butsurigakusha Arima Akito: 
6: 85sai.’ Asahi Shinbun, 28 December, p. 5.
AS. 2015c. ‘Monju Kentōkai Hossoku, Monbukagakushō: Arata na Un’ei Shutai 
Erabi.’ Asahi Shinbun, 4 December, p. 2.
Avenell, Simon. 2012. ‘From Fearsome Pollution to Fukushima: Environmental 
Activism and the Nuclear Blind Spot in Contemporary Japan.’ Environmental 
History, 17 (2): 244-276.
Avenell, Simon. 2018. ‘Japan.’ Routledge Handbook of Civil Society in Asia. Akihiro 
Ogawa (ed.). New York: Routledge, pp. 17-32.
Broadbent, Jeffrey. 1999. Environmental Politics in Japan: Networks of Power and 
Protest. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ebina, Kenzō. 1992. Inaba Hidezō: Gekidō no Nihon Keizai to tomo ni 60-nen. Tōkyō: 
Nishida Shoten.
EKSKH. 1998. Genshiryoku Suishin Undō no Susume. Enerugī to Kurashi-Shimin 
no Kai Henshūkyoku. Tōkyō: Utopia Kaihatsu Kenkyūjo.
EMHK. 2019. Enerugī Mondai ni Hatsugen suru Kai. http://www.engy-sqr.com/
index-leg.html (10 June 2019).
ESK. 2002. Enerugī Seisaku Kihonhō. http://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/search/elawsSearch/
elaws_search/lsg0500/detail?lawId=414AC1000000071 (10 June 2019).
ETT. 2017. Enkaku. Energy Think Together. http://www.ett.gr.jp/about/off ice.html 
(10 June 2019).
Fuchs, Christian. 2018. ‘Authoritarian Capitalism, Authoritarian Movements and 
Authoritarian Communication.’ Media, Culture & Society, 40 (5): 779-791.
Garon, Sheldon. 1997. Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1962. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: 
A Book of Essays. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
GHKK. 1997-2015. Genshiryoku Hōdō o Kangaeru Kai no Zenhōkoku. Genshiryoku Hōdō 
o Kangaeru Kai. http://www.kokumin.org/genshiryoku_houdou (10 June 2019).
GKMK. 2015. Newsletter 33, 31 August. Genshiryoku Kokumin Kaigi. http://www.
kokumin.org/231 (10 June 2019).
ThE CAMPAIGN fOR NUCLEAR POwER IN JAPAN bEfORE AND AfTER 2011 111
GMHK. 2006. Energī Mondai ni Hatsugen suru Kai Katsudō Naiyō. Genshiryoku 
Mondai ni Hatsugen suru Kai. http://www.engy-sqr.com/profile2/katudounai-
you.htm (10 June 2019).
Gordon, Andrew. 1997. ‘Managing the Japanese Household: The New Life Movement 
in Postwar Japan.’ Social Politics, 4 (2): 245-283.
Gordon, Andrew. 1998. The Wages of Affluence: Labor and Management in Postwar 
Japan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
GPAHI. 1991. Genshiryoku PA Hōsaku no Kangaekata. Genshiryoku PA Hōsaku 
I‘inkai. http://labor-manabiya.news.coocan.jp/shiryoushitsu/PAhousaku.pdf 
(19 May 2016).
Group 1984. 1975. ‘Nihon no jisatsu.’ Bungei Shunjū 52: 92-124.
Heinrich, Volkhart F. 2005. ‘Studying Civil Society across the World: Exploring the 
Thorny Issues of Conceptualization and Measurement.’ Journal of Civil Society, 
1 (3): 211-228.
HGK. 2002. 25-nen no Ayumi. Kanazawa: Hokuriku Genshiryoku Kondankai.
Hōgaku Shoin Henshūbu. 1999. Shōhi Seikatsu Advisor no Shigoto ga Wakaru Hon. 
Tōkyō: Hōgaku Shoin.
Honda, Hiroshi. 2005. Datsugenshiryoku no Undō to Seiji: Nihon no Enerugī Seisaku 
no Tenkan ha Kanō ka. Sapporo: Hokkaidō Daigaku Tosho Kankōkai.
Hook, Glenn. 1984. ‘The Nuclearization of Language: Nuclear Allergy as Political 
Metaphor.’ Journal of Peace Research, 21 (3): 259-275.
Hsu, Kan-Lin. 2012. ‘Two Paradigms of the Developmental State Approach, with 
Special Reference to South Korea and Taiwan.’ American Journal of Chinese 
Studies, 19 (1): 13-28.
Iwai, Noriko; Kuniaki Shishido. 2015. ‘The Impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake 
and Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident on People’s Perception of Disaster 
Risks and Attitudes toward Nuclear Energy Policy.’ Asian Journal for Public 
Opinion Research, 2 (3): 172-195.
JAEC. 1996. Heisei 8-nen Genshiryoku Hakusho. Tōkyō: Japan Atomic Energy 
Commission.
JAEC. 2009. Genshiryoku I’inkai Shimin Sanka Kondankai no Katsudō ni tsuite. 
Japan Atomic Energy Commission. http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei/
siryo2009/siryo24/siryo5-1.pdf (10 June 2019).
JAEC. N.d. Rekidai Genshiryoku I’in. Japan Atomic Energy Commission. http://
www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/iin/iin0.pdf (10 June 2019).
JAERO. 1994. Genshiryoku Bunka o mezashite: 25-nen no Ayumi. Tōkyō: Japan Atomic 
Energy Relations Association.
Johnson, Chalmers. 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial 
Policy, 1925-1975. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
112 TObIAS wEISS 
Katz, Hagai. 2006. ‘Strengthening the Conceptual Foundations of Civil Society 
Operationalizations: Discussing Heinrich’s “Studying Civil Society across the 
World.”’ Journal of Civil Society, 2 (2): 173-177.
Komori, Atsushi. 2012a. ‘Genpatsu to Media 10: Kōhō ha Kensetsuhi.’ Asahi Shinbun, 
14 September, p. 11.
Komori, Atsushi. 2012b. ‘Genpatsu to Media 240, Money 14, Kōkokutō no Nedan.’ 
Asahi Shinbun, 21 September, evening edition, p. 16.
Koppenborg, Florentine T.M.A. 2020. ‘Legal Fallout from the Fukushima Nuclear 
Accident: Reforming Nuclear Safety Administration in Japan.’ Fukushima and 
the Law. Julius F. Weizdörfer; Kristian C. Lauta (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. Forthcoming.
Kozumi, Hiroshi; Shin’ichi Sasaki. 2010. Konnani Omoshiroi Kankyō Kanserā no 
Shigoto. Tōkyō: Chūō Keizaisha.
Mason, Robert. 1999. ‘Whither Japan’s Environmental Movement? An Assess-
ment of Problems and Prospects at the National Level.’ Pacific Affairs, 72 
(2): 187-207.
McKean, Margaret. 1981. Environmental Protest and Citizen Politics in Japan. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Meyer, David; Suzanne Staggenborg. 1996. ‘Movements, Countermovements, and 
the Structure of Political Opportunity.’ American Journal of Sociology, 101 (6): 
1628-1660.
Minakuchi, Satoshi. 2016. Keireki. http://www.gns.ne.jp/minakuchi/mi00_1.htm 
(10 June 2019).
MS. 2012. ‘Kenshō, Daishinsai Ōi Saikadō Jimoto Dōi ‘Shushō Kaiken shika nai,’ 
Yuzuranu Fukui, Seifu Gosan.’ Mainichi Shinbun, 5 July, p.1.
NEK. N.d. Nihon Enerugī Kaigi. http://enercon.jp/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/0
9/8a2e4337a25c0400dad0d05c8f71ef871.pdf (10 June 2019).
NSH. 1972. Kankyōmondai Sangyō Kaigi Kiroku: Seichō to Kankyō. Tōkyō: Nihon 
Seisansei Honbu.
NSH. 2005. Seisansei Undō 50nenshi. Tōkyō: Nihon Seisansei Honbu.
NSK. 2012. Kōshin Kenshū no Arikata ni kan suru Kentō Iinkai Hōkokusho. Nihon 
Sangyō Kyōkai. http://www.nissankyo.or.jp/adviser/qualif ied/download/
kousinkentou_houkokusyo.pdf (10 June 2019).
Ōshika, Yasuaki. 2011 ‘Kokuyūka Kyozetsu no Kōbōsen: Tōden Dokushō ano Hi ni 
Kaeritai.’ Aera, 5 December, p. 64.
Pekkanen, Robert. 2004. ‘After the Developmental State: Civil Society in Japan.’ 
Journal of East Asian Studies 4 (3), 363-388.
REF. 2010. Teikan. Radiation Education Forum. https://ref.or.jp/f ile/profile_teikan.
pdf (10 June 2019).
Sankei Shinbun. 2008. ‘Arima-Zachō Ichimon Ittō,’ 22 May, p. 7.
ThE CAMPAIGN fOR NUCLEAR POwER IN JAPAN bEfORE AND AfTER 2011 113
Suga, Hidemi. 2012. Hangenpatsu no Shisōshi: Reisen kara Fukushima he. Tōkyō: 
Chikuma Shobō.
Sugimoto, Shūsaku. 2013a. ‘Denryoku Gyōkai: Shinsaigo ni Shikin 1800-man En. 
Genshiryokuiin NPO ni.’ Mainichi Shinbun, 25 March, p. 31.
Sugimoto, Shūsaku. 2013b. ‘Genpatsu Propaganda: Denryokugyōkai kara Shikin 
Teikyō no NPO Kankeisha, Kōchōkai Yonkaijō de Hatsugen.’ Mainichi Shinbun, 
28 March, p. 30.
Sugimoto, Shūsaku. 2013c. ‘Genpatsu Propaganda: Enechō Jigyō, Rokunen Juchū, 
Moto Genshiryoku Iin no NPO mo.’ Mainichi Shinbun, 26 March, p. 8.
Suzuki, Akira. 2003. ‘The Death of Union’s Associational Life? Political and Cultural 
Aspects of Enterprise Unions.’ The State of Civil Society in Japan. Frank J. Schwartz; 
Susan J. Pharr (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 195-213.
Suzuki, Akira. 2016. ‘Japanese Labour Unions and Nuclear Energy: A Historical 
Analysis of Their Ideologies and Worldviews.’ Journal of Contemporary Asia, 
46 (4): 591-613.
Suzuki, Tatsuru. 1983. Denryoku Sangyō no Atarashii Chōsen. Tōkyō: Nihon Kōgyō 
Shinbunsha.
Taguchi, Fukuji. 1960. ‘Chūseiren ni okeru Soshiki Mondai.’ Nenpō Seijigaku: 
Nihon No Atsuryoku Dantai. Nihon Seiji Gakkai (ed.). Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 
pp. 64-85.
Utsumi, Hirofumi. 2012. ‘Nuclear Power Plants in “The Only A-bombed Country”: 
Images of Nuclear Power and the Nation’s Changing Self-portrait in Postwar 
Japan.’ The Nuclear Age in Popular Media. Dick Van Lente (ed.). London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 175-201.
Way, Lucian. 2014. ‘Civil Society and Democratization.’ Journal of Democracy, 25 
(3): 35-43.
Weiss, Tobias. 2019a. Auf der Jagd nach der Sonne: Das journalistische Feld und die 
Atomkraft in Japan. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Weiss, Tobias. 2019b. ‘Japan’s ‘Pro-nuclear Civil Society’: Power in the Analysis of 
Social Capital and Civil Society.’ Journal of Civil Society, 15 (4): 326-52.
Yamaoka, Jun’ichirō. 2015. Nihon Denryoku Sensō: Shigen to Ken’eki, Genshiryoku 
o Meguru Tōsō no Keifu. Tōkyō: Sōshisha.
Yoshioka, Hitoshi. 2011. Shinpan Genshiryoku no Shakaishi. Tōkyō: Asahi Shinbunsha.
Interviews
Interview FNRAJG 2017. Former nuclear radiation advisor to the Japanese govern-
ment, 2017.
Interview Funakoshi 2015. Makoto Funakoshi, Japan Atomic Energy Relations 
Organization (JAERO), 2015.
114  TObIAS wEISS 
About the Author
Tobias Weiss is Research Fellow at Heidelberg University, Germany. In Janu-
ary 2018, he f inished his PhD at the University of Zurich. His main research 
focus is on civil society, mass media and politics in Japan. His most recent 
publications include Auf der Jagd nach der Sonne. Das journalistische Feld 
und die Atomkraft in Japan (Nomos, 2019); ‘Journalistic Autonomy and Frame 
Sponsoring: Explaining Japan’s “Nuclear Blind Spot” with Field Theory,’ 
Poetics (2019); ‘Japan’s Pro-nuclear Civil Society: Power in the Analysis of 




5 The ‘Pro-Establishment’ Radical Right
Japan’s Nativist Movement Reconsidered
Naoto Higuchi
Abstract
Japan has witnessed the rise of nativist demonstrations and hate 
crimes since the late 2000s, leading the Diet to enact the country’s 
f irst anti-racism law in 2016. The aim of this chapter is to examine the 
pro-establishment nature of Japan’s nativist movement. The move-
ment often criticizes the ruling right-wing establishment but should 
be regarded as a detachment force of the establishment in two ways. 
First, Japanese nativism is a variant of historical revisionism and the 
emergence of nativist violence is a ‘by-product’ of the rise of historical 
revisionism among the right-wing establishment in post-Cold War 
Japan. Although the nativist movement and the right-wing establish-
ment are not directly associated with each other, the former took full 
advantage of the discursive opportunity opened by the latter. Second, the 
general public favours the nativist movement as part of the conservative 
establishment.
Keywords: xenophobia, radical right, Zainichi Koreans, racism, nationalism
On 11 April 2009, 200 demonstrators marched around an apartment of an 
undocumented Filipino family in Warabi (a suburban city of Tokyo), shout-
ing, ‘Illegal families get out!’ This was organized by a nativist group named 
Zainichi Tokken o yurusanai Shimin no Kai (Association of Citizens against 
the Special Privileges of Koreans in Japan, hereafter Zaitokukai) established 
in 2007. This demonstration was rather exceptional for Zaitokukai, whose 
main target is Koreans in Japan, but became a catalyst for a dramatic increase 
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in its membership (see Figure 5.1),1 having grown into the largest and the 
most well-known amongst nativist groups with more than 15,000 members.2 
It was sympathetic public opinion to the Filipino family that paradoxically 
enhanced the visibility of Zaitokukai: its stance strongly resonated with 
those who disagreed with this trend.
On 3 June 2018, when nativists held a gathering in Kawasaki, a city known 
for being home to a Korea town, 400 anti-racist protesters surrounded 30 
nativists and shouted, ‘Racists go home!,’ keeping them out from a building 
planned for the venue. After a small scuffle between the two groups, nativists 
realized they had lost and f inally brought the gathering to a halt.
Things had changed in the nine years between the two incidents. Although 
Japan has a long history of right-wing movements, their core ideologies were 
1 However, this f igure accounts for members who have registered by email; there is no 
obligation to disclose information concerning individuals or the payment of fees. Consequently, 
it would be more accurate to say that there are over 15,000 registered individuals rather than 
members.
2 Although there have been more than a dozen nativist organizations (Gill 2018), other groups 
failed not only to recruit a large number of members but to attract public attention.
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anti-communism and emperor-centred nationalism, having been rather 
indifferent to nativism.3 It seems, therefore, Zaitokukai came to the fore out 
of the blue, targeting Koreans who were a well-integrated ethnic minority in 
Japan. Although Zaitokukai claims Korean residents enjoy ‘special privileges,’ 
such as special permanent residency, the issuing of subsidies to Korean 
schools, favourable welfare provisions and the alias system (use of Japanese 
names), this is no more than a groundless rumour. Nevertheless, Japan saw 
the rise of Zaitokukai and this shocked many Japanese because it was the 
country’s first nativist movement organizing anti-immigrant demonstrations.
The rise of anti-racist countermobilization in 2013 also surprised people 
enough to win the attention of the general public (Higuchi 2020).4 Since then, 
‘hate speech’ has been a buzzword to describe behaviour like that shown 
by Zaitokukai. A Diet member group of the opposition was also established 
in May 2013 to urge the ruling coalition to legislate an anti-discrimination 
law. The ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was reluctant 
to enact any anti-discrimination laws, but it f inally yielded to the opposi-
tion, passing the Hate Speech Elimination Law in May 2016. Although the 
effectiveness of this law is limited, because it neither prohibits hate speech 
nor punishes it (Martin 2018), this is still a remarkable change all the more 
because it is Japan’s premier law against racism.
After Zaitokukai founder Makoto Sakurai5 resigned in order to take 
responsibility for a physical assault against an anti-racism activist by Zai-
tokukai members at the end of 2014, the group quickly deteriorated. Figure 5.1 
shows that few members have joined Zaitokukai since January 2015, except 
for a short period immediately after the enforcement of the Hate Speech 
Elimination Law, although it managed to overcome the f irst crisis at the 
end of 2010 when several members were arrested and charged with forcible 
obstruction of business.6 Finally, Zaitokukai stopped updating its webpage in 
3 Here nativism refers to ‘an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively 
by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) 
are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-states’ (Mudde 2007: 19).
4 The countermovement was initiated by a few anti-nuclear activists, but it has been a 
spontaneous protest independent on any groups. Recruited by social media, thousands of 
people – including Japanese leftists, Koreans, K-pop fans, and even right-wing activists – have 
protested against Zaitokukai events.
5 In 2003, Makoto Sakurai (1973- ) started his right-wing activity as a blogger posting anti-Korea 
content when he was a part-time worker in a municipality off ice of Tokyo. He is now the leader 
of the Japan First Party, which backed a dozen of candidates in local elections in April 2019 but 
failed to gain a seat.
6 In 2010, they attacked a Korean school in Kyoto and also crashed into the off ice of Tokushima’s 
teacher’s union.
120  NAOTO hIGUChI 
June 2017, and its activities came to a standstill. Although Sakurai launched 
another organization named the Japan First Party in 2017, aimed to f ield 
candidates for local elections, the movement was no longer able to recover 
its momentum.
The aim of this chapter is to reconsider the origins, nature, and breadth 
and depth of the power base of Japan’s nativist movement. At f irst glance, 
Japan successfully forestalled the expansion of nativist groups. However, it is 
misleading if we regard them analogous to the European anti-establishment 
radical right, because the key to understanding Japan’s nativist movement 
and its support base is their pro-establishment nature. Thus, I examine 
the hypothesis that behind the rise of the nativist movement lie changing 
interests of the right-wing establishment.7 More precisely, I argue that this 
is a ‘by-product’ of the rise of historical revisionism among the right-wing 
establishment in Japan.
In this chapter, I distinguish three types of actors8: (1) the nativist move-
ment as the new radical right, (2) rightist politicians (mostly of the ruling 
LDP) and organizations around the Japan Conference9 as the right-wing 
establishment, and (3) the LDP as a whole as the conservative establish-
ment. The religious right and groups of war veterans (and their families) 
make up the organizational base for the right-wing establishment. The 
religious right is composed of Shinto and Buddhist organizations, includ-
ing a considerable number of related cults (regarding the orientations of 
the religious right, see Ho, in this volume). These are characterized by 
strong political influence in close association with the LDP (Higuchi 2018). 
The religious right insists on historical revisionism as well as traditional 
7 Here the nativist movement is def ined as a social movement based on an ideology, which 
holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and 
that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous 
nation-states (Mudde 2007: 19). The radical right in Japan refers to societal groups or parties 
that adopt nationalism and nativism/historical revisionism/traditionalism/anti-communism 
as their policies, to the far right of mainstream conservatives (Higuchi 2018). The def inition of a 
‘right-wing establishment’ is political elites who are hawkish but still belong to the mainstream.
8 Although Japan’s radical right has a three-layered structure (Higuchi 2018), I will not refer 
to survivors of pre-war fascist organizations in this chapter. In post-war Japan, they created the 
public image of the radical right. Members of such organizations who held public off ice were 
purged in the process of post-war demilitarization by the US occupation power, but they kept 
close relationships with the conservative establishment (Szymkowiak and Steinhoff 1995). They 
also include quasi-outlaw cadres with connections to the maf ia, making mass mobilization 
impossible (Smith 2014). But their anti-communist claims lost legitimacy and they have been 
on a course of decline in the post-Cold War period.
9 Nippon Kaigi (The Japan Conference), the largest nationalist group in Japan, was launched 
in 1997.
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ethics and emperor-centred nationalism, but has been rather indifferent 
to migrants and ethnic minorities.
At f irst sight, the nativist movement differs greatly from the right-wing 
establishment. Although some activists back their favourite politicians, the 
movement has little contact with the right-wing establishment, distancing 
itself from the ‘established’-style radical right. In addition, the nativist 
movement often opposes policies of the ruling LDP, while the right-wing 
establishment has been staying in line with it. However, I argue nativists 
took full advantage of the opportunity that the right-wing establishment 
opened, which brought about the rise of the movement.
Discursive Opportunities: An Analytical Viewpoint
The notion of ‘political opportunity structure’ is widely used to explain 
the relation between social movements and politics. The basic premise of 
this is that the rise and fall of social movements are usually mediated by 
politics, which not only facilitates or constrains mobilization but also char-
acterizes the nature of movements. Among the f ive important dimensions 
classif ied by Tarrow (1998: 76) (opening of access, political realignments, 
split within the elite, influential allies and declining capacity to repress 
dissent), influential allies have been the most important factor for Japan’s 
right-wing movement because it has been in close association with the 
LDP’s right-wing politicians. However, given that the nativist movement 
lacks contact with political elites, it is diff icult to explain the rise of the 
movement in relation to institutional aspects of political opportunities. 
Instead, I focus on discursive opportunities that have provided favourable 
conditions for the nativist movement (Koopmans and Muis 2009; Koopmans 
and Statham 1999). Discursive opportunities refer to ‘institutionally anchored 
ways of thinking that provide a gradient of relative political acceptability 
to specif ic packages of ideas’ (Ferre 2003: 309). They prescribe which cause 
will stand out in a given political system at a given time; the credibility of 
a construction of reality; and the legitimacy of demands (Koopmans and 
Statham 1999: 228).
Activists can more easily gain visibility, resonance and legitimacy by 
constructing movements in accordance with elite discourse, as is the case with 
the rise of violence against asylum seekers and the revision of asylum rights 
in Germany in the 1990s (Koopmans and Olzak 2004). This issue was a matter 
of maximum priority for politicians and the media for a year and a half and 
radical right violence increased, taking advantage of controversy over asylum 
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seekers. The radical right adjusted themselves to the political circumstances 
that had caused asylum seekers to be perceived as an unbearable burden 
by some in Germany. Xenophobic violence might not have broken out if 
the discursive opportunities in Germany had not become anti-immigrant.
In contrast, migration has seldom attracted political interest in Japan, 
as I will explain later. However, politicians have been repeatedly uttering 
remarks to justify pre-war Japanese colonization and invasion of neighbour-
ing countries (Wakamiya 2006). Regardless of whether or not the term ‘hatred 
of Koreans’ (kenkan) is used, a Japanese-style orientalism towards Korea is 
deeply rooted both politically and socially. However, even if we regard this 
enduring common fault of Japanese society as the cause, it cannot explain 
the rise of the nativist movement in the late 2000s. We need to focus on 
changes in discursive opportunities over several decades. I argue the rise of 
historical revisionism served as a fertile ground for the nativist movement.
Data
In this chapter, I use a series of data related to the radical right in Japan.10
Data (1): I used the blog of Zaitokukai founder Makoto Sakurai. Because 
Sakurai’s blog covers events from the beginning of the formation of the nativist 
movement and posts links to information about related events, information 
that is essential to coding can be gathered from it. Using this method, I col-
lected information about 1,006 protest events occurring between 2007 and 2012.
Data (2): This data examines the interests of the right-wing establishment 
with the aim of elucidating the changes in its designation of enemies. I listed 
the titles, from 1982 to 2015, of issues of the major right-wing monthly journals 
Shokun! and Seiron, to which many right-wing politicians contributed: 
articles by the current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe appeared in these journals 
42 times from 1993 to 2015.11 I used the data to deal with discourse that was 
further to the right than that of the conservative establishment.
Data (3): I use the data of an online survey we conducted with 77,084 
greater Tokyo residents in December 2017.12 These data are used to map public 
sentiment towards social movements, political parties and foreign countries.
10 For details of the data used, see Higuchi (2016: Appendix) and Satō et al. (2018). Data collection 
was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 17H01005.
11 As Shokun! ceased publication in 2009; I replaced it with WiLL from that point onwards.
12 This survey was supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (grant-in-aid for 
Scientif ic Research (A) 17H01005) in collaboration with Shun Harada, Yuko Hirabayashi, Barbara 
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Data (4): I conducted interviews with 34 activists in the nativist movement 
from February 2011 to October 2012. Throughout my f ieldwork, I asked 
activists to tell me their life histories leading to their participation in the 
movement. The attributes of participants were: gender – 4 females and 30 
males; age – four people in their 20s, thirteen in their 30s, eleven in their 
40s, four in their 50s, and two in their 60s.
The Nativist Movement in the Right-wing Discursive Space
Opening Discursive Opportunities towards East Asia
As Koopmans argues, it is assumed that the nativist movement developed in 
a given discursive space. Thus, we need first to trace how it changed over time 
by illustrating the interests of the right-wing journals through two graphs. 
Figure 5.2 plots the changes in the frequency with which the Soviet Union/
Russia, China, South Korea and North Korea appear in articles. Two broad 
changes emerge for the 1990s and the 2000s from this graph. Throughout 
the 1980s, the frequency for the Soviet Union, then the imaginary enemy 
of Japan, remained at a high level. Conversely, East Asian countries (China, 
South Korea and North Korea) appeared in only 4.8% of articles in the 1980s.
This was to change in the 1990s: although the Soviet Union continued 
to be of interest until its dissolution, after that point its ratio dropped 
dramatically and failed to return to its former levels.13 In the 1990s, 
right-wing journals lost interest in foreign countries, and in 2000 the 
f igure for all four countries combined fell below 10%. However, signs of 
the changes that would take off in the 2000s were already visible in the 
1990s, and Figure 5.3 shows the direction that this discourse was taking. 
Until the mid-1980s, the number of articles related to military affairs 
and defence sometimes exceeded 10%. After the end of the Cold War, 
military affairs and defence ceased to make up the central concerns of 
the right-wing establishment, and in their place history-related articles 
exceeded 10% for the f irst time in 1997. One of the background factors 
to this was the fact that the right-leaning Sankei Shimbun Co.,14 which 
Holthus, Mitsuru Matsutani, Kikuko Nagayoshi, Hiroshi Ohata, Keiichi Satō and Woncheol 
Sung. Preliminary results are shown Satō et al. (2018).
13 The decreasing presence of the Soviet Union resulted in a striking reduction in discursive 
opportunities for old radical right groups, and may be seen as one of the causes of their decline.
14 Sankei is the smallest of Japan’s f ive national newspapers and most clearly expresses rightist 
opinions.
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publishes Seiron, was backing new revisionist history textbooks in this 
year. The increasing importance of historical issues and the additional 
steady increase in the proportion of those related to foreign countries 
occurred from the second half of the 1990s, and this focus remains 
unchanged to the present day.
Figure 5.2 also shows the beginning of an increase in articles about 
foreign countries following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in New 
York, and a further increase with the 2002 visit to North Korea by Prime 
Minister Koizumi. This is not just a matter of passing interest: these articles 
reached and maintained a level of over 20%. The only exception came at 
the time of the drubbing handed out by the change of the government 
from the conservative LDP to the centrist Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
when it took off ice in 2009. With the advent of this century, there was an 
increase, amongst articles related to foreign countries, to around 20% of 
articles related to East Asia. Furthermore, leaving aside North Korea in 
2003, which breathed new life into the abduction issue, it was China that 
attracted overwhelming attention (see the introduction by Chiavacci 
and Grano, in this volume). In line with the hypothesis presented in the 
introduction, East Asian countries had come to be seen as the biggest 
enemies.
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Japan’s Nativist Movement as a Detachment Force of the Right-wing 
Establishment
When we compare the topics of right-wing journals and events by the nativist 
movement in Figures 5.4 and 5.5, we find both similarity and difference between 
the two. Nevertheless, the targets of Zaitokukai and right-wing journals roughly 
shifted together in the following ways. (1) Events and articles targeting East Asia 
fell in 2009 and then shot up in 2012, because both relentlessly bashed the DPJ 
government as a new threat during its rule for three years. (2) History-related 
events and articles increased in 2009 to champion Toshio Tamogami, the former 
Chief of Staff of Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force who caused a problem by present-
ing a revisionist article, but the proportion fell once again in the following year.
This is an unexpected result, because the primary goal of the nativist 
movement is expulsion of Koreans in Japan as the name of Zaitokukai 
alludes. In fact, its targets are more varied. Figure 5.4 shows targets of events 
organized by Zaitokukai. In total, 28% of events called for attacking Koreans 
in Japan and 4% against other migrants such as Chinese and Filipinos. As 
a result, events targeting ethnic minorities were outnumbered by those 
related to neighbouring countries (33%): nearly half (45%) of events were 
related to history and East Asia.
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This is because the core idea of the nativist movement is rooted in histori-
cal revisionism. The movement primarily followed the way paved by the 
right-wing establishment and then took its own line. The primary goal of 
Zaitokukai is to repeal the Special Immigration Control Act legislated for 
Koreans because they say it is a symbol that Koreans are bestowed ‘special 
privileges.’ This legal status is applied to those who are former colonial 
citizens and their descendants who have been living in Japan since before 
Japan’s defeat in World War II. Under US military rule, the Japanese govern-
ment stopped allowing these people (mostly Koreans) the right to choose 
their nationality. When the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect in 
1952, former colonial citizens lost their Japanese citizenship, making their 
legal status unstable. Japan’s reluctance to grant rights to former colonial 
citizens, as well as the division of the Korean peninsula, delayed f ixing 
the legal status of Korean residents. Finally, Japan-South Korea bilateral 
negotiations reached an agreement to legislate the Special Immigration 
Control Act in 1991. Insistent criticism by Zaitokukai of the law exemplif ies 
its revisionist desire to erase a dark chapter in Japan’s history by expelling 
Koreans.
This is the most salient characteristic of Japan’s nativism, which should 
be regarded as a variant of historical revisionism that tries to justify the 
disgraceful history of modern Japan. The rights and status of Koreans have 
been associated with the history of their migration under colonial rule, 
which reminds the Japanese of things they would rather forget. This is why 
the nativist movement persists in its focus on Koreans: a web poll conducted 
by Zaitokukai also showed that of the 5,272 people who voted 78% (4,123 
people) said the country that they ‘hate the most’ was South Korea (with 
12% for China and 4% for North Korea).15 While anti-China and anti-Chinese 
movements have also been organized, these mobilized only a very small 
number of people, failing to attract attention. Koreans are well integrated 
into Japanese society and their population has now been overwhelmed 
by other immigrants,16 but they are the sole group that evokes the issue of 
colonial settlement.
15 The result of the vote was retrieved from the following webpage: http://www.zaitokukai.
info/modules/xoopspoll/pollresults.php?poll_id=78 (6 June 2013).
16 Korean nationals number 452,701 or 17% of the total foreign population in Japan, according 
to the Ministry of Justice: ‘Statistics on the Foreigners Registered in Japan’ (https://www.e-stat.
go.jp/stat-search/f iles?page=1&layout=datalist&lid=000001216283, retrieved 28 April 2019). They 
were the largest nationality group until this population was exceeded by Chinese nationals in 
2007.
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Table 5.1  Events leading to nativist movement membership
Classification Actual motive N
“foreigner problem”
Contact with foreign workers 2
6
Legalization for a filipino family 2
Voting rights for foreigners 1
hostility toward Korean residents 1
South Korea Sport (Soccer world Cup, Olympics) 2 2
North Korea Abduction issue 4 4
China
Territorial dispute over Senkaku Islands 1
5
Anti-Japanese demonstrations in China 1
Tianemen Square incident 1
beijing Olympics 2
historical revisionism 8 8
Others 9 9
Total 34 34
Source: Own analysis, for details see data (3) in the section on data sources
Such features also shape people’s journey to nativist activism. Whilst all 
of the activists I met were keen to talk about how Koreans are harmful to 
Japan, the impetus for their activism varied. Although they became nativists, 
most of them did not recognize the ‘evil conduct of Koreans’ until joining 
the movement.17 Some had negative feelings towards Koreans, but most had 
gone about their lives without paying any attention to them: the majority 
of the activists I met did not have contact with foreigners living in Japan. 
Table 5.1 shows the results of Data 4, in which only six out of 34 activists 
whom I interviewed indicated hostility towards migrants or foreign residents 
as their initial interest leading to activism: antipathy towards neighbour-
ing countries served as impetus for eleven, and eight felt sympathy with 
historical revisionism. Negative feelings towards neighbouring countries 
and historical revisionism are mutually reinforcing – repeated criticisms 
from South Korea and China easily turned historical revisionism into hate 
17 Makoto Sakurai, the founder of Zaitokukai, also started his activity as an anti-South Korea 
blogger and then started to accuse Koreans in Japan.
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towards neighbouring countries, and those who felt antipathy towards 
Japan’s neighbours accepted historical revisionism when they regarded 
these criticisms as unjustif iable intervention in domestic affairs.
Thus far there is nothing different between the right-wing establishment 
and the new radical right. The notion of discursive opportunities is based 
on the premise that the culture of social movements borrows part of the 
dominant culture and, for that reason, it operates under structural con-
straints (see Steinberg 1999). Most of the discourse of the nativist movement 
also can be seen as having been taken from the discourse of the right-wing 
establishment. It is not that the discourse of the right-wing establishment 
and the nativist movement are directly linked, but that of the latter can 
increase its appeal by appropriating that of the former.
Nativism as a Variant of Historical Revisionism
Nevertheless, the discourse of the nativist movement is more than a simple 
repetition of that of the right-wing establishment. It is true that fundamental 
changes in economic and political conditions in the region lie behind the 
rise of East Asian countries as adversaries (Chiavacci and Obinger 2018). 
During long-term economic stagnation since the 1990s, Japan began to view 
China and South Korea as economic rivals. The rise of China as a military 
superpower also brought about favourable conditions for the nativist 
movement (see the introduction by Chiavacci and Grano, in this volume).
In fact, Japan is a country of rather weak anti-immigrant sentiment 
(Igarashi and Nagayoshi 2019), making xenophobic claims unconvincing. 
A minor exception is anxiety about ‘foreigner crime.’ In Japan at the end of 
the 1980s, migrants or foreigners were basically seen as ‘workers’ looking for 
better-paid jobs under Japan’s booming economy. By the latter half of the 
1990s, they began to be criminalized by the National Police Agency (NPA) 
that emphasized the threat of foreigners to public security (Takaya 2007). 
As a result, the Japanese public is characterized by strong anxiety about 
migrants as potential criminals (Simon and Sikich 2007).
However, this neither gave nativists the chance for the rise of their move-
ment nor turned the attention of the right-wing establishment to migration 
issues. While the nativist movement played a part in campaigns of the right-
wing establishment, it is still distinguished by its insistence about Koreans 
and other migrants. One-third of events by Zaitokukai targeted Koreans and 
other migrants in Japan, while right-wing journals have been rather indifferent 
to them. Focus on migration in right-wing journal articles peaked at 3.5% in 
2010 when the DPJ government planned to submit a law to grant voting rights 
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to foreign residents (see Figure 5.5).18 These journals neither regard migrants 
or foreigners as a threat nor as a useful tool for political manoeuvring. As 
a result, right-wing journals have only once referred to the phrase ‘special 
privileges for Koreans,’ which is the primary concern of Zaitokukai.
So, how did the nativist movement make this half-opened discursive 
space their own? Table 5.2 simply shows the difference between Koreans 
and other migrants. Firstly, it indicates that the right-wing establishment 
showed some interest in foreign workers other than Koreans in the 1980s, 
although the number of articles is not so large. Almost all related articles 
appeared between 1988 and 1990, the era in which there were heated debates 
about introducing foreign workers. The tone of the articles was relatively 
neutral, discussing the pros and cons of accepting migrants. Since then, the 
right-wing establishment has lost interest in migration even while the NPA 
was engaged in a series of campaigns to criminalize migrants from the late 
1990s: only one article related to migrants appeared from 1996 to 2000 and 
f ive articles from 2001 to 2005. Disregard by the right-wing establishment of 
migration issues resulted in the lack of successful nativist movements before 
Zaitokukai. When a right-wing organization named the National Socialist 
League (copying the Nazis) started an anti-Iranian migrant campaign in 
the early 1990s, it could neither attract public attention nor recruit new 
members. It then established an organization named the NPO Movement 
to Expel Foreigner’s Crimes in 2004, which is one of harbinger groups of 
Zaitokukai, but this again failed to become a successful movement.
Table 5.2  Number of articles on foreign residents in right-wing journals
Other migrants Koreans South Korea North Korea History
1982-1990 19 3 57 46 251
1991-1995 6 12 48 83 169
1996-2000 1 19 77 102 375
2001-2005 5 28 97 244 515
2006-2010 9 42 124 202 551
2011-2015 23 23 374 137 683
Total 63 127 777 814 2544
Source: Own analysis, for details see data (3) in the section on data sources
18 Then opposition LDP also launched a campaign against voting rights for permanent resident 
foreigners.
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Secondly, Table 5.2 also shows how right-wing journals were much more 
concerned about Koreans than other migrants between 1991 and 2010. It is no 
coincidence that an increasing number of articles on Koreans corresponded 
to those on history and South and North Korea. Articles related to Koreans 
in Japan focused mostly on three topics. (1) Voting rights for foreigners: the 
right-wing establishment believed that enfranchisement would risk paving 
the way for invasion by Koreans as enemies within. (2) Korean intellectuals: 
the right-wing establishment treated those intellectuals critical of Japanese 
historical revisionism as enemies. (3) The pro-North Korean community organi-
zation Chosen Soren (General Association of Koreans in Japan) and affiliated 
organizations: the right-wing establishment has been harshly attacking them 
(Itagaki 2015) each time a conflict breaks out between the two countries (e.g. 
development of nuclear weapons and abduction of Japanese by North Korea).
Yet the number of articles regarding Koreans in Japan has been much 
smaller than those dealing with the Korean peninsula and history. This indi-
cates Koreans in Japan have been of secondary importance to the right-wing 
establishment. This is why harbingers of the nativist movement started from 
anti-Korea activities, with Zaitokukai founder Makoto Sakurai initially opening 
his webpage named ‘South Korea as the Wonderland’ in 2003. The nativist 
movement then succeeded when it added Koreans in Japan as its main target 
by expanding the discursive space that the right-wing establishment exploited.
As we can see, a wide array of targets helped to attract people with various 
motives to the nativist movement. Activists f irst became interested in the 
movement in accordance with their own interests, as Table 5.1 indicates. 
The diversity seen in initial motives of Zaitokukai activists reveals that 
Japan’s nativist movement was born from a mixture of historical revisionism, 
hostility towards neighbouring countries and xenophobia. After joining the 
movement, activists learned the core ideology of Zaitokukai to be nativists 
moving against Koreans as nearby enemies. The core idea was nurtured in 
cyber space, in which many posted ‘evidence’ of ‘special privileges of Koreans’ 
being systematized, but this idea was basically adapted from discourse of 
the right-wing establishment (Higuchi 2016).
Public Attitudes towards the Nativist Movement
Geopolitical Conditions Favourable to the Nativist Movement
The mainstreaming of the radical right has become a popular topic (e.g. 
Akkerman, De Lange and Rooduijn 2016; Minkenberg 2013; Mondon 2013; 
Mondon and Winter 2017), and scholars often argue that radical right parties 
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generally started from anti-system, populist or even fascist and pariah status, 
encountering ostracism by other parties, while some became accepted by 
mainstreaming themselves, gaining increasing support and seeking political 
off ice. Some mainstream parties also began to pedal policies similar to the 
radical right, while others (although reluctantly) invited them to ruling 
coalitions. In this sense, Japan’s success to drive out the nativist movement 
seems exceptional.
The reality is quite the contrary: the nativist movement is under siege only 
because they went too far to be tolerated. Whilst its brutal attacks shocked 
the general public, its core ideologies – nativism, racism and xenophobia 
– were relatively supported. Figure 5.6 shows the results of Data 3, which 
illustrate the scores of feeling thermometers, in which 0 represents the 
coldest and 100 the hottest, towards social movements, political parties 
and neighbouring countries.19 As far as the results of the data indicate, 
the Japanese general public do not feel negatively towards the nativist 
movement even since the enactment of the Hate Speech Elimination Law 
in May 2016. The movement is even slightly (but statistically signif icantly) 
more favoured than the leftist anti-national security law movement that 
mobilized hundreds of thousands of demonstrators surrounding the Parlia-
ment House in 2015.20
The favourable public image of the nativist movement comes from 
antipathy towards neighbouring countries. Our respondents were much 
more negative about South Korea and China. More than a quarter of them 
demonstrated the least favourable attitudes (0 degree) towards the two 
countries. Behind Zaitokukai’s self-definition as a ‘civic association’ organ-
ized by ‘ordinary citizens’ lies latent public support for the movement.21 
Although their reckless behaviour and escalating hate speech caused the 
downfall of Zaitokukai, strong antipathy towards Japan’s neighbours opened 
a huge discursive space for nativists.22
19 For results of a similar survey, see Kobayashi et al. (2015).
20 This will be because of the disparity between the left and the right: 14% of our respondents 
saw themselves as left-wing and 24% as right-wing. Although the anti-national security movement 
was widely supported, demographically dominant rightists felt hatred towards it.
21 Japan’s radical right disapprove of the use of words such as ‘citizen’ and ‘civic,’ which they 
believe are leftist terms; instead, they preferred words like ‘patriot’ or ‘national.’ As a result, 
Zaitokukai included ‘citizens’ in its name because its founders wanted to differentiate it from the 
right-wing establishment and regarded themselves as a rightist rival of leftist civic movements. 
In this sense, Zaitokukai’s idea to include ‘citizens’ in its organization name was a breakthrough 
for Japan’s radical right movement.
22 This is why I have proposed the notion of Japanese-style nativism, which refers to nativism 
rooted in relations with Japan’s nearest neighbouring countries, and is based on the colonial 
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The Radical Right on the Side of the Establishment
Another feature of the support base for the nativist movement is its pro-
establishment nature.23 I performed an exploratory factor analysis using the 
same data as Figure 5.6. The analysis of the items shown in Table 5.3, which 
includes foreign countries, political parties and the nativist movement, 
resulted in a three-factor solution: East Asia, the Left and the Right. Given 
Zaitokukai’s strong hostility towards Japan’s neighbours, it is natural that the 
f irst three indices (China, South Korea and the nativist movement) comprise 
a single concept. Feelings towards the nativist movement f irst depend on 
East Asian geopolitical conditions: worsening bilateral relations have led 
to expansion of the support base of the movement. Indeed, hate towards 
Chinese and Koreans is different from general anti-immigrant sentiment: 
patriotism heightens the hostility towards them while it is not signif icantly 
related to anti-immigrant sentiment (Tanabe 2018).
settlement and the Cold War (Higuchi 2016).
23 The same data also revealed that those who voted for Makoto Sakurai during the Tokyo 
gubernatorial election in August 2016 showed signif icantly higher political trust than other 
respondents (Higuchi et al. 2019).


















Source: Own analysis, for details see data (3) in the section on data sources
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Table 5.3  Result of exploratory factor analysis
Factor loadings
East Asia Left Right
China 0.846 0.118 0.189
South Korea 0.872 0.115 0.119
Nativist movement -0.614 0.261 0.537
CDP 0.058 0.854 -0.039
JCP 0.097 0.841 -0.137
LDP 0.080 -0.250 0.781









Source: Own analysis (method of extraction: principal component factor analysis, factors are 
extracted from promax rotation), for details see data (3) in the section on data sources
Furthermore, the nativist movement also marked higher factor loadings 
for the third dimension along with the conservative LDP and the United 
States. Other surveys have also found a strong correlation between feelings 
towards the LDP and those towards the United States, which exemplif ies 
support for the post-war Japanese political system characterized by long-term 
conservative rule and dependence on the United States. At f irst glance, it 
seems strange to f ind the nativist movement belonging to the same dimen-
sion, because the nativist movement is composed of grassroots groups 
organized by outsiders to the political arena (except for a few veterans of 
old right-wing organizations). However, it should be remembered that the 
changing enemies of the right-wing establishment brought the nativist 
movement into the world. They gained strength by taking advantage of the 
expanded discursive space. A simple look at the protest events hosted by 
the nativist movement shows that it demonstrates a high level of faithful 
response to discursive opportunities, and this makes it diff icult to deny 
the political links to the right-wing establishment.
Figure 5.7 also suggests aff inity of the nativist movement with the 
conservative establishment. This is based on the results of Data 3, which 
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asked respondents their feelings towards the nativist movement and South 
Korea. I plotted each category’s average scores of feeling thermometers 
towards the former on the horizontal axis and those towards the latter on 
the vertical axis (0-100 degrees). The result shows that feelings towards the 
nativist movement and South Korea are negatively correlated. In addition, 
the nativist movement is far more preferred to South Korea: the average 
score of the former is 45 degrees and the latter 28 degrees.
Socio-economic status is weakly correlated to the scores of the two: 
all education background and most occupations concentrate near the 
intersection of dash lines that indicates average scores.24 Age and gender 
are more strongly correlated: younger people and women tend to dislike 
the nativist movement and to feel better about South Korea.25 However, 
the most statistically dispersed are relations between party support and 
both scores. Those supporting rightist parties such as the ruling LDP are 
more favourable to the nativist movement and more unfavourable to South 
Korea.26
These results show that support for the nativist movement is not based 
on social class but on party identif ication; it is neither related either with 
ethnic competition, nor deprivation.27 Rather, it should be understood as 
‘pathological normalcy’ (Mudde 2010) in the sense that the general public 
regard the movement as part of the conservative establishment. As we saw in 
Table 5.3, feeling towards the nativist movement is positively correlated with 
the conservative establishment and negatively with East Asian countries. 
The movement bridges sympathy with conservatism and antipathy towards 
neighbouring countries. In addition, Japanese are much more ‘tolerant’ of 
hate speech against Koreans than against other minorities such as women 
and the disabled (Kohno and Nishizawa 2019), which suggests that the 
discourse of the nativist movement has legitimacy. The pathological move-
ment is supported as something normal.
The nativist movement was launched in concert with the conservative 
shift in the LDP in this century (Park 2015) but aimed to stimulate the 
conservative establishment to be more hawkish from its position on the 
24 Household income and stratum identif ication are also poorly related to both scores.
25 This is due to the recent growth in the popularity of Korean pop culture.
26 The defeat of the LDP in the 2009 general election brought about new parties on the right of 
it, as is the case with JRP (Japan Restoration Party) and Kokoro (The Party for Japanese Kokoro). 
But both have been falling into decline: while JRP is still popular in the Kansai area, Kokoro is 
moribund.
27 Other studies in Japan also found a weak relationship between social class or economic 
deprivation and nativism (Higuchi 2019).
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right of the right. This is why they call themselves ‘action conservatives’ 
(Yamaguchi 2013): founders of the nativist movement accuse the right-
wing establishment, such as the Japan Conference, of embracing ‘armchair’ 
activism. They claim other organizations limit themselves to conventional 
repertoires of action such as gatherings and petitions. Although they share 
political views with the right-wing establishment, they believe more direct 
actions are needed to reach their goal.
Conclusion
On 14 October 2018, 130 nativists marched around downtown Tokyo, shouting 
‘We don’t need immigrants! LDP, repeal the immigration policy!’ The Japan 
First Party, established by the leader of Zaitokukai, organized demonstrations 
in six cities against a new policy to introduce unskilled migrant workers. 
They explained the background of the demonstration as follows: ‘We decided 
to start protest actions against the immigration policy by the centre-left 
ruling coalition of the LDP and Komei Party.’28
28 Webpage of the Japan First Party: https://japan-f irst.net/news/2018-10-14-hanimin-day/ 
(11 November 2018). Emphasis added.
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Like its European counterparts, which have often been labelled as ‘anti-
system,’ ‘protest,’ or ‘countercultural,’ Japan’s nativists appear to be protesting 
the conservative establishment. Given its criticism of Shinzo Abe, the core 
pillar of the right-wing establishment, it sounds somehow strange to regard 
Japan’s nativist movement as pro-establishment. As we have examined in this 
chapter, however, Japan’s nativists have built a support base to back up the 
right-wing establishment, which began to look on East Asia as the primary 
enemy. The root of the problem lies not in anti-immigrant sentiments but 
in the fact that the nativist movement in Japan took full advantage of deep-
rooted support for historical revisionism and hostility towards neighbouring 
countries among its political elites. Although LDP politicians superf icially 
criticize hate speech by the nativist movement, they have never regarded 
its historical revisionism as a problem. Such attitudes of the conservative 
establishment brought about the legitimacy of the nativist movement, just 
as in Art’s (2006) comparison of the German and Austrian cases. He pointed 
out that Austrians tended to be afraid to face their war responsibilities, 
regarding themselves as victims of Nazism. Behind the rise of the Austrian 
radical right lies a political culture tolerant of fascism.
In addition, geopolitical conditions during the Cold War, in which Japan 
played a new role as the primary ally of the United States in Asia, also 
excused – at least partly – Japan’s crime of colonization prior to World War 
II. Lukewarm policies regarding the colonial settlement allowed the right-
wing establishment to preserve historical revisionism until its legitimacy 
was heightened in the post-Cold War era. Conflict regarding recognition of 
history is not only unresolved but has become one of the most important and 
diff icult issues hindering reconciliation in East Asia. Japan saved the initial 
cost of stabilizing bilateral relations with newly established neighbouring 
states by disregarding its responsibility towards them. In the long term, 
however, Japan is still paying for its ignorance of the past, as exemplif ied 
by the rise of historical revisionism and the nativist movement climbing 
on the bandwagon.
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Abstract
Taiwan’s conservative movement to defend the threatened traditional 
morality and sexualities is an intellectually fascinating case of coun-
termovement, yet an oft-neglected aspect of Taiwan’s civil society. This 
article locates its origins in the preceding change of Taiwan’s Christian 
community. Protestant and Catholic leaders pioneered the opposition 
to gender equity and a more relaxed attitude on sexuality, and, over 
the years, they gained support from other religions. I will analyse the 
contestations over the issues of abortion, same-sex marriage and gender 
equity education. On the whole, the conservative movement has largely 
failed to turn back the clock. However, their presence was powerfully felt 
and had the potential to usher in a new political alignment that moved 
beyond the pre-existing cleavage.
Keywords: conservatism, countermovements, same-sex marriage, abor-
tion, Christianity
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society as populated only by progressive organizations and individuals. 
In fact, not all protest activism aims at promoting tolerance, protection of 
minorities and the rights of the disadvantaged. According to Tilly (2005: 
435), democratization necessarily equalizes access to power so that the 
ways different social groups pursue their interests tend to converge. Street 
protest used to be the signature political activity of the disfranchised, but 
once its eff icacy has been successfully demonstrated, such a ‘weapon of 
the weak’ lends itself to be imitated and usurped by more aff luent and 
established constituencies. Countermovements, defined as ‘the mobilization 
of sentiments initiated to some degree in opposition to a movement’ (Zald 
and Useem 1987: 249), are an expectable phenomenon in the wake of an 
intensive period of progressive mobilizations or reforms.
In the United States, the New Left movements of the 1960s invited the 
conservative backlash in the 1970s, as countermovements in opposition to 
abortion, civil rights and women’s liberation mushroomed (Lo 1982; Mottl 
1980). McAdam and Kloos (2014: 104-106) maintain that these conserva-
tive reactions have left an enduring political consequence by pushing the 
Republican Party further towards the right. In Taiwan, following decades 
of democratization, it should not come as a surprise that those sentiments 
that oppose changes f ind protest making a ready-to-use tool to have their 
voices heard. Incidents such as the attempts to oppose education reforms, 
the mobilization of power company workers to defend nuclear energy and 
employer resistance to labour protection (Ho 2005b: 414-416) fall into the 
category of countermovements. Nevertheless, there has been little scholarly 
attention on this topic, as most of the existing literature is devoted to pro-
reform activism, rather than their opponents in civil society. In an edited 
volume on social movements under the Ma Ying-jeou government (2008-2016) 
(Fell 2017), there were thirteen chapters that analysed environmental, 
student, labour, women’s and other progressive movements, but none of 
them took a look at the conservative ones. A literature review of the 134 
journal articles on Taiwan’s social movements published from 1980 to 2014 
(both in English and in Chinese) did not f ind a single piece that focused 
on conservative movements (Ho et al. 2018). Such lopsided scholarship 
fails to do justice to the multifarious and complex contentious politics in 
contemporary Taiwan.
This chapter redresses this imbalance by taking a closer look at one 
conservative countermovement. Around the turn of the century, Taiwan’s 
religious leaders initiated a campaign to defend traditional family values 
and gender norms that were increasingly eroded by cultural modernization 
that brought about what they identif ied as the perverse tendency of ‘sexual 
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liberation.’ Over the years, abortion, same-sex marriage and gender equity 
education have successively emerged as the arenas where conservatives and 
progressives engaged in f ierce combat. This article will f irst describe the 
genesis of this religion-based countermovement and how it evolved into a 
sustained campaign with considerable political influences. Secondly, I will 
offer an interim assessment of its impact. On the policy fronts, conservatives 
have failed to arrest Taiwan’s transition to a more equal and multicultural 
society. Nevertheless, they succeed in rallying a considerable pool of sup-
porters, thereby making further progressive reforms more diff icult and 
threatening to usher in a new political realignment. Being a latecomer in 
protest politics as well as a reaction to the reforms secured by the women’s 
movement and the gender movement, conservatives took pains to imitate 
the tactics and framing of their opponents.
In this chapter ‘conservatism’ refers to the effort to restore traditional 
values in opposition to cultural modernity as exemplif ied by multicultural-
ism. Giddens (1991: 241) notices the transition from a ‘politics of life chance’ 
(income distribution, for instance) to a ‘politics of lifestyle,’ which is at its core 
about ‘self-actualization’ in an increasingly reflective and changeable world. 
Thus, conservatism in the cultural sense represented a backlash against the 
politics of lifestyle in the name of a hallowed orthodoxy. Habermas (1985: 
88-93) identif ied three common components of the ‘neoconservatism’ in the 
1970s West: (1) the suspicion of critical intellectuals, (2) the assumption that 
rational science, universalistic morality and avant-garde art had lost their 
validity, and (3) traditional values viewed as a solution to contemporary 
social problems. Habermas viewed the newer conservatism as a reaction 
to the ‘new social movements’ of women, peace and ecology, which all 
promoted democratization of the everyday world. In the context of Taiwan, 
anti-intellectualism and anti-modernization did not emerge as a perceivable 
force; hence, the more appropriate use of the term ‘conservatism’ should be 
restricted to the third aspect mentioned by Habermas. Taiwan’s conservatism 
was characterized by opposition to the women’s movement and the gender 
movement, which challenged patriarchal values and promoted equality 
and the diversif ication of identities. It should be noted that conservatism 
thus def ined is strictly cultural and is unrelated to other public disputes 
concerning Taiwan’s political future (independence or unification), economic 
redistribution or environmental protection. As shown in the following, the 
opposition activists to abortion and same-sex marriage adopted a non-
partisan approach by emphasizing that they represented mainstream voices. 
Hence, Taiwan’s cultural conservatives are not organizationally linked to 
those conservative tendencies in other issues.
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The term ‘countermovement’ also requires some upfront clarification here. 
I use it to refer to those organized campaigns that specif ically oppose the 
goals of another pre-existing movement. Since most social movements strive 
for progressive changes in Taiwan and elsewhere in the world, countermove-
ments emerge as a backlash and hence are conservative in orientation. 
Theoretically, it is possible to have ‘progressive countermovements’ – say, 
anti-Trump protests in the US – but such usage is rare and easily confusing. 
Understanding that the great majority of countermovements are conserva-
tive, it is still important to conceptually separate ‘countermovement’ and 
‘conservatism.’
The Religious Roots of the Conservative Movement
With the noticeable exception of the Presbyterian Church, the oldest and 
largest Protestant denomination in Taiwan, religious organizations have not 
played a signif icant role in the transition to democracy, as most religious 
leaders either shied away from public issues or toed the line defined by the 
Kuomintang (KMT) regime (Rubinstein 1991: 29). The Presbyterian Church’s 
advocacy for political reforms and political independence in the 1970s 
incurred the government’s repression. Some Presbyterian pastors provided 
lessons on the tactics of non-violent resistance, thus cultivating a cohort of 
pro-democracy, labour and indigenous activists, adding new blood to the 
nascent wave of social protests in the late 1980s. However, politically engaged 
Presbyterians were an exceptional minority to their largely conformist 
co-religionists.1 The campaign to end child prostitution in the late 1980s 
was mounted by some Christian welfare organizations and it later evolved 
into an anti-human traff icking movement with international linkages (Ho 
2010: 544). However, the goals were consensual and mainstream, rather than 
motivated by an explicitly conservative agenda.
Outside Christian minorities, Taiwan’s economic success and the growth 
of the middle class enabled a Buddhist renaissance that laid down a political 
culture of civility, tolerance and cosmopolitanism (Madsen 2007). Such civic 
virtue helped democracy to take root; nevertheless, Buddhist leaders seldom 
took a stand in political and social disputes. Traditional folk religion, which 
arguably attracted the most followers in Taiwan, was intimately involved 
with the rise of environmental protests in the mid-1980s (Ho 2005a; Weller 
1 The protests by New Testament Church followers in the mid-1980s represented another rare 
exception of anti-KMT militancy among Christians (Rubinstein 1994).
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1999: 115-121). Yet, its essentially localistic orientation entailed that its influ-
ences could not extend beyond the community borders. Before the transition 
to democracy was accomplished with the f irst peaceful power turnover in 
2000, the political visibility of religion-based activism remained minimal.
Before Taiwan’s Christian communities spearheaded a conservative 
intervention into public life, there had been a change in its ecology as a more 
individualistic, inward-looking and conformist tendency began to take root. 
In 1987, a collaborative campaign by major Protestant denominations to 
revive the faith was launched. The so-called Year 2000 Evangelism (Liangqian 
Nian Fuyin Yundong) aimed to increase the Christian population to two 
million by the turn of the century. The campaign introduced the methods, 
materials and training pioneered by evangelicals in the US, Singapore 
and Hong Kong. In particular, there was an emphasis on applying biblical 
principles to everyday life so as to ‘solve family problems, youth problems, 
faith problems, and social problems’ (Shia 1993: 9). Although the campaign 
failed to meet the growth target, it laid the foundation for the rise of a 
conservative countermovement in many ways. First, it was a reflection of 
the political and ethnic cleavage during the authoritarian era. Taiwan’s 
Protestant communities used to be divided by Taiwanese-speaking churches 
(best presented by the Presbyterians) and Mandarin-speaking ones. The 
Mandarin-speaking churches tended to be composed of mainlanders who 
embraced the KMT ideology of anti-communism. With the participation of 
some Presbyterians, this evangelic campaign blurred the pre-existing divide 
and consolidated the Mandarin-speaking pastor leadership. As a result, a 
more conservative outlook with emphasis on family values became more 
widespread among Taiwan’s Protestants, hastening the secular decline of 
the social gospel direction once championed by the Presbyterian Church 
(Interview NMM 2017). Moreover, Year 2000 Evangelism proceeded with a 
series of joint prayers and training on a regional basis. As a result, citywide 
connections between Christians spanning across denominations came 
into being in many places, thereby weakening the loyalty of churchgoers to 
their own denominations. Later, when conservative Protestants mobilized 
for lobbying, protests or electoral campaigning, these networks served as 
a solid organizational basis (Interview TGF 2017). Not surprisingly, when a 
gay pride event was f irst held in 2000, the leading clergymen of Year 2000 
Evangelism were among the f irst to voice criticism.2
2 The rise of Taiwan’s religious conservatism is part of a global phenomenon. The US evangelical 
campaign is certainly an important source of inspiration for Taiwan activists; however, the 
influences from Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea are probably more direct, given their 
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The Catholic conservative movement began with the establishment of the 
Human Life Ethics Center (HLEC), originally aff iliated with Fu Jen Catholic 
University, in 1999. While the Protestant activism started with an ambitious 
proselytization campaign, the Catholic stream initially focused on life educa-
tion. In the name of teaching students to cherish personal dignity, religious 
doctrines were brought onto the campus. The HLEC launched an energetic 
campaign to distribute an American anti-abortion documentary, Eclipse of 
Reason, in high schools as a supplementary material for ‘life education’ or 
‘health education’ (Kuan 2011). The HLEC also promoted the value of chastity 
to discourage pre-marital sex. Taiwan’s Catholic leaders articulated their 
opposition to surrogate motherhood, gene cloning and the legalization of 
the morning-after pill on the grounds that these new technologies were 
said to violate the sanctity of life.
Protestant and Catholic Christians made up a minority in Taiwan – in 
a 2015 survey they were 6% of the population (Fu et al. 2016: 168) – yet 
they pioneered the conservative movement. They achieved this through 
mounting three campaigns that targeted abortion, same-sex marriage and 
gender equity education, respectively.
The Anti-abortion Campaign
With the passage of the Genetic Health Act in 1984, abortion became a lawful 
procedure for women who wanted to terminate pregnancy voluntarily. The 
only restrictions were that minors needed parental consent and married 
women required that from their spouses. The legalization of abortion did 
not come as a result of feminist advocacy, but rather as a top-down decision 
to implement a population-planning policy. During the legislative review, 
members of the KMT old guard criticized the act for its negative impact 
on the ‘anti-communist mission’ and on traditional Chinese culture, and 
the nascent women’s movement activists stood behind the government by 
avoiding the use of confrontational terms such as ‘women’s rights’ or ‘bodily 
autonomy’ (Ku 1995). After the toned-down debate in the mid-1980s, abortion 
did not emerge as a controversial topic until the religious conservatives 
launched their campaign. Prior to that, some Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP) lawmakers proposed a revision to remove the required spousal consent 
cultural similarities and the language. Some US right-wing conservative organizations have 
working relationship with the local campaigners, but it is not an outright export of the ‘cultural 
war’ to Taiwan.
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and some feminists raised a similar demand in the 1990s. However, these 
demands consciously proceeded in a low-prof ile manner in order not to 
stir up a backlash.
In 2002, 61 lawmakers from KMT, DPP and other parties proposed a 
revision to the law in order to protect ‘foetal rights’ as a result of lobbying 
by Catholic and Protestant groups. The amendment aimed to restrict abor-
tion by requiring compulsory consultation and adding a six-day waiting 
period to the abortion process. With the participation of major Buddhist 
organization leaders, the following year witnessed the formation of the 
League of All Citizen Movements to Respect Life (Zunzhong Shengming 
Quanmin Yundong Da Lianmeng). To ward off the anti-abortion drive, in 
2003 feminists, with the support of 56 lawmakers, unveiled another revision 
to the law that took away spousal consent and mandated school authorities 
to promote sex and gender equality education. To outbid the pro-abortion 
forces, in 2005 the conservatives put forward another revision that required 
high schools to implement abstinence-only sex education. The DPP govern-
ment was clearly caught in the middle of the warfare between the religious 
conservatives and the feminists as it intensif ied. Health off icials attempted 
to broker a compromise version of the law in the hope of satisfying the 
opposing demands. In 2006, a revision proposed by the executive branch 
established a three-day waiting period and at the same time abolished 
spousal consent. Three feminists on the Committee for the Promotion of 
Women’s Rights, a cabinet-level policymaking body that focused on gender 
issues, immediately resigned in protest (Cheng 2015: 22).
After the flare-up in 2006, both camps continued to propose different 
revisions, but the identical version from the Executive Yuan was sent in for 
review in 2008 and 2012, spanning the transition from Chen Shui-bian’s era 
to Ma Ying-jeou’s. As a result, the existing legal regulation on abortion since 
1984 was left intact as neither side was able to secure a unilateral change. 
In hindsight, the stalemate was not so much a victory for the women’s 
movement, but rather the diversion of conservatives’ attention to the more 
‘alarming threat’ posed by the LGBT movement.
The Opposition to Same-sex Marriage
The 1990s saw the flourishing of the LGBT movement in Taiwan as lesbians 
and gays began to set up their campus clubs, bookstores, churches and sup-
port groups (Damm 2011: 157-159). The off icial registration of the Taiwan 
Tongzhi (LGBT) Hotline Association in 2000 represented a milestone for the 
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sexual minority to claim a public role. The new century witnessed a growing 
government acceptance of this newly visible identity movement. Ma Ying-jeou 
had carefully cultivated a pro-LGBT image during his electoral campaign for 
Taipei mayor in 1998. In 2003, the city government subsidized the annual 
Taiwan Gay Pride. When Chen Shui-bian became the president in 2000, he 
vowed to promote the values of human rights, since it was the first time that 
Taiwan’s opposition party had come to power. In the Basic Law of Human 
Rights Protection Bill, drafted in 2001, lesbian and gay couples were allowed to 
form families and adopt children; this, however, did not materialize (Lo 2010).
In 2006, Hsiao Bi-khim, a DPP lawmaker, initiated a bill to legalize same-
sex marriage. Hsiao’s draft was quickly voted down by an emergency inter-
vention of religious conservatives who were able to mobilize sympathetic 
lawmakers.3 The brief skirmish had contrasting impacts on both camps. For 
LGBT activists, the failure demonstrated it was still too early to place the 
legalization of same-sex marriage on the agenda, and hence pursuing civil 
partnership was thought to be a more realistic path (Chien 2012: 191-194). Prior 
to the encounter, Taiwan’s religious conservatives had paid little attention 
to the same-sex issue. A 2003 assessment concluded that the oppositional 
forces were too weak, so LGBT activists were not considered to be a force 
that needed to be dealt with (Lai 2003: 104). The conservatives were therefore 
caught off guard because they had underestimated the advance of the LGBT 
movement. Consequently, in 2007 Catholic and Protestant conservatives 
formed a coalition to defend marriage as a heterosexual union – the Taiwan 
League for Preserving Family (Taiwan Weihu Jiating Lianmeng) – the f irst 
countermovement organization to safeguard the traditional family as well 
as the harbinger of subsequent conservative mobilizations.
The establishment of the Taiwan Alliance to Promote Civil Partnership 
Rights (TAPCPR) (Taiwan Banlu Quanyi Tuidong Lianmeng) in 2009 opened 
a new chapter for the LGBT community to assert their legal rights. TAPCPR 
advocated a multiple strategy to liberalize the legal regulations on marriage 
and family, and in 2013, one of its demands, the equal right to marriage for 
same-sex couples (hunyin pingquan), was sponsored by DPP lawmakers and 
was ready for the f irst reading in the legislature. However, the attempt to 
liberalize marriage was effectively neutralized by a stronger operation by 
conservatives. The League of Taiwanese Religious Groups Caring for Family 
(Taiwan Zongjiao Tuanti Aihu Jiating Dalianmeng) was formed, which not 
only included the previously involved Catholics and Protestants, but now 
3 See the announcement by the Taiwan Tongzhi (LGBT) Hotline Association, https://goo.gl/
Astnq7 (11 August 2017).
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obtained the support of the Unif ication Church and Buddhist leaders. 
On 30 November 2013, a massive rally to ‘protect’ the next generation’s 
‘well-being’ was held, which was claimed to attract 300,000 participants.4 
The Presbyterian Church, which was previously torn between its liberal and 
conservative wings, decided to take a theological stand to affirm the sanctity 
of heterosexual marriage and family with a pastoral letter in January 2014, 
which, however, engendered various interpretations within the church. As 
a result, the attempt to liberalize the Civil Code’s def inition of marriage 
ended before the f irst reading was f inished.
While conservatives were able to ward off the challenge for equal rights 
in marriage in 2013 with the help of some KMT lawmakers, they were ap-
prehensive of the party’s declining political strength, particularly after its 
major defeat in the local election in 2014, largely as a consequence of the 
Sunflower Movement (Ho 2019a). The Sunflower Movement involved a 
24-day student-led occupation of the national legislature in opposition to a 
free trade deal with China. The incident was the largest episode of political 
contention to occur in Taiwan since its democratization, and its peaceful 
and arguably successful conclusion left an enduring impact in the country’s 
political landscape. Threatened by the prospect that the DPP might win 
the presidency and the legislative majority in the general election in 2016 
as well as the surge of support for the openly pro-LGBT New Power Party 
(NPP) and the Social Democratic Party (see Kwan and Fell, this volume), 
conservatives launched a new party, the Faith and Hope League (FHL, 
Xinxin Xiwang Lianmeng). FHL started a signature-collecting campaign 
for a referendum that any future changes in marriage should be put to a 
popular vote. In the end, FHL received 1.7% of the vote in proportionate 
representation and failed to obtain any parliamentary seats. Although it 
claimed to have collected more than 150,000 signatures, its referendum 
application was vetoed by a government committee.
The general election in 2016 resulted in the worst-case scenario for 
conservatives, as the DPP surged to control both the presidency and the 
legislature and the NPP emerged as the third-largest party. Spearheaded by 
LGBT-friendly DPP and NPP lawmakers, the second attempt to liberalize the 
Civil Code for same-sex marriage was put onto the agenda in October. The 
conservatives launched a series of large-scale emergency rallies in November 
and December to oppose the revision and at the same time mounted grass-
roots campaigns to pressure the pro-gay lawmakers. Some DPP lawmakers 
balked at providing full-scale support for same-sex marriage by proposing 
4 Kingdom Revival Times, https://goo.gl/o9SNcg (13 August 2017).
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a special law for same-sex couples to minimize its impact. As a result, the 
effort to revise the Civil Code only f inished the f irst reading without being 
able to be reviewed and processed in the subsequent procedure.
In March 2017, the Constitutional Court decided to adjure the same-sex 
marriage case, thereby taking over the dispute from the legislative arena. 
Partly because around half of the judges newly appointed by the DPP 
government were liberal in orientation, the court ruled on May 24 that 
marriage rights for same-sex couples should be respected and decreed a 
two-year period for its eventual realization (Ho 2019b). The landmark deci-
sion represented a decisive setback for the conservatives as the ruling of the 
Constitutional Court was very diff icult to challenge via existing channels. 
In the referendums that accompanied the local election in November 2018, 
same-sex marriage opponents gained a clear victory by winning the popular 
endorsement to define marriage as a union of a man and a woman. Navigat-
ing the narrow path between the Constitutional Court decision and the voter 
preference expressed in the referendums, the DPP government managed 
to legislate a special law that allowed same-sex couples to obtain the same 
rights with heterosexual couples in May 2019. The draft was passed with 
the support of 56 DPP, 7 KMT, and 5 NPP lawmakers, making the country 
the f irst in Asia to implement marriage equality.
Gender Equity Education
Compared to the issues on abortion and same-sex marriage, the dispute over 
gender equity education appeared smaller in scale because it represented 
a flanking manoeuvre by conservatives to oppose the legal recognition of 
the LGBT community. Due to the feminists’ advocacy, Taiwan’s government 
began to implement gender equity education (originally called ‘equity 
education for both sexes’ [liangxing pingdeng jiaoyu]), with a ministry-level 
committee established in 1998, and a special law enacted in 2004. The 
earlier emphasis was on prevention of sexual assault and sexual harassment, 
hence largely free from dispute. In 2011, conservatives rose to oppose the 
implementation of a curriculum that taught students to avoid bullying 
behaviour targeting ‘gender temperaments, sexual orientation, or gender 
identity’ (Chen 2014). Their main argument was that the government should 
not create a category to ‘normalize’ the LGBT population and ‘protect’ their 
‘deviant’ behaviours.
The Taiwan True Love Alliance (Taiwan Zhen’ai Lianmeng) was then 
formed and its lobbying succeeded in obtaining the legislature’s support 
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in preventing the Ministry of Education from implementing the pro-LGBT 
curriculum guidelines. The contention focused on a teacher manual for use 
in junior high schools which encouraged students to explore their sexual 
orientation and gender temperaments. With the intervention of feminists 
and gender movement activists, the new curriculum guidelines still included 
‘gay and lesbian education’ and only a relatively minor concession was made 
to appease the conservative opponents (Huang 2017a: 267-269). In 2014, 
the government appointed two scholars associated with the Taiwan True 
Love Alliance to the Ministry of Education’s Commission on Gender Equity 
Education, marking the f irst time openly anti-gay persons were allowed into 
the agency. In 2018, the conservatives won a referendum to exclude ‘same-sex 
education’ from the teaching of gender equity education. In response, the 
Ministry of Education revised the related bylaw to replace the term with 
a lengthier description, ‘different gender, gender characteristics, gender 
temperaments, gender identity, and sexual orientation,’ and insisted on the 
necessity of teaching understanding and tolerance for sexual minorities.
While conservatives were mostly unsuccessful in forestalling the advance 
of a more inclusive gender equity education at the national policy level, 
they appeared more adaptive with local participation channels. The gender 
equity education plan included ad hoc commissions at city/county and 
school levels, which made it possible for conservatives to prevent what they 
identif ied as ‘inappropriate materials’ to be used in schools. Conservatives 
mobilized parents to pressure local authorities or schools to include ‘chastity’ 
and ‘moral character’ teaching materials in the gender equity education 
(Interview TT 2017).
The Consequences and Implications
Table 6.1 summarizes these three campaigns of Taiwan’s conservatives. 
Religion-based conservatives were mostly unsuccessful in realizing their 
main agenda in spite of their activism over a decade, as Taiwan’s government 
and society gradually evolved in a more tolerant and inclusive direction. 
Nevertheless, the countermovement left enduring impacts by reconfiguring 
the existing state-society pattern in many ways.
First, let us look at the timing of its emergence. Zald and Useem (1987: 
254) maintained ‘a countermovement is likely to emerge if the movement 
appears to be accomplishing its goals.’ Countermovements came into being 
when the previously privileged sectors felt threatened but still possessed 
the resources to resist (Andrews 2002: 919; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996: 
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1638-1639). The characterization of a countermovement as a status quo-
maintaining reaction is applicable to the campaigns against same-sex 
marriage and gender equity education, but not to the abortion issue. In 
2002, Taiwan’s religious conservatives actually mobilized to modify an 
abortion regime that had been in place for nearly two decades. In retrospect, 
the anti-abortion agitation signif ied the f irst joint public intervention by 
religious leaders. At that time, they were largely unfamiliar with the rules of 
the game. A Lutheran pastor remembered that they did not mount follow-up 
actions after petitioning in 2003 because they thought the lawmakers would 
automatically carry out their promise to narrow the access to abortion. They 
later found out that large-scale rallies and demonstrations are a necessary 
means to prod legislators to redeem their promises (Interview TGF 2017). 
Afterwards, Taiwan’s conservatives apparently became more sophisticated, 
which explained why they could quickly launch preventive actions on 
same-sex marriage in 2006 and on gender equity education in 2011.
The rise of conservatives as political actors modif ied and complicated 
the interactions between social movements and the state. Previously, 
reform advocates mobilized in the name of civil society and challenged 
the government as the latter stood for the existing order; now civil society 
became divided and a complicated three-way interaction among movements, 
countermovements and the state ensued. Inevitably, the rise of countermove-
ments increased the cost of concession for government off icials in their 
Table 6.1  Three Conservative Campaigns in Taiwan
Target Issues Abortion Same-sex Marriage Gender Equity 
Education











League of All Citizen 
Movements to 
Respect Life (2003)
Taiwan League for 
Preserving family 
(2007)
Taiwan True Love 
Alliance (2011)
Policy Results (1) failure to restrict 
the abortion access
(2) Preventing the 
feminist attempt to 
remove the spousal 
consent




(1) failure to stop the 
inclusion of LGbT 
education in school
(2) The attempt to 
insert conservative 
curriculum locally as 
undecided
Source: Own compilation
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dealings with progressive movements (Luders 2016: 206). The shift in the 
political landscape brought a greater challenge to the women’s movement 
than to the LGBT community because the former traditionally prioritized 
state agencies as a source for change. Feminist leaders had successfully 
maintained their presence in the government via a number of participa-
tory channels, such as the Executive Yuan’s Gender Equity Committee 
(formerly the Committee for the Promotion of Women’s Rights) and the 
Ministry of Education’s Commission on Gender Equity Education. These 
policy interventions have been identif ied as ‘state feminism’ in Taiwan, 
which offered a critical leverage to implement pro-women measures (Huang 
2017; Hwang and Wu 2017; Peng 2008; Yang 2004). The rise of conservatives 
threatened to neutralize these participatory channels. As said above, the 
KMT government appointed anti-gay representatives to the Commission 
on Gender Equity Education in 2014. Again, in the wake of the pro-LGBT 
ruling of the Constitutional Court, the DPP government made a promise to 
nominate conservatives to alleviate their opposition, although the promise 
did not materialize.5
Other policy channels pioneered by Taiwan’s human rights movement 
were in danger of being ‘usurped’ by conservatives. In 2013, conservatives 
sent their delegates to take part in the review meetings of the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) with the intention to offset the demand for marriage equality 
(Interview TAPCPR 2017). In the 2017 review meeting of two human rights 
conventions (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 
anti-gay activists f iled shadow reports that asserted that the promotion of 
lesbian and gay rights violated the rights of heterosexual persons.6 With 
the conservatives’ participation, it has become more diff icult to promote 
progressive changes by these off icial mechanisms. There was evidence that 
governmental agencies and bureaucrats learnt to take an unclear policy 
stand to avoid controversies. The Department of Health proposed three 
identical revision drafts on abortion (in 2006, 2008 and 2012) in a futile 
attempt to appease both camps. The Ministry of Justice appeared reluctant to 
include the same-sex marriage issue in its human rights review. Its off icials 
avoided taking a stance so that when proponents and opponents were 
engaged in a heated battle in the legislature in 2016, the executive branch 
remained conspicuously silent.
5 Central News Agency, https://goo.gl/YKG4U3 (16 August 2017).
6 Storm Media, https://goo.gl/gHppRA (16 August 2017).
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In terms of mobilizing structure, the conservative countermovement 
represented the mirror image of Taiwan’s feminist movement. The former 
possessed a stronger mobilizing capacity and political influences at the local 
level due to the church connections, whereas the latter enjoyed a number of 
tactical advantages at the national level because of the ‘femocrat’ network. 
The conservative activists I interviewed commonly complained about the 
bias of the mainstream media that tended to underreport their rallies and 
demonstrations so that they had to rely on the church-managed newspapers 
and TV channels. One Buddhist leader in the League of Taiwan Guardians 
of the Family embraced a conspiracy theory that held that the government 
pressured the mainstream media to ignore the anti-LGBT events (Interview 
NTCBA 2017). On the other hand, the LGBT activists whom I interviewed 
were surprised to f ind that conservatives were able to launch initiatives in 
the name of parents and obtain support from local councillors. While the 
conservative countermovement appeared pyramid-shaped with a mass 
followers, their rivals were more represented by individual professionals. 
Weng and Fell (2006: 159) have described Taiwan’s women’s movement as 
‘rootless’ due to its lack of a mass base. As such, women and gender activists 
f ind it diff icult to compete with the conservatives when it came to staging 
large-scale rallies. In several confrontations, opponents of same-sex marriage 
easily outnumbered its supporters.
Finally, although the conservative countermovement has not succeeded 
in realizing its policy demands so far, its political ascendancy was clearly 
felt and threatened to usher in a new political realignment. Previously, they 
considered the KMT as their natural ally and occasionally were able to secure 
the support from individual DPP politicians. The dwindling of the KMT’s 
political strength prompted the formation of the FHL as a religion-based 
conservative party in 2015. Led by a pro-unif ication mainlander politician 
Joanna Lei, the FHL struggled to convince the voters that it signif ied an 
independent choice beyond the DPP/KMT rivalry. With the eruption of the 
same-sex marriage dispute in 2016, political opportunities for conservatives 
surfaced. DPP lawmakers who supported marriage equality began to face 
angry complaints from their voters. Southern Taiwan has been the DPP’s 
stronghold, as the party won a clear sweep there in 2016 by obtaining all 22 
legislative seats located below the Zhuoshui River, and yet the grassroots 
reaction was particularly strong there. As a result, many southern lawmakers 
shifted to the ‘special law’ position or decided to keep silent in order to 
avoid the controversy (Interview DPP 2017a). The DPP mayors’ symbolic 
gesture to hoist a rainbow flag on International Human Rights Day was met 
with strong protests, and even local DPP politicians were not supportive 
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(Interview DPP 2017b). Particularly deleterious to the DPP was the defec-
tion of some Presbyterian leaders. A Presbyterian pastor in Tainan who 
took part in the pro-democracy movement in the past now led a campaign 
to recall the DPP lawmaker Wang Ding-yu after he expressed a pro-gay 
stance. Acknowledging that many of his church followers were staunch DPP 
supporters, he insisted on prioritizing the LGBT issues because a person’s 
partisan identity should not impede ‘the moral judgement on what is right 
and what is wrong’ (Interview PTCMRC 2017). Two southern presbyteries 
issued a strongly worded statement to challenge the Constitutional Court’s 
pro-gay ruling.7 It remains to be seen how the disenchantment on the part 
of DPP’s conservative rank and f ile will affect its support.
An unpublicized survey by a Taiwanese think tank8 in December 2016 
indicated the anti-gay marriage sentiment cut across the partisan divide. 
Among the 58.6% of respondents who indicated their disapproval or strong 
disapproval, 34.3% was from the pan-green camp (29.7% DPP and 4.6% 
NPP supporters) and 36.9% from the pan-blue camp (29.6% KMT, 5.3% 
People First Party, and 1.1% New Party supporters). If these conservative 
citizens were successfully persuaded to defect by voting for a new party, 
they could have represented a bona f ide independent force. As mentioned 
in the introduction by Chiavacci and Grano (in this volume), East Asian 
conservative movements appear to share a pro-establishment origin and 
outlook, and they have not evolved into the radical populist strain nowadays 
commonly seen in the West. Taiwan’s conservative opponents to abortion, 
same-sex marriage and gender equity education f itted into this descrip-
tion because they tended to characterize themselves as ‘nonpartisan’ and 
‘apolitical’ parents who were concerned about their children’s well-being and 
social stability. As such, this framing helped gain sympathy from pan-green 
and pan-blue voters. The conservative countermovement had powerfully 
demonstrated its strength without having given rise to a viable political force. 
Yet, it has the potential to do so as favourable opportunities have emerged. 
Just like the US Supreme Court decision Roe v. Wade (1973) that energized 
the anti-abortion movement (Luker 1984: 126-127), the landmark decision 
of Taiwan’s Constitutional Court in 2017 might give a short-term boost to 
the LGBT movement, while planting the seed of a stronger backlash. The 
future viability of a culturally conservative party hinges upon the following 
7 Christian Daily, https://goo.gl/8z17ct (16 August 2017).
8 Taiwan Thinktank is a policy research organizations with links to DPP politicians. The 
author was brief ly involved with its opinion survey program. The data cited here came from 
one poll result, which was not announced for some political reason.
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factors: (1) whether the KMT can recoup after the unprecedented defeat in 
2016 and regain the allegiance of its previous voters, (2) whether the DPP 
can stem the haemorrhage of its conservative voters, and (3) whether the 
conservative countermovement can expand its reach beyond its religious 
network. All these remain to be observed.
The Learning Curve of a Countermovement
In a 2007 interview, a Catholic priest recounted his experience in initiating 
a pro-family campaign9:
We were praying every day for God’s guidance. Especially since we [the 
HLEC] were the f irst institute in the Chinese society in Taiwan, we needed 
to proceed cautiously under God and every effort was a new trial. If we 
caused harm, it would have damaged all Christians. […] When we began 
to enlist the support of the churches on the draft [to restrict access to 
abortion], many thought it was enough to ‘spread the gospel.’ They did not 
want to engage in politics for fear of involvement with the political parties.
Since religious conservatives had been political outsiders for a long time, they 
had to build everything from scratch. Most of their leaders and followers were 
new to movement politics. An FHL legislative candidate in 2016 admitted 
her only previous experience with social movements was participation in 
commemorating the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 (Interview FHL 2017). As 
a latecomer, conservative activists encountered a political arena that has 
been largely shaped by progressive movements. Even the detail about how 
to manage a petition booth, for instance, had to been learned from their 
opponents. A recall campaign leader acknowledged having consulted DPP 
activists with experience of street activism. ‘They recommended the use 
of songs, banners, and slogan to promote ourselves, and we had to learn by 
doing’ (Interview SL 2017).
Countermovements were likely to adopt their opponents’ tactics when 
the latter demonstrated their utility (Burstein 1991: 512). When it came to 
contestations over media representation, countermovements tended to 
‘piggyback’ on their rivals in order to make use of the journalistic balance 
norm (Rohlinger 2002: 495). In the case of Taiwan’s conservative counter-
movement, its religious basis allowed it to bring certain protest repertoires 
9 Cited from the Bread of Life Literature Collection, https://goo.gl/Su6N2d (18 August 2017).
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that were not available to the secular movements, for example, the use of 
mass prayers and the ‘exorcism’ of gays and lesbians. However, while these 
actions might have strengthened the solidarity among faithful followers, 
they turned out to be useless, if not counterproductive, in appealing to 
the non-Christian majority. Lesbian and gay activists wasted no time in 
highlighting these seemingly bizarre, outlandish and even superstitious 
gestures and ways of speaking to the public. An FHL activist explained her 
experience (Interview FHL 2017):
I learnt from my last electoral campaign that people would not pay at-
tention to me if I told them God wanted me to affect the election. So I 
had to learn to speak the language of people, not that of God. I could not 
say, ‘God ruled the world.’ I needed to address their immediate concerns. 
Some Christians used to say that gay people would go to hell. But saying 
things like that made us seem cruel.
As such, conservative leaders took pains to downplay their religious back-
grounds. What was initially called the League of Taiwanese Religious Groups 
Caring for the Family was renamed as the League of Taiwan Guardians of 
the Family in order to hide its religious identity (Huang 2017b: 122).
There were many incidences where conservatives consciously imitated 
the tactics practiced by preceding movements. The FHL’s 2015 signature-
collecting campaign to demand that any change of the legal def inition of 
marriage would need to be approved by a referendum was clearly inspired 
by a preceding campaign to revise the referendum law. The attempts to 
storm the legislature in order to disrupt the review meeting as well as the 
subsequent claims of police violence against them in December 2016 could be 
seen as an echo of actions taken by the Sunflower Movement.10 The ensuing 
campaign to unseat avowedly pro-gay lawmakers closely followed the script 
of post-Sunflower recall campaign, which targeted some KMT lawmakers.
While the women’s movement and the gender movement have established 
a number of advocacy organizations that have gained public visibility and 
credibility, conservatives managed to set up their own to present their claims. 
For instance, while the Gender/Sexuality Rights Association of Taiwan 
(Taiwan Xingbie Renquan Xiehui) has been a recognized representative 
of the LGBT community, another emerged – the Gender Human Rights 
Preservation Association of Taiwan (Taiwan Xingbie Renquan Weihu Cujin 
Xiehui) – making opposite demands. Similarly, the Taiwan Gender Equity 
10 Kingdom Revival Times, https://goo.gl/QBrgfK (18 August 2017).
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Education Association (Taiwan Xingbie Pingdeng Jiaoyu Xiehui), a veteran 
campaigner for tolerance, now faced a challenge by an explicitly anti-gay 
organization, the Taiwan Gender Education Development Association 
(Taiwan Xingbie Jiaoyu Fazhan Xiehui).11 Forming parallel and confusingly 
sounding organizations not only diluted the conservative groups’ religious 
origins, but also helped to bring out an alternative voice in civil society.
The rhetoric and framing by conservatives evolved as their countermove-
ment became more mature. According to the observation of an LGBT 
activist, the early use of f ire-and-brimstone language by conservatives 
actually backf ired by alienating the public; later on, they refrained from 
cursing lesbian and gays by concentrating their message on the ‘protection 
of the family.’ The activist acknowledged that the revised rhetoric made 
the anti-gay campaign more socially acceptable (Interview TAPCPR 2017). 
In place of references to Sodom and Gomorrah, conservative activists had 
learnt how to avoid using explicitly discriminatory language. The typical 
statement of their revised position was that they ‘respected’ lesbians and 
gays, but they opposed the ‘homosexual movement’ with its sexual libera-
tion agenda which was bound to bring about promiscuity, cause gender 
confusion and foster the AIDS epidemic. Conservatives mastered the art 
of conveying their message by using their opponents’ vocabulary. For 
example, ‘sexual bullying’ was a term created to name and f ight against 
the marginalization of LGBT students. Conservatives quickly usurped 
this notion by arguing that ‘normal’ students (read: heterosexual ones) 
were now being ‘bullied’ by gender equity education which was said to 
‘encourage homosexuality.’12
Studies found that the movement claims previously used by progressives 
were often taken over and redefined to match the conservative agenda. The 
examples included the use of ‘multiculturalism’ to refer to white separatism 
(Berbrier 1998) and church schools (Davies 1999), ‘civil rights’ to mean 
anti-abortion activism (Johnson 1999), and ‘community control of schools’ 
to support the kinds of religious schools favoured by the Christian Right 
(Naples 2002). Regardless of the creditability of these reinterpretations, 
these incidences indicated that ideas and notions which were invented 
by progressive movements and introduced into the public domain lent 
themselves to be re-appropriated by those who resisted change. Conserva-
tives borrowed these pre-existing movement frames precisely because the 
latter had gained legitimacy, more or less.
11 Chinese Christian Tribune, https://goo.gl/61mtm6 (18 August 2017).
12 Newtalk, https://goo.gl/xa7x1B (18 August 2017).
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Particularly after the flare-up of the dispute over same-sex marriage at 
the end of 2016, such ‘frame borrowing’ became more frequent. Opponents of 
same-sex marriage self-styled themselves as a ‘citizen movement’ (gongmin 
yundong),13 a term that had become a popular way to characterize protest 
activism leading up to the Sunflower Movement in 2014. Some student 
protesters named their action as a ‘Gypsophila paniculata movement’ 
(mantianxing yundong),14 meaning ‘baby’s breath movement,’ following 
Taiwan’s time-honoured practice of characterizing a successful student 
movement by the name of a flower (such as the Sunflower Movement or the 
Wild Lily student movement of 1990). The legislative process on the Civil 
Code revision was also criticized as a ‘black box review’ (heixiang shencha),15 
reminiscent of the way the KMT government dealt with a controversial 
free-trade agreement with China. Finally, while feminists championed 
the idea of gender mainstreaming and successfully incorporated it into 
government policies, conservatives attempted to implement their version 
of ‘family mainstreaming’ ( jiating zhuliuhua)16 in the same way.
Taiwan’s LGBT movement started with a non-essentialist assumption of 
gender identity and sexuality, which were seen as culturally constructed 
and fluid, whereas conservatives tended to see them as natural, biologically 
determined or designed by God. As early as the mid-1990s, there had been 
a Christian association that aimed at ‘helping’ lesbians and gays to f ind 
their ‘God-created’ gender roles in Taiwan.17 While there has been a long 
history of ‘curing’ lesbians and gays by coercion, medicine or faith, the recent 
development witnessed a breakthrough in framing. Some conservatives 
began to embrace a ‘post-homosexual’ (houtong) theory, which viewed 
homosexuality in a person as a transient and unstable identity that would 
eventually return to the normal one. Same-sex marriage opponents staged 
reverse ‘coming out’ ceremonies in which post-homosexual people shared 
their personal stories. A typical narrative contained two plot elements: (1) 
traumatic experiences (incest or childhood sex abuse) had led to gender 
confusion and same-sex behaviour, and (2) they found true happiness after 
accepting their ‘natural’ gender and sexuality.18 The post-homosexual theory 
actually turned the table on LGBT activists by claiming their identity was 
not f ixed and thus malleable to intervention or correction.
13 Kingdom Revival Times, https://goo.gl/95ywqJ (18 August 2017).
14 Christian Daily, https://goo.gl/5SY3oZ (18 August 2017).
15 Kingdom Revival Times, https://goo.gl/wMmzM8 (18 August 2017).
16 Kingdom Revival Times, https://goo.gl/aHsqg2 (19 August 2017).
17 Taiwan Leaving Egypt Counseling Association, https://goo.gl/Pbmjqf (27 August 2017).
18 League of Taiwan Guardians of Family, https://goo.gl/bqeqkn (27 August 2017).
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Like their global counterparts, Taiwan’s conservative countermovement 
imitated the tactics and framing used by the rival movements. The resulting 
surge of social movements during Ma Ying-jeou’s government (2008-2016) 
meant that conservatives had a large menu from which they could learn on 
how to package their messages. Taiwan’s conservatives were eager students 
of the movement activism that preceded them, partly because they made 
an effort to shed their religious roots by learning the art of being a secular 
movement.
Conclusion
The conservative opposition to abortion, same-sex marriage and gender 
equity education is an intellectually fascinating case of the development 
of a countermovement, one that intended to undo the achievements ac-
complished by the Taiwan women’s and gender movements. An analysis of 
Taiwan’s civil society would be incomplete if we fail to take these campaigns 
into consideration, because they were equally self-organized, mass based 
and policy oriented, just like their progressive rivals.
This chapter has argued that the emergence of a religion-based coun-
termovement has a historical origin in that Taiwan’s Protestant Christians 
underwent a profound ecological change which facilitated the hegemony 
of conservative evangelicals. Protestant and Catholic leaders pioneered the 
opposition to gender equity and multiculturalism, and over the years, they 
gained support from other religions. On the issues of abortion, same-sex 
marriage and gender equity education they have largely failed to turn back 
the clock; yet, their emergence threatens to usher in a new political alignment 
in Taiwan. As a countermovement, Taiwan’s conservatives were latecomers 
to movement politics. They have demonstrated remarkable adaptability, 
however, by imitating tactics and framing from their opponents successfully. 
Their further evolution and impact remain to be observed.
Finally, does the emergence of the conservative movement signify a 
cultural change in Taiwan, in the sense that more and more people are 
embracing traditional values regarding sex, gender and family as a conscious 
choice? Demographic evidence indicates that Taiwanese are marrying late, 
giving birth to fewer children and more likely to divorce over the years. In 
other words, people are increasingly choosing a lifestyle that clearly deviates 
from the idealized family pattern. The growing acceptance of lesbians and 
gays is particularly noticeable among members of the younger generation. 
The Taiwan Social Change Survey data shows a signif icant rise in tolerance. 
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In 1991, only 11.4% of respondent approved of same-sex marriage, a f igure 
that rose to 54.2% by 2015.19 Therefore, the conservative movement in Taiwan 
does not originate from a society-wide value change, nor does it represent 
a mainstream voice. More likely, conservative activists are resisting the 
inevitable trend of cultural modernity – one that values individual autonomy 
and freedom – that is gradually taking root in Taiwan.
References
Andrews, Kenneth T. 2002. ‘Movement-Countermovement Dynamics and the 
Emergence of New Institutions: The Case of “White Flight” Schools in Mississippi.’ 
Mobilization, 80 (3): 911-936.
Berbrier, Mitch. 1998. ‘“Half the Battle”: Cultural Resonance, Framing Processes, 
and Ethnic Affectation in Contemporary White Separatist Rhetoric.’ Social 
Problems, 45 (4): 431-450.
Burstein, Paul. 1991. ‘“Reverse Discrimination” Cases in the Federal Courts: Legal 
Mobilization by a Countermovement.’ Sociological Quarterly, 32 (4): 511-528.
Chen, Chao-Ju. 2014. ‘Fanzhi Yundong Zuowei Qiji: Xingbie Pingdeng Jiaoyufa 
Shizhounian de Xinchufa’ [Countermovements as an opportunity: A new begin-
ning on the tenth anniversary of the Gender Equity Education Act]. Xingbie 
Pingdeng Jiaoyu Jikan, 69: 63-71.
Cheng, Ling-fang. 2015. ‘Erling Yier Nian Rengong Liuchan Xiufa Zhengyi zhi Fenxi’ 
[An analysis of the controversy over proposed revisions to Taiwan’s abortion 
legislation in 2012]. Taiwan Weizhi, 34 (1): 21-36.
Chien, Tsu-chieh. 2012. ‘Cong Tongxing Hunyin dao Duoyuan Jiating: Chaoxiang 
Qinmi Guanxi Minzhu hua de Lifa Yundong’ [From ‘same sex marriage’ to 
‘pluralistic family arrangements’: The legislative movement for democratic 
intimate relationships]. Taiwan Renquan Xuekan, 1 (3): 187-201.
Damm, Jens. 2011. ‘Discrimination and Backlash against Homosexual Groups.’ 
Politics of Difference in Taiwan. Tak-wing Ngo; Hong-zen Wang (eds). London: 
Routledge, pp. 152-180.
Davies, Scott. 1999. ‘From Moral Duty to Cultural Right: A Case Study of Political 
Framing in Education.’ Sociology of Education, 72 (1): 1-21.
Fell, Dafydd. 2017. Taiwan’s Social Movements under Ma Ying-jeou. London: 
Routledge.
Fu, Yang-chih et al. 2016. Taiwan Shehui Bianqian Jiben Diaocha Jihua: Diqiqi Diyici 
Diaocha Jihua Zhixing Baogao [Summary report of the Taiwan Social Change 
19 Academia Sinica, https://goo.gl/zjDbKA (16 November 2017).
162  MING-ShO hO 
Survey: The f irst year of the seventh round]. Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute 
of Sociology.
Giddens, Anthony. 1991. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late 
Modern Age. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1985. ‘Neoconservative Culture Criticism in the United States and 
West Germany: An Intellectual Movement in Two Political Cultures.’ Habermas 
and Modernity. Richard Rorty (ed.). Oxford: Polity Press, pp. 78-94.
Ho, Josephine Chuen-juei. 2010. ‘Queer Existence under Global Governance: A 
Taiwan Exemplar.’ Positions, 18 (2): 537-554.
Ho, Ming-sho. 2005a. ‘Protest as Community Revival: Folk Religion in a Taiwanese 
Anti-Pollution Movement.’ African and Asian Studies, 4 (3) 237-269.
Ho, Ming-sho. 2005b. ‘Taiwan’s State and Social Movements under the DPP Govern-
ment (2000-2004).’ Journal of East Asian Studies, 5 (3): 401-425.
Ho, Ming-sho. 2019a. Challenging Beijing’s Mandate of Heaven: Taiwan’s Sunflower 
Movement and Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement. Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press.
Ho, Ming-sho. 2019b. ‘Taiwan’s Road to Marriage Equality: Politics of Legalizing 
Same-sex Marriage.’ China Quarterly, 238: 482-503.
Ho, Ming-sho; Chun-Hao Huang; Chun-Ta Juan. 2018. ‘The Institutionalization of 
Social Movement Study in Taiwan: A State-of-the-Field Report.’ International 
Journal of Taiwan Studies, 1 (1): 115-140.
Huang, Chang-ling. 2017a. ‘Uneasy Alliance: State Feminism and the Conservative 
Government in Taiwan.’ Taiwan’s Social Movements under Ma Ying-jeou. Dafydd 
Fell (ed.). London: Routledge, pp. 258-272.
Huang, Ke-hsien. 2017b. ‘“Cultural War” in a Globalized East: How Taiwanese Con-
servative Christianity Turned Public during the Same-sex Marriage Controversy 
and a Secularist Backlash.’ Review of Religion and Chinese Society 4: 108-136.
Hwang, Shu-ling; Wei-ting Wu. 2017. ‘Dang Fuyun Chongzhuang Guojia: Fuquanhui 
Tuidong Xingbie Zhuliuhua de Hezong Lianheng Celue’ [When the women’s 
movement confronts the state: Multiple strategies for promoting gender main-
streaming]. Taiwan Shehuixue, 22: 1-55.
Johnson, Victoria. 1999. ‘The Strategic Determinants of a Countermovement: The 
Emergence and Impact of Operation Rescue Blockades.’ Waves of Protest: Social 
Movements Since the Sixties. Jo Freeman; Victoria Johnson (eds). New York: 
Rowman & Littlef ield, pp. 241-266.
Ku, Yenlin. 1995. ‘Funu Yundong yu Gonggong Zhengce de Hudong Guanxi: Duotai 
Hefa Hua yu Pingdeng Gongzuo Quan Celue Renxi’ [The interaction between 
women’s movement and public policy: An analysis of strategies in abortion 
legalization and equal employment opportunity]. Taiwan de Guojia yu Shehui. 
Michael Hsin-huang Hsiao; Cheng-kuang Hsu (eds). Taipei: Dongda, pp. 151-174.
ThE RELIGION-bASED CONSERVATIVE COUNTERMOVEMENT IN TAIwAN 163
Kuan, Hsiao-wei. 2011. ‘Fan Duotai Yundong yu Rengong Liuchan fa Lunshu’ [The 
anti-abortion movement and discourses on abortion law]. Shehui Yundong 
de Nian Dai: Wanjin Ershi Nian Lai de Taiwan Xingdong Zhuyi. Ming-sho Ho; 
Hsiu-hsin Lin (eds). Taipei: Socio, pp. 215-256.
Lai, Yu-lin. 2003. ‘Taiwan Tongzhi Yundong de Jigou Hua: Yi Tongzhi Zixun Rexian 
Weili’ [The institutionalization of the Taiwan Tongzhi Movement: A case study 
of the Taiwan Tongzhi Hotline Association]. Nuxue Xuezhi, 15: 79-114.
Lo, Cheng Chung. 2010. Beichu Mai de Caihong Qi [The betrayed rainbow f lag]. 
https://goo.gl/ztKRh6 (11 August 2017).
Lo, Clarence Y.H. 1982. ‘Countermovements and Conservative Movements in the 
Contemporary US.’ Annual Review of Sociology, 8: 107-134.
Luders, Joseph E. 2016. ‘Feminist Mobilization and the Politics of Rights.’ The 
Consequences of Social Movements. Lorezno Bosi; Marco Guigni; Katrin Uba 
(eds). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 185-214.
Luker, Kristian. 1984. Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood. Berkeley: University 
of California Press.
Madsen, Richard. 2007. Democracy’s Dharma: Religious Renaissance and Political 
Development Taiwan. Berkeley: University of California Press.
McAdam, Doug; Karina Kloos. 2014. Deeply Divided: Racial Politics and Social 
Movements in Post-war America. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Meyer, David S.; Suzanne Staggenborg. 1996. ‘Movements, Countermovements, the 
Structure of Political Opportunity.’ American Journal of Sociology, 101 (6): 1628-1660.
Mottl, Tahi L. 1980. ‘The Analysis of Countermovements.’ Social Problems, 27 (5): 
620-635.
Naples, Nancy A. 2002. ‘Materialist Feminist Discourse Analysis and Social Move-
ment Research: Mapping the Changing Context for “Community Control.”’ Social 
Movements: Identity, Culture and the State. David S. Meyer; Nancy Whittier; 
Belinda Robnett (eds). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 226-246.
Peng, Yenwen. 2008. ‘Dang Guanliao Yushang Fuyun: Taiwan Tuidong Xingbie 
Zhuliuhua de Jingyan Chutan’ [When bureaucrats meet feminists: Exploring 
the progress and challenges of gender mainstreaming in Taiwan]. Dongwu 
Zhengzhi Xuebao, 26 (4): 1-58.
Rohlinger, Deana A. 2002. ‘Framing the Abortion Debate: Organizational Resources, 
Media Strategies, and Movement-Countermovement Dynamics.’ Sociological 
Quarterly, 43 (4): 479-507.
Rubinstein, Murray A. 1991. The Protestant Community on Modern Taiwan: Mission, 
Seminary, and Church. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
Rubinstein, Murray A. 1994. ‘The New Testament Church and the Taiwanese Prot-
estant Community.’ The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present. Murray A. Rubinstein 
(ed.). New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 445-473.
164  MING-ShO hO 
Shia, Chung-Chien. 1993. ‘Liangqian Nian Fuyin Yundong de Guoqu Xianzai yu 
Weilai’ [The past, present, and future of Year 2000 Evangelism]. Xin Shizhe 
Zazhi, 14: 5-9.
Tilly, Charles. 2005. ‘Regime and Contentions.’ Handbook of Political Sociology: States, 
Civil Societies, and Globalization. Thomas Janoski; Robert R. Alford; Alexander 
M. Hicks; Mildred A. Schwartz (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 423-440.
Wang, Chao-wen. 2005. ‘Jiaopai Hezuo de xu yu Shi’ [The reality and f iction of 
collaboration between denominations]. Xin Shizhe Zazhi, 90: 11-14.
Weller, Robert P. 1999. Alternative Civilities: Democracy and Culture in China and 
Taiwan. Boulder: Westview.
Weng, Hui-chen; Dafydd Fell. 2006. ‘The Rootless Movement: Taiwan’s Women’s 
Movement in the KMT and DPP Eras.’ What Has Changed? Taiwan before and 
after the Change in Ruling Parties. Dafydd Fell; Henning Klöter; Chang Bi-yu 
(eds). Wiesbaden: Harraowitz, pp. 147-164.
Yang, Wan-Ying. 2004. ‘Fuquanhui dao Xingbie Pingdeng Weiyuanhui de Zhuan 
Bian: Yi Geguo Jia Nuxing Zhuyi de Bijiao Guandian Fenxi’ [From the Committee 
for Promotion of Women’s Rights to the Committee for Gender Equality: A state 
feminism study from comparative perspective]. Zhengzhi Kexue Luncong, 21: 
117-147.
Zald, Mayer N.; Bert Useem. 1987. ‘Movement and Countermovement Interac-
tion: Mobilization, Tactics, and State Involvement.’ Social Movements in an 
Organizational Society. Mayer N. Zald; John D. McCarthy (eds). New Brunswick: 
Transaction, pp. 247-272.
Interviews
Interview DPP 2017a. Lawmaker of the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party), 
17 April 2017.
Interview DPP 2017b. Chief Executive Off icer, Taichung City party branch of the 
DPP (Democratic Progressive Party), 5 July 2017.
Interview FHL 2017. Faith and Hope League legislative candidate in Taichung 
City, 25 May 2017.
Interview NMM 2017. Editor-in-chief of New Messenger magazine, 14 August 2017.
Interview NTCBA 2017. President of New Taipei City Buddhist Association, 
29 May 2017.
Interview PTCMRC 2017. Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Minzu Road, Tainan, 
9 June 2017.
Interview SL 2017. Leader of Stability League of Taipei City, New Taipei City and 
Keelung City, 12 June 2017
ThE RELIGION-bASED CONSERVATIVE COUNTERMOVEMENT IN TAIwAN 165
Interview TAPCPR 2017. Secretary General of the Taiwan Alliance to Promote Civil 
Partnership Rights, 28 June 2017.
Interview TGF 2017. Spokesperson of the League of Taiwan Guardians of the Family, 
31 May 2017.
Interview TT 2017. Branch Director, Taiwan Tongzhi (LGBT) Hotline Association, 
Kaohsiung, 19 June 2017.
About the Author
Ming-sho Ho is Professor of Sociology at National Taiwan University, 
Taiwan. He specializes in social movements, labour and environmental 
issues in Taiwan. His recent works have been published in Environmental 
Politics, Sociological Inquiry, Sociological Perspectives, China Quarterly and 
the Journal of East Asian Studies. He has also published Working Class Forma-
tion in Taiwan: Fractured Solidarity in State-Owned Enterprises, 1945-2012 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), and Challenging Beijing’s Mandate of Heaven: 
Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement and Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement (Temple 
University Press, 2019).

7 The Relationship between Mainstream 
and Movement Parties in Taiwan
Case Studies of the New Power Party (NPP) and the Green 
Party Taiwan-Social Democratic Party Alliance (GPT/SDP)
Tommy Chung Yin Kwan and Dafydd Fell
Abstract
Since democratization began in the mid-1980s, Taiwan’s party system 
has been dominated by two parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). However, smaller parties have at 
times played an important role, bringing diversity into the system, stress-
ing different issues and representing neglected communities. These small 
parties tended to be those that split off from the mainstream parties, 
while alternative social movement parties struggled to be electorally 
relevant. The picture changed recently with the rise of two different types 
of movement parties, the New Power Party (NPP) and the Green Party 
Taiwan/Social Democratic Party Alliance (GPT/SDP). In this chapter 
we examine the relationship of these new players with the mainstream 
party, DPP, offering some thoughts on how the relationship affected the 
development of these alternative parties.
Keywords: Taiwan, small parties, movement parties, party system
Social movements are generally considered as outsiders in political 
systems. Nevertheless, movement activists can always supplement the 
extra-institutional tactics by participating in party politics to bring their 
issues on to the legislative agenda. In Taiwan, social movements have long 
faced the challenge of how to engage with political society. One option is 
to remain aloof of party politics and just try to influence or lobby political 
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parties from the outside. Nevertheless this runs the risk of losing political 
influence. To switch from street politics to the legislature in Taiwan, there 
are arguably three options for the social activists. Firstly, they can work with 
one of the two established mainstream parties, and it has been particularly 
common to see alliances with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (Ho 
2003). An alternative is to work with, or form, social movement-oriented 
parties. Here there are two main options. They can work with a more DPP-
allied movement party such as the New Power Party (NPP) or with parties 
autonomous from the DPP, such as the Green Party Taiwan (GPT).
The Sunflower Movement in 2014 was by far the largest social movement 
since Taiwan’s democratization. It arose not only due to concerns about the 
China factor, but also was a response to what Chiavacci and Grano (in this 
volume’s introduction) call ‘new social anxieties and increasing normative 
diversity.’ After being ignited by the abrupt attempt of passing the Cross-
Strait Service Trade Agreement by the government in the legislature, the 
movement quickly escalated into a mass movement comprising different 
issues, ranging from social justice to labour and environmental politics as 
‘it was a culmination of a long series of contentions and a confluence of 
diverse streams of many CSOs in the past few years’ (Hsu 2017). After the 
Sunflower Movement, the NPP had carried forward the dynamics of the 
movement to participate in the electoral politics of Taiwan. Compared to 
the rookie NPP, the GPT is a veteran in Taiwan politics, existing for more 
than two decades, despite its limited progress in terms of votes and seats. 
As mentioned in the chapter by Chiavacci and Grano as well as the one by 
Grano (in this volume), environmental protection movements have been the 
key social movement involved in Taiwan’s political transition – for example, 
the GPT is a movement party that emerged out of an environmental CSO. 
The cases of NPP and the GPT offer us an excellent chance to contrast the 
development of movement parties in Taiwan.
A number of studies on small parties have theorized about how their 
relationships with mainstream parties can affect their development trajec-
tories (Meguid 2008). Therefore, in this study we examine the relationship 
between two different types of movement parties, the NPP and GPT/SDP1 
with a mainstream party, the DPP, and consider how this relationship has 
affected their recent development.
Since democratization began in the mid-1980s, Taiwan’s party system 
has been dominated by two parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the DPP. 
1 The Social Democratic Party (SDP) off icially ran in an alliance with the GPT in the 2016 
campaign.
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However, smaller parties have played an important role, bringing diversity 
into the system, stressing different issues and representing neglected com-
munities.2 Taiwan’s smaller parties can be divided into two types. These are 
splinter parties and alternative parties. Splinter parties are those that split 
away from one of the two mainstream parties, often because of disagree-
ments over policy issues or matters of nomination. Lucardie (2000: 176) has 
termed them ‘purifier parties’ that cling ‘to an existing ideology, which it feels 
is diluted or betrayed by one (or more) of the established parties.’3 The classic 
Taiwanese case is the New Party, which was established by KMT defectors 
in 1993 (Fell 2006). These can be distinguished from alternative or niche 
parties that Lucardie (2000: 177) calls ‘prophetic parties,’ which stress new 
issues and ideologies that have been ignored or neglected by the mainstream 
parties.4 Given that many of these alternative parties owe their origins in 
Taiwan’s social movements, Ho and Huang have recently termed them as 
‘movement parties’ (Ho and Huang 2017). The most researched Taiwanese 
party in this category is the GPT, which was established in 1996 (Fell and 
Peng 2016). The NPP and SDP are more recently established examples of 
movement parties.
A key feature in Taiwan’s party system has been that the splinter par-
ties have fared better electorally than the movement parties. Before the 
emergence of the NPP, splinter parties had a far better record in winning 
signif icant numbers of votes and seats, however, they tended to see their 
support levels collapse within one or two electoral cycles. A critical factor in 
explaining the development of smaller parties is in their relationship with 
mainstream parties. In the case of splinter parties, once the mainstream 
parties appear to be returning to party ideology, then the purif ier parties’ 
supporters and politicians may return, often leading to a collapse in the 
purif ier’s electoral base. The decline of the New Party and People First Party 
are good examples of this pattern, losing support as their original party, the 
KMT, appeared to return to more orthodox positions on national identity (Fell 
2005, 2014).5 In contrast, movement parties in Taiwan have struggled to get 
any of their candidates elected at either the local or national level. Rochon has 
proposed that while splinter parties will initially perform better, alternative 
parties would perform better, ‘once they had carved out an electoral niche 
2 For a discussion of the development of Taiwan’s small parties, see Fell (2005, 2014) as well 
as Ho and Huang (2017).
3 Rochon (1985) terms these as ‘challenger parties.’
4 Rochon (1985) calls these ‘mobilizers.’
5 The orthodox stance on national identity refers to a pro-national unif ication position, 
embracing the idea of Chinese national identity.
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for themselves’ (Rochon 1985). At least prior to 2016, Taiwan’s case seemed 
to support the f irst part of Rochon’s argument but not the latter part.
As the f ilm director Wan Jen reminds us in his hilarious cross-Strait 
romantic comedy, It Takes Two to Tango. In other words, we need to consider 
the approaches of both the mainstream and smaller alternative parties in this 
relationship. In a classic study on small parties, particularly the prophetic 
parties, Bonnie Meguid (2008) argues that the best way to understand the 
development of challenger parties is by looking at the strategies of the main-
stream parties. She suggests that mainstream parties can take dismissive, 
accommodative or adversarial strategies towards the prophetic parties’ core 
issues. In other words, when mainstream parties pursue dismissive strategies 
the niche parties’ core issue is likely to decease in salience and its electoral 
support will decline. Where the mainstream party adopts accommodative 
strategies then the issue may rise in salience but because the mainstream party 
may take over issue ownership, it, rather than the niche party, will benefit 
electorally. The ideal scenario for the niche party is where the mainstream 
party takes oppositional or what Meguid (2008) calls ‘adversarial attitudes,’ as 
this will raise niche party issue salience, reinforce niche party issue ownership, 
and she suggests, enhance the small parties’ electoral performance.
Nevertheless Spoon (2011) does remind us that the strategies of small 
parties can also affect their survival. She argues that if such parties can 
reach a balance between their ideals and vote maximization, then small 
parties can survive, even in the ‘most unfavourable’ institutional settings, 
for instance, the Green Party’s victory in Brighton Pavilion in the 2010 UK 
general election. We are thus interested to see whether the small parties’ 
relationship with larger parties can help us to understand the recent fate 
of movement parties in Taiwan. In our selected cases, the NPP adopted a 
much more welcoming strategy to cooperate with the DPP, while the GPT/
SDP maintained distance with the mainstream parties.
To analyse the relationship between mainstream and movement par-
ties, we consider what are the options for small parties in dealing with 
the mainstream parties? How did the different approaches to mainstream 
parties adopted by the NPP and the GPT/SDP lead to different electoral 
fortunes? In the f irst section of this chapter, we will def ine the concept of 
the ‘movement party’ to discuss their major characteristics. Then we will 
consider movement parties by examining the case of two such parties in 
recent years, the NPP and the GPT. In both cases, we analyse the relationship 
between these small parties and the mainstream parties. We also offer 
some thoughts on why these parties adopted such strategies and how the 
relationship affected the development of these alternative parties.
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The Concept of a Movement Party
Sidney Tarrow (2015: 94) denotes that ‘movements frequently give rise to 
parties when movement activists transfer their activism to institutional 
politics.’ The transition of activists from extra-institutional protests to 
institutional party politics often involves the formation of movement parties. 
Since social movements can bring ‘signif icant change in the distribution of 
ideological views among voters,’ Anthony Downs (1957: 115) argues that the 
outbreak of social movements provides a good opportunity for new parties 
to be launched successfully. According to Herbert Kitschelt (2006: 280), 
‘movement parties are coalitions of political activists who emanate from 
social movements and try to apply the organizational and strategic practices 
of social movements in the arena of party competition.’ Representing the 
unrepresented salient issue is the raison d’être of movement parties. They 
are f illing the void left by mainstream parties. In other words, they are 
prophetic parties that stress new issues. Kitschelt (2006: 280-281) further 
lists three general characteristics of movement parties. First of all, they 
often lack a formal organizational structure compared with off ice-seeking 
mainstream parties. Second, they focus on a small set of issues instead of a 
broad political platform. Third, the formation of movement parties does not 
necessarily mark the abandonment of extra-institutional demonstrations 
of the social activists, they can alternatively switch their battlef ield from 
the parliament back to the street.
Movement parties often f ind themselves falling into the dilemma of 
whether they should invest in organizational structure to become more 
mainstream to broaden their support base and, ultimately, increase 
their electoral fortunes or remain as a single-issue party. Developing a 
more general party platform to appeal to more issues could target more 
constituencies, however, it would easily lead to accusations that it has 
become another purely ‘off ice seeking’ mainstream party. Movement 
parties have a rather long history in Taiwan, which could be dated back 
to the Workers’ Party in the 1980s (Ho and Huang 2017). Ho and Huang 
(2017: 344) argue that the electoral victory of NPP in 2016 ‘represents the 
culmination of nearly three decades of effort by civil society activists to 
elect their own representatives, rather than relying on the sponsorship 
of more established politicians.’ Nevertheless, Fell is more cautious, cat-
egorizing the NPP as ‘a hybrid party, with both alternative and splinter 
party features’ (Fell 2016: 58). Therefore, from the perspective of Taiwan’s 
party system, the emergence of NPP is an important case to analyse and 
explain.
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The Emergence of the NPP
The NPP was established in January 2015 following the split of the activists’ 
group the Taiwan Citizen Union (TCU). The TCU was originally formed 
before the Sunflower Movement, with the aim of nominating candidates to 
run in the 2016 parliamentary election in order to ‘break the dominance’ of 
the mainstream parties (TCU 2014). The manifesto of the TCU was signed 
by 35 activists and professionals, including the founding members of the 
later-formed NPP, for instance, Lin Fong-chen, Huang Kuo-chang and Chiu 
Hsien-chih.
On 18 March 2014, the Sunflower Movement broke out and the legislative 
chamber was occupied by activists for over three weeks. Much about the 
NPP, from its personnel to its electoral campaigns, clearly show that the 
party owed its origin to the Sunflower Movement. The NPP leader, Huang 
Kuo-chang, was one of the leaders in the Sunflower Movement. Other 
prominent f igures in the movement, including the charismatic student 
leaders Chen Wei-ting, Wei Yang and Lin Fei-fan, openly endorsed NPP 
candidates in the 2016 Legislative Yuan election by featuring in the NPP’s 
electoral campaigns.6 In the campaigns they never shied away from showing 
their close ties with the Sunflower Movement. An example is the NPP’s party 
list TV ad. This ad opens with the Sunflower slogan ‘Reject the Cross-Strait 
Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA)’ and shows images of Sunflower protests 
as well as the Sunflower occupation itself. Later in the ad their party list 
candidate Jang Show-ling is described as an ‘Anti-CSSTA Fighter’ in the 
campaign.7 In the NPP’s manifesto, it says that ‘We promise to continue to 
be an activist party. Wherever there are injustices, the NPP will be there. 
NPP will always push for reform, f ighting for the people.’8
The Significance of the NPP
In the 2016 Legislative Yuan election, the NPP won three seats in the single-
member district election and two seats in the proportional representation 
6 For example, see Lin Fei-fan’s video advertisement: https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=SBjF0_d96Og (12 December 2019), and Chen Wei-ting’s endorsement: https://goo.gl/vNMpdM 
(12 December 2019).
7 Advertisement featuring the Sunflower Movement: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=O6p8i5Fx1Gg (12 December 2019).
8 New Power Party, ‘Women de Chengnuo’ (Our promise), https://bit .ly/31il lrW 
(12 December 2019).
ThE RELATIONShIP bET wEEN MAINSTREAM AND MOVEMENT PARTIES IN TAIwAN 173
elections.9 These f ive seats made the NPP the third-largest party in the 
parliament. The victory of the NPP also signif ies a change of the political 
landscape in Taiwan. Previously, small parties in Taiwan, for instance, 
the PFP and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), were purif ier parties (Fell 
2014). Party members broke away from mainstream parties to form the 
new parties. In contrast, the newly formed NPP has many of the attributes 
of a prophetic party (Lucardie 2000). Its candidates did not have previous 
election experience before with mainstream parties and it focused more 
on new issues (Fell 2016: 52). It could be argued that it is the f irst movement 
party to win more than a single parliamentary seat in Taiwan.10 The room 
for small parties in Taiwan under the current legislative electoral system 
is small (Fell 2014). The success of the NPP has at the same time replaced 
the TSU in the parliament and allowed it to overtake the PFP to become 
the third-largest party. The third-largest-party status was reaff irmed by 
the party identif ication surveys conducted by the Election Study Center, 
NCCU. In December 2016 the NPP’s party identif ication was 4.1%, higher 
than the PFP’s 2.3% and one year later there was a slight decline in the NPP’s 
support to 3.8%, compared to the PFP’s 1.3% (ESC 2019). In other words, in 
both seats and support rates, the NPP has become the third party in Taiwan 
ahead of the traditional splinter small parties.
The Ambiguous Relationship with the DPP
The 2014 Sunflower Movement was not merely against the Cross-Strait 
Service Trade Agreement; it was about the underlying quality of democracy. 
Dafydd Fell denotes that from the slogan of Sunflower Movement – ‘Protect 
Democracy, Return the CSSTA’ – the movement was caused by a perception 
of the failure of regular party politics (Fell 2017b). Thus, the movement 
was not only targeting the then governing party, the KMT, but also the 
whole establishment, including the largest opposition party, the DPP. The 
formation of the NPP is the perpetuation of the Sunflower Movement. To 
a certain extent, it intended to keep some distance from the DPP. In its 
manifesto, it states that the alternation of governing party could not solve 
9 NPP won 6.1% of vote in the party list election, see Central Election Commission, http://
engweb.cec.gov.tw/ (12 December 2019).
10 The sole exceptions are the GPT’s one National Assembly seat in 1996 and the Chinese Social 
Democratic Party’s single seat in 1992. The Worker’s Party did hold a seat in the Legislative 
Yuan for over two years but in that case the legislator had been elected for the DPP in 1986 and 
defected mid-term.
174  TOMMy ChUNG yIN K wAN AND DAfyDD fELL 
the societal problem in Taiwan, but the formation of the NPP is to break 
the ‘political imagination’ in Taiwan.11 This is in line with the TCU’s aim 
before the Sunflower Movement.
The NPP is a product of the Sunflower Movement and, thus, it theoretically 
and fundamentally distanced itself from the DPP. Nevertheless, the two 
parties did come close to an alliance in the NPP’s initial period. The DPP 
adopted an accommodative approach to the NPP after its foundation. The 
DPP party leader, Tsai Ing-wen, openly welcomed the foundation of the NPP 
by saying that ‘even if the new party [the NPP] does become a competitor of 
the DPP, we [the DPP] will continue to work with these friends and maintain 
a friendly relationship’ (LT 2015a).
The relationship between the NPP and the DPP has often been ambiguous, 
especially when it is compared with another nascent movement party, which 
also split from the TCU, the Social Democratic Party (SDP). The SDP did not 
endorse and cooperate with the DPP during the election. Conversely, the NPP 
adopted a semi-alliance strategy with the DPP. It worked closely with the DPP 
to cooperate on the nomination of candidates. In the three single-member 
districts seats that the NPP won, the DPP did not nominate candidates and 
openly supported the NPP candidates.12 The cooperation between the DPP and 
NPP did not only involve the DPP giving way to the NPP, it also happened the 
other way round. In the New Taipei City (1st District), the founding member 
of the NPP, Feng Kuang-yuan, gave way to a DPP candidate, Lu Sun-ling, in 
order to avoid a DPP-NPP competition within the same district. In the end, 
Lu successfully won the seat in that district (Lin 2015a).
In addition, the NPP also nominated eight ‘token candidates,’ which 
means that they were ‘mission-oriented’ and nominated only for the sake of 
promoting the party list election. Among these candidates, seven out of eight 
‘token candidates’ were nominated in the same district that the DPP had 
nominated candidates, they campaigned for the NPP party list election but 
did not campaign for their own district election (LT 2015b). It is noteworthy 
to point out that some DPP candidates voiced their dissatisfaction towards 
these ‘token candidates’ as they might still get a considerable number of 
votes in the single-member district elections under the party label of the 
NPP even without campaigning. In addition, there was one district where 
there was open tension between the DPP and NPP candidates – in Hsinchu 
City, where the NPP nominated one of its founders, Chiu Hsien-chih, to stand 
11 New Power Party, ‘Women de Chengnuo’ (Our promise), https://bit.ly/31illrW (12 December 2019).
12 They are Freddy Lim in Taipei City Fifth District, Hung Tzu-yung in Taichung Third District 
and Huang Kuo-chang in New Taipei City Twelfth District.
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against the veteran DPP politician Ke Chien-min. However, despite this being 
a traditionally safe KMT district, the DPP’s Ke narrowly came out on top.
The NPP openly endorsed and supported the DPP presidential election 
candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, in the electoral campaign (Fell 2016: 52). Huang, the 
NPP leader, pleaded with voters that ‘although I and Chairlady Tsai are not 
from the same party, our heart is Taiwanese. We both support reform. […] 
Please vote for Chairlady Tsai to save the government! Please vote for me to 
change the parliament!’13 The emphasis of Taiwanese identity highlighted 
the fact that it was a shared value for the DPP and NPP, which allowed 
cooperation between the two parties.
Both parties also jointly formed a united electoral campaign headquarters 
during the elections.14 For instance, a number of DPP politicians, including 
the high-ranking f igure Chen Ju, openly campaigned for Huang. She sup-
ported Huang and claimed that Huang’s NPP represented ‘a progressive 
power’ (Lin 2015c). Moreover, in an NPP PR election ad there is a scene where 
the NPP’s Huang shares a stage with Tsai. The ambiguous relationship is 
clear in the NPP campaign in which the party says: ‘We will gain over half 
seats in parliament, that is, the DPP plus NPP getting a majority. We will 
take responsibility for supervising the DPP ([government]’ (Lin 2015b).
However, the semi-alliance between the NPP and DPP did ultimately 
backfire when it came to the electoral fortunes of the NPP, especially in the 
PR seats. The NPP originally expected to win four or f ive seats on the PR 
list (Ho and Huang 2017). The DPP attempted to adopt an accommodative 
strategy towards the NPP in its own PR list nomination, as it nominated eight 
social movement activists on the PR list to appeal to the social movement 
supporters. Moreover, the DPP, sensing the threat that the NPP posed to its 
PR list, decided to adopt a strategy of highlighting these social movement 
candidates in the f inal weeks. These candidates thus featured heavily in 
both newspaper and TV advertising as election date approached.15 The DPP’s 
accommodative strategy also applied to its issue approach in the campaign. 
For example, Tsai’s advertisements made appeals to core social movement 
themes that the DPP had largely neglected in recent earlier campaigns, 
such as marriage equality and land justice. We will return to this in more 
detail in the section on the GPT.
13 New Power Party, ‘Xieshou Nuli Rang xia Yidai you Weilai’ (Working together for a better 
future), https://bit.ly/35ATruF (12 December 2019).
14 Ibid.
15 For example, see the DPP’s newspaper ads on the front pages of the Liberty Times on 8 and 
9 January 2016.
176  TOMMy ChUNG yIN K wAN AND DAfyDD fELL 
Overlapping between the NPP and the DPP
The party platform of the NPP reflects a degree of institutionalization of 
the party. It is far more than a single-issue party. In its party platform, it dis-
cusses nearly every issue in Taiwan and advocates a series of policy reforms, 
ranging from national identity, constitutional reform, to environmental 
politics, multiculturalism and child care. It operates like a mainstream 
catch-all party. In the off icial party introduction, the ‘normalization of 
Taiwan as a nation-state’ is the f irst principle and it is no different to Taiwan 
Independence.16 In other words, the DPP and the NPP hold similar positions 
in support of Taiwan’s independence.
However, the broad spectrum of its party platform actually reflects the 
many facets of the Sunflower Movement. The major activists group during 
the movement, the Democratic Front against the Cross-Strait Service Trade 
Agreement (DFACSSTA), comprised a total of 37 civil society organizations, 
including the feminist group Awakening Foundation, the Taiwan Rural Front 
and the Taiwan Labour Front. This shows the occupation of the Legislative 
Yuan represented far more voices than only opposition to the CSSTA. As a 
product of the Sunflower Movement, the NPP also developed a complete 
and well-rounded party platform. However, this risked the NPP appearing 
to overlap with and too closely resemble the DPP. The distinction between 
the DPP and the NPP was blurred. The DPP could easily adopt an accom-
modative approach to focus on the same issues. As a result, voters would 
f ind it increasingly hard to distinguish between the two and, in the long 
term, the mainstream party would benefit electorally.
The NPP and Other Smaller Parties
Thus far we have mainly focused on the relationship between the NPP 
and the DPP. However, previous studies have also shown that competition 
and cooperation between rival smaller parties can also be critical in their 
development. One such example had been the way the PFP hollowed out 
the NP’s support between 2000 and 2001 (Fell 2017a). One key element in the 
NPP’s success was the way it took an accommodative approach towards the 
TSU’s ownership of the anti-China message. Both parties used such appeals 
in their TV advertisements. For instance, in the NPP’s TV ad we see a protest 
16 New Power Party, ‘Jiben Zhengce Zhuzhang’ (Our policy), https://bit.ly/31g8tD0 
(12 December 2019).
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scene against the meeting between Ma Ying-jeou and Chinese President Xi 
Jinping, while the TSU warned of Taiwan becoming another Hong Kong. 
However, the NPP’s vote share and the collapse of the TSU’s vote share in 
2016 suggests the NPP’s accommodative strategy had allowed it to steal the 
ownership of the issue.
In summary, NPP adopted a semi-alliance approach with the DPP. 
Although there were instances of competition and arguments in the co-
operation, both parties benefitted from the alliance. The NPP became the 
third-largest party in Taiwan and the DPP won historic presidential and 
parliamentary victories in 2016. However, the alliance also made the NPP 
less distinctive and less like as a ‘prophetic party’ compared with the older 
movement party, the GPT.
The Green Party Taiwan (GPT)
Taiwan’s Green Party was established in January 1996. Thus, it can be 
seen as part of the second wave of movement parties following the f irst 
wave, which was dominated by leftist parties (Fell 2005). Although Ho 
argues the GPT was part of the attempt by the environmental movement 
to regain autonomy from the DPP, it also had an ambiguous relationship 
with the party in the GPT’s early history (Ho 2003). For instance, in 1996 
party f igures were divided over whether they should support the DPP’s 
candidate in the f irst direct presidential election. In the GPT’s initial phase, 
despite being largely ignored by the DPP, the mainstream parties did leave 
some scope for the GPT to emerge. The ruling KMT had an openly pro-
nuclear policy and the DPP was showing mixed signals on environmental 
issues (Ho 2003). After the GPT’s promising start in 1996, it failed to make 
a breakthrough in the 1998 local elections. The party then collapsed and 
appeared to have followed the same pattern as the leftist parties of ceasing 
to contest elections.17
The GPT that emerged in the aftermath of the 2008 national elections 
was distinct enough to be seen as a brand-new party. The membership, 
leadership and core issues were quite distinct from its predecessor. In ad-
dition to its emphasis on environmental issues, the party broadened its 
appeal on subjects such as LGBT rights and labour issues. A further key 
change was that it had a much clearer position on keeping a distance from 
its former ally, the DPP. On the back of the party’s new approach it was 
17 For the next few years the GPT at either did not join elections or nominated a token candidate.
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able to develop electorally to move to the brink of becoming Taiwan’s f irst 
relevant alternative party by the eve of the 2016 national elections.
What explains the changed relationship with the DPP? The f irst place 
to start was the experience of the DPP’s f irst time in power (2000-2008). 
There were quite high expectations when the DPP came to power and it 
did appoint a number of key environmentalists into government positions. 
Most notable were Chen’s f irst environmental minister, Edgar Lin, and 
Chang Kuo-long in Chen’s second term. However, in interviews with GPT 
members and supporters there was a high degree of dissatisfaction with the 
DPP government (Fell and Peng 2016: 78). A notable sore point was the DPP’s 
failure to deliver on its anti-nuclear pledges, in particular, the resumption 
of construction of the fourth nuclear power station. It also failed to resolve 
the issue of the nuclear waste disposal site on Lanyu Island.18 The sense of 
betrayal comes through quite strongly in the award-winning documentary 
How Are You, Gongliao? (2004) made by prominent GPT supporter Tsui Shu-
hsin. Increasingly, the DPP was viewed as taking a similar developmentalist 
approach to its predecessor, the KMT. In order to stay in power, the DPP was 
seen as compromising with big business to the detriment of the environment 
and the rights of workers. For example, a number of GPT figures interviewed 
spoke of their frustrating experience while serving on the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Committee (Fell and Peng 2016: 77-78).
We also found a strong sense of anti-DPP sentiment among many GPT 
members and supporters interviewed. This was partly due to similar frustra-
tions from their experiences of DPP rule, but also we found many GPT 
supporters came from families that did not have clear political aff iliations 
or whose parents were Pan Blue supporters. In fact, when we examine the 
GPT’s electoral record and where it nominated, we can see that non-DPP 
voters have made up a signif icant portion of its support base.
One way that we can see the dislike of the DPP was in the case of the Pan 
Han-sheng candidacy in Taipei in 2012. Pan Han-sheng was the closest the 
GPT had to a political star and was standing for election to the legislature 
from Taipei City District 7. In this case an informal agreement was reached 
between Pan and the DPP to allow him to stand with DPP backing. Given that 
this was not the result of a party-to-party agreement, it was a controversial 
case of collaboration. Although the DPP did offer Pan support, some in 
the party opposed him and a rebel DPP candidate did stand. Towards the 
end of 2012, long after the election, a GPT focus group found high levels of 
resentment directed at Pan for the way he handled the campaign. The vast 
18 For a discussion of the anti-nuclear movement, see Grano (2015: 60-91).
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majority of interviewees were critical with only a small number focusing 
on the fact that Pan was the GPT’s top vote getter and helped raise party 
visibility.
When we asked GPT voters it was clear they had a clear preference for 
taking a non-allied positions regarding the mainstream parties. In fact, 
when asked why voters preferred the GPT one of the most common answers 
we found was distaste for mainstream parties. A quote from a previous 
interviewee said that ‘in fact you can’t say the GPT particularly attracts me, 
but that the other parties hold no attraction at all to me’ (Fell and Peng 2017: 
187). We found many younger generation voters were critical of what they 
saw as the repetitive debates over national identity between mainstream 
parties. The inconsistent record of the DPP in supporting environmental 
issues also strengthened GPT supporters’ decision to vote for the GPT.
We can see that the mainstream parties’ strategies towards niche party 
issues favoured the GPT in 2012. The Fukushima accident had raised the 
salience of the nuclear issue and in addition other value shifts benefitted 
the GPT, such as growing support for LGBT rights. The ruling KMT had 
adopted a highly developmental position and was still pushing ahead with 
the fourth nuclear power station (Fell and Peng 2016). The DPP candidate 
in 2012, Tsai Ing-wen, did mention a nuclear-free homeland but it was no 
longer a core member of the anti-nuclear movement. When it came to social 
movement-related issues, the DPP stance corresponded to Meguid’s (2008) 
dismissive approach.
The experience of 2012 meant there would not be a repeat of the Pan 
experiment. In fact, the tensions were so high that Pan ended up establish-
ing a brand-new party, the Trees Party, to contest the 2014 local elections. 
In many ways 2014 was the GPT’s most professional campaign to date. 
One problem was that the party did not contest seats in its traditional 
stronghold of Taipei, leaving this for the Trees Party. The GPT’s desire to 
avoid even the impression of an alliance with the DPP was made clear in 
the case of Yang Zhi-xiang. Yang had been nominated as a GPT candidate 
in the Hsinchu city council election but his nomination was revoked 
partly due to his joining the Taiwan Independence Election Alliance.19 
By the end of the election, the GPT won two seats and had become the 
most signif icant movement party. However, there was trouble brewing 
as rather than joining the GPT, there were moves a foot to create a new 
social movement party (discussed in the previous section), initially known 
as the TCU.
19 See the GPT news release: http://www.greenparty.org.tw/news/20141015/190 (12 December 2019).
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On the surface 2016 should have been the moment that the GPT made 
its great breakthrough at the national level. It was the largest and oldest 
alternative party, with a f ine track record of involvement in a range of 
social movements. With the advent of the Sunflower Movement, there was 
a sense of optimism in the social movement sector. The GPT had made a 
breakthrough at the local level in Taoyuan and Hsinchu in 2014. Moreover, 
the GPT had established an alliance with the newly formed SDP, a party 
that had strong candidates in Taipei. In interviews even on the eve of the 
election there was optimism that the party had a real chance to break 
through the magic 5% required to win party list legislative seats. However, 
when the results were announced, it was the NPP that was celebrating and 
the GPT was left bitterly disappointed. Despite the fact that it had run a 
much better funded and organized campaign than in the past, the GPT was 
only able to increase its vote share from 1.7 to 2.5%. The GPT’s relationship 
with both the mainstream parties and other challenger parties can help 
us to understand this failed breakthrough in 2016.
The KMT (and NP) were even more adversarial on issues related to social 
movements, however, this probably had only limited impact on the GPT 
because the KMT concentrated its attacks on the DPP and the NPP. Similarly, 
both the DPP and NPP attempted to claim ownership of key issue areas 
on which the GPT was campaigning. For instance, both the DPP and NPP 
campaigned for marriage equality, attempting to steal this once GPT-owned 
issue. Thus, to a certain extent, the GPT was not able to benefit from the 
rising salience of its core issues.
We can also measure the relationship through nomination practice. While 
the DPP left the NPP three seats to contest against the KMT, it only gave one 
such seat to the SDP’s Fan Yun, in one of the safest KMT seats in the country. 
The DPP was more willing to offer seats to the PFP or KMT defectors than 
those on the SDP/GPT alliance. We have discussed the way the DPP attempted 
to adopt an accommodative strategy towards the NPP niche issues in the 
f inal weeks of the campaign. This probably had a detrimental effect on 
both movement parties, as their eventual PR list was below what some had 
been expecting. Another way the DPP threatened the GPT was through its 
nomination strategies. It chose to nominate two former GPT co-convenors 
on its PR list and a former GPT National Assembly candidate. They were Yu 
Wan-ju, Chen Man-li and Wang Jung-chang. The damage was more severe 
in the case of Yu, as she had off icially only ceased to be co-convenor in early 
2015.20 In fact, all three featured prominently in DPP newspaper and TV 
20 Yu served as GPT’s co-convenor from March 2012 to March 2015.
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ads in the f inal weeks.21 Thus, we can say that the DPP was using a mix of 
adversarial and accommodative strategies to deal with the GPT.
We can see the antagonistic relations between the GPT and the DPP in 
the case of Fan Yun. Fan was the only SDP/GPT Alliance candidate that 
the DPP did not nominate a candidate to run against and so her coopera-
tion with the DPP was closely scrutinized by GPT members. Her level of 
cooperation was much lower than that seen in the Pan case, but when 
she did appear publically with the DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen, she was subjected 
to harsh criticism from GPT members. After the election, she admitted 
that she had underestimated the cleavage between the DPP and the GPT 
members. Another example is that Fan participated in the DPP candidate 
Ke Chien-ming’s book launch two weeks before the election. Fan claimed 
that she showed up as an audience member. However, GPT and other social 
activists, including Chen Wei-ting, heavily criticized Fan’s cooperation 
with the DPP. The GPT issued a statement to criticize Fan’s behaviour as 
‘incompetent’ and voice their discontent to Fan and the SDP (LT 2016). Once 
again, we can see how the GPT tried to avoid even the slightest impression 
that it was a DPP ally.
Looking back at the 2016 results, what lessons can we draw for the GPT in 
terms of its relationship with other parties? The DPP’s strategy was actually 
very successful as it not only limited the seats of its ally party (NPP) but also 
prevented the emergence of a genuine alternative party in the GPT. What 
of the GPT? Did it make mistakes in its inter-party relations? The failure 
to create either a single united alternative party or at least an electoral 
alliance of the three or four social movement parties played a role. It even 
handled relations with its ally poorly, to the degree that it would not be able 
to recreate the GPT-SDP alliance in 2020. If there had been a single united 
alternative party in 2016, though it might not have won district seats, it 
probably would have performed well enough to win party list seats. During 
the campaign there was clear tension between the NPP and GPT, as they 
fought for a similar set of voters on the party list. Even the presence of the 
small Trees Party undermined the GPT’s fortunes, particularly in the party 
list contest. This could have been avoided if the party had been able to bring 
Pan back into the fold or to establish an alliance. In other words, for the 
GPT the poor relationship with other challenger parties also contributed 
to the failed breakthrough.
Could the GPT have performed better if it had followed the NPP’s model 
of a semi-formal alliance with the DPP? We think this is unlikely for a couple 
21 See e.g. the DPP ad in Liberty Times, 5 January 2016.
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of reasons. The GPT had limited appeal to the DPP as it did not nominate 
strong district candidates and by the eve of the election the DPP was strong 
enough that it could probably have won more seats by offering up fewer 
seats to other parties. It is hard to imagine GPT members and supporters 
accepting such an agreement. In many ways the GPT’s distance from the 
DPP was one of its few clear selling points at a time it was being squeezed 
by the NPP and DPP. Moreover, the way the NPP’s PR vote collapsed also 
reveals the dangers of too close an alliance with a mainstream party.
Conclusion and Future Prospects
In this chapter we have examined the development of two of Taiwan’s 
movement parties with reference to their relationship with mainstream 
parties. We have examined both sides of the relationship. In other words, we 
followed Meguid’s (2008) framework to look at the strategies that mainstream 
parties adopted towards small parties. In addition, we examined the alliance 
strategies adopted by our two case study movement parties. We showed 
that an examination of this two-way relationship can help us to explain 
the development of such movement parties. At least in the short term the 
NPP’s hybrid issue approach, combined with its alliance with the DPP, did 
allow it to break into parliament at the f irst attempt.
An important f inding of our chapter is that in addition to the relationship 
between small and large parties, an important variable is the interrelation-
ship among rival challenger parties. In other words, forming relationships 
between parties is the key to thriving in Taiwan’s party system. As we have 
shown, in 2016 the mutual relationship between the smaller alternative 
parties did have a major effect on their election fortunes. The failure to 
develop a single united movement party, or at least a viable alliance of similar 
parties was critical in the GPT’s failure to capitalize on the momentum 
it had been building since 2012. Without cooperating with mainstream 
parties, will the movement parties be able to coordinate nomination and 
avoid multiple movement party candidates f ighting for the same district? 
Will they be able to develop a system for mutual support for movement 
party candidates to reduce campaigning costs?
We can get some idea from the local elections in 2018. These were naturally 
more straightforward as these were using the MMD electoral system, so 
small parties could potentially win seats without mainstream alliances. 
The DPP had enjoyed historic success at the local level in 2014 and thus it 
was not surprising it lost seats in 2018 to the KMT as a result of widespread 
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disappointment in Tsai’s government. There were large numbers of voters 
unconvinced by either the KMT or the DPP. Nevertheless, there were no 
signs that any of the older splinter parties are able to step back in and take 
advantage, as they continued to lose seats in 2018. Therefore, this was another 
historic window of opportunity for the alternative parties. Compared to 2014 
or 2016, the f ield for movement parties was much more crowded with the 
NPP, GPT, SDP, Labour Party and Taiwan Statebuilding Party all running 
serious campaigns. As the 2018 campaign developed it became clear that 
there were tensions between the main challenger parties, especially between 
the NPP and the others. In the end, the election resulted in signif icant 
numbers of movement party politicians entering local assemblies for the first 
time, with sixteen seats for the NPP, three for the GPT and one for the SDP.
Looking further ahead to national elections in 2020, the challenges for the 
movement parties will show similarities and differences in their inter-party 
relations. If the NPP tries to follow a similar strategy to 2016, it is possible 
voters will punish it in the way they have other parties that allied too closely 
to mainstream parties, as predicted by Rochon. In fact, the movement party 
approach perpetuated since the Sunflower Movement received support 
from voters. However, the more institutionalized and catch-all party-like 
structure of the NPP could easily lose its movement party features. Its 
close ties with the DPP means that it runs the risk of losing autonomy in 
the policies it advocates. Whether the NPP can anchor itself to the party 
system in Taiwan remains to be seen, however, the early success of the NPP 
in the 2016 elections has undoubtedly shown that a semi-alliance strategy 
is a possible way for small parties to thrive under the unfavourable political 
environment in Taiwan. If the NPP does decide to remain in a semi-alliance 
with the DPP, then there should once again be an opportunity for a genuine 
alternative party. Whether this will be the GPT, a new SDP-GPT alliance or 
something else, is still uncertain at the time of writing in the autumn of 2019.
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8 New Immigration, Civic Activism  
and Identity in Japan
Influencing the ‘Strong’ State
David Chiavacci
Abstract
This chapter discusses immigrant advocacy groups’ influence in Japan’s 
immigration policy. For three decades Japan has been a new immigration 
country. However, immigration policy has been marked by ideational 
and institutional fragmentation, resulting in a deadlock lacking bold 
reforms and immunizing state actors to external pressure. Against this 
backdrop, civil advocacy has been surprisingly influential. While civic 
groups have generally not been included in decision-making bodies, 
they have altered the perception of immigration. By analysing reforms 
combating human traff icking, this chapter identif ies factors that resulted 
in indirect influence of civic advocacy in this case, allowing us to gain a 
differentiated understanding of the limited but still signif icant influence 
of civic activism on Japan’s ‘strong’ state in immigration policy.
Keywords: strong state, Japan, immigration policy, civil society, human 
traff icking
This chapter discusses the influence and role of Japan’s immigration advo-
cacy groups in immigration policy. It analyses their impact on public and 
political debate, in policy implementation and in political decision-making 
concerning immigration. Japan has undergone a transformation into a new 
immigration country with a highly continuous inflow of new immigrants in 
the last three decades (see Figure 8.1). Up to the mid-1980s, Japan’s foreign 
population consisted almost exclusively of so-called oldcomers, which 
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had migrated to Japan’s main islands during the colonial era, and their 
descendants. However, since the late 1980s, the increase of foreign residents 
has started to gain a new momentum through the inflow of newcomers. 
Japan’s foreign population has increased three and half-fold over the last 30 
years (MOJ 2018: 21). Today, Japan is one of the most important migration 
destinations among advanced industrial countries measured by the yearly 
net inflow of foreign population (OECD 2019: 295).
This transformation into an immigration country has been accompa-
nied by large and intensive public and political debates about admission 
and integration policies as well as by new civic activism in the f ield of 
immigration. More concretely, the years since the mid-1980s have been 
marked by three phases of more intensive public and political discussions 
on immigration. The number of articles in three large national newspapers 
shows as indicator a clear f luctuation over time that allows us to identify 
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these three debates and intermediate phases after two economic shocks and 
the following downturns (burst of the bubble economy in the early 1990s 
and the worldwide economic crisis of 2007/2008) (see Figure 8.2).
An overview of the number of substantial reform proposals shows similar 
tendencies with a f irst policy debate around 1990, a second debate with a 
more intensive period from 2004 to 2008 and the beginning of a third debate 
since 2014 (see Table 8.1).
Questions of Japan’s identity have played an important role in these 
immigration policy discussions. While the political-economic establish-
ment has primarily debated about the advantages and disadvantages of 
immigration for Japan’s economy, new immigration has increasingly also 
questioned Japan’s self-view as an ethnically homogeneous nation. What 
kind of a society does Japan want to become and be in the future? Instead of 
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focusing on economic benefits and costs calculations, immigrant advocacy 
groups (IAGs) have stressed the importance of protecting the human rights 
of newcomers and have tried to move the focus to Japan’s duties and self-
understanding as a good member of the international community.
Japan has often been described as a strong state with a weak civil soci-
ety. Classical theoretical models of Japanese politics note the tendency of 
decision-making by closed networks between ministerial bureaucracy, the 
long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and certain economic inter-
est groups (Muramatsu and Krauss 1984; Pempel and Tsunekawa 1979). 
These networks do not include civil society. Pekkanen (2006), for example, 
highlights Japan’s dual civil society. In international comparison, a large 
share of the population participates in civil society activities and civil society 
organizations (CSOs) are very strong in providing services in daily life. In 
contrast, political advocacy of civil activists is very limited. Especially at 
the national level, where the voice of civil society is excluded from political 
decision-making.
Hence, one might expect a very limited impact of civil society advocacy in 
immigration policy. In fact, in all my interviews with civil society activists 
over the last f ifteen years, their limited influence in national decision-
making was a recurrent point of grievance (e.g. Interview IAG 2003, 2012). 
However, my analysis will show that IAGs have actually been able to gain 
quite some influence in agenda setting, formulation and implementation 
in immigration policy. Generally, they were able to do so not through direct 
participation in policymaking, but indirectly through influencing public 
debates as well as national and international partners. Their inf luence 
has surely been limited, but even Nippon Keidanren, by far Japan’s most 
powerful economic advocacy group and a central member of the conservative 
establishment, complains about its marginal voice in immigration policy 
Table 8.1  Substantial reform proposals in immigration policy, 1984-2018
Period Proposals Proposals per year
1984-1988  5 1.0
1989-1993 11 2.2
1994-1998  1 0.2
1999-2003 19 3.8
2004-2008 34 6.4
2009-2013  8 1.6
2014-2018 21 4.2
Source: NDL (2008: 195-204) for 1984 to 2007 and own compilation for 2008 to 2018
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(Interview Nippon Keidanren 2006; Tsuda and Cornelius 2004: 451). In view 
of their organizational capabilities in comparison to Nippon Keidanren, 
the signif icant role and level of impact by IAGs is actually quite surprising 
(see also Shipper 2008).
Japan’s Immigration Policy: A ‘Strong’ State
Most research on social movements and civil society advocacy starts with 
the assumption that the state and its elites are a rather homogeneous 
entity antagonistic toward civil actors. Hence, the political-economic 
establishment is often not really analysed. However, state structures and 
interrelations between its elites are often highly complex and marked by 
internal conflicts. Immigration policy, in particular, is a policy f ield that is 
characterized by ideational heterogeneity that leads to ‘strange bedfellows,’ 
that is, cooperation and coalitions between actors that are clear opponents 
in most other policy f ields. Hence, before our focus turns to civil society 
and IAGs, we have to discuss the ideational and institutional framework 
in Japan’s immigration policy f ield in order to understand policymaking 
structures that civil society actors confront.
Research on Japanese policymaking and its eff iciency depicts contradict-
ing tendencies. On the one side, Chalmers Johnson (1982) has described Japan 
in his seminal analysis of its economic policy as a strong developmental 
state that successfully formulated and implemented an economic growth 
strategy. However, on the other hand, J.A.A. Stockwin and his collaborators 
(1988) have shown that Japanese politics is, in many other f ields, marked 
by immobilism and standstill. The f ield of immigration policy has to be 
ascribed to the second group. The main factor behind this standstill is 
the institutional fragmentation of immigration policymaking in Japan. 
In contrast to the economic policy, no pivotal state agency in immigra-
tion policy exist. Off icially, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) is in charge of 
immigration policy, but its immigration bureau’s staff is composed of 
bureaucrats from different ministries, which has undermined its internal 
coherence and sidelined it inside the MOJ. Ikuta (2000: 144) criticizes it as a 
‘mosaic agency’ that is characterized by internal segmentation. Moreover, 
a number of other ministries are involved in immigration policy. Due to 
strong vertical integration of state agencies, coordination and cooperation 
between Japanese ministries is in many policy f ields weak and suboptimal, 
but immigration policy has even be marked by open conflicts between 
ministries (Chiavacci 2011, 2020). Especially in immigration policy, Japan 
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resembles a ‘confederation of ministries’ (Kyogoku 1987: 222-223). Moreover, 
this institutional fragmentation is not only confined to the bureaucracy. 
Political parties (and especially the LDP) are also internally split concerning 
immigration policy, and Japan’s executive has never executed real leadership 
in immigration policy until very recently.1
Ideational diversity underpins and reinforces this institutional fragmenta-
tion. Policy actors look at and discuss immigration policy from completely 
different perspectives. For example, during the second immigration debate 
from the late 1990s to the severe economic recession induced by the world-
wide f inancial crisis in the late 2000s, some wide-reaching immigration 
policy proposals were made for a much more active immigration policy in 
view of Japan’s demographic ageing and its foreseeable labour shortages in 
the near future. One large working group of about 80 LDP parliamentarians 
even proposed that Japan should radically change its restrictive immigration 
policy and become an immigration nation welcoming about ten million 
immigrants over the next half-century (LDP 2008). However, at the same 
time, a moral panic about rising criminality and declining public security 
swept Japan (Hamai and Ellis 2006). Increasing immigration and growing 
numbers of foreign residents were seen as one main factor for this supposed 
crime wave. Hence, many policymakers (including many LDP politicians) 
predicted the descendent of Japan into a swamp of chaos and lawlessness 
in the case of more immigration and urged to retain a restrictive immigra-
tion policy (Chiavacci 2011: 204-209, 2014: 125-130). The increasing role of 
politicians at the expanse of bureaucrats in those years might even have 
further strengthened fragmentation in immigration policy. One prime 
example is the changing position of the MOJ in immigration policy, f irst 
under Jinen Nagase and then Kunio Hatoyama, both LDP politicians who 
served as Minister of Justice in 2007. With Nagase as minister, the MOJ 
adopted a position in favour of an open immigration policy by proposing 
the acceptance of non-highly qualif ied foreign workers through an off icial 
guest worker programme that is responsive to labour market demands. A 
few months later, Hatoyama became minister and, under his leadership, the 
MOJ returned to a security perspective on immigration and again promoted 
1 The years 2018/2019 look like a period of important reorientation of Japan’s immigration 
policy. Since Japan had become an immigration country in the later 1980s, it is the f irst time 
that the cabinet under Prime Minister Shinzō Abe exerted executive leadership in immigration 
policy. This resulted in the passing of comprehensive reforms in December 2018 that are currently 
implemented (ISA 2019). The analysis of these reforms and their potential impact is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Still, we have to note that these reforms and their possible extension in 
the coming year could mark a historic turning point in Japan’s immigration policy.
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a very restrictive immigration policy, rejecting the establishment of any new 
guest worker programmes. Overall, in the immigration policy f ield, ‘Japan’ 
as a coherent and strategic actor does not exist. Japan’s immigration policy 
is the result of a highly complex policymaking process characterized by 
internal conflicts that takes place in the absence of a dominant ideational 
framework or strong political leadership.
The general immobilism and absence of a coherent long-term strategy due 
to ideational diversity and institutional fragmentation is clearly notable when 
taking a closer look at Japan’s immigration policy, which shows a huge gap 
between the official and real immigration policy. Officially, Japan has a very 
restrictive immigration policy. It is only accepting highly qualif ied foreign 
workers in defined job f ields that are explicitly named in its immigration 
law as a positive list. However, in contrast to this fundamental framework, 
about 80% of the new foreign residents are de facto working in jobs not 
included in this positive list (Bungei Shunjū 2008: 295). This gap is not due 
to an incapacity of the state to control immigration, but to a number of 
‘side door’ policies that result in the acceptance of a signif icant number of 
foreign workers outside of the highly qualif ied job f ields. These side doors 
like the exceptional treatment of Japanese emigrants and their descendants 
(nikkeijin) or the transformation of foreign trainee system into a de facto 
guest worker programme are the main results and novelty of the limited 
reforms in immigration policy over three decades until very recently. In other 
words, while the front door remained closed for all non-highly qualif ied 
foreign workers, new side doors were increasingly opened for them. No 
political actor was strong enough to open the off icial front door, but some 
political entrepreneurs succeeded in introducing side doors, often almost 
by accident, in a highly complex and conflictive policymaking processes 
(for details, see Chiavacci 2011: 123-145). Once opened, no political actors in 
favour of a truly restrictive immigration policy were strong enough to close 
these side doors again because they quickly led to signif icant immigration 
flows and structural dependences in some industrial sectors. In fact, since 
the late 1990s, even the well-known Japanese export sectors in car and 
consumer electronics manufacturing have been structurally dependant on 
foreign workers (Kamibayashi 2004). This dependence also explains why 
these side doors have been incrementally opened more over the years and 
why Nippon Keidanren and other business associations started to lobby in 
the late 1990s for a more active immigration policy. The new immigration 
to Japan that started in the late 1980s with undocumented immigration was 
cemented through immigration flows through new established and slowly 
further opened side doors. Japan silently became an immigration country 
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despite the often-repeated official statement over the years by members of the 
administrative and political elites that Japan is not an immigration country.
However, as already mentioned above, Nippon Keidanren was not able 
to exert a signif icant influence on immigration policy by opening the front 
door or introducing new side doors. A labour market perspective was never 
dominant, and the institutional fragmentation increased the immunity of 
important state actors against outside pressures, even from such a formidable 
lobby machine like Nippon Keidanren. As Suleiman (2003: 32) pointed 
out, states that ‘appear weakest because of the fragmentation of the state 
structure may be more resistant to powerful interests.’ The Japanese state 
in immigration policy is prime example for this. Its internal fragmentation 
leads to its immunity to external pressure, but undermines any strategic 
development of immigration policy. This is why I write of a ‘strong’ state 
with ‘strong’ in quotations marks.
Emergence and Status of Immigrant Advocacy Groups: Another 
Case of Strong Social Service Providers and Weak Advocacy 
Capabilities?
If we turn then to Japanese immigrant advocate groups, we would expect 
that their influence on immigration policy is marginal. As mentioned above, 
political opportunity structures for civil society groups are, in general, 
very unfavourable for advocacy in national policymaking. In contrast to 
important economic interest groups, they are not members of the elite 
circles, in which policy ideas are discussed informally behind closed doors, 
and normally only hand-picked civil society actors are invited to participate 
or testify in deliberation councils (shingikai), in which policies are then 
formally developed. Hence, civil society activists are generally excluded 
from decision-making in national politics. Moreover, in Japan civil society 
groups are normally local organizations with few resources. In comparison 
to civil society organizations in other advanced industrial countries, they 
often have very tight budgets and small numbers of professional staff. 
Hence, civil society in Japan structurally lacks the prerequisites to generate 
pressure on the elite circles. In view of the missing voice of civil society 
in national politics in general, Pekkanen (2006) has labelled Japan’s civil 
society as ‘members without advocacy.’ Moreover, civil society is especially 
weak regarding social protest. During the f irst three post-war decades, 
Japan had large social movements and political activism that pressed for 
alternative models of national development in clear contradiction to the 
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conservative establishment and staged huge and quite often violent protest 
events. However, in the mid-1970s, this protest cycle came to a sudden 
end (Chiavacci and Obinger 2018). In the following four decades until the 
Fukushima nuclear incident in 2011, social movements and confrontational 
political activism did not completely disappear in Japan, but they focused on 
issues on the local level and were no longer a national force. For example, in 
the f ield of nuclear energy many local and regional anti-nuclear organiza-
tions and movements existed and they were quite successful in blocking 
about 80 nuclear energy projects (Hirabayashi 2013: 37), but in comparison 
to many Western countries, the Japanese anti-nuclear movement was much 
weaker on the national level (Hasegawa 2011).
Still, a large share of the population is active in civil society organizations 
in Japan, especially if we also include local neighbourhood associations, to 
which most Japanese belong (Pekkanen et al. 2014). However, the strong point 
of these civil society organizations is not advocacy, but social services for the 
local communities. Ogawa (2009) sees them in this context not as a check or 
counterweight to the state and elite circles, but as an exploited extension of 
them. The introduction of a new non-profit organization (NPO) law in 1998 
resulted in a strong increase of recognized NPOs. However, in Ogawa’s view 
this does not imply the rise of civil society as a new political force in Japan, 
but, on the contrary, ‘a calculated reorganization of the Japanese public sphere 
designed to establish a small government in the post-welfare state through the 
transfer of social services originally delivered by the state to volunteer-driven 
NPOs’ (Ogawa 2009: 174).2 In the immigration field, the overwhelming majority 
of CSOs are primarily helping foreign residents in their daily life. Hence, 
following Ogawa, one might even critically ask if the state has strategically 
co-opted civil society and Japanese volunteers in the immigration f ield. Is 
the state using CSOs and NPOs as cheap local social service providers and as 
a substitute for a much more expensive integration policy run by the state?
In fact, civil society actors themselves soon realized their limitations. 
Often founded in parallel to the rising number of foreign residents in local 
communities, they performed crucial services for the new immigrants 
and started to cooperate with local administrations. However, in view of 
the strong centralization of the state, many policy problems could only be 
solved on the national level. Hence, IAGs started to form national networks 
2 Moreover, Weiss (in this volume) shows in his analysis of nuclear energy policy that the 
pro-nuclear establishment successful created and maintained CSOs and civic activism for the 
dissemination of nuclear energy support among the general public. The conservative establish-
ment formed and guided CSOs in order to attain its political goals in Japan.
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and umbrella organizations in order to establish and sustain their lob-
bying efforts in national agenda setting and decision-making. Still, even 
the resources of large organizations are very limited. According to their 
2016 f inancial reports, the Asian People’s Friendship Society (APFS) and 
the Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ) – arguably Japan’s two 
most important immigrant advocacy organizations – have a yearly income 
of about US$90,000-100,000 raised through membership fees and dona-
tions. This is about 600 times smaller than the yearly revenues of Nippon 
Keidanren. In other words, if Nippon Keidanren is an aircraft carrier with 
escort vessels then immigration advocacy organizations are small f ishing 
boats. In view of this gap, we might expect IAGs to have no impact at all, 
but in fact they have been able to gain a surprising degree of influence. We 
shall look at the mechanisms that led to this influence on three levels: (1) 
framing of immigration policy, (2) implementation of immigration policy, 
and (3) formulation of immigration policy.
Framing of Immigration Policy
As mentioned above, immigration policy in Japan is marked by ideational 
diversity. IAGs regard immigration primarily in the perspective of interna-
tional human rights and tried to promote this frame in public opinion and 
among decision-makers.3 They have published quite a number of books and 
booklets (e.g. GJHI 2013; GRMN 2009; GSUN 2004, 2008) in which immigra-
tion is framed as a human rights issue and have organized demonstrations 
and campaigns in order to sensitize Japan’s population for human rights 
problems in immigration policy. IAGs have actively tried to place their 
arguments in Japan’s mass media and to influence public opinion (Shipper 
2005: 321-324, 2008: 172-180).
To which degree were IAGs able to influence public debate on immi-
gration and to bring to the fore a human rights perspective? The main 
counterdiscourse to human rights in Japan is surely the topic of foreign 
criminality. Immigrants cast into this frame are not primarily seen as human 
beings with human rights, but as potential criminals who contribute to 
increased crime rates and constitute a menace to public security. From the 
3 This is not a new development in view of Japan’s transformation into a new immigration 
country. Lawyers and civil society activists concerned about oldcomers in Japan also utilized 
human rights and international norms to provide the framework and arguments supporting 
the improvement of their rights and right to earn a livelihood (Gurowitz 1999; Miyazaki 1970).
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very beginning of the new immigration, this frame was present in Japan. 
The National Police Agency (NPA), for example, started in 1987 to include 
in its yearly white paper on police a chapter about foreign criminality and 
highlighted the increase in criminal acts by foreigners (NPA 1987). Still, if 
we compare the media coverage in the four largest Japanese newspapers, we 
see that actually about a third more articles on human rights and foreigners 
were published than on crimes and foreigners from the late 1980s to the 
mid-1990s (see Figure 8.3). However, the frame of foreigner crimes became 
much stronger. Due to a number of police scandals, a moral panic started 
in the late 1990s, which proclaimed a huge crime wave and an end of public 
security (Hamai and Ellis 2006). Although statistic did not justify in any 
way such drastic narratives (Shipper 2005: 306-307; Yamamoto 2004: 41-47), 
foreigners were identif ied as one main culprit for rising crime in this crime 
panic. The impact in public discourse is obvious (see Figure 8.3). During 




























































































Source: Own figure based on full-text search in electronic databases of articles containing 
foreigner (gaikokujin) and crime (hanzai) or foreigner and human rights ( jinken) in daily newspa-
pers Asahi Shinbun (Kikuzō II), Mainichi Shinbun (Maisaku), Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Nikkei Telekom 21) 
and Yomiuri Shinbun (yomidas Rekishitan)
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the second debate, the number of articles on foreigners and crime is about 
50% higher than about foreigners and human rights.
Correspondingly, public opinion shifted. In the governmental survey on 
human rights, the share of persons who were in favour that foreigners receive 
the completely same protection of their human rights as Japanese nationals 
fell from about two-thirds in earlier surveys since new immigration had 
begun to about 54% in 2003 (CAO 2003: 188-189). A large survey in Tokyo in 
2006 showed the new priority of crime and public security. An overwhelming 
majority of nearly 80% of the interviewees were in favour of giving priority 
to combating foreign criminality instead of protecting the human rights of 
foreign nationals (Higuchi 2006: 38). And in the large international survey on 
national character carried out by the International Social Survey Programme 
in 2003, the share of respondents who agreed or fully agreed with the state-
ment ‘An increase in immigrants leads to rising crime rates’ was over 70% in 
Japan, far above nearly all Western countries (Chiavacci 2011: 208).
In view of these data, one might reach the conclusion that the impact 
of the IAGs was negligible and that their voices were drowned in the noise 
of the crime panic. However, without IAGs questioning the discourse on 
foreign criminality and trying to keep present the frame of human rights, 
the dominance of the ‘foreigners as threat’ discourse would surely have been 
even more overwhelming. In fact, based on the number of newspaper articles 
on foreigners and human rights that increased on average per year during the 
second debate by 25% in comparison to the f irst debate (see Figure 8.3), the 
rising activities of IAGs were not unsuccessful. It was, however, not enough 
to counter the crime panic that led to an increase of over 150% in the case 
of articles covering foreigners and criminality in the second debate. Still, 
one could also argue that the IAGs played an important role in rebalancing 
media coverage in the long term. As Figure 8.3 shows, in the ongoing third 
debate since 2014, about the same number of articles on both topics has 
been published up to now. Recent surveys show that the crime panic has 
stalled and that the frame of ‘foreigners as criminals’ has become much 
weaker (CAO 2012, 2017; Murata 2014).
Implementation of Immigration Policy
IAGs have not only tried to influence public perception of immigration 
and frames in immigration policy, but they have also tried to gain a voice 
in immigration policy implementation and formulation through advocacy. 
Let us begin our analysis with policy implementation, which is especially 
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important in the case of Japan as laws and regulations are often formulated 
in very general ways and, hence, there is a large degree of administrative 
and political room in their implementation.
Generally, IAGs have been excluded from decision-making bodies, but they 
started to visit politicians and bureaucrats directly in order to make their voice 
and point of view heard in policymaking circles. Over the years, IAGs were 
able to establish ties with political parties and ministries and to gain more 
influence (Hosoki 2016: 301-306; Milly 2014: 110-130). Still, if we look at these 
efforts in comparison to Nippon Keidanren’s activities, a difference of several 
levels is evident. Nippon Keidanren has fully embedded permanent networks 
with politicians and bureaucrats. For example, the LDP’s Forward Policy Unit 
hosts eleven researchers of Nippon Keidanren. Hence, this think tank, which 
should officially enhance the LDP’s autonomous policymaking capabilities, is 
de facto a liaison office between Nippon Keidanren and the LDP (Momoi 2018).
However, three factors have allowed IAGs to gain some leverage despite 
their limited resources. First, the high degree of expertise. IAGs can rely 
on voluntary participation and support by lawyers and scholars. Their 
voices might not be strong, but they are recognized as being well informed 
in decision-making circles. Second, no economic interest. In contrast to 
economic interest groups like Nippon Keidanren, IAGs are convincing 
idealistic actors because they do not profit themselves from political deci-
sions. Third, sharing of ideational stance with powerful actors. A human 
rights perspective is not completely absent in decision-making circles. 
Japan’s immigration policy has often been described as being based on its 
economic interests and/or its goal to maintain an ethnically homogeneous 
population. However, as described above, among elite actors ideational 
perspectives and motives are much more complex. The Ministry of For-
eign Affairs (MOFA) regards immigration policy as an element of Japan’s 
foreign policy, and it would like to secure Japan’s international reputation 
by preserving international standards like human rights. The Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) sees it as one of its main duties to 
secure the application of Japanese labour laws to all foreign workers. The 
Ministry of Justice is generally very conservative and stresses control over 
immigration as a part of public security, but it is also in charge of Japan’s 
human rights policy. Even many conservative politicians believe that respect 
for international human rights is in the self-interest of Japan if it is to realize 
its aspiration to be a leading member of the international community (Gelb 
and Kumagai 2018). Of course, there are signif icant differences concerning 
the priority of human rights and its envisaged level of implementation. IAGs 
would like Japan to be an ideal actor fully protecting the human rights of its 
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immigrants. Many members of the establishment envision Japan as a good 
actor in the international community – one that is not criticized for having 
a dehumanized immigration policy. Still, there are common perspectives 
concerning Japan’s identity between the two groups.
The impact of IAGs in immigration policy implementation is often not 
graspable, but in some cases its influence can be traced back and identif ied 
quite clearly. A prime example is the policy implementation granting ‘special 
status of residence’ to irregular immigrants. The Japanese state has always 
declined to have an amnesty programme, in which irregular immigrants 
would be pardoned collectively and granted rights of residence because it 
is argued that this would create incentives for more irregular immigration. 
However, in accordance with immigration law, the MOJ has the discretion to 
allow upon application special residence based on a case-by-case assessment 
(Kondō et al. 2010).
In September 1999, IAGs started a public campaign for the recognition of 
irregular immigrants with public rallies and press conferences. The goal was 
to raise public awareness of the issue, to give irregular immigrants a human 
face and to increase pressure on the MOJ for a more liberal implementation of 
its policy to grant special residence. At the end of the campaign in 2006, 43 of 
the 64 irregular immigrants who participated in the campaign had received 
special residence permissions by the MOJ (Yoshinari 2015: 46-50). Moreover, in 
reaction to the campaign, the MOJ started to publish guidelines that clarified 
the factors that would increase the chances of a positive evaluation of a request 
for special residence. Most IAG activists whom I interviewed regarded the 
outcome of the campaign and the influence of IAGs to be ambivalent by 
pointing out, for example, that ‘only two-thirds of the applicants have received 
residence permits. Hence, the outcome was only partially successful, and we 
have not accomplished our original goals’ (Interview IAG 2012). However, in 
view of the whole context and in contrast to their self-assessment, the outcomes 
document the substantial influence of IAGs in policy implementation.
First, it is important to note that in the foreign criminality discourse 
described above irregular immigrants, in particular, were identif ied as 
potential criminals and as a threat to Japan’s public security (Chiavacci 
2011: 265; Shipper 2005). The 1999 white paper on police argued, for example 
(NPA 1999: 17):
Among the undocumented immigrants who originally came to Japan 
for work purposes, many get involved in criminal activities, which are 
more prof itable than illegal work. The large number of undocumented 
immigrants becomes a hotbed of crime by foreigners.
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Although there has never been any proof (not even in the off icial crime 
statistics) for this argument, irregular immigrants are singled out as potential 
criminals. The impact on public opinion about irregular immigrants was 
immense. In the 2004 survey on public security, for example, the increase of 
irregular immigrants was the most often identif ied factor for rising crime in 
Japan (CAO 2004). Hence, it had been reasonable to expect that the Japanese 
state would be especially rigorous in handling irregular immigrants and truly 
restrictive in granting them special residence status. However, in fact, the 
policy of granting of special status of residence for irregular immigrants has 
been quite liberal to the point that we can speak of a non-official legalization 
programme. In fact, from 1999 to 2012, the MOJ has granted over 100,000 
special residence permits (see Figure 8.4), which explains about half of the 
stark fall in off icially recorded irregular immigrants from 277,000 (1999) 
to 67,000 (2012) in Japan (CAO 1975-2017). IAGs and their campaigns had a 
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signif icant impact on the large size of legalization despite the huge public 
backlash against irregular immigrants.
Still, the recognition of irregular immigrants by the MOJ and the influence 
of IAGs on it are not the only factors for the stark fall of irregular immigrants in 
Japan. From 2003 onwards, the government ran a campaign for ‘re-establishing’ 
Japan as secure country. Reducing the number of irregular immigrants was a 
central element of this campaign. Several stricter regulations were introduced – 
for example, a reporting obligation for employers of foreign workers (gaikokujin 
koyō jōkyō no todokede) – which resulted in a significant drop in the number 
of irregular immigrants (Suzuki 2017). In general, IAGs were not in favour of 
introducing these new measures. They argued that the discourse of foreign 
criminality and of irregular immigrants as a security threat was completely 
overblown and that the priority should be not on security considerations, 
but on guaranteeing the human rights of irregular immigrants. However, 
in contrast to the policy implementation, they had no significant influence 
on policy formulation. Still, in the next section, we will discuss some cases 
and constellations in which IAGs exerted some influence in policymaking.
Formulation of Immigration Policy: Indirect Lobbying through 
National and International Partners
As described above, IAGs have tried to gain a voice in immigration policymak-
ing, but their impact through direct lobbying has been very limited because 
they were de facto sidelined from decision-making by generally not being 
invited into deliberation councils or their hearings. However, IAGs have gained 
some influence indirectly through national and international organizations. 
On the national level, IAGs have closely cooperated with the Council of Cities 
with High Concentrations of Foreign Residents. This council was founded in 
2001 and currently has 28 members. Like IAGs, the municipalities organized in 
this council realized that local integration policy has strong limitations without 
a comprehensive integration policy on a national level. As local governments, 
they had a stronger voice in national policymaking and developed demands for 
a national integration policy in coordination with IAGs. While Japan still has 
no comprehensive integration policy on the national level, the efforts of this 
council had at least some successes like the establishment of a small section 
in charge of policies for foreign residents in the Cabinet Office.4
4 Please note that sub-national politicians have not always been partners of IAGs. In the early 
2000s, for example, Shintarō Ishihara, governor of Tokyo at the time, and some other prefectural 
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A second avenue of indirect lobbying and influence of IAGs has been 
their reporting to international actors like UN treaty body commissions or 
the International Labour Organization (ILO). By providing international 
organizations with alternative viewpoints to the national administration, 
IAGs were important information sources for the f inal reports of these 
organizations, which often had much more inf luence on the Japanese 
government than the direct lobbying efforts of the IAGs. This constitutes 
a classic example of the ‘boomerang effect’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998) in which 
NGOs circumvent national obstruction through international cooperation 
and alliances. Still, even this international path of lobbying has in general 
clear limits. An exception are the new policies against human traff icking 
and new restrictions in the issuing of entertainer visas. By taking a closer 
look at the policy process that led to their introduction, we are able to 
identify factors that normally limit the impact of the international path 
of lobbying of IAGs.
Human traff icking and its links to sex work was for long time an issue 
that ranked very low on the international agenda and was poorly funded. 
However, since the late 1990s, it has gained much more attention. Not only 
international organizations like the United Nations (UN) or the ILO, but 
also powerful actors like the US or the EU have enacted new legislation 
and introduced new measures against human traff icking (Patterson and 
Zhuo 2018). Japan was very early and strongly criticized for its entertainer 
visa policy in this context.
‘Entertainer’ is one of the visa categories included in the positive list of 
occupations in the immigration laws for which Japan grants foreign nationals 
a working visa. Off icially, this visa category is for actors, musicians, models 
etc. that come to Japan. However, in reality, the overwhelming majority 
of foreign nationals that enter Japan with an entertainer visa are working 
in the large entertainment milieu and red light districts. From the late 
1970s onwards, the number of foreign ‘entertainers’ entering Japan, who 
are nearly only women, started to expand (see Figure 8.5). Up to today, 
the entertainer visa is numerically by far the most important working 
visa category for foreigners entering Japan. The working conditions in the 
different establishments in Japan’s entertainment business vary strongly. 
Some business models clearly involve prostitution, but it would be wrong 
governors reinforced through their public statements and claims the narrative of foreigners 
as potential criminals and a security threat and exerted substantial political pressure on the 
central government to make immigration controls stricter and to lower the number of irregular 
immigrants (Chiavacci 2011: 205-206; Shipper 2008: 161-163).
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to qualify all foreign entertainers simply as sex workers in the narrow 
meaning. Still, the off icial regulations allowing establishments to employ 
foreign entertainers are very strict, and the activities of foreign entertainers 
as hostesses, barmaids, dancers etc. were normally in clear contradiction to 
these regulations. This can be seen in the temporary but dramatic drop in the 
number of foreign entertainers granted visas in 1995 and 1996 (see Figure 8.5), 
when the director of the Tokyo Immigration Off ice acted to more strictly 
enforce the regulations by controlling establishments and determined that 
a staggering 93% of them did not fulf il the off icial requirements for the 
visas (Sakanaka 2005: 80-87).
Japanese and international IAGs working in the f ield of human traf-
f icking strongly condemned Japan’s entertainer visa policy, which opened 
in their view the door to debt bondage and forced sex work. Together with 
international organizations, they demanded not only a stricter enforcement 
of existing regulations in issuing entertainer visas, but also new legislation 
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to combat human trafficking. They were also important information sources 
for international organizations like the ILO (2004) or IOM (1997) that strongly 
criticized Japan for its entertainer visa policy and passivity in combating 
human traff icking. However, these national and international voices had 
at f irst a very limited influence.
Ministries and agencies started to discuss among themselves new 
measures against human traff icking, but differences in opinion (as is so 
often the case in immigration policy) led to a deadlock and immobilism 
(Chiavacci 2011: 255-256). In April 2001, the Gender Equality Bureau of the 
Cabinet Off ice set up the Specialised Research Committee on Violence 
against Women (SRCVW, Josei ni tai suru Bōryoku ni kan suru Senmon 
Chōsakai). The main focus of the committee was domestic violence, sex 
crimes, prostitution, and sexual harassment, but it discussed also human 
traff icking issues. The committee included representatives from CSOs, but 
they were handpicked and did not include any representative from IAGs. 
The commission’s f inal report in March 2004 contained also some very 
general recommendations regarding human traff icking (SRCVW 2004: 12), 
but in view of the committee composition it was hardly surprising that it 
basically followed the arguments presented in its hearings by representatives 
of ministries and agencies. It neither demanded any new legislation against 
human traff icking nor questioned the lax implementation of the regulations 
concerning entertainer visas in its f inal report. Up to this point, the policy 
formulation followed the ‘normal’ path of immobilism and limited influence 
by IAGs. However, foreign pressure (informed through IAGs) soon reached 
a completely new level.
In 2000, the US Congress had passed a new bill against human trafficking. 
As a part of this new legislation, the US Department of State (DOS) started 
to publish a yearly report in which countries worldwide (apart the US) were 
ranked regarding their efforts to combat human trafficking (DOS 2001-2019). 
The first reports adopted a system with three tiers and Japan was included in 
the second tier of countries that do not fully comply with minimal require-
ments defined by the US, but who undertake considerable efforts against 
human traff icking. However, in the 2004 report, a new group with a watch 
list of second tier countries was introduced. These countries were expected to 
introduce new legislation and measures against human trafficking. Otherwise, 
they were running the risk to be downgraded to Tier 3 countries that did 
not fulfil the basic requirements and also did not show significant efforts in 
curbing human trafficking. The DOS relied strongly on information from the 
IAGs and especially from the Japan Network against Trafficking in Persons 
(JNATIP), which had been founded in 2003, for assessing Japan. It placed Japan 
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in its 2004 report in the Tier 2 watch list (DOS 2004). Actually, it had originally 
planned to include Japan in the Tier 3 list that compromised only outsiders of 
the international community like North Korea or Myanmar, but ‘upgraded’ it 
to the Tier 2 watch list after Japanese officials assured that it would introduce 
new policies and measures to combat human trafficking, including a stricter 
policy in issuing of entertainer visas (YS 2004). Still, to be on US’s watch list 
regarding human trafficking was a huge embarrassment for Japan. At the time, 
Japan was attempting (ultimately unsuccessfully) to secure a permanent seat 
on the UN Security Council. And since 1998, it promoted human security as a 
main pillar in its foreign policy. In short, Japan’s foreign policy was completely 
undermined by the 2004 report, which showed that even the US – its closest 
and most important ally – regarded Japan as a problem case regarding human 
trafficking. The speaker of the Japanese government declined to comment on 
the 2004 report after its publication (AS 2004b), but the statements of Hiroyuki 
Hosoda, at the time Chief Secretary of State, documents its impact on the 
government. When asked in parliament about the 2004 report and the efforts 
of the government to curb human trafficking, he answered (Sangiin 2004: 14):
Regarding human traff icking, I have received various reports, and I have 
also attended the second meeting of the related inter-ministerial liaison 
commission in July of this year and have asked the involved ministries 
and agencies for aggressive efforts.
Even among embassies in Tokyo this has become a huge topic. In other 
words, it is extremely embarrassing for Japan, and must be corrected, 
absolutely. There are victims, f irst and foremost women, and many cases 
are emerging. We, in the government, have to work aggressively so as not 
to have these kinds of cases.
From a, at best, secondary topic in government circles, human traff icking 
had been catapulted onto the agenda of the cabinet. The cabinet secretariat 
not only took the lead and set up an inter-ministerial liaison commission in 
order to formulate new legislations and policies against human traff icking, 
but the Chief Secretary of State got personally involved to make clear to 
all actors participating that this was an issue of highest priority. The LDP, 
which had never regarded it as necessary to become active in the human 
traff icking problem, set up its own project team, which demanded new 
policy measures and a stricter issuing of entertainer visas (AS 2004a). These 
activities led to a comprehensive and fast reaction. In short time, only a few 
months, a new law supporting measures for victims of human traff icking 
as well as a much stricter awarding of entertainer visas were realized. The 
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government also set up a permanent coordination body and formulated 
an action plan, which was revised in 2009 and 2014 (Ōno 2017: 211-217). The 
impact of the stricter entertainer visa policy was very large, especially on 
the number of Philippine entertainers entering Japan, which dropped from 
2004 to 2006 by nearly 90% (see Figure 8.5).
In comparison to other indirect lobbying efforts by the IAGs, the case of 
human trafficking was exceptional due to its impact. Japan was exposed and 
shamed for its failure to render due support to victims of human traff icking. 
It saw its identity as ‘cultural nation’ and as a good member of international 
community questioned (Ōno 2017: 193-194). The accuser was none other than 
the US, its most important ally and the global hegemon.
In the 2005 report on human traff icking, the US recognized Japan’s effort 
and upgraded it again to Tier 2 (DOS 2005: 132):
The government has made an impressive start in providing assistance to 
trafficking victims, including implementation of a national action plan with 
modest, additional resources for government-run shelters and private shelters. 
The government made substantial efforts to improve the legal framework 
by drafting penal code revisions which specifically criminalize trafficking 
and increase penalties for trafficking-related offenses. During the reporting 
period, the government undertook major reforms to significantly tighten the 
issuance of entertainer visas to women from the Philippines, a process used 
by traffickers to enslave thousands of Philippine women in Japan each year.
However, in the following years, the Japanese foreign trainee system came 
under criticism in the US human traff icking reports. Off icially the trainee 
system is part of Japan’s overseas developmental aid. Foreign workers from 
developing economies are brought to Japan as trainees to learn new skills 
and to contribute of the economic development of their home country after 
their return. However, as said above, from the early 1990s onwards, the 
trainee system has been primarily a guest worker programme that allows 
Japanese companies, and especially SMEs, to employ cheap foreign labour 
in occupation sectors that are shunned by Japanese workers due to their 
poor working conditions. IAGs had criticized the trainee programme for 
many years, but now it came increasingly under international scrutiny. It 
was identif ied as a being connected to human traff icking of foreign workers 
and as leading to infringements of their human rights.
This criticism was not only coming from the US (see e.g. UN 2010), but again 
the US and its reports on human traff icking were the main foreign pressure 
on Japan. While the IAGs were still rather ignored by decision-making circles 
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in Japan, the US Department of State strongly relied on them as important 
information source and partner in f ighting human traff icking. In the 2017 
report, for example (DOS 2017), local IAGs are explicitly mentioned several 
times and obviously used as reliable sources. Ippei Torii (Secretary General 
of SMJ) even received the Traff icking in Person Report Hero Award in 2013 
from the US government.
The Japanese government has reacted to this pressure by strengthening 
governance and oversight of the foreign trainee system. The IAGs had a 
signif icant impact in these developments. Based on his very detailed and 
careful analysis of these reforms in the foreign trainee system, Kremers 
(2014: 715) identif ies them as the crucial actors that ‘were able to change 
the attitude of other political actors and interest groups and as a result 
tipped the scales in the policy-making process.’ While it would surely still 
be wrong to describe IAGs as a powerful political actor fully integrated into 
the elite decision-making circles, they have become a political voice that 
can no longer be simply ignored.
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government from 2009 to 2012 
provided a window of opportunity. In the truly historic elections of 2007 
and 2009, the LDP lost its majority in both chambers of the parliament.5 
When still in opposition, the DPJ had already cooperated with the IAGs 
in formulating their own reform proposal of the foreign trainee system by 
inviting the SMJ as external advisor into its responsible working committee 
(Kremers 2014: 735-736). Once in power, it was much more open to cooperate 
with the CSOs, which resulted in much better access to the decision-making 
process for the IAGs, which were invited to hearings. However, since the 
elections of 2012, the LDP has returned to power, which has sidelined IAGs 
from decision-making bodies again. Moreover, US pressure on Japan concern-
ing human traff icking has also decreased. In the reports of 2018 and 2019, 
Japan was still being criticized in several aspects, but it was moved to the 
Tier 1 list of countries fully compliant with the minimum standards relating 
to human traff icking set by the US. Hence, the window of opportunity for 
IAGs to affect the human traff icking issue in Japan has closed again.
Conclusion
Since the late 1980s, Japan has become a new immigration country. However, 
this has not transformed Japan into an immigration state that has clear 
5 For detailed analysis of these elections, see Chiavacci (2010), Shiratori (2010) and Sugawara (2011).
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long-term vision and strategy concerning immigration. On the contrary, due 
to its internal fragmentation on the ideational and institutional level, Japan’s 
immigration policy has been marked over three decades until very recently 
by immobilism, that is, very limited, incremental and path-depending 
reform steps in contrast to far-reaching debates and reform proposals. This 
led also to clear gaps between Japan’s off icial and real immigration policy. 
However, this resulted also in an especially ‘strong’ Japanese state concerning 
immigration against external pressure. Due to its internal fragmentation, it 
is even diff icult for such powerful pressure groups like Nippon Keidanren 
to signif icantly influence immigration policy and its reform, especially in 
the f ield of admission policy.
In view of this, the ability of the IAGs to impact frames, implementation 
and reforms in immigration policy has been quite striking. Like other CSOs 
in Japan, IAGs have very limited staff and resources, but they were able to 
gain some influence in the making of immigration policy. They may seem 
to be too idealistic in their framing of immigration and their emphasis on 
human rights, but this idealism paired with the absence of vested interests 
in immigration policy gave them much credibility. Moreover, their ideal 
of Japan as a country that honours its international duties and protects 
the human rights of all people, including the foreign ones, is a national 
identity that is actually shared at least partly by some of the very important 
and powerful actors of the decision-making elites and large parts of the 
population. Hence, their argumentation strikes a cord with many powerful 
actors in immigration policy. The influence of IAGs is the largest on the 
level of policy frames and policy implementation. They upheld a human 
rights perspective in Japan when the country was flooded by a crime panic, 
in which foreigners and especially irregular foreign residents were seen as 
a threat to public security and blamed for its decline. In a more dynamic 
perspective, we can even argue that this crime panic and the identif ication 
of foreigners as culprits has been an important factor for the rise of IAGs as a 
counterforce. This wave of xenophobic statements was surely an important 
motivation for many people to become active and fight for human rights and 
decency. Following an argument made by Arrington (2016) in the context 
of victim movements in Japan and South Korea, we can also argue that 
the fact that these IAGs had to f ight for a long time to get more access to 
elites and to be heard was another factor for their ability to mobilize more 
activists and establish themselves.
On the level of immigration policymaking, the influence of IAGs is most 
limited, but even in this area we cannot ignore their role. IAGs were able to 
have their strongest impact indirectly through international networks. Still, 
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the new measures against human traff icking and reforms concerning the 
entertainer visa are an exceptional case. Not only international organizations, 
but especially the US as Japan’s main ally exerted huge international pressure 
on Japan and led to temporary political salience and a centralization of 
immigration policymaking and very fast and comprehensive reforms. Still, 
without the IAG as an independent as well as respected actor and information 
source, this international pressure would never have reached the level it did.
Immigration and immigration policy will continue to be an important 
issue for Japan, which will also raise the basic question of who Japan wants 
to be. Currently, new immigration reforms are formulated and implemented 
in view of Japan’s demographic development and increasing labour shortage. 
IAGs will continue to play an important role in these developments and 
Japan’s future and future identity.
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Part III
Neoliberalism and Social Inclusion

9 Japanese NPOs and the State  
Re-examined
Reflections Eighteen Years On
Akihiro Ogawa
Abstract
This chapter builds on long-term research at SLG, a pseudonym for a 
non-prof it organization (NPO) in eastern Tokyo, established under the 
1998 NPO Law. Incorporated as an NPO in 2000, SLG is one of the largest 
civic society organizations promoting lifelong learning in Japan. Over 
nearly two decades, SLG offered more than a hundred courses to the local 
community. However, SLG faced a crisis and risked dissolution in 2018 due 
to the municipal government’s decision to cut its funding. This chapter 
argues that SLG was a successful case of neoliberalism-oriented public 
administration, pursuing decentralization and reduced costs; at the same 
time SLG did not encourage independent, citizen-oriented activities. This 
chapter documents current discussions at SLG, reflecting the reality of a 
Japanese civil society landscape in which NPOs are central.
Keywords: NPOs, neoliberalism, new public management, new public 
governance, co-production
My field site SLG (pseudonym) is a non-profit organization (NPO) established 
in 2000. Located in a traditional downtown district of eastern Tokyo, which 
I will henceforth call Kawazoe (pseudonym), SLG promotes community-
oriented lifelong learning. I have been observing this organization since 
September 2001 and thus my research commitment to SLG now spans nearly 
20 years. It is one of the largest lifelong learning NPOs in Japan, in terms of 
the number of its members and the size of its budget. Furthermore, it offers 
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more than a hundred courses per year to the local community, in a very 
innovative way. That is, at SLG, local resident-volunteers create courses for 
local residents and this course creation reflects the spirit of community 
development: they decide what they want or need to learn by themselves in 
support of their own local community. A total of some 260,000 local residents 
have studied at SLG since 2001, when it was f irst established.
This chapter presents a new dynamism between the state and civil society 
in contemporary Japan, shedding light on NPOs. It is based on my long-term 
research project. NPOs have been important actors in the Japanese civil 
society landscape since the late 1990s and are established under the Law 
to Promote Specif ied Non-profit Activities, colloquially known as the NPO 
Law. They were the product of a Japanese social movement following the 1995 
Great Hanshin earthquake when more than one million volunteers acted 
to aid victims of the disaster. The government bureaucracy’s ineffective 
efforts to deal with this tragedy paled in comparison to the impressive 
work of volunteers, then resulting in the institutionalization of volunteer-
based NPOs in 1998 (see Pekkanen 2000 for the legislative process). In fact, 
this was a momentous Japanese civil society project that has given rise to 
nearly 70,000 NPOs (CAO 2018) over the past two decades. These NPOs have 
increasingly taken on responsibility for local communities’ social welfare, 
becoming progressively more signif icant in both providing services and 
creating social change to better meet the emerging needs of service users. 
My f ield site SLG is part of this macro-landscape of Japanese civil society.
My research project at SLG was originally part of my doctoral disserta-
tion, which analysed the institutionalization of NPOs – a new type of civil 
society organization (CSO) in Japanese society. Employing ethnographic 
methods such as participant observation, I have been actively involved in 
this organization, f irst as an unpaid staff member of the secretariat, and 
later as a regular volunteer. Meanwhile, I have been an action-minded 
researcher at SLG since my graduate days (Greenwood and Levin 1998); in 
other words, I have not simply acted as a traditional silent observer, but have 
actively collaborated with other secretariat staff members and volunteers 
to solve real problems that arise at SLG. My long-term engagement in SLG 
has culminated in the production of two books – The Failure of Civil Society? 
(Ogawa 2009b) and Lifelong Learning in Neoliberal Japan (Ogawa 2015), as 
well as journal articles and book chapters (e.g. Ogawa 2004, 2006, 2008, 
2009a, 2009c, 2012, 2013).
In 2017, SLG was in a state of crisis and may be dissolved as an NPO later in 
2018, due to a decision by the municipal government to cut its funding. The 
government’s logic for so doing goes as follows: The local lifelong learning 
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centre, the public building in which SLG is housed, will be renovated next 
year. During that time, SLG will be unable to offer its lifelong learning 
courses or to function as a social service delivery provider on behalf of the 
government. Thus, the government will not fund SLG in the upcoming f iscal 
year, starting in April 2018. Notice of this was given in April 2017, one year in 
advance, and SLG was asked to withdraw from the building by 31 March 2018.
Following the notice by the municipal government, SLG volunteers began 
exploring other possibilities or tools to extend their current community-
oriented learning. Practically speaking, SLG stakeholders believe that what 
SLG has created in the community over the past two decades should not 
disappear simply due to lack of money. Meanwhile, the head of SLG an-
nounced in May 2017 to all 20 of its paid secretariat staff members that SLG 
would not renew their single-year employment contracts after 1 April 2018. 
The government funding has largely been used for employment, primarily 
of local people. Kawazoe is an industrial district with a dense concentration 
of middle- and small-sized factories, but its businesses have lost momentum 
under the sluggish economy over the past two decades in Japan. Thus, the 
government funding created jobs in the local community. Given notice well 
in advance, the SLG employees have already begun job hunting. Fortunately, 
the Japanese labour market is currently favourable, probably due to the 
positive effects of Abenomics – the economic policies advocated by Shinzo 
Abe since 2012, which combine the ‘three arrows’ of monetary easing, f iscal 
stimulus and structural reforms. In this chapter, I will document my cur-
rent research into the relationship between the state and civil society as a 
record of my long-term commitment to SLG. The institutionalization of SLG 
represents a distinctive way of moulding civil society in the international 
third sector scholarship. Their current discussions reflect the reality of the 
Japanese civil society landscape over the past two decades, in which NPOs 
were centred.
Neoliberalism and NPOs
One of the major arguments I have made in previous work is that Japanese 
NPOs are a key form of agency in neoliberalism. I argue that neoliberalism is 
opening up a space for civil society, claiming that ‘[t]he institutionalization 
of NPOs is a calculated reorganization of the Japanese public sphere designed 
to establish a small government in the post-welfare state through the transfer 
of social services originally delivered by the state to volunteer-driven NPOs’ 
(Ogawa 2009b: 174). The institutionalization of NPOs was indeed a political 
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project implemented by the Japanese neoliberal state to mould its population 
or the state-individual relationship in a specif ic manner under the name of 
civil society. Globally, a key feature of neoliberal governmentality since the 
1980s has indeed been the devolution of social services. For example, civil 
society organizations came to play programmatic roles previously assumed 
by the state. They assumed a new ‘function’ under neoliberal structural 
adjustment programmes imposed by the World Bank and the IMF (Goldman 
2005: 270-271). Meanwhile, at a local level, SLG delivers social services, or 
a range of lifelong learning opportunities, that were originally provided 
by the municipal government. This is in line with the method adopted by 
neoliberal politics, primarily to achieve cost cutting, as has been pointed 
out by many third sector research scholars such as Salamon and Anheier 
(1998), Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), and Bruce and Chew (2011). This trend is 
evident across the globe in different national and regional contexts. Japan 
indeed provides prominent examples of such devolution policies in social 
services (see Hayashi, in this volume), and substantial work has also been 
undertaken by Alford and Yates (2016) and Alford (2009, 2002) in Australia 
and in Anglo-Saxon countries, for example, the UK’s Compact.
While neoliberal ideology criticizes state intervention, neoliberal practices 
involve ‘coercive, disciplinary forms of state intervention in order to impose 
market rule upon all aspects of social life’ (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 
5). To explain this kind of neoliberal governance, Peck and Tickell (2002) 
identify two interrelated practices: ‘roll-back neoliberalism’ and ‘roll-out 
neoliberalism.’ ‘Roll-back neoliberalism’ refers to ‘the active destruction or 
discreditation of Keynesian-welfarist and social-collectivist institutions 
(broadly def ined)’ (Peck and Tickell 2002: 384, italics in the original). This 
is simply known as ‘privatization’ or ‘sharing or delegating of authority 
to non-governmental agents’ (Handler 1996: 78-80). Following the mac-
roeconomic crisis condition in the 1970s, Margaret Thatcher of the UK 
and Ronald Reagan of the US favoured the neoliberalism-oriented policy 
practice in the 1980s. The Japanese conservative government also promoted 
this policy; for example, in the 1980s, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone 
privatized the Japanese national railroad, which is currently called JR. Later 
in the 2000s, Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi expanded the neoliberal 
state-sponsored restructuring programme by creating Japan Post to replace 
the government-run Postal Services Agency.
Meanwhile, ‘roll-out neoliberalism’ refers to ‘the purposeful construction 
and consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, modes of governance, and 
regulatory relations’ (Peck and Tickell 2002: 384, italics in the original). As 
Peck and Tickell (2002: 388-389) argue, when the shallow neoliberalism of 
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Thatcher and Reagan encountered their institutional and political limits 
in the early 1990s, the neoliberal projects gradually metamorphosed into 
more socially interventionist and ameliorative forms, epitomized by the 
Third-Way contortions of the Bill Clinton and Tony Blair administrations. 
Since then, new forms of institution-building and governmental interven-
tion have been licensed within the broadly def ined neoliberal project. 
This is also true in the context of Japan. Although the terms ‘privatization’ 
and ‘decentralization’ suggest a withdrawal by the state from the f ield of 
social welfare, the ways in which the policies have been carried out have, 
perhaps counterintuitively, strengthened and expanded the state’s role 
in the provision of social welfare services, as argued by Haddad (2011: 37). 
This development was supported by an ‘activist state’ model, which Pharr 
(2003: 324) claimed was used successfully by the Japanese to institutionalize 
specif ic kinds of civil society groups in order to promote state ideology 
through funding and tax incentives.
The neoliberal state is nowadays concerned with the roll-out of new forms 
of institutional ‘hardware’ (Peck and Tickell 2002: 389), one of which is the 
new public management (NPM) that has been expanding since the 1980s. 
NPM consists of the transfer of principles and management techniques of 
business and markets from the public sector to the private sector. It has 
good chemistry with neoliberal governance, which aims at minimized 
government costs with less public activity performed in accordance with 
the eff iciency principle of the free market. Japan adapted and then in-
novated this management style from Western systems (Westney 1987), 
while techniques and rhetoric were f iltered through Japanese cultural 
and political factors (Jun and Muto 1995). Furthermore, Yamamoto (2009) 
explains that NPM-style decentralization and agencif ication in Japan drew 
on UK executive agency examples and rhetoric; however, actual f lexibility 
in the management of Japanese agencies was partially stif led by central 
control manifested through budgeting practices.
Japanese NPOs, including my case SLG, would well f it to this NPM-
inspired market-based orientation, and even to ‘new public governance’ 
civil society reforms, which intend to enhanced effectiveness, f lexibility 
and democratic quality of public services (see Howlett et al. 2017). NPOs 
played an active role in operating this setup of the institutional hardware. 
My NPO – SLG – has been called kōsetsu min’ei in Japanese, which means 
‘established by public authorities like the municipal government but oper-
ated by citizens or residents.’ In the terminology of third sector research 
scholarship, Japanese NPOs of this type would be categorized as GONGOs 
(government-organized non-governmental organizations) or ‘GONPOs’ in 
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the Japanese context, as dubbed by Asahi Shimbun (2009), a major daily. 
These comprise organizations created by the political process but that 
operate quasi-independently of the agencies that established them, as well 
as organizations that implement government-created responsibilities to 
oversee areas of economic or professional activity (Salamon and Sokolowski 
2016: 1534). SLG could also be described as the local government contracting 
out the provision of social services, more specif ically the offering of lifelong 
learning courses, as part of its attempts to reduce the size of the state under 
neoliberal ideology (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).
Government funding was a major source of income for SLG from the time 
of its establishment. In fact, the municipal government injected a total of 
one billion yen (US$9 million) into SLG over its eighteen years. Because of its 
mobilization of local volunteers, the costs of creating lifelong learning courses 
have been almost halved when compared to the cost of government provision 
of the same type of services. Thus, based solely on the cost, I would argue that 
SLG was a successful case of neoliberalism-oriented public administration, 
which pursues decentralization and cost cutting. Meanwhile, however, SLG 
has failed to diversify its sources of income as a civil-society organization, 
although its directors have continuously made serious efforts to change the 
funding structure, by, for example, raising money from local businesses.
State-Society Relations Framed by ‘Co-production’
With the promulgation of the 1998 NPO Law, the patterns of non-state 
provision of welfare services in the country changed dramatically. The 
Japanese government transformed the pattern of social welfare service 
delivery through privatization and decentralization policies. The resulting 
pattern continued and expanded existing and largely informal organizations 
and activities, and fostered the rapid development of a more privatized and 
decentralized non-profit sector or NPOs dedicated to the delivery of social 
welfare services. SLG was an experienced public service delivery partner.
Nowadays, the state adopts a stewardship role in moulding civil society 
in a direct manner, as has been well argued by civil society scholars such 
as Cohen (1999), who points out the state’s fundamental role in helping civil 
society to develop. In fact, Evers (2013: 155) has asserted that the state, and 
more precisely democratic statehood, is directly involved in the civil society 
debate, not only in terms of providing protection and support for the activi-
ties of others but also as a cofounding agency. Recently, it has more often 
been argued that civil society organizations are partners of ‘co-production’ 
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with the state, a currently renewed academic interest building upon work 
by early scholars like Ostrom (1973) and Parks et al. (1981).
The 2009 Nobel Laureate of Economics Elinor Ostrom (1996: 1073) used 
‘co-production’ to describe a process through which ‘inputs from individuals 
who are not “in” the same organization are transformed into goods and 
services.’ The term ‘co-production’ suggests a relationship between ‘regular 
producers’ (policymakers and practitioners) and ‘clients’ (service users) 
(Ostrom 1999), specif ically where the ‘client’ acts not as a ‘consumer’ of 
services, but as a ‘co-producer’ of them (Ostrom 1999: 1073).
The term ‘co-production’ was rarely used in Japanese studies when I 
began my research at SLG as a doctoral project. At that time, ‘partnership’ 
or ‘devolution’ were popular terms used to describe such policy collabora-
tion (Ogawa 2009b). The term ‘co-optation’ was also used, as civil society 
organizations are co-opted to the state (Ogawa 2009a). Meanwhile, as an 
anthropologist, I argued the phenomenon in a different way, coining the 
term ‘volunteer subjectivity,’ employing Foucault’s governmentality (Ogawa 
2004, 2008, 2009b). I examined the mobilization of volunteer subjects in 
Japanese society, and gradually came to realize that the agent was surely 
the state. The state’s motivation was anchored in the idea that volunteer 
activities could be organized under NPOs to replace the government’s own 
provision of social services. This new Foucauldian subjectivity was expected 
to contribute to a new space for civil society under the neoliberal regime.
In the framework of co-production, Ostrom analysed the role of citizens 
in the provision of public services; co-production is a design for democratic 
governance and social inclusion (Ostrom 1990; see also Parks et al. 1981). 
Victor Pestoff et al. (2012) recently expanded on the concept of co-production 
in ‘new public governance’ scholarship, and argued that co-production 
can achieve higher-quality services and/or results in the provision of more 
services, often at a lower price, than is possible without citizen participa-
tion. For the state, co-production is an administrative technique of making 
citizens engage in the improvement of public services. As Lam and Dearden 
(2015: 64) point out, this ‘goes beyond assuring that the users’ voices are heard, 
to engaging service users in developing and deciding on solutions that will 
affect them.’ For citizens, meanwhile, co-production is a participative tool 
that actively involves them in public affairs. Although co-production emerged 
and developed as a concept that emphasized citizens’ engagement in policy 
delivery, its meaning has evolved in recent years to include both individuals 
(citizens and quasi-professionals) and civil society organizations like NPOs 
collaborating with government agencies in both the design and management 
of services as well as their delivery (see Pestoff and Brandsen 2010).
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SLG is an important case of developing the capacity of the NPO sector 
in Japan to apply co-production to social services or lifelong learning 
courses in the local community. Local volunteers create learning contents, 
mobilizing their local knowledge and networks. The state, meanwhile, 
funds these citizen-based activities, while local volunteers raise money 
autonomously. The creation of courses for local lifelong learning was a 
co-production activity between volunteers and the state: It sought to 
shift the balance of power, responsibility and resources in society from 
professionals to ordinary citizens under such a strong state as Japan, as 
it involved citizens in the production and delivery of their own services. 
I would argue that neoliberal politics, a dominant political ideology 
since the 1980s in Japan, has indeed created such a space for civil society 
organizations to be active in public affairs. Furthermore, I can point out 
that the neoliberal state employing the practice of co-production offers 
ordinary individuals new opportunities to participate in various arenas of 
action, ‘to resolve the kind of issues hitherto held to be the responsibility 
of authorized government agencies’ (Burchell 1996: 29). In co-production 
design (Durose and Richardson 2016), citizens are all potentially creative 
makers in their own right. For policy design, this means seeing citizens as 
‘co-designers’; doing so ‘turn[s] people into participants. […] [T]hey become 
innovators and investors, adding to the system’s productive resources 
rather than draining them as passive consumers waiting at the end of the 
line’ (Leadbeater and Cottam 2007: 98).
Mission Completed
To revert to the SLG case, one of the reasons the municipal government cut 
the SLG budget was that the government’s policy mission is now complete. 
By its ‘policy mission,’ I refer to the promotion of lifelong learning activities 
in the local municipality, which was clearly articulated in the government’s 
policy document on lifelong learning in the 1990s (SWG 1990, 1999a, 1999b). 
Thus, SLG was created as part of the municipal government’s framework of 
lifelong learning policy. It was planned as an alternative place for learning 
for local residents in the community as an extension programme to higher 
education institutions like universities, which often provide learning op-
portunities. Japan is unquestionably a society that highly values lifelong 
learning. Informal learning was guaranteed under the Social Education 
Law in 1949, shortly after World War II, and such learning is recognized as 
a legal right for ordinary people.
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Although documented in full elsewhere (e.g. Ogawa 2009b: 71-77), I will 
here briefly introduce the history of SLG: The municipal government opened 
the local lifelong learning centre, in which SLG is currently housed, in 
1994. This represented the f irst attempt to build such a facility in a Tokyo 
metropolitan municipality. By way of background, this move was also made 
in direct response to the national enactment of the Law for the Promo-
tion of Lifelong Learning in 1990, which prescribed measures such as the 
establishment of a Lifelong Learning Council at the national and local levels 
to promote lifelong learning, provisions for the development of lifelong 
learning in designated communities, and surveys to assess the learning 
demands of local residents.
The local lifelong learning project in Kawazoe was buoyed by the euphoric 
sentiment of the ‘bubble’ economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, 
by the time the lifelong learning centre opened, the local government faced 
huge f iscal diff iculties due to the decline in tax revenue. It then occurred 
to the municipal government to create a local residents’ group to operate 
the centre. The government mobilized local residents as volunteers and 
assigned them the task of creating lifelong learning courses, thereby delegat-
ing an active role of government as def ined by the education laws. SLG 
was originally established as an informal citizens’ group in 1995 and then 
re-organized as an NPO under the 1998 NPO Law. SLG would not generate 
any additional cost to the government through its establishment as a formal 
organization, and it even reduced the cost while fulf illing its objectives, due 
to the mobilization of volunteers as unpaid human resources. This was also 
in line with the neoliberal ideology of practice.
SLG changed the traditional style of state-led learning (see Kawanobe 
1994); instead, local residents explored the intellectual demands of residents, 
found teachers, negotiated with them, and wrote course plans, including tui-
tion content. In return, the government funded the salaries of the secretariat 
staff who conducted the administrative work for course operation. It also 
dispatched staff members to the SLG secretariat to help with administrative 
work. The head post of the secretariat was occupied by retired off icials 
as part of amakudari, literally meaning ‘descent from heaven’ – a system 
whereby retiring Japanese bureaucrats gain employment and executive 
positions in the private sector. This practice facilitated communication 
with the government.
SLG garnered strong national attention in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
and similar types of lifelong learning activity f lourished countrywide. 
Many visited SLG to learn about course creation, while SLG people also 
visited their counterparts elsewhere. In the mid-2000s, such interactions 
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were expanded to form a national network of bunka borantia, or ‘culture 
volunteers’ in direct translation, who were volunteers in local public facilities 
for lifelong learning, such as citizens’ public halls, libraries, museums – that 
is, traditional social education facilities in Japan (see Ogawa 2015: 74-78). 
SLG hosted the fourth national conference of bunka borantia in 2008.
In my previous work, I labelled bunka borantia ‘knowledge-constructing 
subjects’ (Ogawa 2015: 73). While interacting with the neoliberal state, 
the bunka borantia are active in learning, producing, accumulating and 
applying a certain, appropriate knowledge to survive in and deal with 
the constant changes in their daily lives. I argued (Ogawa 2015: 74) that a 
profound shift from the Keynesian welfare state to that of neoliberal politics 
represents a deliberate cultural restructuring and engineering based upon 
the neoliberal model that Michael Peters (2001) calls the ‘entrepreneurial 
self.’ In tandem with the development of bunka borantia, Japan’s policy on 
promoting atarashii kōkyō, or the ‘new public commons,’ in the late 2000s, 
strongly encouraged the building up of such a disciplinary subjectivity.
One of the tangible results observed in the area of Kawazoe was that 
lifelong learning activities flourished. Copying exactly SLG’s style of course 
creation, other public facilities in the local community, including the envi-
ronmental centre, the women’s centre, and the history museum, mobilized 
local resident-volunteers, who were assigned to create courses on their topics 
of choice, such as gender, recycling and local history. Compared to SLG’s 
courses, these courses became more focused and detailed, reflecting the 
specif ic interests of each centre. While SLG targeted a general audience, 
mostly the aging population, such emerging lifelong learning opportunities 
target specif ic audiences. One course created at the women’s centre, for 
example, focused on childrearing, targeting young fathers. In fact, the 
demographics of Kawazoe have been changing since the early 2000s as 
new high-rise tower apartments are constructed in the area and new young 
families join the local community. As its demography changes, the demand 
for new learning grows. However, SLG was unable to respond to this specif ic 
demand and I have observed local residents’ interests obviously shifting 
from SLG to the newer learning opportunities that became available. Indeed, 
some of the SLG volunteers moved to other public facilities to support their 
course creation as well as to respond to the new learning demands in the 
community. The numbers of SLG course takers also declined, particularly 
in the past three years.
Thus, one of the government off icers informed SLG management in 
April 2017 that its mission has now been completed. In the 1980s, the munici-
pal government began a discussion on the promotion of lifelong learning, and 
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30 years later, lifelong learning is now fully rooted in Kawazoe. I would argue 
that the renovation of the building was a good excuse for the government 
to cease its funding. From conversations with government off icials over the 
past couple of years, I had the sense that they were looking for the right time 
to do so. This seemed not to have been a sudden decision; it was planned in 
advance but not communicated effectively with SLG management.
Since the mission was deemed complete, there was unlikely to be ad-
ditional funding from the government. I fully understand that this is the 
logic of public administration, in which funding is project based. Otherwise, 
a new proposal to the municipal government from SLG or vice versa would 
be expected. However, SLG had not produced any new proposals or even 
predicted future developments to the government. Nor had it taken the 
formal initiative to lead community learning at the next stage in a timely 
manner before SLG dissolved.
While I would argue that the government intentionally stepped in at 
this moment, there were a number of signals that change was imminent. 
For example, lifelong learning policymaking was originally overseen by 
the Education Board of the municipal government, while SLG funding was 
provided under the education categories of the municipal budget. However, 
in April 2017, lifelong learning policymaking moved to the community 
development department, which also oversees interactions with civil society 
organizations in the municipality. Thus, SLG is now being treated as one 
such civil society organization. No special consideration for funding would 
be made. Previously, because of the historically close relationship with the 
government mentioned earlier, SLG almost automatically received funding 
from the government. At the same time, lifelong learning policymaking 
was downgraded from the department level to the section level and is now 
overseen by just two people. Nevertheless, there was no active engagement 
with these structural changes from the SLG side.
Where Is SLG Heading?
‘Mission completed’ – Most SLG people agreed with this comment by the 
government off icial. In fact, the head of SLG recently wrote in the in-house 
newsletter that ‘[o]ur ship is now full of cargo. We get off on the shore, 
drop the cargo and organize it.’ When I enquired what he actually meant 
by this, he told me that we are moving to the next stage: ‘SLG has been 
providing lifelong learning opportunities to a very broad audience. We are 
like a department store for lifelong learning. The recent learning activities 
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could be more tailored. Times have changed.’ Devolution was a fashion and 
it was successful at delivering social services under neoliberal politics, but 
what is next?
SLG dissolved in March 2018. People at my f ield site are now consider-
ing its next move, and as an action-minded researcher, I am part of this 
discussion. One current argument at SLG is whether to develop courses that 
could compete with other lifelong learning providers as described above. 
To this end, an area studies course has been created, or what I would call 
Kawazoe studies – a comprehensive area studies subject that studies local 
history, culture and people’s lives, combined with classroom lectures and 
f ield visits in traditional downtown Tokyo. This course would be expand-
able in the future since SLG foresees a continuing intellectual demand 
on the course. The numbers enrolling in Kawazoe studies courses is solid 
and the head of SLG believes that it can propose Kawazoe studies to the 
government to secure further funding. Kawazoe studies is a core part of the 
community-oriented lifelong learning that SLG has pursued. Not limited 
to local residents, such a course might draw in a new audience, including 
tourists coming to the Tokyo Olympics/Paralympics in 2020.
Another issue raised by SLG was that the organizational form – as an 
NPO – is no longer an effective tool for materializing citizens’ interests in 
public affairs. SLG people realized that while such an organizational form 
might effectively facilitate the practice of a neoliberal state, it would not be 
conducive to citizen-oriented activities. Too many documents need to be 
submitted to the government every year, which accounts for SLG’s hiring 
of 20 administrative staff to complete these documents, in addition to their 
regular business. Instead, another form, such as ippan shadan hōjin (general 
incorporated associations), seems to represent another potential tool to 
extend their interest.1 The major difference between NPOs and general 
incorporated associations is the simplification of administrative work for the 
latter. For example, to establish a general incorporated association, at least 
two people jointly craft teikan, or the articles of incorporation, and the notary 
off ice simply certif ies those articles together with the registration fee of 
1 The establishment of general incorporated associations is part of the reform of public 
interest corporations (PICs, kōeki hōjin). Under the old Civil Code, article 34, PICs are required 
to apply to be converted to one of six types of newly enacted incorporated organizations: zaidan 
hōjin (public interest incorporated foundations), shadan hōjin (public interest incorporated 
associations), ippan zaidan hōjin (general incorporated foundations), ippan shadan hōjin (general 
incorporated associations), kōeki zaidan hōjin (public interest incorporated foundations), and 
kōeki shadan hōjin (public interest incorporated associations). See http://www.koueki-houjin.
net/shadan/ and http://www.jfc.or.jp/eng/introduction/ (10 February 2018).
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112,000 yen (US$1,000). This registration takes one to four weeks to complete 
and no other procedure is required. Meanwhile, for NPOs, the Cabinet Office 
or prefectural governments certify the articles of incorporation with no reg-
istration fee, but registration takes f ive to six months to complete. Following 
the incorporation, they are supervised by the Cabinet Off ice or prefectural 
government, and are required to submit annual reports. Meanwhile, there 
are no such requirements for general incorporated associations to submit 
documents to the government. Lastly, NPOs are limited to 20 designated 
areas of activity, which often limits SLG’s activities. SLG was registered in 
four areas: contributing to informal education, community development, 
arts and sports, and information society. There are other areas in which SLG 
could be active, but committing to different areas, including community 
safety, children’s welfare, or occupational training, is illegal under the NPO 
Law, which lacks and sometimes limits the imagination regarding new 
course creation at SLG. The 1998 NPO Law was itself problematic on some 
points, as I have already pointed out (Ogawa 2009b: 159-160). Meanwhile, 
the Act of the General Incorporated Associations does not designate any 
specif ic areas of activity. Citizens freely choose their own activities. Thus, 
ippan shadan hōjin seems the most citizen-friendly among these public 
interest entities.
Conclusion
My research at SLG provides an important case study for considering the 
relationship between the state and civil society in contemporary Japan. To 
situate this chapter within the current discourse of third sector research, 
it can be seen that neoliberalism created a space for grassroots voices 
through such practices as co-production. Amongst Japanese NPOs, SLG is 
a leading case because it has been well tailored to provide and innovate for 
new social needs; as a result, it has created a rich diversity of enabling and 
locally embedded social services (cf. Table 1 in Evers 2009: 246). Further, 
SLG volunteers have tapped into their ‘entrepreneurial selves.’ Armed with 
what I called ‘civic knowledge’ (Ogawa 2015: 78), I believe they have been 
well empowered as independent, active citizens.
SLG was indeed established as part of local efforts to delegate power to 
citizens in a participatory governance structure for a pluralistic democracy. 
Thus, the civil society discussion should not be limited to issues of strength-
ening third sector-based service provision, as recent research has focused 
more on gains in civility and civicness (cf. Evers 2013: 158; Evers 2009). In 
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this sense, I understand SLG volunteers to comprise what Wagner (2012: 
321) calls ‘civic volunteers’ – that is, volunteers are no longer a means to 
an end, but an end in itself, by realizing in their daily lives as citizens the 
organizational mission they serve.
Meanwhile, however, power has not decentralized suff iciently. The 
practice of co-production was expected to change the power structure. 
When NPOs entered Japanese society, my memory is that people expected 
state-held power to be decentralized towards local people, active citizens and 
communities. However, neither Japanese NPOs, nor the form of governance 
since the late 1990s, represent a decline in state power as they are, in fact, 
mostly instituted and controlled by the state, and the state has retained its 
power and resources, most notably over money. At SLG, decision-making, 
in particular, strategies for innovation or long-term planning, was indeed 
always top-down; it came from the municipal government, although detailed 
planning, such as course creation, was mostly conducted by local-resident 
volunteers. As Montgomery (2016: 1993) points out, many civil society actors 
f ind themselves enmeshed within forms of governance that force them to 
compete in order to be eff icient service delivery providers that play by the 
rules of the neoliberal game. He also points out that despite neoliberalism’s 
claims being articulated under the rubric of participation, its outcomes will 
only serve to entrench the existing vertical distribution of power in society 
(Montgomery 2016: 1997). The case of SLG presents the internal, complex 
dynamics of power between the state and civil society, which directly 
reflects this neoliberal ideology.
Those involved in SLG – that is, its local residents-volunteers – are step-
ping onto the new stage. Montgomery (2016) calls the style of governance 
used by SLG ‘technocratic governance’ with its neoliberal foundations, as 
the state mobilizes the technologies of governance to reduce the space 
for political dissent. Meanwhile, the new paradigm, which he calls the 
‘democratic paradigm,’ sees social innovation as a tool to politicize the 
very space that neoliberals have sought to depoliticize, challenging the 
vertical power distribution and seeking to replace it with horizontal 
alternatives. I observe that SLG is now in transition to the next ‘democratic 
paradigm.’
After eighteen years, SLG has now begun actual bottom-up mobilization 
for much better social services delivery and social commitment to the local 
community. Instead of this being simply the end, however, I observe that 
former SLG people actually have a chance to empower themselves through 
co-production activities with the municipal government. They are starting to 
take the initiative in providing necessary services for their own community 
JAPANESE NPOS AND ThE STATE RE-ExAMINED  233
in another organizational form. For the moment, however, they are unsure 
about collaboration with the government since they do not feel the necessity 
to do so. They can provide their own community-oriented lifelong learning 
programme, and in the future, they might include the municipal government 
if they deem it necessary to do so. The current action reflects upon their 
persistent concerns regarding how civil society organizations should be, 
and they should collaborate with the government. Based on the experiences 
over the past two decades, their strong belief is that civil society should not 
be manufactured by the state, and citizens should be independent of the 
government. Civil society is an arena where grassroots people have access 
to public affairs, and both stakeholders – citizens and the state – should 
take equal positions to make democracy sustainable. SLG was a successful 
case of a government project. However, as a civil society project, it failed.
Their new activity will enrich the Japanese civil society landscape by 
adding a new case study and might lead to another effective method for 
service delivery that we need to consider. The development of SLG that is 
now underway may be situated within a much larger picture of the changes 
in relations between the state and civil society under the shift in the political 
regime from neoliberalism to ‘post-neoliberalism’2 (e.g. Christensen and 
Laegreid 2008; Torf ing and Triantaf illou 2013). I will continue to watch 
these new developments with interest.
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10 Changing Patterns of South Korean 
Social Movements, 1960s-2010s
Testimony, Firebombs, Lawsuit and Candlelight1
Jin-Wook Shin
Abstract
This chapter examines the changing patterns of South Korean social 
movements from the 1960s to the 2010s in terms of their constituents, 
their communication and mobilization structure, and the way in which 
they influenced institutional politics. Some long-term trends that require 
particular attention include: the extension of participants from cultural 
elites and organized activists to a huge number of ordinary citizens; 
the shift of the structure of the f ield of social movements from the 
inter-organizational ties of committed activists to highly decentralized 
networks of organizations, communities and individuals; and a change in 
the major way of affecting institutional politics from the moralized acts 
of cultural elites through strategic actions by movement organizations 
to large-scale protests led by networked citizens directly pressuring the 
actors of institutional politics.
Keywords: democratization, civil society, social movements, protest, 
contentious
This chapter examines the changing patterns of South Korean social move-
ments from the 1960s to the 2010s in terms of their constituents, issues, 
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influenced institutional politics. It also traces the historical processes in 
which new elements of culture and agency are born, develop and combine 
with pre-existing elements in a particular way to generate new configura-
tions. It is impossible to explore many big topics in social movement research 
for various movement sectors over a half-century period. Of course, this 
chapter does not aim to do so. The intent of this chapter is much more 
moderate, namely, to reconstruct changes in the typical patterns of South 
Korean social movements based on prior studies and to ask what long-term 
trends these changes show and what their theoretical and political meanings 
will be.
The four words in the subtitle of this chapter – ‘testimony,’ ‘f irebombs,’ 
‘lawsuit,’ and ‘candlelight’ – respectively symbolize the most salient features 
of the period from the 1960s to the 1970s, from 1980 to the late 1980s, from the 
1990s to the mid-2000s, and from the early 2000s to the 2010s. They may be 
understood in terms of what social movement studies have called ‘collective 
action repertoires,’ but in this chapter they also refer to the key actors in each 
period and the particular way in which they affected institutional politics. 
In the historical context of South Korea, the four symbolic words represent 
(1) moral accusation by cultural elites committed to social problems, (2) the 
disruptive protest actions of organized radical groups against dictatorship, 
(3) the reform movements led by professionalized social movement organiza-
tions after the transition to democracy, and (4) the politics of influence 
through decentralized contentious actions by networked citizens in the 
twenty-f irst century.
South Korea is an interesting case for tracing the historical changes in 
social movements and their relationship to institutional politics. There are 
three reasons for this. First, South Korea has experienced rapid development 
and radical changes in political, economic and technological aspects. Ac-
cordingly, the subjects of social movements, their mode of action and the 
source of influence have also experienced distinct changes within a short 
period of time. Therefore, the South Korean case is appropriate to observe 
dynamic changes in social movements during the near past. Second, in 
South Korea, democratization movements played a key role in the resistance 
to and the breakdown of the authoritarian regime. Moreover, civil society 
organizations contributed greatly to the reform process since the introduc-
tion of democracy in 1987. Therefore, there are many salient examples in 
South Korean contemporary history for analysing the changes in the way 
social movements influenced institutional politics. Third, in the twenty-first 
century, a new form of spontaneous, decentralized and large-scale action of 
citizens occurred many times in South Korea and often had a grave impact 
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on the government policies and power relations in party politics. Therefore, 
a historical consideration of the case of South Korea will help understand 
the specif ic characteristics of the most recent trends in social movements 
and their implications from a global perspective.
Methodologically, the primary interest of this chapter is to describe the 
most characteristic features of each historical period in the form of ideal 
types. As is well known, such an ideal type is an ideational construct that 
highlights, exaggerates, and idealizes certain aspects of a much more com-
plex reality. However, following Simmel (1992: 50-51), this chapter attaches 
more importance to reconstructing the typical aspects of concrete historical 
and cultural reality than pursuing conceptual abstractions (like Max Weber). 
Accordingly, the following pages will not simply present distinctive features 
of each period one after another, but will try to provide an analysis of the 
processes and configuration in which the new elements that are specif ic 
to the later periods are combined with the traditions in a particular way 
and the old elements that appeared to have vanished reappear in history 
and are connected with the new dominant trends.
This chapter will f irst deal with the period from the early 1960s to the 
late 1980s under military dictatorship, then the period from the 1990s to the 
mid-2000s under a democratic regime, and, f inally, the period from the early 
2000s to the late 2010s in which the latest developments have happened. 
Conclusively, the notable long-term trends in the historical changes in 
South Korean social movements and their implications will be discussed.
Protest Movements under Dictatorship
The Emergence of Civil Society from a History of Violence
In 1945, Korea was liberated from the occupation of Japan (1910-1945) and 
restored its national sovereignty. Since the Republic of Korea was established 
in the southern area of the Korean Peninsula in 1948, South Korea has been 
under authoritarian rule for nearly 40 years until the end of dictatorship 
and the introduction of democracy in 1987. The South Korean people, who 
had already experienced the rule of the Japanese military-police complex 
for more than 30 years, continued to live in a history dominated by state 
violence. The Korean War (1950-1953), the military confrontations under the 
Cold War order, the two military coups in 1961 and 1979, and the military 
massacre of the democratization movement in 1980 are merely some among 
the most widely known events. Under military dictatorship, kidnapping, 
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torture, confinement, execution, surveillance and threats were not excep-
tional events but a constant and essential part of daily life.
Despite the long dominance of state violence, the political dynamics of 
South Korea is not characterized by the sorrow of the victims only, but also 
by the clash between a ‘strong state and [a] contentious society’ (Koo 1993). 
In particular, during the four decades from the establishment of the Republic 
of Korea to the breakdown of the dictatorship, the antagonism between 
the authoritarian ruling elites and the resistant civil society was one of the 
biggest cleavages in South Korean politics and society. The civil society of 
South Korea was born as a response to the authoritarian-bureaucratic state 
and thus had a resistant character from the beginning.
The April Revolution of 1960 – when hundreds of thousands of people 
nationwide participated and protested against the corruption and abuse of 
power of the Rhee Syng-Man regime (1948-1960) – achieved the resignation 
and exile of Rhee. This event was not only the f irst case of realizing vertical 
accountability against political power that had lost its legitimacy, but it also 
established the typical pattern of South Korean citizen politics in which a 
concentrated and large-scale citizen protest exerted a strong influence upon 
state power. Nevertheless, the Second Republic, which was established by 
a democratic election after the April Revolution, was soon collapsed by a 
military coup led by General Park Chung-Hee.
The coup of 1961, which launched a long period of dictatorship in South 
Korea, was not an accidental event, but rather was prepared with a high 
probability by the nation’s previous history. What Moore (1966) saw as 
a constellation vulnerable to a fascist path to modernization existed in 
South Korea. The military not only grew in size during the Korean War, but 
also belonged to the f irst to acquire modern bureaucracy, technology and 
discipline. The bourgeoisie, on the other hand, was neither economically 
nor politically independent, and there was no radical peasantry. Against 
this historical background, the military rulers could greatly repress citizens’ 
basic rights and political-cultural pluralism. They suppressed the political 
expression and participation of the citizens, restricted the actions of the 
opposition parties and frequently dispatched police to labour disputes. 
Above all, comprehensive monitoring and terror by the Korean Central 
Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was the most terrible aspect of the military dic-
tatorship. Although in South Korea, unlike in Taiwan under the Kuomintang 
dictatorship, party competition and regular elections were not denied in 
principle, everyday control by the state power and political intervention in 
the electoral process made the operation of the institutions of democratic 
pluralism virtually impossible.
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However, such state violence did not totally suppress all freedom. An 
independent civil society has grown steadily and in constant confrontation 
with the authoritarian rulers and their allies within society since the 1960s. 
What made such a development possible was above all the democratiza-
tion movements, but a great number of groups that wanted to join and act 
together beyond the limits allowed by the state contributed to the gradual 
expansion of civil society. They included religious groups that worked for 
industrial workers and the urban poor; student movement organizations 
and communities at the university; autonomous labour movements that 
have grown since the early 1970s; and the scholars, artists, writers and 
journalists who played a role in diverse movement sectors. These civil society 
organizations and their participants became influential actors in Korean 
politics and society after the collapse of the dictatorship.
Politics of Testimony by Cultural Elites
In South Korea, violent revolts and sporadic resistance have been present 
since at least the 1950s, but from the 1960s the protest movement made 
clear its identity and goals by turning into a democratization movement. 
Paradoxically, under authoritarian rule, the collective action repertoires 
typical to democratic nations (such as public assemblies, street rallies and 
press conferences) have become increasingly dominant in South Korea. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s independent civil society forces emerged 
everywhere the complete control of state violence has failed.
During the Park Chung-Hee regime (1961-1979), several national-level 
social movement organizations began to grow. In the mid-1960s, the f irst 
nationwide student movement organization that emerged was led by Chris-
tian students. More importantly, organizations aff iliated with religious 
institutions (such as the Gatoliknodongcheongnyeonhoe (Catholic Youth 
Workers, JOC), the Protestant Dosisaneopseongyohoe (Urban Industrial 
Mission, UIM), the Christian Academy, and the YMCA) extended their 
activities to provide cultural, educational or legal support for workers, 
peasants and the urban poor. Many of them refrained from making direct 
political challenges, but their existence had significant political implications 
and consequences. In particular, they were increasingly monitored and 
oppressed by the authoritarian regime as they have spread ‘dangerous’ 
ideas of universal human dignity and equality.
In the early 1970s, Park’s one-man dictatorship was strengthened after the 
enactment of the so-called Yushin [Revitalizing] Constitution in 1972. What 
is interesting is that the democratization movement became more active and 
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politicized as the repression of human rights and civil liberties became harsher. 
In contrast to the case of Taiwan, in which middle-class activists with moderate 
goals played a key role during the period before the end of dictatorship (Ho 
2010; Hsiao 1996), the reinforcement of political violence in South Korea during 
the 1970s resulted in the extension of politicized protesters into a wide range of 
civil society groups which have focused on charity and gradual social reform.
To explain why the enhanced repression in Korea did not lead to the 
decline, but rather to the extension, of protest is well beyond the scope 
of this chapter. What can be said in the present context is that the shared 
values and organizational collaboration between various movement sectors 
seem to have been of great signif icance in maintaining the movements. 
In the mid-1970s, the oppositional politicians and the leaders of student 
movements formed the Mincheonghakryeon (Alliance of Democratic 
Youth and Students), a nationwide solidarity organization for resistance 
against the dictatorship, and theorized the sammin (three min) ideology 
declaring political democracy (minju), social justice and equality (minjung) 
and national independence and inter-Korean reconciliation (minjok) as 
the highest goals to accomplish. Meanwhile, the religious institutions, too, 
raised their voices, advocating democracy and human rights. In particular, 
the Christians – Catholic or Evangelical – contributed hugely to the political 
and moral inf luence of democratization movements in general (Chang 
1998; Chang and Kim 2007; Kang 2000). For example, the activities of the 
Jeonguiguhyeonsajedan (Catholic Priests Association for Justice), the 
Cheonjugyoingweonuiwonhoe (Catholic Human Rights Committee) and 
the Gidokgyogyohoehyeopuihoe (National Council of Christian Churches 
in Korea) put a considerable political burden on the dictatorship.
Another important event of the 1970s was the resurgence of the labour 
movement, which had been nearly destroyed in the course of the Korean War 
and the militarization of Korean politics. After the suicide by self-immolation 
of a young worker, Jeon Tae-Il, in 1970, an independent labour movement, 
which will eventually be called Minjunodongundong (Democratic Trade 
Union Movement), began to establish independent trade unions, defend 
workers’ rights and oppose the government’s repressive practices. The 
resistance took place primarily in the light-industry manufacturing sec-
tors (such as textiles, clothing and electronics), which at that time had an 
important strategic position in South Korea’s industrialization. Workers 
who worked in such industries – mostly young female workers from rural 
areas – developed a sense of solidarity and collective identity by sharing 
the pain of hard work, economic hardship and abuse in the workplace (Koo 
2001; Nam 2000; Yoon 2001).
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Such changes in the area of religion, universities, politics and factories 
need to be properly evaluated when we explore the social foundations of 
South Korean civil society and democracy. Many leaders of the democ-
ratization movement of the 1980s, as well as the key symbolic f igures in 
today’s South Korean democracy, have the roots in this period. Despite their 
signif icance, social movement organizations in the 1970s were nothing but 
small and scattered oases within the political desert of South Korean society. 
It took a long time before they had enough structural and associative power 
(Wright 2000) to threaten the regime through collective action.
Under such conditions, the democratization movements and other 
independent civil society forces of the 1960s and 1970s relied heavily on 
loose networks and declarative acts of prominent dissidents, including 
oppositional political leaders and cultural elites. Movement organizations 
gradually accumulated local changes, but their political and social influence 
at the national level could be amplif ied only by the act of declarations 
by a small number of cultural elites, such as religious leaders, professors, 
teachers, journalists and artists. For that reason, the violence committed 
by the military and the secret police was often targeted at the leaders with 
moral influence.
However, the state terror resulted in a paradoxical effect of creating 
the sacred symbols of innocence and conscience by making the victim a 
martyr and a prophet. Yeoksa-wa-jeungoen (History and testimony), the 
title of a book written by Ahn Byung-Mu (1972), one of the theologians who 
established Minjung theology in South Korea (comparable to the Liberation 
theology of Latin America), identif ied the enormous power of the act of 
testimony in an era of repression, concealment and distortion. However, 
the power of the testimony of history was soon relativized by the advent 
of a new history – the Gwangju massacre in May 1980.
Massacre and the Radicalization of Protest Movements
In the late 1970s, as resistance against the dictatorship spread across the 
country, President Park Chung-Hee seriously considered using violent repres-
sion by mobilizing the military. Kim Jae-gyu, the then-chief of the KCIA, 
opposed it, but when he failed to dissuade Park, he assassinated the president 
in October 1979. After the death of Park, expectations of a restoration of 
democracy grew, but the so-called New Army Group (Singunbu) led by 
General Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo, who had been supported by 
Park Chung-Hee during the 1970s, staged a coup in December. In the spring 
of 1980, massive protests called the Seoul Spring occurred and a series of 
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rallies demanding democracy continued nationwide. To put down the 
challenges, Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo mobilized the army and 
the Special Forces in Gwangju, a capital city in the south-western region of 
South Korea. As a result, hundreds of people were killed either during the 
military operation or as a consequence of the wounds and trauma caused 
by the operation, which is called the Gwangju massacre.
The massacre of 1980 and the defeat of democracy taught a serious lesson 
for South Korean civil society: The ‘truth’ without the organized power 
of the people acting together was helpless against the machine gun and 
the bayonet of the state, and its price was the blood of innocent humans. 
Documents of the then-protest groups show that they became increasingly 
convinced that what they needed was the power of the organized people in 
order to clarify the truth of Gwangju, in order not to repeat the tragedy of 
Gwangju, and, ultimately, in order to end the rule of violence.
Under the Chun Doo-Hwan regime (1980-1987), the ideological radicaliza-
tion of the resistant groups and the strengthening of their organizational 
power have progressed rapidly. Attempts have been made to expand and 
consolidate popular organizations, and anti-fascist, anti-capitalist and 
anti-imperialist ideas have spread, particularly among university student 
activists. They systematically and strategically mobilized the action units 
which were organized hierarchically from the national level through the 
regional and university level to the individual departments and secret 
associations at each university.
The activities of the student movements in the 1980s were not always 
provocative. Given the fact that intelligence agents, police and their col-
laborators were ubiquitous, an impetuous collective action could be a fatal 
error exposing organizations and sacrif icing activists. However, once they 
decided to act, the act was usually highly disruptive. In an environment in 
which no political expression of dissent was tolerated, students used sudden 
assemblies, demonstrations and occupations as the means of action to inform 
the people and the world of the voice of resistance. They were also armed 
with f irebombs and iron pipes to extend the duration of demonstration 
once the police arrived to stop them.
It is true that violent actions can be detrimental to social movements 
when they are negatively framed by mass media (Gamson 1990), but, under 
certain circumstances, disruptive actions can be effective when the pains 
and claims of the powerless are so systematically repressed that they are 
not delivered to the public (Piven and Cloward 1977). South Korean student 
activists wanted to bring out the truth of the massacre and the voices against 
dictatorship to the ordinary citizens of their country and to the outside 
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world, but the media was being strictly controlled by the state. They chose to 
attract attention from the public and the foreign media by highly provocative 
actions. So, the f irebombs became the symbol of the South Korean student 
movements of the 1980s.
The transition of South Korean democratization movements from the pas-
tors and intellectuals of the early days to the young and much more radical 
f igures of student f ighters throwing f irebombs and occupying government 
buildings was a drastic change. However, it would be a mistake to think that 
the subjects of the democratization movements of the 1970s were simply 
replaced by the new generations. In reality, they both continued their f ight 
alongside each other and were closely connected to each other organization-
ally and personally. The Minjuheonbeopjaengchui Gukminundongbonbu 
(Alliance of People’s Movements for a Democratic Constitution), a coalition 
organization that played a leading role in the successful democratic uprising 
in June 1987, was launched at historic Myeongdong Cathedral and was 
composed of respected spiritual leaders who led the resistance movements 
in the 1960s and 1970s. Moral authority and political disruption met and 
amplif ied their power to go beyond the violence of the dictatorial state.
Reform Movements after the End of Dictatorship
The Differentiation of Civil Society under Democracy
In June 1987, a democratic uprising involving more than two million people 
nationwide took place. The scale of the protests was incomparably greater 
than that of 1979-1980, and above all, white-collar, middle-class citizens 
were at the forefront of resistance. Because of the unprecedented size and 
intensity of the protest, the military had to abandon their original plan to 
use violent repression like in Gwangju in 1980 to extend the regime and 
eventually promised to introduce a democratic system, including direct 
presidential election, in response to citizens’ demands. It was the end 
of decades of dictatorship and the beginning of a protracted process of 
democratization in South Korea.
After the end of the authoritarian regime, the political opportunities of 
civil society organizations gradually expanded. The oppression of public 
authorities over the contentious claim making by civil society organizations 
was weakened. In addition, the attitudes of the institutional sectors such as 
the government, political parties, enterprises, and the press became more 
open and cooperative to communication with civil society. Meanwhile, civil 
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society organizations participated in advisory activities for the government, 
played a leading role in the legislation in the National Assembly, encouraged 
corporate social responsibility, and initiated cooperation with the main-
stream media. This kind of change was particularly remarkable during the 
period from 1998 to 2007 under President Kim Dae-Jung, a symbolic f igure 
of the democratization movements in Asia, and President Roh Moo-Hyun, 
a former human rights lawyer.
However, even after the democratic transition, the expansion of civil 
liberties and rights was limited and selective. Moreover, the confrontational 
oppression-resistance relationship between the state and civil society did 
not disappear. In the f irst free election of 1987, Roh Tae-Woo, one of the 
military bosses, was elected as president. The f irst democratically elected 
government showed a change both in domestic and foreign policies, but 
soon reinforced the suppression of political opposition and labour disputes. 
Although Kim Young-Sam, a former democratic dissident, was elected as 
the f irst civilian president in 1992, his election victory was a consequence 
of the much criticized coalition of his Unif ied Democratic Party with the 
Democratic Justice Party, which was a successor party organized by the 
former dictators.
In these limited and ambiguous democratization processes, the political 
environment of social movements varied greatly, depending on the issues 
and the movement sectors. The freedom of expression, of the press, of 
thought and association of the middle classes expanded considerably, but 
the organization and collective action of the lower classes were systemati-
cally controlled. Class-based movements, such as the labour and peasant 
movements, were still under surveillance and suppression by state power 
and corporations. In response to this situation, trade unions that inherited 
the tradition of the Democratic Trade Union Movement of the 1970s and 
1980s formed the Jeonnohyeop (National Council of Trade Unions) in 1990 
to continue a militant trade union movement. In 1995, the Minjunochong 
(Korean Confederation of Trade Unions), based upon the powerful trade 
unions of big conglomerates like Hyundai, was established.
It is true that the South Korean workers’ organizations acted more fre-
quently and radically than in other countries of East Asia during the 1990s 
(Liu 2005). However, the labour movements continued to decline after the 
late 1990s. The unionization rates rose for a short period of time from 1987 to 
1989, but after the Asian f inancial crisis in 1997, fell to less than 10% as the 
number of irregular workers increased and the labour market segmentation 
deepened. Organized workers could play a limited role in political and social 
reforms and had great diff iculty in being recognized as representatives of 
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the entire working class. Militant workers’ struggles in South Korea were 
sometimes referred to as an example of ‘social movement unionism,’ but 
such a view may make a mistake of ‘romanticizing’ the more complex reality 
of the South Korean labour movements (Park 2007).
On the other side, a new wave of reform movements relying on more mod-
erate and institutionalized means of action and seeking support from and 
the participation of a broader spectrum of citizens grew rapidly during the 
same period. Participants in these movements often referred to themselves 
as simin undong (citizens’ movements) in a sense distinguished from minjung 
undong (class-based movements). The fact that the conceptual distinction 
between simin undong and minjung undong became increasingly popular 
in the f irst half of the 1990s was a sign showing that the South Korean social 
movements were rapidly differentiating under democracy. The differences 
that have remained latent under the big slogans such as ‘democratization,’ 
‘anti-dictatorship,’ and ‘anti-fascism’ came to the surface. Such differences 
were embodied in different organizations and inter-organizational ties that 
shared the movement goals, problem def inition, strategies and means of 
action.
The actual relationship between the differentiated sectors was, however, 
far more complex than the conceptual division. On the one hand, some 
citizens’ movements ruled out class issues definitely and refused to cooperate 
with organizations with class-specif ic goals. In such a context, the distinc-
tion between ‘legal, popular, and peaceful citizens’ movements’ versus 
‘illegal, radical, and violent class-oriented movements’ served as a linguistic 
device for stigmatizing the class-based movements. Pastor Seo Kyung-Suk, 
who f irst presented this conceptual division in a systematic form, became 
a leader of New Rights in the 2000s. On the other hand, many of those who 
founded and led progressive citizens’ movements were participants in the 
democratization movement and the radical student movements of the 1980s, 
and they actively cooperated with workers’ organizations throughout the 
1990s (Kim 2006: 103-104). Progressive citizens’ movements had a significant 
impact on national policy reforms in the area of economic, labour and social 
policies. Moreover, a number of local and community-based organizations 
for social services and support of socially disadvantaged people emerged 
in the name of citizens’ movements.
The Citizens’ Movements: Their Influence and Its Dark Side
The citizens’ movements have been active in various f ields of reform, includ-
ing political democratization, economic reform, social welfare, environment, 
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women, education, peace, human rights and consumer rights. Their activities 
in these sectors partially overlapped with those of other movement groups 
of the same or earlier period, which were not called ‘citizens’ movements.’ 
Yet the citizens’ movements had an orientation and identity to distinguish 
themselves from democratization movements during the authoritarian era 
and the minjung movements of the 1990s. First, in terms of the ideology of 
movements, they pursued solidarity in diversity, respecting the differences of 
movement ideologies within a broad consensus of values instead of requiring 
ideological homogeneity among the movement sectors and organizations. 
Second, in terms of the goals of movements, they emphasized concrete 
reform of law, institutions and practices, although they, too, emphasized 
the need for fundamental changes in social structure. Third, they would 
not directly defend particular class interests but sought broad support for 
reform by means of a kind of hegemonic strategy of connecting particular 
reform agendas with universalistic appeals to the ‘common good’ or the 
‘public good.’
The citizens’ movements played a decisive role in a wide range of reform 
activity, including the monitoring of the government and the parliament; 
advancements in political institutions; economic democratization; protection 
of human rights; expansion of civil liberties; improvement in gender equality; 
and the introduction of environmental policy paradigms. In particular, 
organizations that had rich human, organizational and f inancial resources 
replaced many of the roles which are normally expected of government and 
political parties in a representative democracy. The South Korean political 
parties were lacking the ability to produce and legislate new policies under a 
democratic system because they could not develop properly during the long 
period of dictatorship. Thus, competent leaders of the citizens’ movements 
and scholars, lawyers and members of other expert groups associated with 
the movement organizations greatly contributed to legal and institutional 
reforms in many sectors (Lee and Park 2009). In this sense, they performed 
a ‘proxy representation’ function, replacing the less developed party politics 
(Cho 2000: 286).
The signif icance of the citizens’ movements in the overall reform pro-
cesses after the end of dictatorship has to do with the tradition of strong 
commitment of South Korean civil society to national politics. In contrast 
to many Japanese NGOs focusing on local activities, for example, many 
civil society organizations in South Korea have been highly politicized and 
interested in influencing politics and policy at the national level (Lee and 
Arrington 2008). The major examples of the 1990s citizens movements are the 
Gyeongsilryeon (Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice), founded in 1989, 
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and the Chamyeoyeondae (People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy), 
founded in 1994. They grew into a ‘comprehensive citizens’ movement’ (Cho 
2000; Kim 2006), which had a very broad range of areas of activity, includ-
ing economic, labour, welfare and political reform and the monitoring of 
administrative, legislative and judicial institutions. In addition, nationwide 
movement organizations concentrating on specif ic sectors, such as the 
Yeoseongdancheyeonhap (Korean Women’s Association United), founded in 
1987, and the Hwangyeongyeonhap (Korean Federation for Environmental 
Movements), founded in 1993, provided innovative ideas, knowledge and 
policy contents to the government, political parties and the media.
In terms of means of action, their activities centred on solving problems 
and providing realizable alternatives through institutionalized channels, 
such as the court, political parties, the government and the media. Although 
they also used conventional means of action, such as rallies and demonstra-
tions, for putting public pressure on institutional actors, such campaigns 
as such were not of essential importance within their overall strategic 
scheme. In response to such changes in behaviour, the key actors of the 
movement have also changed. In addition to experienced leaders and fully 
employed activists of the movement organizations, members of expert 
groups, including lawyers, scholars, and employees of various non-prof it 
research institutions, have played a crucial role. In contrast, most of the 
members and sympathizers of the movements normally contributed either 
by paying their dues, making donations or occasionally volunteering in the 
campaigns.
The Institutionalization of Social Movements and Its Consequences
The changes mentioned above imply that the institutionalization of social 
movements has been progressing in South Korea in many respects since the 
1990s. Institutionalization of social movements has two aspects. If one is a 
growing recognition and acceptance of social movements by the institutional 
sectors of politics and society, the other is that the movement actors tend 
to resort to institutionally established routines. In South Korea since the 
1990s, social movements have gradually gained recognition as a ‘normal’ 
component of society, while at the same time favouring institutionalized 
goals and means of action. These trends may be interpreted as an aspect 
of the tendency towards a ‘social movement society’ (Neidhardt and Rucht 
1993; Meyer and Tarrow 1998b).
There were some typical ways of mobilizing institutional channels by 
the citizens’ movements: raising issues and promoting alternatives through 
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the support of friendly media; introducing new policies or reforming old 
institutions in cooperation with political parties and politicians in the 
parliament; and providing policy contents to the bureaucrats and putting 
pressure for acceptance, sometimes in consultation with high-ranked 
off icials in the presidential off ice and the government ministries. The 
movement organizations often combined such constructive activities with 
offensives against the veto forces whom they blamed for being responsible 
for the problem and resisting the reform. For that aim, the essential means of 
action that has become increasingly important was the lawsuit. The citizens’ 
organizations exploited the legal disputes to attract popular support and to 
draw responses from politicians while making an issue of various problems, 
such as corruption, abuse of power, dereliction of duty, irregularity and 
unconstitutionality.
The radical shift of action repertoires by the citizens’ movements is 
evident, but it does not necessarily mean that the institutionalized action 
methods were always quantitatively dominant. According to Jung (2011) 
and Kim (2009a), the frequency of non-institutional protest events such as 
street demonstration increased during the period of the Kim Young-Sam 
government (1993-1998), declined under President Kim Dae-Jung (1998-2003), 
and rose again under the Roh Moo-Hyun government (2003-2008). Notwith-
standing such ambiguities in the quantitative trends, it seems to be clear 
that the institutionalized means of action of the citizens’ movement were 
the most effective in achieving important reforms at this time. Additionally, 
in many cases, popular actions (such as public assemblies, street rallies and 
signature campaigns) have eventually been linked to activities in and with 
the government, the parliament, the media and the courts.
However, the process of professionalization and institutionalization 
as described above did not only imply progress in social movements, but 
also caused considerable problems inside the movements and triggered 
new sorts of conflict. First, as the experienced activists and expert groups 
came to hold key positions in the movements, ordinary citizens became 
increasingly marginalized in the planning and performance of the move-
ments. The fact that such processes of institutionalization involve both the 
aspect of inclusion and that of marginalization (Meyer and Tarrow 1998a: 21) 
became a source of the emergence of new dynamics of change. Second, as 
the progressive movement organizations, particularly the big ones, formed 
a reform alliance with the liberal regime since the late 1990s, the citizens’ 
trust in the civil society groups began to decline (Kim 2009b). While leaders 
of the citizens’ movements often prioritized the achievement of reform by 
any means, the scepticism about their political independence has grown as 
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many movement figures were appointed as high-ranking officials and played 
important roles in the policymaking of the government (Kim 2006: 118).
Third, under the liberal regime, the so-called New Right movements 
emerged. Anti-communist right-wing groups became active, leading to the 
intensification of ideological and political confrontation ‘within’ civil society 
in the place of the conventional cleavage of ‘the state versus civil society.’ 
The right-wing groups promulgated diverse ideologies and reform visions 
stretching from belligerent anti-leftist extremism to radical market liberal-
ism, but they collaborated in their struggle against the liberal-progressive 
parties and civil society forces. They emerged as a reaction to the crisis of 
the conservative parties in the mid-2000s after a series of electoral success 
of the progressives and, later, could exert signif icant influence over the 
process of the conservative turn in politics and public opinion from the 
late 2000s (Shin 2015).
As such, the institutionalization of the citizens’ movements not only 
has resulted in many signif icant reforms, but also created problems that 
later turned out to be a cause of transformation in the contentious politics 
of South Korea. Actually, more and more citizens in the 2000s wanted to 
distance themselves from every political party and influential organization 
of civil society and, eventually, created an entirely new and independent 
way of conducting contentious politics. The symbol of such a change was 
the ‘candlelight.’
Citizen Politics in the Twenty-first Century
From Organizational to Networked Social Movements
In the previous pages, we saw that since the 1990s, professionalized civil 
society organizations have achieved reform goals through institutionalized 
means, whereas the democratic movements of the 1980s have continued to 
conflict with the authoritarian state through their provocative actions. The 
two periods are sharply contrasted not only in terms of the environment of 
the social movement, but also of the movement participants’ recognition of 
reality, their goals and modes of action, and the institutional recognition. 
What is common to them, however, is that ‘organizations’ and their strategies 
have played a decisive role, even if the support of the unorganized citizens 
were essential to the success of the movement. Still in the 1990s, many of the 
movement activists called them ‘mass,’ that is, an object of conscientization, 
persuasion and mobilization.
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This situation has changed completely since the early 2000s. The South 
Korea of the twenty-f irst century saw a sudden rise and spread of spontane-
ous and decentralized collective actions by loosely connected individuals 
and communities, which Manuel Castels (2012) called ‘networked social 
movements.’ A new form of protest called chotbuljiphoe (candlelight protest) 
symbolizes this trend: The gathering of a great number of citizens spreads 
rapidly by independent communication, networking and coordination; 
participants share information and exchange opinions via the internet and 
smartphones; and they plan their actions, consult about action methods, 
and recruit further participants without connection with political parties 
or movement organizations; the constituents are greatly diversif ied in 
terms of their age, sex, occupation and prior experience of protest action.
Over the past few years, such new forms of resistance have emerged 
and spread in many parts of the world. Elements that social movement 
researchers have often considered as mutually exclusive coexisted in these 
new protests (consciousness and spontaneity, collectivity and individuality, 
online communication and offline gatherings) and were combined in various 
ways in one and the same movement. The Arab Spring of 2010-2011, Spain’s 
movement of the indignados from 2011, the Occupy Wall Street Movement 
in the United States in 2011, the Hong Kong Umbrella Revolution and the 
Sunflower Movement in Taiwan in 2014 are well-known examples. New 
citizen politics in South Korea shares the contexts and characteristics of 
these global trends in many respects.
What is particularly interesting in the case of Korea is that not only did 
large-scale protest actions involving millions of people take place repeatedly 
within a short period of time, but also in many cases they have had a strong 
and immediate impact on government action, election politics and power 
relations at the national level. Although participants pursued independence 
from all institutional political forces and ostensibly claimed to be ‘non-
political,’ their actions were in reality targeted at highly political issues 
and aimed at exercising influence upon national politics. They were more 
interested in institutional politics and more active in institutionalized forms 
of political participation such as voting than non-participants (Lee 2009).
Obviously, the form of the candlelight vigil itself is not new at all. It not 
only has a long history in religious rituals, but also has been a popular form 
of gathering in the modern social movements, such as in the German peace 
movement and the Indian women’s movement. It was also often used by 
religious groups in the South Korean democratization movements until the 
1980s. The novelty of the Korean candlelight protests in the twenty-f irst 
century is that individual citizens connected by the internet and the SNS 
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could amplify their issues and increase the number of protest participants 
extremely rapidly; effectively combine spectacular physical gatherings and 
online communications; and exert immediate political pressure on the 
government and political parties. For example, the candlelight protest in 
2004 led to a surprising election victory of the reform-oriented party and 
thus completely changed the power relations in the state; the protest in 
2008 blocked the neoliberal policy lines of the newly formed conservative 
administration; and the protest in 2016-2017 succeeded in impeaching the 
president, who was accused of corruption and power abuse in a peaceful 
and constitutional way.
The Birth, Growth and Success of Candlelight Protests, 2002-2017
We can identify the exact date when the ‘candlelight protest’ emerged as 
a term referring to a new form of collective political expression of citizens 
in South Korea. On 27 November 2002, a citizen suggested on the internet 
that a small memorial meeting be held in front of Seoul Metropolitan City 
Hall. In three days, a small number of citizens gathered with candles in their 
hands. It was a candlelight vigil to commemorate the two middle school 
girls who died by being hit by an armoured vehicle of the US army stationed 
in South Korea in June of that year. This incident was considered a mere 
accident at the time and did not attract public attention at all. However, 
the problem began with the fact that the South Korean court did not have 
jurisdiction over the case under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
between the United States and South Korea. In November of that year, 
the two US soldiers responsible for the accident were acquitted in the US 
military court and returned to the United States. This was a trigger. The 
size of candlelight vigils increased rapidly in a few weeks and exceeded 
100,000 in mid-December. Citizens communicated on the internet and held 
a candlelight vigil every weekend, asking for the revision of the SOFA and 
the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. The rise of 
candlelight vigils has had a signif icant impact on the presidential election 
held in late December. Former human rights lawyer Roh Moo-Hyun, who 
was but a peripheral f igure in Korean politics, won a dramatic victory in 
the election.
The political influence of the candlelight protest was confirmed again 
just two years later. President Roh Moo-Hyun, who had a strong reform 
tendency, repeatedly clashed with established politicians and political 
parties after his inauguration, and the National Assembly impeached him 
for violating political neutrality in March 2004. About 70% of the citizens 
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opposed impeachment, according to several polls by the time, and some 
of them directly expressed their opinions, continuing candlelight vigils 
and street marches at the city centre of Seoul. The protest in 2004 were 
not only larger than in 2002, but also had a more direct political impact. 
The Yeollin Woori Party, which was a small party supporting President 
Roh, won a majority of seats in the general election held in April when the 
candlelight protests were underway. In May of that year, the Constitutional 
Court overturned the impeachment.
Since 2008, as the conservative Lee Myung-Bak and Park Geun-Hye 
governments have regressed to quasi-authoritarian politics, the candlelight 
protests have grown remarkably in size, frequency and intensity. Lee Myung-
Bak, who was one of the bosses of Hyundae conglomerate, took off ice in 
February 2008. The candlelight protests, which lasted about four months 
from spring to summer, brought about a new stage in the development of 
South Korean social movements in the twenty-first century. The protest was 
triggered by the conclusion of the US-Korea Agreement on the Import of US 
Beef Products in Korea in April of that year. Many South Koreans worried 
about mad cow disease, or BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy), because 
the agreement allowed the import of the SRMs (specif ied risk materials). 
Surely, there are similar cases of protest related to anxiety about mad cow 
disease in other countries (Ho and Hong 2012; Lewis and Tyshenko 2009; 
Setbon et al. 2005). However, the issue in Korea was highly political in nature.
Many South Koreans blamed the Lee Myung-Bak administration not 
only for ignoring the health rights of the people, but above all for placing 
no importance on public opinion. The key word in the initial phase of the 
protest was ‘communication.’ The major target of blame was the govern-
ment’s unilateral policy decision and implementation without efforts to 
communicate with citizens and to reflect the majority opinion of the public. 
The issue soon expanded into a heated debate over the aggressive neoliberal 
policies of the new government. The key issues of the protest were often sum-
marized as ‘5+1,’ namely: large-scale construction projects by the government, 
privatization of the public sector, privatization of medical services, reduction 
of public support for education, government control of broadcasting, and 
‘beef.’ The candlelight protest in 2008 is often called the ‘beef protest,’ but, 
in reality, it was the opposition to political re-authoritarianization and 
neoliberalization that intensif ied and politicized the protest.
In terms of scale, the protest that started with a relatively small number 
of citizens in April 2008 expanded very rapidly, reaching an estimated 0.6 
million in mid-June. This scale was well above the candlelight vigils in 
2002 and 2004. What is surprising in terms of duration is the fact that even 
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though the mobilization by movement organizations has played a minimal 
role, the protest continued for about four months with tens of thousands 
of participants on average. The participants maintained the protests by 
the online-street spiral, in which they linked online communication to 
the off line protests while sharing online the experience of their off line 
gatherings (Lee et al. 2010).
If in the f irst candlelight vigils of the early 2000s, tensions between 
movement organizations and networked individuals became visible even 
though the former still played a role, the candlelight vigils in 2008 was an 
event in which the latter definitely became the new ‘leaderless’ leader of the 
social movement in South Korea (Jho 2009). The majority of participants 
were citizens with little or no prior experience of protest; their age, sex 
and occupation were much more diversif ied than in the past. The active 
participation of the youth, housewives and young couples with their children, 
who have been rare in places of political rallies in the past, attracted much 
attention. Online communities with millions of members, which were 
usually non-political in nature, suddenly turned into spaces of political 
debate and strategic discussion. The protest of 2008 could not bring about 
any substantial change in party politics because it took place right after the 
conservatives won a victory in the presidential and parliamentary election. 
Nevertheless, the Lee administration had to abandon many important policy 
intentions, such as the reduction of public welfare and the privatization of 
the water supply, electricity, and medical services.
After the decline of the protest in 2008, large-scale candlelight protests 
continued addressing various issues, including police violence, political con-
trol of broadcasting, educational policy and the intervention of intelligence 
agency in the presidential election. It was, above all, the candlelight protests 
in 2016-2017 for the impeachment of the then-President Park Geun-Hye that 
showed the political influence of the new citizens’ activism in the most 
dramatic way. Park Geun-Hye, daughter of former dictator Park Chung-Hee, 
was elected president in December 2012, and the former key f igures of the 
authoritarian rule of the 1970s returned to the highest positions of the 
government. The Park administration restricted freedom of expression, 
media, assembly and demonstration. Moreover, suspicions had been raised 
repeatedly that the president and high-ranked off icials were involved in 
corruption and that the president’s private friends exerted a huge influence 
on the government’s decisions. However, the presidential off ice kept major 
state institutions under its control, including prosecutors, police and the 
judiciary, while the opposition parties lacked suff icient political resources. 
It was the candlelight protest that started to bring a change to this situation.
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The protest began on 29 October 2016, and lasted until 11 March 2017, a 
day after the Constitutional Court’s f inal approval of the impeachment. 
The cumulative number of participants exceeded seventeen million. On 
26 November 2016, when the protest reached its peak, more than two million 
people participated nationwide. Every Saturday, about 20 times, hundreds 
of thousands of citizens gathered in the centre of Seoul to demand the 
resignation or impeachment of the president, criticizing abuses of power, 
political corruption and the privatization of state power. Not unlike the 
candlelight vigils over the past decade, the participants were very diverse 
in respect of their age, sex and occupation; most of them communicated 
and decided to participate independently of political parties and movement 
organizations. The protest was peaceful and orderly. The police reported 
that there was not a single incident of violence and not one arrest during 
the four months. By demonstrating such peace and order, the participants 
wanted to gain friendly media coverage and broad public support. In this 
way, they were also able to exert maximal pressure on the legislators and 
the government.
On 3 December 2016, the National Assembly voted 234 to 56 in favour of 
impeaching President Park for f ive major reasons: violation of the constitu-
tional principle of people’s sovereignty and rule of law; abuse of presidential 
power; violation of the duty to protect the right to life; violation of criminal 
law such as bribery; and violation of free speech. On 10 March 2017, the 
Constitutional Court unanimously approved the impeachment proposal 
and dismissed President Park. The reasons for impeachment were the viola-
tion of the people’s sovereignty and the rule of law, as well as the abuse of 
presidential power. A presidential election was held within 60 days after 
the impeachment decision and a new government came into being. The 
candlelight protest showed a typical example of ‘politics of inf luence’ 
promoting the work of democratic-constitutional institutions through 
powerful but self-limiting actions from below.
Submerged Networks and the Encounter of Histories
New subjects of political activism in South Korea, symbolized by the ‘can-
dlelight,’ show a tendency to come onto the public stage when they f ind it 
necessary to act about an issue and return to their everyday life after the 
decline of the protest waves, instead of constantly committing themselves to 
movement organizations or establishing a new one. This kind of pendulum 
movement between appearance and disappearance of acting citizens in 
South Korean politics continued for the f irst two decades of the twenty-f irst 
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century. The retreat of the citizens from contentious politics does not imply 
here ‘exit’ as opposed to ‘voice,’ to borrow from Albert Hirschman’s concepts 
(Hirschman 1970).
Today, the private world of the citizens includes as its indispensable 
component a variety of loose but broad communication networks connected 
by online public spheres, internet communities and the SNS. Information, 
knowledge, opinions and communication about public issues are inher-
ent in the private lives of individuals. In this sense, it would be accurate 
to say that the citizens holding the candles did not disappear, but rather 
that they ‘submerged’ when they left the political space. For they are not 
isolated individuals, but part of what Alberto Melucci called the ‘submerged 
networks’ (Melucci 1989), and these dispersed and fragmented forces in 
everyday life may suddenly ‘emerge’ at the centre of politics in a moment 
when they encounter specif ic triggering events. The characteristics of civil 
society that Charles Taylor described as ‘amphibian’ (Taylor 1990) now are 
being generalized among the citizens.
The reason why the conf lict between a ‘strong state and [a] strong 
civil society’ (Oh 2012) has intensif ied in South Korea in the twenty-f irst 
century can be found in the fact that the citizens’ desire and capacity for 
political participation have become stronger, whereas institutional politics 
was still dominated by old behavioural patterns or even regressed into 
re-authoritarianization. In particular, the fact that the Lee Myung-Bak and 
Park Geun-Hye administrations have not just pursued conservatism in policy, 
but turned the nations’ democracy and rule of law backward, has had two 
significant consequences for South Korean civil society. One is the politiciza-
tion of a widespread citizenry which came to more consciously attach value 
to democracy and the rule of law after experiencing the violation of them. 
The other is that the newly politicized citizens encountered in the process 
of political participation the former participants of the democratization 
movements of the prior periods and their symbols, rituals, protest cultures 
and narratives of their experience of violence and resistance against it.
Just as in 1987 the symbolic f igures of the democratization movements 
of the 1970s fought together with the citizens of younger generations who 
f illed the square in front of Seoul Metropolitan City Hall, the leaders of the 
movements that have grown since the 1990s formed the Bisanggukmin-
haengdong (People’s Emergency Action for Park’s Resignation) to support the 
citizens who stood in the same place in 2016-2017. Although such experienced 
activists could not claim to be leaders of the protest like in the 1990s, they 
managed to f ind their role within a decentralized movement ecology of the 
twenty-f irst century. Moreover, during the candlelight protests, not only 
260  J IN-wOOK ShIN 
was the story of Park Geun-Hye’s abuse of power and corruption told, but 
accounts of the violence committed by the state under the dictatorship 
and the sacrif ices of those who resisted it were passed on to the younger 
generations and to the older citizens who had not been much interested 
in politics and history. They learned slogans, poems, protest songs and the 
lived experiences of the 1970s and 1980s, while at the same time the former 
dissidents learned new cultures and ways of communication. As such, social 
movements in South Korea underwent a great change during the past half 
century, but, at the same time, different histories met each other in every 
new present and created a new mosaic.
Discussion and Conclusion
The history of South Korean civil society and social movements for decades 
from the 1960s to the 2010s shows some long-term trends.
The f irst one is a tendency of the expansion of movement participants. 
The subjects of South Korean social movements have been continuously 
widened from a small number of cultural elites and organized student 
activists who led the protest movements in the 1970s and 1980s; through 
an increasing number of professional movement organizations that grew 
under democracy during the 1990s; to millions of ‘candlelight citizens’ in the 
twenty-f irst century who communicate, network, mobilize and strategize 
independently. Most recently, the trend towards the political activism 
of citizens and the changes in the logic of institutional politics, which 
Ulrich Beck had predicted in the 1980s (Beck 1986), are becoming more and 
more salient and are being generalized across ideological, generational, 
occupational and gender differences.
Here we need to specify the exact nature of this change. First of all, the 
individualization of the unit of action does not necessarily suggest the 
decline of associational life. In the case of South Korea, the participants 
of the candlelight protests were more frequently aff iliated in voluntary 
associations and more active in voting behaviour than non-participants. 
However, it is noticeable that while on the whole, the movement participation 
is becoming normal, the specif ically class-based movements are continuing 
to shrink. The growing inequalities in many aspects after the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997, including income, employment and assets, are becoming 
important political agenda in electoral competition and party politics, but 
mobilization from below on the issues of inequality are not led primarily 
by class organizations such as trade unions, but by a broad network of civil 
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society communities and associations. Last but not least, the generalization 
of political activism is ambivalent from a normative point of view. Not only 
actions pursuing universalistic values but also those opposing them are 
now emerging and spreading rapidly.
The second trend is that the structure of the f ield of social movements has 
moved from the simple coexistence of a limited number of weakly organized 
actors until the 1970s; through a centralized system of organizations and 
inter-organizational ties in the 1980s; to a set of loose networks of diverse 
organizations and inter-organizational networks in the 1990s; and, f inally, to 
a highly decentralized f ield within which a huge number of social networks, 
communities and individuals communicate and interact.
Until the 1970s, progressive religious groups, student movements, demo-
cratic dissidents and the labour movements were still poorly organized 
and the connection between the groups was not solid. After the military 
massacre of 1980, the democratization movements considerably reinforced 
their organizational capacity and a nationwide structure of solidarity. 
After the end of dictatorship, the f ield of social movements has become 
diversif ied in terms of ideology, goals, and issues. From the early 2000s, 
individual citizens, non-movement communities and social networks gained 
great importance in the rise, spread and success of contentious actions. 
These recent changes drastically increased the complexity of the movement 
ecology and reduced the predictability and strategic manageability of the 
progress of mobilization.
Finally, the third trend is a change in the way social movements and 
protest actions affect institutional politics. South Korean citizens could 
move politics and society: (1) until the 1970s, by a strongly moralized act of 
cultural elites testifying the repressed ‘truth,’ e.g. democracy, equality, or 
human dignity; (2) then, by disruptive actions of radical activists of the 1980s 
to attract the attention of the public and to impose political burden over the 
dictators; (3) after the introduction of democracy in 1987, by disputes, negotia-
tions and cooperation of the civil society organizations with the institutional 
sectors like the government, politicians, media and the court; and, f inally, 
(4) after the considerable expansion of citizenship under democracy during 
the 1990s and 2000s, by means of massive self-mobilization of individual 
citizens and their power of influencing public opinion and, thereby, putting 
substantial political pressure on the government and political parties.
The most recent changes in South Korea may be interpreted, to borrow from 
Reinhard Bendix (1977), as a premature decline of ‘functional representation’ 
and the rapid rise of political dynamics based on ‘plebiscitarian principle,’ 
in which the state and individuals face each other without allowing the 
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intervention of the institutionalized intermediary channels. This specif ic 
configuration generates a particular ambiguity in the meaning of recent 
upsurges in ‘people power.’ During the decades of authoritarian rule, South 
Koreans did not have the opportunity of expanding their citizenship. The end of 
dictatorship in 1987 could have brought substantial change in this respect, but 
while the rights of individuals have been improved gradually, organized civil 
society remained extremely underdeveloped for various reasons that cannot 
be discussed further here. Under such historical conditions, Korean citizens 
in the twenty-first century have created a unique methodology of quickly 
collectivizing themselves without the hard work of organization and instantly 
influencing powerful actors without changing the deeper power structure.
The recent development of South Korean social movements – the 
expansion of the participants, the decentralization of the f ield and the 
increasing power of spontaneous protests – suggests both new democratic 
potentials and the persistence of old problems. Therefore, we may be able to 
expect a sustainable progress towards the social ideals that can be justif ied 
normatively only by deliberately dealing with such ambivalence.
I will conclude this chapter by briefly mentioning the implications that 
the transformations of South Korean civil society and social movements 
described here have had for the broader relationships between the state 
and civil society in the nation – although a detailed discussion on this issue 
goes well beyond the goals and scope of this chapter.
As mentioned in the introduction, autonomous actors of South Korean 
civil society have developed their organizations, collective identities and 
political consciousness in the process of resistance to the authoritarian 
state. Therefore, scholars have characterized the state-society relationship in 
South Korea until the late 1980s by conceptual schemes such as ‘strong state 
versus contentious civil society’ or ‘strong state versus strong civil society’ 
(Koo 1993; Oh 2012). Actually, it seems clear that South Korea’s state-society 
relationship did not take the form of ‘strong societies, weak states’ (Migdal 
1988), which was characteristic of many developing countries. However, we 
need to recognize the relationship between the state and civil society in 
Korea on the basis of a more differentiated conceptualization about what 
‘strengths’ and ‘weaknesses’ of the state and civil society mean.
The literature on the power of the state over society has illuminated 
the diverse aspects of state capacity, including coercive, administrative, 
legislative and extractive capacities and the capability of collaborating 
with societal actors to implement public goals (Evans et al. 1985; Hall 1986; 
Mann 1993; Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1990). During the period of dictatorship, the 
South Korean state certainly had a powerful coercive capacity, but that was 
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not the whole story. During this period, not only has the administrative 
capacity of the South Korea government greatly expanded, but also the 
relationship between the state bureaucracy and the fast-growing economy 
has become closer. South Korea’s authoritarian-developmental state had 
strong transformative capacities to implement its growth-oriented national 
goals (Evans 1995; Johnson 1982, 1999; Wiess 1998).
On the other hand, due to the suppression of democracy, the legislative and 
democratic regulatory capacity of political parties and the state bureaucracy 
remained extremely low, while the growth-centred state has enhanced its 
taxation capacity, which is one of the most important preconditions for the 
redistributive function of the modern state, only to a limited extent. In that 
sense, South Korea’s state has long been strong in some respects but weak 
in others. To borrow from the well-known conceptual pairs elaborated by 
Michael Mann (1988, 1993), it was not just a ‘despotic’ state, but had many 
limitations in developing the ‘infrastructural’ capacities to penetrate into 
society in a collaborative relationship with society.
Civil society actors in South Korea, who have confronted a state that 
possessed powerful coercive and administrative capacities but lacked demo-
cratic and redistributive capabilities, pursued values such as democracy and 
human rights, economic equality and justice, and reconciliation between 
the two Koreas. They were struggling to realize ‘heterodox’ (Eisenstadt 
1998) projects of social and political development, which were obviously 
antithetical to the authoritarian, growth-oriented and anti-North Korean 
orientation of the political centre. Furthermore, they continued to use 
strategies and action methods that substantially threatened and challenged 
political power. For these reasons, the relationship between the public 
authorities and civil society actors was essentially conflict-ridden throughout 
the whole periods under the authoritarian regime.
Since the 1990s, the relationship between the state and civil society in 
South Korea has undergone qualitative changes in many respects, although 
the legacies of the civil society actors’ distrust of and opposition to the state 
still are vital. Three changes seem to have particular signif icance.
The f irst one is the differentiation and the growing complexity of the 
institutional domains of both the state and civil society. As the structure of 
the state and civil society has become more plural, a complex relationship 
has developed between diverse actors of the state and party politics, on the 
one side, and equally variegated actors in civil society, on the other side. Thus, 
the dichotomy of ‘the state versus civil society’ has been relativized in its 
signif icance. Second, the interplay between institutional politics and social 
movements has brought about both conflict and cooperation. Challengers 
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of social movements still are criticizing governments and political parties 
and urged change, but as the political environment has become more open 
under democratic system, more opportunities have been given to social 
movements to cooperate and negotiate with actors in institutional politics. 
The third change is the increasing interpenetration between the state and 
civil society. On the one hand, civil society leaders, agendas and policy 
proposals are increasingly coming into the administrative and legislative 
institutions of the state. On the other hand, the f ield of civil society tends 
to be divided along the lines of cleavages in the institutional politics. As 
a result, there emerged a complex constellation of conflicts and alliances 
between political and civil society actors having various interests and ideas.
In short, if the relationship between the state and civil society in South 
Korea was clearly oppositional and confrontational during the decades 
from the 1960s to the 1980s, their new relationship during the subsequent 
decades from the 1990s to the 2010s is characterized by increasing complexity 
and contingency. In response to such changes, the South Korean state and 
civil society now have the task of innovating their mutual relationships by 
developing new capacities corresponding to the new environments. The 
South Korean state has to f ind ways of achieving public goals by raising 
administrative eff iciency, strengthening capacities of democratic regula-
tion and institutionalizing the participation of citizens in public issues. 
Meanwhile, civil society actors should not be contented with criticizing the 
government and politicians, but have to make more efforts to create what 
Amitai Etzioni (1968) has called ‘the active society,’ in which citizens are 
aware of the common purpose, are committed to activities for actualizing 
those purposes and potent in their capacity to create and maintain such 
a social order. The question of how to fulf il these demanding tasks will 
continue to be of importance in South Korea in the future.
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11 Opening up the Welfare State to 
‘Outsiders’
Pro-Homeless Activism and Neoliberal Backlashes in Japan
Mahito Hayashi
Abstract
This chapter examines local/national trajectories of social movements for 
homeless people, arguing that ‘pro-homeless’ activism has fundamentally 
improved the Japanese welfare state. State-led high growth historically 
allocated resources favouring capitalist expansion, not people’s wel-
fare. This tendency hit the homeless the most. In turn, this has given 
pro-homeless activism signif icant potentials and capacities. Firstly, 
pro-homeless activism has dominantly taken local forms, improving 
welfare provision at welfare off ices. Secondly, in the late 2000s, activism 
won achievements at the national level, by reframing homelessness as a 
national problem. Thirdly, the wholesale inclusion of the homeless/poor 
has evoked their re-marginalization. Today, neoliberal/neoconservative 
forces are advancing anti-poor politics to revoke movements’ prior suc-
cesses, paradoxically testifying to the power of pro-homeless activism in 
developing the welfare state.
Keywords: social movements, social exclusion, neoliberalism, welfare-
workfare transitions, poverty
At the endpoint of the high-growth era and notorious ‘bubble economy,’ in 
the 1990s, Japan entered a new period of socio-economic instability. Over 
these decades, homelessness grew although the quantitative aspect could not 
be compared, for example, to the rise of homelessness in the United States in 
the 1980s when HUD (the Department of Housing and Urban Development) 
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estimated the number of homeless street people at around 300,000 (Rossi 
1989: 37-38). According to off icial counts organized by the Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), homeless people living in Japanese 
public space was below 30,000 at its peak during the early 2000s (MHLW 
2003). This number seems insignif icant even after taking into account 
Japan’s smaller national population. That estimation, however, seriously 
underrates the impact of homelessness in post-high-growth Japan. For 
one thing, homelessness in and after the 1990s radically challenged Japan’s 
well-organized construction of urban public space as well as the nation’s 
homogeneous self-portrait of domestic society as ‘all-one-hundred-million 
middle class’ (ichioku sō chūryū). For another, it sent a palpable sign to many 
that Japan’s state-led development, which had once enjoyed an international 
reputation for equality, was now in crisis. Moreover, homelessness was 
the harbinger and herald of the ‘generalized poverty’ which Japan was to 
experience to the present day.
Yet, there is a completely different angle from which we can assess the im-
pact of homelessness in Japan: that of the social movements for homelessness. 
These movements are what this chapter calls ‘pro-homeless movements,’ 
which grew during and after the 1990s and played a fundamental role in 
changing local and national modes of citizenship. While the core programme 
of Japan’s citizenship for the poor – Public Assistance – took its current 
form in the early 1950s, it was unable to effectively contribute to poverty 
alleviation for the most needy for a long time. The national programme 
rejected those who were most impoverished and in need of public support. 
When the rise of homelessness reminded citizens and political leaders of 
this weakness of the welfare state, pro-homeless activists and volunteers 
stood up and started redressing the exclusive nature of this citizenship. 
Owing to their extreme sensitivity to citizens’ rights, to the ‘fringe politics’ of 
exclusion and inclusion, pro-homeless movements have played a special role 
in contemporary Japan – namely, improving the circumscribed welfare state 
by opening it up to its ‘outsiders.’ By tracing local and national trajectories of 
this ‘opening up,’ this chapter assesses how and to what extent the Japanese 
welfare state overcame its exclusive character between the 1990s and 2010s.
I do not claim that this welfare state lacked any instances of improvement 
before the 1990s. Positive developments took place, for example, in the 
1950s, 1970s and 1990s, when new systems of provision materialized (Calder 
1988; Peng 2005; Shinkawa 2005). By and large, however, even the periods 
of expansion improved only those measures that targeted ‘worthy’ – child-
raising, disadvantaged, and elderly – households; this could be understood 
as a ramif ication of Japan’s productivist welfare regime (Kwon 2005). At 
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any rate, it was in this context of exclusion that pro-homeless activists, 
supersensitive to the unnoticed and unresolved plight of the homeless, 
played key roles in changing the status quo, not only for those without a roof 
or home but for the entire nation. Overall, this chapter’s analysis shows that 
social movements for the homeless became the ‘game changers’ of the welfare 
state in post-high-growth Japan. In what follows, I f irst look at the local 
pro-homeless movements that changed the local conditions of the citizenry 
beginning in the 1990s. I further argue that a new pro-homeless movement 
in the late 2000s played a pivotal role in improving the Japanese welfare 
state nationwide. I reveal that the wholesale inclusion of various (previously 
excluded) impoverished populations in the welfare state provoked a backlash 
politics of neoliberalism and widespread popular discourses on ‘welfare 
dependency.’ I conclude that these neoliberal responses are now necessitating 
that radical activists reposition themselves in the new, unfolding political 
landscape of ‘workfarist regulation’ (Peck 2001).
While this chapter elaborates the central themes of this volume from a 
unique perspective, its discussions are pertinent especially to two chapters. 
Chapter 8 (Chiavacci) considers the inf luence of civil society actors to 
labour immigration policy in Japan. This chapter, focusing similarly on 
social actors working for the population marginal to mainstream society, 
explore national and local spaces in which these social actors can have the 
rule-changing influence on state actors. Chapter 9 (Ogawa) considers the 
contradictory ways in which Japanese non-profit organizations become, at 
once, a tool of neoliberalization and leverage for participatory democracy. 
This chapter resonates with this research interest as it locates Japanese 
social movements in the ongoing dynamism of neoliberalization.
Local and National: Two Spaces of Activism
In Japan, the historical pattern of the Japanese welfare state has conditioned 
homelessness and social movements for the homeless. The state has a pro-
gressive framework of citizenship for the poor (see the next section), yet, 
individuals who were without f ixed addressed, able-bodied, unmarried, and 
male were largely rejected as they were considered employable individuals 
capable of supporting themselves in the labour market. They thus constituted 
the ‘unworthy’ poor categorically located outside of the Japanese welfare 
state, whose receipt of public support was considered to deteriorate their 
work ethic and promote the self-destruction of their ‘able bodies.’ Their 
survival process was located outside of Japan’s ‘welfare through work’ (Miura 
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2012), the enterprise-level system of welfare provision for core labourers. As 
a result, not a few Japanese citizens historically suffered low-wage problems 
and poor living conditions even in boom years (MHL 1962). They also formed 
a body of the ‘working-poor’ population whose existence was elusive (Eguchi 
1979). The important thing is that the exclusion of these poverty-stricken 
labourers and citizens from the Japanese welfare state occurred at the 
local (rather than national) level because the state gave the welfare off ice 
a considerable degree of discretion over everyday decision-making with 
regard to the applicants.
The localization and denationalization that one f inds in the operation of 
citizens’ rights and programmes for the ‘unworthy’ poor were both threats 
and opportunities for the pro-homeless movements. It was problematic 
because the state’s responsibility was obscured and because national-level 
standardization was diff icult. At the same time, however, the localized 
system presented some opportunities within the municipality. Due the 
localized procedure of decision-making, movements could perhaps change 
the trajectory of municipal decisions by influencing them. Activists may 
have been able to change the attitude of rank-and-f ile workers and higher 
administrators in the municipality in such a way that the municipality re-
sponded more positively to the ‘unworthy’ poor by using citizens’ rights and 
programmes for citizenship. The possibility of such local-level improvement 
was dependent on the construction of sound strategies by the movements. 
If deployed appropriately, by reflexively responding to the exclusive ethos 
of the gatekeepers, these tactics proved capable of advancing the inclusion 
of the homeless within the municipality concerned.
This might sound hypothetical. However, real improvements did transpire. 
Local conditions for homeless citizens really have been improved through the 
cumulative actions of pro-homeless activists vis-à-vis the welfare off ice and 
other sections in the municipality (e.g. Yamasaki et al. 2006). Nonetheless, 
this approach did encounter problems, such as non-standardization and 
uncertainty. Supporters and the homeless could hardly expect a more 
desirable, nationally standardized situation in which every needy individual 
would receive national benefits across Japan no matter where they lived and 
how they approached the welfare off ice. Hypothetically, one way exists to 
overcome the limits of the locality: nationalization. Activism might construct 
national spaces and strategies, in such a way as to make national (not local) 
organs attentive to the plight of the homeless. Such nationalization remained 
a hypothetical possibility for quite a long time, but a new pro-homeless 
movement came into being in the late 2000s and effectively nationalized 
citizenship politics for the homeless and other poverty-stricken labourers 
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and citizens. At the same time, this nationalization had an unexpected 
corollary as it also nationalized adversarial forces that disagreed with 
benevolent inclusion. Today, movements have to justify their progressive 
causes more reflexively at the national level vis-à-vis the ongoing backlash 
politics and the lay audience.
What Is Good about the Japanese Welfare State? Benign Laws as a 
‘Hope’
The ungenerous character of the Japanese welfare state is widely acknowl-
edged (Esping-Andersen 1989, 1997; Estevez-Abe 2008). How could activists 
make this welfare state attentive to the ‘unworthy’ poor locally and nation-
ally? Answering this question demands a closer look at the legal system. 
The best part of the Japanese welfare state resides in the way it benevolently 
legalizes ‘livelihood rights’ (seizon ken) as the sacred rights of all citizens, 
regardless of their prior contributions and social attributes. The constitution 
establishes the livelihood rights in a rigorous universal manner by declaring: 
‘All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of 
wholesome and cultured living’ (art. 25). To realize these livelihood rights, the 
Public Assistance Act of 1950 constructs the framework of Public Assistance, 
saying: ‘The minimum standard of living guaranteed by this Act shall be 
where a person is able to maintain a wholesome and cultured standard of 
living’ (art. 3). Essential benefit programmes in Public Assistance – income, 
medical and housing benefit – are expected to serve as practical tools to 
maintain the livelihood rights of all citizens. Even more, the act has clauses 
that facilitate the flexible mobilization of Public Assistance, enumerating 
unique problems unhoused individuals can have (arts 4, 10, 38).
This highly benevolent legal conception of livelihood rights becomes a 
weapon for activists when they ask local/national authorities to include 
the homeless in the rights to national citizenship. Realistically speaking, 
there are obstacles. Most obstructing, court cases such as Asahi vs Horiki 
(1967) have powerfully established that the benevolent clauses of liveli-
hood rights merely set an ‘effort target’ – not a real goal – for the Japanese 
welfare state.1 Judgements like this one served as powerful excuses for the 
local authority to exclude the poor from Public Assistance even when they 
1 In this court case, the Supreme Court declared that ‘Article 25 of the Constitution declares 
[livelihood rights] only as the liability of the state and it is no intended to provide each Japa-
nese citizen with rights in a concrete sense.’ The irrationality of this judgement in light of the 
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suffered homelessness, suggesting that the benef its would only promote 
their self-destruction and a weakened work ethic. Despite such conservative 
and patronizing interpretations, however, the benevolent livelihood clauses 
could be construed in a more inclusive and universal manner if one only 
reads them straightforwardly. This possibility has inspired local and national 
activists to allow the authorities to maintain the livelihood rights of the 
homeless. I do not say that the ‘gatekeepers’ of livelihood rights – local and 
national authorities – automatically opened up the welfare state upon 
request. To begin with, such instances of relaxation were rare. Whenever 
and wherever they took place, innovative, thoughtful and painstaking 
processes of activism lay behind the local and national authorities’ acts 
of ‘benevolent’ inclusion. The following analysis takes instances from the 
Tokyo-Yokohama metropolitan region; the next section explains its key 
geographical and historical attributes.
Field Setting
The central area of the Tokyo-Yokohama region is the focus of this chapter. 
This geographical area is worth illuminating for two good reasons. First, it 
has major urban enclaves (yoseba) populated by precarious day labourers 
and the homeless, and these inner-city enclaves have nurtured pro-homeless 
movements within Japan’s burgeoning cities. The enclaves of yoseba in 
the Tokyo-Yokohama area – San’ya (in Tokyo Metropolis) and Kotobuki 
(in Kanagawa Prefecture) – have accommodated homelessness-prone day 
labourers. Living in yoseba, day labourers found affordable hotels and casual 
labour markets opening on/off the streets. As such, yoseba was the space for 
day labourers, whose less-skilled workforce was vitally needed by Japan’s 
unfolding industrialization, at docks, in construction sites, on manufacturing 
lines, etc. As day labourers suffered economically unstable conditions, they 
underwent episodic homelessness, triggering local homeless movements 
even before the 1990s (Aoki 1989; Hayashi 2014a). In and after the 1990s, 
many of them run into homelessness on a chronic basis. In this historical 
context, the inner-city areas of yoseba have strengthened their character 
as the strongholds of pro-homeless movements.
While the existence of yoseba, and its history of internalizing ‘safe spaces’ 
(Tilly 2000) for pro-homeless activism, offers the f irst rationale for my 
Constitution has evoked waves of pro-poor litigations but they have not seen a major withdrawal 
of this declaration in the court sector.
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geographical selection in this chapter, the second justif ication comes from 
the rise of pro-homeless movements outside of the inner-city districts of 
yoseba. Tokyo Metropolis and Kanagawa Prefecture both came to host 
pro-homeless movements beyond the urban enclaves of yoseba (for the case 
of Tokyo, see Hasegawa 2006). In Tokyo Metropolis, several pro-homeless 
groups – such as Sinjuku Renrakukai (in Shinjuku Ward) and Nojiren (in 
Shibuya Ward) – started work during the 1990s in Tokyo’s major central 
business district, and these groups were followed by a further proliferation of 
new pro-homeless groups in the run-up to the 2010s. In Kanagawa Prefecture, 
social movements for the homeless also spread to the spaces outside of the 
traditional enclaves of yoseba in the 1990s and 2000s. The next two sections 
take up cases from the Tokyo-Yokohama region for these reasons.
Opening up the Welfare State Locally: Social Movements in 
Kanagawa in the 1990s and 2000s
Pro-homeless Activism in Yokohama
During the 1990s, homelessness grew in and outside of the inner-city districts 
called yoseba, which exist in every metropolitan region in Japan. In the 
small area, yoseba accumulates various functions needed for the life of 
day labourers – functions of the labour market, accommodation, dining, 
socialization, etc. – and it became the hotbed of homelessness that visited 
day labourers in the 1990s and 2000s. At the same time, yoseba became the 
hotbed of pro-homeless activism. Old and new participants stood up for the 
plights of homelessness-prone day labourers and promoted local waves of 
activism. As such, yoseba in metropolitan regions turned into the stronghold 
of social movements for the homeless (for the case of Tokyo Metropolis, see 
Hasegawa 2006). This chapter shall take a case of yoseba activism from the 
Kotobuki district, which is situated in the city of Yokohama.
In many cities, social movements for the homeless in these formative 
years concentrated on agitating against anti-homeless evictions, for one 
thing, and on providing food and medical services to the homeless, for 
another. While these issues gained importance in the Kotobuki district – 
Yokohama’s inner-city area of yoseba – the city’s uniqueness was that the 
issues of livelihood rights and Public Assistance were recognized as hugely 
important by local activists from the beginning. While this focus on the 
‘social rights’ of homeless people would later become widespread in other 
cities, Yohoama’s pro-homeless activism and its offshoots in Kanagawa 
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Prefecture were the forerunners of this movement strategy: opening up 
the welfare state to the homeless locally.
One reason why activists in Kotobuki were so able to pronounce the 
politics of homelessness in terms of social security can be found in the local 
history. In the 1970s, activism attempted by the Kotobuki Day Labourers 
Union repeatedly asked the municipality to maintain the livelihood rights 
of homelessness-prone labourers, causing the municipality to produce a 
local framework of provision (Nomoto 1977). When homelessness grew in 
the 1990s, new and old activists stood up for the homeless by relying on this 
local history of activism back in the 1970s, thereby reactivating the old focus 
on citizenship issues in the new context.
In promoting the livelihood rights of the homeless, two courses of actions 
existed for local activists. On the one hand, they could push the municipality 
to offer a local framework of relief. That was a real possibility in the city 
of Yokohama because this particular city, as I have just mentioned, had a 
history of creating and using the local system of relief for homelessness-prone 
day labourers. Back in the 1970s, Yokohama’s inner-city district hosted an 
indigenous form of day labourer activism, which pressed the local authorities 
regarding the rights of day labourers through negotiations as well as more 
physical measures. The municipality itself was led in the 1960s and 1970s 
by the progressive mayor Ichio Asukata. Despite having Socialist Party 
credentials, he failed to curtail the harsh methods of the police. However, 
he did involve the movements in local governing processes. In the light of 
the historical experience, activists in the 1990s expected a certain degree of 
continuity in the regulations to take place, making local policy somewhat 
more responsive to the needs of the homeless. On the other hand, the move-
ments located in this local context could perhaps ask the municipality for 
something more than to rely on local relief: namely, the maintenance of 
the livelihood rights of homeless people by extending Public Assistance 
to them. If one reads the Constitution and the Public Assistance Act of 
1950 literally, one can draw the conclusion that Public Assistance can (and 
should) be offered to the homeless. Practically speaking, however, asking 
the city to mobilize the Public Assistance programme for the homeless was 
an unusual idea since even the city of Yokohama had rejected that claim 
before the 1990s.
Located in this local history, movement participants in the Kotobuki 
district during the 1990s chose to pursue pro-homeless activism in both 
of these directions. Regarding the former direction – the reactivation of 
Yokohama’s local relief system – the movement demanded the city implement 
the eff icient use of hotel and food tickets. Around 1991, the municipality 
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had started mobilizing this local relief system to benefit the homeless. The 
problem was that the local relief system remained ineffective. The number 
of affordable hotels that could accommodate the homeless was limited, and 
the total number of hotel and food tickets issued by the municipality were 
also insuff icient. The movement questioned the municipality about these 
problems. For that purpose, activists visited the welfare off ice on weekdays 
to monitor the municipality’s operation of the local relief system. Activists 
also visited the welfare off ice to count the number of tickets being issued 
in order to ensure the city was allocating an adequate number. Further, 
the movement had discussions with municipal workers and demanded a 
better provision of hotel and food tickets. Figure 11.1 indicates the result: the 
numbers of hotel and food tickets issued per month skyrocketed in the 1990s.
To tell the truth, the movement’s request for local relief faced a dilemma 
as a pro-homeless strategy: the request for local relief could serve to reduce 
the access of homeless people to the national programme of Public As-
sistance and the higher living standards that this programme could achieve. 
In this context, the request for local relief could constitute an admission 
that homeless people could be dissociated from Public Assistance. Local 
relief could be a rationale for the city’s not using it. Extending this national 
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programme to the homeless demanded more time-consuming and costly 
work on the part of city off icials. In order to solve this dilemma, in 1994, 
Kotobuki’s homeless movement launched a new initiative, one designed 
to encourage the city of Yokohama to mobilize the national framework 
of Public Assistance for homelessness as well as to provide local relief. At 
the beginning, activists repeatedly held study meetings to understand the 
possibilities of this strategy, and they confirmed that the legal framework 
of Public Assistance had substantial capacity to help the homeless. In 1994, 
activists in the Kotobuki district formed a new body entitled the Group for 
Winning Livelihood Rights (Seizon Ken Wo Kachitoru Kai), a collective that 
dealt with the specif ic issue of Public Assistance.
At this point, I shall settle a question readers might have: Why was 
activism in Yokohama focused on welfare-providing issues and seemingly 
neglectful of its root causes, such as the labour market and wage relations, 
from which labourers’ homelessness issued? In point of fact, homeless 
activism in Kanagawa Prefecture repeatedly asked the municipality, and 
even the national state, to ameliorate unemployment and homelessness 
by providing public work, so their original claim addressed the ‘point of 
consumption’ and the ‘point of production’ (see Hayashi 2014a). However, 
the latter part of their claim was rejected by the authorities. In the interests 
of space, I largely exclude this discussion from this chapter. For the same 
reason, I have also omitted my discussion of politics for public space and 
how activists opened up parks and streets for the homeless (see Hayashi 2013, 
2018). It is suff icient for this chapter to say that the original construction of 
pro-homeless movements was multifaceted.
To come back to the Group for Winning Livelihood Rights, activists 
gathered in this coalition had meetings with municipal workers, in order to 
improve the issue of Public Assistance for the homeless. In particular, there 
were three big meetings between representatives of the movement and of 
the municipality in 1994. In summer 1994, one of these meetings mobilized 
150 activists and homeless individuals against the health bureau of the city. 
On that occasion, the movement vocally demanded the non-discriminatory 
application of Public Assistance for any homeless individuals who wanted 
it. The municipality declined this inclusive idea, concerned that it would 
only deteriorate their work ethic and promote their self-destruction – a 
rationale that has been used historically when excluding the homeless.
Turning down the full inclusion, however, the municipality made a key 
change in the local operation of the Public Assistance programme. The city 
of Yokohama decided to help (what one would see as) the most vulnerable 
elements of the homeless community – that is, those over 65 years old, 
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the sick and the injured – by using the framework of Public Assistance. 
This meant that the neediest sections of the homeless population were 
enabled to live, with the help of Public Assistance, in small individual 
hotel rooms in the Kotobuki district, eat decent food, receive proper 
medical treatments and buy other services. Such living conditions for 
the homeless would become possible only through the programme of 
Public Assistance. A core activist recalls how signif icant this change was 
(Interview Kondō 2006):
We let them [the city of Yokohama] say, ‘The city accepts the application 
[of Public Assistance] even if applicants have no addressed.’ That was 
decisive. And it has led to our style [of rescuing the homeless]. […] So, 
our movement bore signif icant fruit.
In short, Kotobuki’s pro-homeless activists managed to expand the scope of 
the welfare state at the local level. On the one hand, they improved the local 
relief system for the homeless. On the other hand, the same activists made 
some parts of the local homeless population eligible for the programme of 
Public Assistance. This two-fold improvement at the local level meant that 
the historical limitedness of the Japanese welfare state was partially – but 
signif icantly – overcome for the homeless in the city of Yokohama. As 
other cities in the 1990s were still rejecting the right of homeless people to 
access welfare programmes, it represents a signif icant success on the part 
of pro-homeless activism in Yokohama.
Spreading Activism to New Cities
In this new section, I shall show that a similar type of pro-homeless move-
ment – that is, movements that were supersensitive to the citizenship condi-
tions of homeless people – subsequently spread to new cities in Kanagawa 
Prefecture. On this subject, the f irst thing to be mentioned is the increase 
in movement groups working in new cities outside of Yokohama. In 2001, 
ten cities in Kanagawa Prefecture (out of 33) came to have pro-homeless 
groups while the number was two in 1993. This increase suggests a higher 
capacity of pro-homeless activism in this prefecture generally. All the new 
groups (except one) had direct connections with activists in Yokohama’s 
Kotobuki district at the time of their emergence, and they were the offspring 
of Yokohama’s pro-homeless activism. Spreading pro-homeless movements 
to the new cities could not happen automatically. It took place by putting 
into practice a combination of the following two strategies:
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1 Stretching ‘old’ resources. Faced with a general scarcity of resources, 
movements in new cities tried to mobilize resources held in the Kotobuki 
district. People in Kotobuki flew to new cities with food and blankets 
in order to support local homeless individuals there. This stretching 
strategy functioned typically for the nearby areas of Yokohama (such 
as Yokosuka and Kamakura).
2 Cultivating ‘new’ resources. Especially when activists succeeded in 
cooperating with local Christian churches – which are signif icant 
contributors to homeless movements in Japan – they enjoyed a develop-
ment of new local resources. By 2001, activism in Fujisawa, Odawara, 
Chigasaki, Atsugi and Hiratsuka garnered signif icant support from 
local churches. In these cities, activists found new comrades, f inancial 
bases and various goods.
Through these activist scheme, essential resources and strategies of activ-
ism became available in new cities. On that basis, new groups engaged in 
the provision of food, blankets, clothes and information for the homeless. 
Even further, activist groups in new cities tried to reuse the political strategy 
attempted in the Kotobuki district: asking the municipality to unlock the 
welfare state locally. For this purpose, they sought to establish new channels of 
communication with policymakers and rank-and-file officials in the new cities.
Having discussions with the municipality was not a big problem. The 
real diff iculty arose when the movements requested policy changes. As 
cities outside of Yokohama were smaller in size, their f inancial basis was 
more limited. Further, homelessness was often a new phenomenon in these 
cities and local authorities did not have much experience in helping the 
homeless. In this context, one focus of movement groups became the national 
programme of Public Assistance. When the new cities reported that they 
did not have a great deal of capacity to create a local relief programme for 
the homeless, the same cities could not f ind any good excuse to deny the 
homeless Public Assistance. In the case of Yokohama, the city’s willingness 
and ability to create a local relief system was one reason not to allow all the 
homeless to rely on Public Assistance. Apparently, new cities could not use 
this excuse when excluding the homeless from Public Assistance.
With this in mind, activists held repeated discussions with local au-
thorities to extend the citizenship programme of Public Assistance to the 
homeless. Let us take the instance of the city of Hiratsuka, lying in the 
southern area of Kanagawa Prefecture. In this city, activists formed a local 
movement group – the Hiratsuka Patrol – in 2001, initially, by stretching 
Kotobuki’s resources and staff and, later, by constructing its own resource 
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basis at the local church (the Hiratsuka Baptist church). As soon as they 
started homeless provision, they sought the possibility of getting the city to 
activate Public Assistance for the homeless. To this end, they had frequent 
meetings with local policymakers, in order to convince them that this 
municipality had a real capacity to help the homeless by means of Public 
Assistance.
Even though activists succeeded in convincing municipal workers of the 
validity of their legal interpretation, the problem existed that municipal 
workers had no practical knowledge about how to support the homeless by 
f inding a room to rent and assisting them to reconstruct their life on that 
basis. It seemed very diff icult for municipal workers to help each rough 
sleeper to the point where he/she became able to build a stable basis for life 
off the streets, primarily because supportive houses for the homeless did 
not exist at that time. Yet, the movement in Hiratsuka partially overcame 
this problem by f inding several municipal workers who cherished the pro-
homeless spirit of activism. A core movement participant in Hiratsuka 
recollects the positive change that took place in the municipality (Interview 
Yura 2006):
Figure 11.2  A meeting between Hiratsuka’s activists and the then Mayor Ritsuko 
Ōkura (seen at the back)
Source: Author’s photograph
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The thing was that a municipal worker in the leading position [at the 
welfare off ice] changed. Sasaki-san was replaced by Ōhara-san. And 
then he started working on the issues of homelessness himself. […] He 
went to homeless people when they became interested in applying [for 
Public Assistance].
As this case of Hiratsuka shows, the mobilization of Public Assistance was 
actualized in the new cities through the efforts of the movements and 
movement-municipality relationships. Furthermore, movement groups 
sought discussions with hospitals, the police and supportive houses run 
by private agents. All in all, movements wanted to convince these private 
service providers that they could provide reliable and friendly support to 
maintain the citizenship rights of homeless people. The general outcome 
of these progressive attempts was the opening up of the local welfare state 
to the homeless.
It should be noted that new pro-homeless activism outside of Yokohama 
internalized structural problems. Smaller cities outside of Yokohama en-
countered more obstacles regarding welfare and service provision due to 
budgetary constraints, manpower shortages and inexperience. In the city 
of Hiratsuka, the provision of Public Assistance to the homeless became 
limited even after the intervention of the movement, as some extremely 
homeless-friendly workers at Hiratsuka’s welfare off ice were transferred 
from the welfare off ice to different branches in the municipality. In Japan, 
the welfare office’s decisions on the applications for Public Assistance largely 
depend on the character of its staff and administrators. In this context, this 
personnel change posed a problem to the movement. Activists thought 
that this change was to restrain – if not abandon – the provision of Public 
Assistance to the homeless. Despite having such limits at the local level, 
homeless movements working in the new cities succeeded in ameliorating 
the long-lived inadequacy of the Japanese welfare state for the homeless.
Opening up the Welfare State Nationally: The Pro-homeless 
Movement in Tokyo in the Late 2000s
New Contexts of the 2000s
We have seen that social movements for the homeless have improved 
the welfare state locally. However, problems remained because the local 
promotion of the citizenship rights of homeless people can, without the 
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transformation of the Japanese welfare state per se, become uncertain at 
any time. In the late 2000s, a new pro-homeless movement appeared in 
Japan and triggered national-level changes to the Japanese welfare state. 
This movement facilitated the national bureaucracy’s promulgation of 
progressive administrative codes of Public Assistance for the homeless. This 
section unpacks how and under what conditions this movement achieved 
transformation on the national scale.
Let us look at some general facts. During this period, Japan saw increasing 
numbers of citizens other than the impoverished segment of day labourers 
face the risk of becoming homeless. This civic awareness notably rose in 
2008 when the world f inancial crisis hit Japan. At this critical time, export-
oriented f irms suffered the loss of overseas demand, and they announced 
plans to stop using unskilled dispatched workers. Dispatched workers, 
called ‘temp workers’ in English, are referred to as ‘haken’ (the dispatched) 
in Japanese. Throughout the 2000s, the high availability of temp workers, 
itself a creation of prior neoliberal legal changes, greatly helped Japanese 
capitalism to reduce its wage costs and re-establish its global competitive-
ness. In the global f inancial crisis of the late 2000s, the increased number 
of temp workers became superfluous, and f irms cruelly rejected them from 
the shop floor.
Conditions of temp workers were not identical with the homeless. None-
theless, from the beginning, their character – especially that of unskilled 
blue-collar workers working in the manufacturing industry – was not very 
far from homelessness-prone day labourers: they were low-waged and 
mobile workers suffering severe scarcity in social capital. Furthermore, 
temp workers are the f irst type of labourers to experience dismissals in 
downturns. In the crisis of the late 2000s, these unfavourable conditions 
worsened, and the homelessness of temp workers became a real threat. I 
f ind in this process a sea change regarding the form of homelessness in 
Japan. In the 1990s, homelessness became a major phenomenon, but it 
was primarily limited to disadvantaged day labourers. In and after 2007, 
the dismissal of temp workers and their near-homeless condition started 
alarming general citizens – homelessness now seemed to be engulf ing the 
core of Japanese society.
The Movement in Tokyo and Its National Impacts
The empirical subject of this section is a successful case of pro-homeless ac-
tivism that emerged in this national context of economic and societal crisis, 
which Japan entered around the late 2000s. Located within this context, 
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a new movement used Japan’s critical moment as a timely opportunity 
to nationalize pro-homeless causes and to advocate for the inclusion of 
homeless people in the welfare state. While the previous section’s move-
ment strategy was a local one that addressed citizenship at the level of the 
municipality in Kanagawa Prefecture, the new movement in this section 
tried to change (and succeeded in changing) the national understanding 
of citizenship entitlements. And, really, it became the hallmark of this 
nationalization movement. This national construction of activism learned 
much from the past successful/unsuccessful experiences of local movements; 
therefore, it should not be seen as a leap unrelated to past development. 
Rather, nationalizing attempts in the late 2000s became possible through 
the cumulative impact of local pro-homeless activism. Hence, the key point: 
local movements were the prehistory of the nationalizing movement.
At the heart of this nationalization was an encampment event in To-
kyo that took place during the winter of 2008/2009, an event called the 
Overwintering Village of Temp Workers (Toshikoshi Haken Mura). The 
concept was to attract temp workers who had been dismissed from their 
jobs (and thereby lost the basic means of survival) as a result of the global 
f inancial crisis to Tokyo’s Hibiya Park. The location of the park is very close 
to nationally important buildings such as the Diet, the Supreme Court, the 
Imperial Palace, the headquarters of national ministries, etc. In Hibiya Park, 
the movement planned to pitch tents, maintain soup kitchens and open 
windows of consultation for employment and livelihood problems, all of 
which were intended to accommodate and support the dismissed temp 
workers for the period between late December and early January. From the 
outset, the leaders had the clear intention of drawing the public’s attention 
to this event. The geography of Hibiya Park, which is close to the ‘centre’ of 
national politics, was consciously selected for that purpose.2
The idea of the public encampment f irst emerged in November 2008 
when the mass media reported that approximately 400,000 temp workers 
were likely to be dismissed by March 2009 due to the impact of the global 
f inancial crisis (AS 2008). Concerning the poverty-prone character of temp 
workers, Tokyo’s activists reached the conclusion that the dismissed temp 
workers would become homeless and thus needed special support. Because 
2 Miura (2012) mentions this major social movement as a movement for non-regular workers 
and argues it had an impact as such. I further argue that it had a decisive impact on Japan’s 
national discourses and legal frameworks because the leaders framed their claims as those for 
homelessness-prone and actually homeless workers. In other words, its strength was derived 
from its strategic identif ication with the ‘outsiders’ of the Japanese welfare state (see also Hayashi 
2014b).
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the temp workers most affected by the crisis and dismissals were expected 
to be those mobile blue-collar workers working in factories and plants 
and living in their dormitories, the danger was imminent that the loss of 
employment would directly lead to the loss of housing – to homelessness. 
Union activists and legal specialists quickly arranged a plan to provide 
accommodation and other services for dismissed temp workers. At this 
point, they incorporated a key f igure into the circle, Makoto Yuasa, in order 
to materialize the encampment plan.
After graduating from the University of Tokyo, Yuasa participated in 
a famous pro-homeless group (Nojiren) in Tokyo’s Shibuya Ward and is 
considered to have much experience in pro-homeless events. The inclusion 
of Yuasa in the movement was initially to receive some special assistance 
in engineering the encampment event. However, the involvement of Yuasa 
meant more than this to the movement. By the late 2000s, Yuasa was al-
ready an intellectual well known in leftist circles for his celebrated book 
Han hinkon (Anti-poverty, 2008). With ample knowledge of pro-homeless 
movements in the past, Yuasa soon began reconsidering the whole plan 
(Nakajima et al. 2018). When the event started, it was clear to everyone 
that this charismatic f igure was leading it. What is more, he was seeing the 
transformation of the circumscribed Japanese welfare state as a real chance, 
f inding in Hibiya Park the capacity to become a vortex of national-scale 
transformation (THMJI 2009: 16, 22).
On 29 December 2008, in front of volunteers and homeless individuals 
gathering in Hibiya Park, Yuasa – now a formal leader of the encampment 
event – made an opening speech for the tent village, which formally lasted 
until 5 January 2009. To understand the strong appeal that this event held 
for the broader audience, I need to reemphasize the conjuncture. First and 
foremost, the global f inancial crisis was engulf ing the Japanese economy 
and frightening the Japanese. Dismissed temp workers had already been 
designated as the victims of this ongoing crisis by the media. The geography 
of Hibiya Park attracted the attention of citizens and political leaders and 
made them aware that the issue of temp workers was turning into the 
issue of homelessness under the ongoing crisis. On top of everything, the 
award-winning orator graduated from an elite university was now offering 
the ‘legitimate’ interpretation of the crisis.
The confluence of these various contexts in the middle of Tokyo helped 
the tent village event to enjoy a real resonance with a wider audience beyond 
the narrow circles of the left-wing public. TV shows repeatedly covered the 
event, running on the air heart-breaking personal experiences of being 
unemployed, impoverished and homeless. These stories heightened the 
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public image of the unemployed workers as a homogeneous group of ‘victims’ 
(Jinbo 2009). Responding to this broad media coverage, as many as 1,692 
volunteers gathered at Hibiya Park to help the homeless (Utsunomiya and 
Yuasa 2009). Moreover, well-known members of the national Diet – including 
Kan Naoto, who would later be appointed as Prime Minister – visited the 
tent village and expressed their solidarity with the general cause of the 
event as well as with the 505 homeless labourers gathered in the village 
(Utsunomiya and Yuasa 2009).
Of particular importance is the activists’ relationships with the ministry. 
Yuasa and others embarked on innovative trials to exploit the channels of 
communication with the MHLW. The MHLW administers welfare policy 
and Public Assistance and – while movements in Kanagawa Prefecture 
tried to change the local authority – Tokyo’s movement sought to change 
the national authority, in order to open up the Japanese welfare state to the 
homeless. Owing to the high level of support the movement received from 
the media and the public, and thanks to its cunning use of intellectual and 
symbolic resources, the venture succeeded.
First, the movement demanded that the MHLW let the homeless use its 
auditorium as a shelter, and the MHLW accepted this demand on 2 Janu-
ary 2009 (Utsunomiya and Yuasa 2009: 141). Second, also in response to 
activists, on 4 January 2009 the MHLW opened four more temporary shelters 
to accommodate homeless individuals, whose increasing number was now 
overflowing Hibiya Park (THMJI 2009; Utsunomiya and Yuasa 2009). Third, in 
March 2009, the MHLW made a delayed response to the movement by calling 
for the local welfare off ice to positively consider the application of homeless 
people for Public Assistance (MHLW 2009b). Finally, in December 2009, the 
MHLW handed a stronger version of circulation to local welfare off ices for 
the same purpose, thus further strengthening the access of homeless people 
to Public Assistance all over Japan (MHLW 2009a).
The Rise and Fall of Citizenship: Neoliberal Backlashes in the 
2010s
Neoliberal Backlashes against Universal Citizenship
The upshot is that Tokyo’s pro-homeless movement cunningly grasped the 
crisis-riven situation of the late 2000s and turned this conjuncture into 
the opportune moment of transformation. It became possible through 
the mobilization of geographical, symbolic and intellectual resources to 
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nationalize a pro-homeless campaign. After the public encampment event in 
winter 2008/2009, and after the MHLW promulgated the new administrative 
guidance of Public Assistance in 2009, Japan saw a real increase in Public 
Assistance recipients among those populations who had previously been 
rejected. A new pro-homeless movement, which clamoured for the rights 
of the homeless, led the Japanese welfare state to incorporate its ‘outsiders.’
Figure 11.3 suggests how quickly this inclusion happened as it shows the 
long-term trend of Public Assistance recipients for different household 
types. Readers can see that the category of ‘other households’ (sonota setai) 
quickly increased after 2008. This category refers to those who had previ-
ously been excluded from the Japanese welfare state: those without f ixed 
address, the able-bodied and the unmarried male populations. For this very 
reason, government statistics refer to them as a vague group of the unworthy 
‘other.’ By contrast, the ‘elderly,’ ‘mother and child,’ and ‘disadvantaged/
sick/injured’ households were distinctly mentioned. This suggests that 
the state considered them to be the ‘worthy’ recipients. The fact that the 
other category grew after 2008 was the result of the MHLW’s new legal 
interpretations, which pushed each municipality and local administrator 
to mobilize Public Assistance even for the homeless. As I have shown, that 
was the real political outcome of Tokyo’s pro-homeless movement.




























ELDERLY MOTHER-AND-CHILD HANDICAPPED/SHICK/INSURY OTHER
Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (http://www.ipss.go.jp/s-
info/j/seiho/seihoh28/h28-3.xlsx, 3 february 2018)
288  MAhITO hAyAShI 
In contemporary Japan, however, this quick incorporation of the ‘unwor-
thy’ poor into the national welfare programme has been evoking serious 
concerns on the part of bureaucrats, politicians, intellectuals and citizens. An 
MHLW bureaucrat concerns the increasing rolls of ‘other households,’ saying: 
‘Among the households of the “elderly,” “mother and child,” “disadvantaged/
sick/injured,” and “other” […] we f ind an especially signif icant growth in 
“other households”’ (CAO 2012). Politicians, intellectuals and the mass 
media shared this recognition and sometimes express sharp antipathy 
and animosity towards the poor on the rolls (e.g. Ikeda 2009; Takenaka et 
al. 2011; Katayama 2012; NHK News Crew 2012). The message was simple 
enough: there is now an increased population of ‘welfare dependency’ and 
we have to deal with it very carefully, in order not to further increase this 
population. Various conservative/neoliberal f igures, who normally ‘lived’ 
in different camps, were lined up to persuade the nation of their underlying 
philosophy: let’s re-exclude them once again. Thus, the nationalization of 
pro-poor politics also nationalized moments and forces that despised the 
inclusion of the poor.
While these antipathies represent one discursive reaction to the national 
inclusion of the ‘unworthy’ poor, more nuanced discursive constructs have 
also come into being. After the national acceptance of pro-poor causes by 
means of citizenship in the 2010s, wider debates have emerged about how 
Japan can address the increasingly omnipresent and omnipotent character 
of poverty in society. The pre-existing ‘gap society’ interpretations and argu-
ments, which circulated in the mass media, publications, and internet spaces 
and constructed the self-images of ‘poor us’ until the 2000s (for an overview, 
see Chiavacci and Hommerich 2017), are now in the process of re-articulation, 
affecting the discourses of national politics in major ways (Chiavacci 2018).
These national concerns about the ‘welfare dependency’ problem can 
be ideological. Yet, the strong sensitivity to the ‘unworthy’ poor has struc-
tural roots in political economy. That is, Japan’s massive national def icits 
delimit total welfare spending, and Japan’s serious aging/depopulation 
trends demand the special allocation of budgets, to the exclusion of what 
one might conceive as the ‘unworthy’ poor. It is this resource-allocation 
problem – a structural ‘root cause’ – that now facilitates the formation of 
ideological constructs and neoliberal backlashes against the ‘outsiders.’ In 
this context, Japan until the late 2010s, had already advanced a series of 
reforms to reduce the rolls of Public Assistance and relocate its recipients 
into the labour market. At the core are efforts of bureaucrats and politi-
cians to forge the Japanese version of a ‘workfare state’ (Peck 2001) and to 
replace the traditional welfare policy with a more market-driven ‘workfare’ 
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policy. Because these neoliberal reforms have been advanced cunningly, it 
is becoming hard for pro-homeless and pro-poor activists to wage effective 
campaigns against them.
– In 2012, the Japanese government announced the f inal draft of a 
comprehensive tax and social welfare reform, which determined that 
Japan’s public welfare is overloaded and called for radical reform by 
establishing the ‘second layer of the safety-net’ (i.e. more time-limited 
provisions of support) outside of the f irst layer of Public Assistance 
(CAS 2012: 7).
– Beginning in 2013, the Japanese state started radically slashing the 
benefit level of Public Assistance. Between 2013 and 2015, there was a 
reduction of approximately 6% in the benefit level. In 2017, a further 
reduction was suggested.
– In 2014, the Act for Promoting Social Welfare Reform was enforced, 
which targets the ‘best balance of self-help, mutual help, and public help’ 
(art. 2), and demands a reduction of Public Assistance by constructing 
a work-f irst policy (Additional Clause, art. 2).
– In 2015, the Act for the Self-Support of Needy Persons was enforced 
and created the space of workfare policy by founding the ‘consultation 
assistance programme for the self-support of needy persons’ (art. 1).
– In 2015, the Public Assistance Act of 1950 itself was revised to add 
to the Public Assistance programme a new incentive system for the 
recipients, designed to encourage their quick job search after being 
on the rolls.
In short, the neoliberal reform of the welfare state in the 2010s has already 
produced the new space of workfare on the national scale. As a result, Public 
Assistance – Japan’s core welfare programme – became tightly integrated 
with the national realm of workfare, thereby establishing the continuity of 
welfare-workfare systems and promoting the transfer of the needy to the 
labour market. The Public Assistance programme was systematically made 
remote especially for those who were considered as ‘unworthy’ recipients 
– such as able-bodied, unmarried and male populations – and the welfare 
off ice of the locality was redefined, for these populations, as the frontline 
of ‘workfarist regulation’ (Peck 2001). Furthermore, the Japanese state set 
ambitious targets for each municipality to achieve the curtailing of Public 
Assistance recipients by relocating them to the new workfare system and 
the labour market (MHLW 2018).
While these neoliberal reforms, which are still ongoing, were the state’s 
response to the general increase of welfare budgets and national def icits 
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in Japan, the previous inclusion of the ‘outsiders’ in the welfare state 
was not unrelated. In drawing up these reforms, the central concern of 
policymakers was that the number of recipients belonging to the ‘workable 
age group’ had increased and that it represented a critical situation that 
departed from traditions of the past when Public Assistance was for the 
elderly, injured/sick and disadvantaged populations (MHLW 2013: 4). 
When Japan embarked on the neoliberal reforms, policymakers targeted 
especially those who were previously considered as the ‘outsiders’ of the 
welfare state.
Rediscovering the Pro-homeless Cause
In the upbeat phase of Public Assistance increase beginning in the late 
2000s, which was consolidated through Tokyo’s tent village movement and 
resulting politics, pro-homeless activists felt their relationship with local 
authorities was improving, as municipalities became ever more willing 
to accept the application of homeless people to the national citizenship 
programme. At the same time, in this phase, it became clear to everyone 
that the number of homeless who ‘lived’ on the streets had signif icantly 
decreased due to public welfare provision and also because the authorities 
strengthened anti-homeless policing at the street level. The rationale was 
that the remaining homeless individuals on the streets were eager ‘outsiders’ 
of Japanese society who intentionally preferred street-based life and that, 
therefore, these most ‘unworthy’ poor could be evicted even from the streets.
Given this new context, the unintended consequence of the improved 
welfare state, the movements’ strategy began to diverge. First, the majority of 
pro-homeless activists redefined their role as the supporters of ex-homeless 
individuals now housed by welfare measures. Movements that adopted this 
strategy heightened the degree of collaboration with authorities and sometimes 
ran dormitories for ex-homeless individuals on Public Assistance. Second, a few 
activists pursued a different strategy. That is, they stuck to street homelessness 
in order to problematize the ongoing exclusion of the homeless from the welfare 
state and society. Activists adopting this strategy could sometimes not be clearly 
distinguished from the former group. In the case of Kanagawa Prefecture, the 
same activists, who radically opposed the authorities’ anti-homeless polic-
ing, closely collaborated with municipal workers when they accommodated 
ex-homeless individuals in their dormitory houses. Despite this complexity, 
there were undoubtedly some activists who were still firmly committed to the 
assistance of homeless individuals remaining (and being ‘trapped’) on the streets.
OPENING UP ThE wELfARE STATE TO ‘OUTSIDERS’ 291
What about activism in the most contemporary phase of neoliberal 
backlashes? The Japanese landscape of pro-homeless movements in this 
latest period is ‘f ixed.’ However, what can be said is that the mounting 
pressure for welfare-state retrenchment for the sake of a workfare policy 
– pressure exerted by conservative politicians, bureaucrats, intellectuals 
and citizens – is presenting formidable challenges to activists working for 
homeless and ex-homeless individuals. For one thing, the much deteriorated 
rate of Public Assistance in the current period is already inspiring fear among 
ex-homeless individuals housed in dormitory houses run by movements, 
thereby causing uneasiness among activists. The manager of one such 
dormitory for ex-homeless individuals, run by a movement organization in 
Kanagawa Prefecture, told me that the lowered amount of Public Assistance 
has directly worsened the level of services they can provide for ex-homeless 
residents in the dormitory house, changing homeless movement relation-
ships for the worse (Interview Matsumoto 2018).
For another, activists say that the deteriorated conditions of the Japanese 
welfare state at the current time, as well as the intensif ication of anti-
homeless policing in the streets, should revitalize the meaning of pro-
homeless movements. They dare to make this hypothetical comparison: 
if today’s public space were subject to the same (lower) level of intensity 
regarding anti-homeless policing as it was ten years ago, not a few home-
less individuals would choose to stay in parks and streets rather than to 
leave them and rely on Public Assistance. The reasons are that the rate 
of assistance has already declined and that it is set to further deteriorate 
over the next few years, and that parks and streets were more ‘livable’ for 
the homeless before the 2010s. In this regard, one activist vocally claims 
(Interview Takazawa 2018):
There are some homeless people who can do better by living in the streets 
than by leaving them. […] Unfortunately, citizens do not understand this 
way of living a life. Citizens harshly think that such homeless people are 
criminals. They castigate the homeless on that ground. […] The job of 
our [pro-homeless] movements is to change [the views of] such society.
This statement, made by a veteran activist in Yokohama, suggests that a 
potential new avenue for pro-homeless movements is now emerging amidst the 
neoliberal backlashes. That is, the ongoing reduction in welfare spending and 
the resultant degradation of livelihood rights, which have powerfully destroyed 
the legal basis of the welfare state, could be combated by movements that 
support the homeless and homelessness-prone labourers ‘living’ in public space.
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Conclusion
Due to their sensitivity to citizenship problems, social movements for the 
homeless have played signif icant roles in improving Japan’s welfare state, 
especially after the early 1990s. It was a time when the nation reached 
the endpoint of post-war development, whose good growth capacity had 
masked the malfunctioning of the welfare state. By clamouring for the 
opening up of public-welfare measures to the ‘outsiders’ of the welfare 
state, activists have tried to produce better safety net conditions, nationally 
and locally, for the homeless and other impoverished populations. To 
this end, the institutions of consumer rights and public provision in the 
welfare state, which had long dismissed the homeless, have become the 
targets of activism. The livelihood rights enshrined in the constitution, 
and the Public Assistance programme established by the Public Assistance 
Act of 1950, had been implemented in a highly restricted way regarding 
homeless people even though they have strong potential to ameliorate 
homelessness. Pro-homeless activists have found in the gap – a cleavage 
between citizenship clauses and their real operation – a chance to improve 
the circumscribed welfare state of Japan.
Before the late 2000s, activists tried to persuade local authorities to 
construct a local mode of welfare provision for the homeless. These trials 
were based on their critical interpretations of the law, which emphasized 
the ‘worthiness’ of homeless individuals. The inner-city area of metropolises 
populated by day labourers – segregated districts called ‘yoseba’ – became a 
hive for such pro-homeless activism. In the case of the city of Yokohama, the 
municipality responded to the activists by mobilizing Public Assistance – the 
core programme of the Japanese welfare state – for elderly and sick/injured 
homeless persons. While this decision was progressive in itself, the city 
also revitalized its local relief system for the local homeless population. As 
similar types of movement-regulation dynamics spread to other cities in 
Kanagawa Prefecture, by the 2000s, this area became a major hotbed for 
local welfare states attentive to the plight of the homeless, creating new 
conditions of citizenship in the prefecture.
In the late 2000s, an entirely new form of pro-homeless movement came 
into being in Tokyo, which ambitiously sought to change the Japanese welfare 
state at the national level. The (potential) number of precarious homeless 
labourers quickly increased during the winter of 2008/2009 as a result of 
the global f inancial crisis. In response, the movement set up a ‘village’ of 
tents, soup kitchens and consultation windows in the middle of Tokyo’s 
central business district, just in front of politically important buildings of 
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the Japanese state. As this cunning choice of geography was combined with 
the strategic use of symbolic and intellectual resources, which were largely 
‘personified’ by orator Makoto Yuasa, the movement succeeded in attracting 
much public attention and persuading the MHLW, the national gatekeeper 
of Public Assistance, to open up the core programme of citizenship to the 
homeless at the national level. While this facilitated the inclusion of the 
homeless into the Japanese welfare state, in the 2010s, Japan ran into yet 
another new phase of neoliberal backlashes and workfare-state building, 
leading to the deterioration of citizenship for the poor. In this context, pro-
homeless activism is gaining new importance in combating neoliberalism 
and promoting a better welfare state at the national and local levels.
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Since the 1990s, South Koreans have gained better access to the courts as a 
channel for pursuing social and policy change. In particular, Koreans with 
disabilities began using the courts to challenge discrimination, enforce 
their rights, and influence policymaking. Through qualitative comparative 
analysis of recent legal mobilization by Koreans with disabilities, this 
chapter investigates factors that influence when and why people mobilize 
the law. Drawing on sociolegal and social movement theories, it shows 
that explanations focused on evolving legal opportunity structures – 
encompassing procedural rules, statutes, and legal interpretations – can 
only partly explain changing patterns in legal mobilization. Explanations 
should also consider the ‘support structures’ for legal mobilization: lawyers, 
advocacy organizations, and funding.
Keywords: legal mobilization, Korea, disabilities, reform, social movements
Societal groups have many options when seeking to influence policy deci-
sions. In between elections, they can contact bureaucrats, lobby elected 
off icials, join or support an interest group, raise public awareness via the 
media or public events, publish reports, protest, or f ile lawsuits. Mobilizing 
the law by turning to the courts has long been considered a form of political 
participation, albeit a challenging one (e.g. Zemans 1983). The complex 
rules, procedures, and costs of litigation can be daunting. Judicial processes 
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are arguably more structured than other forms of political participation. 
Changes in these rules and procedures can render legal mobilization more 
or less attractive to those seeking to sway state actions. Yet for marginalized 
groups, legal activism may be the only path forward when they fail to capture 
the establishment’s attention.
Since the 1990s, South Koreans have gained better access to the courts as 
a forum for advocacy and grievance articulation. Democratization in 1987 
entailed a decline in state interference in judicial processes, and the 1988 
establishment of the Korean Constitutional Court became a new channel for 
claims making (Ginsburg 2003). Institutional and cultural hurdles to legal 
mobilization continued to fall in the democratic era. Legal reforms increased 
the size of the private bar, created a system of legal aid and improved the 
eff iciency and predictability of judicial processes (Choi and Rokumoto 
2007; Ginsburg 2004). Domestic civil society demand for better access to 
justice and foreign business pressures for neoliberal deregulation after the 
Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 propelled these changes (Kim 2011b). New 
legislation also created justiciable rights and shifted the burden of proof 
for cases related to product liability and pollution. Greater access to justice 
and pent-up claims, however, fuelled a dramatic rise in per capital litigation 
rates. Newer institutions, such as the National Human Rights Commission 
of Korea (NHRCK), opened non-judicial channels for rights claiming in the 
new millennium. Impact litigation and other forms of legal activism became 
important tactics for civic groups in Korea, and they diversif ied with the 
emergence of public interest lawyering after 2004 (e.g. Hong 2011; Goedde 
2013). Legal mobilization has also served to bolster other forms of political 
activism, including protest and lobbying.
This chapter traces how particularly marginalized individuals – those 
with disabilities – are increasingly leveraging the law and making rights 
claims. Historically, Koreans with disabilities were excluded from society 
and kept at home or sometimes in residential institutions (Kim 2005). As 
in many societies, the Korean government f irst assisted the physically 
disabled, who were often veterans, and only later those with mental or intel-
lectual disabilities. As economic growth accelerated in the 1980s and social 
welfare policies were introduced, state assistance for people with disabilities 
gradually improved. But policies adopted a welfare-based paternalistic 
understanding of disability, not one that recognized people with disabilities 
as rights-bearing individuals who should be included in society. Hence, 
Koreans with disabilities mobilized and drew inspiration from international 
disability rights activism starting in the 1980s. Emboldened by broader 
pro-democracy mobilization at the time, they protested the state’s superficial 
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reforms ahead of the 1988 Seoul Olympics and Paralympics. Thereafter, 
they overcame marginalization to seek other reforms and increasingly 
use the courts to challenge discrimination, enforce their rights, augment 
other activism tactics, and influence political agendas and policymaking. 
The chapter asks: What explains the rise of legal activism among Koreans 
with disabilities? What do these changes reveal about access to justice 
more generally?
Liberalizing political opportunity structures contributed to the changing 
relationship between Korea’s disability communities and the establishment 
in the past three decades. Political institutions liberalized with democratiza-
tion and spurred judicial reforms. Scholars often emphasize the institutional 
structures which frame state-society relations and change relatively slowly 
(e.g. Checkel 1999; Lee 2012; Centeno et al. 2017). I argue that institutional 
explanations are important but can only partly account for the increased 
use of legal tactics by persons with disabilities. Scholars recently coined the 
useful term ‘legal opportunity structure’ to describe the relatively stable but 
not static features of legal and judicial systems that encourage or discourage 
people from mobilizing the law (Andersen 2006; Wilson and Rodriguez 
Cordero 2006; Vanhala 2012, 2018a). In this concept, they include rules 
governing access to the courts and the costs of litigation, existing laws and 
judicial precedents, and sometimes the presence of resources and allies for 
the litigation process. While scholars have long noted how structural factors 
like rules on standing (i.e. who has the right to bring suit) or cost shifting 
affect litigation rates, Hilson (2002) and Andersen (2006) drew on social 
movement studies’ notion of opportunity structures to highlight how some 
factors that affect groups’ propensity to litigate are more contingent than 
structural. The concept of opportunity structures adds an awareness of the 
perceptual elements of opportunity to the traditional structural accounts. 
Opportunities need to be recognized and seized. Relatively few studies of 
legal opportunity structures, however, have analysed how they change (but 
see Evans Case and Givens 2010; Vanhala 2012, 2018b).
The chapter traces how the legal opportunity structure for disability-
related claims in Korea has improved in the past two decades. New domestic 
statutes and Korea’s ratif ication of the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD) supplied justiciable rights; changes in rules and 
judicial rulings related to the burden of proof and statute of limitations have 
lowered impediments to litigation; new institutions like the NHRCK have 
facilitated non-judicial rights claiming, sometimes combined with litiga-
tion; and courts are making accommodations for persons with disabilities. 
Drawing on sociolegal and social movement theories, however, I suggest that 
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a fuller explanation of disability-related claiming must also consider the 
‘support structures’ for legal mobilization: lawyers, advocacy organizations, 
and funding (Epp 1998). I highlight, therefore, how an infrastructure for legal 
mobilization has become institutionalized in Korea, enabling claimants to 
better recognize, utilize, and incrementally pry open legal opportunities.
This research demonstrates the importance of analysing interactions 
between structure and agency in shaping state-society relations. It provides 
evidence for the growing awareness that societal actors are hardly passive 
within structural constraints but can incrementally reshape opportunity 
structures through strategic litigation and policy innovations (Andersen 
2006). Courts in Korea are considered some of the most conservative 
institutions, so a liberalizing legal opportunity structure indicates that 
democratic consolidation is reaching the judiciary. By analysing a country 
with historically low levels of judicial intervention in policymaking and 
high marginalization of persons with disabilities, this chapter also reveals 
how legal mobilization is reconfiguring the ways in which disabled persons’ 
organizations engage with the establishment. The shift towards a rights-
based understanding of disabilities, which is associated with legal tactics 
and rights claiming, spurred Koreans with disabilities to demand and 
achieve a voice in domestic policymaking and thereby realize the CRPD’s 
principle of participation and the global disability activism slogan ‘Nothing 
about us, without us.’ Their access to the courts and resources for gaining 
access to the courts have also improved.
The chapter begins by introducing the issue of disability rights in Korea 
to explain the theoretical leverage this case gives us for understanding 
changing state-society relations in one of East Asia’s established democracies. 
It then examines relevant changes to rules governing access to the courts, 
adjudication procedures and judicial remedies, focusing on how these 
changes affect the incentive structures for persons with disabilities. It also 
investigates how claims in court relate to other claiming, such as through the 
NHRCK. Examining changes in the legal opportunity structure elucidates 
how relatively obscure or technical aspects of the law can have signif icant 
political consequences, especially for patterns of state-society relations.
Case Selection and Background
As a relatively new democracy and an East Asian case with low rates of 
litigation historically, Korea represents an ideal case for investigating changes 
in legal opportunity structures. Korea has become something of a juggernaut 
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in terms of the growing role of law and courts in politics generally since its 
democratization. The Korean Constitutional Court, which started hearing 
complaints in 1988, saw its caseload rise by nearly f ive-fold between 1996 
and 2016.1 In addition, in the past two decades, the number of new civil 
lawsuits rose by 150%, and the number of administrative lawsuits rose by 
230%.2 These f igures include a variety of private and public causes, only a 
fraction of which are related to disabilities.
Korean citizens’ turn towards the courts constitutes an accelerated ver-
sion of changes in governance that are happening in democracies worldwide. 
The trend has been called the judicialization or legalization of politics (e.g. 
Barnes and Burke 2015; Hirschl 2011; Vallinder 1994). Citizens are demanding 
and achieving greater transparency and accountability from their govern-
ments, often through the courts (Cain et al. 2003; Cichowski 2006). Korean 
courts have played important roles in political conflicts, including those 
related to presidential impeachment, state liability for authoritarian-era 
abuses, and public corruption. Most analyses of the judicialization of politics 
in Korea focus on such high-visibility cases and the Constitutional Court 
(Kim 2008; Kim and Park 2012). However, as Ramseyer (1985: 605-606) noted 
with regard to Japan, private litigation can serve the public interest when it 
deters rights abuses or catches state misconduct. Private litigation may also 
have public benef its in that it enhances enforcement and state agencies’ 
regulatory goals, albeit to a lesser extent in Korea than in the United States 
(Farhang 2010; Kagan 2001). It can reveal information that informs policy 
debates and adds impetus for policy change. Disputes related to disabilities 
are increasingly the subject of such legal mobilization, as citizens frame 
their demands in terms of rights and seek policy change.
Disability policy is an especially fruitful issue area in which to study legal 
mobilization’s role in state-society relations because it advanced rapidly in 
the past two decades and illustrates the confluence of international factors 
and domestic forces like democratization. Though adapted by domestic 
activists, internationally circulating ideas about disability rights and legal 
tactics for promoting them gained traction in Korea, only to f lourish in 
the past decade. Beginning with the UN Decade of Disabled Persons (1983-
1992), rights-based self-advocacy gradually replaced the traditional Korean 
model of single-disability and service-oriented associations and networks 
of families of disabled persons that cooperated with the government. Youth 
1 Data from the Korean Constitutional Court (KCC) website, http://www.ccourt.go.kr 
(20 February 2018).
2 Calculated from data available in the Sabeop Yeongam (Judicial yearbook), various years.
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with various disabilities leveraged the 1988 Paralympics in Seoul to protest 
for reforms, including the introduction of employment quotas and welfare 
benefits for the disabled. As a result, the Law to Promote Employment among 
Persons with Disabilities and revisions to the Disability Welfare Law came 
into force in 1990. The state’s welfare support for people with disabilities, 
which was allocated through a much criticized medically based rating 
system, and disability accommodations incrementally grew in the 1990s 
with the introduction of modest social welfare programmes for all (Yang 
2017). Social welfare reform policies were consolidated under Korea’s f irst 
progressive president, Kim Dae-jung, in the wake of the f inancial crisis of 
1997 (Wong 2004), but families and increasingly NGOs were still expected 
to help care for people with disabilities.
Some disability activists continued to favour direct action even after 
democratization. For example, many members of the Solidarity for the Right 
to Move (Idonggwon Yeondae) that formed in the early 2000s to protest 
for accessible public transportation after the much publicized death of 
a wheelchair user in the Seoul metro in 2001, had been active in the pro-
democracy movement and spearheaded the sit-ins and hunger strikes around 
the 1988 Paralympics. They achieved the f irst legal guarantee of a right to 
mobility in article 3 of the 2005 Transportation Convenience Law, even after 
the Constitutional Court had denied any government obligation to provide 
low-floor buses.3 They also cooperated with the newer self-advocacy groups 
that had established the Korea Federation of Organizations of the Disabled 
(Jangchongryeon) in the mid-1990s. Around the same time, more traditional 
disability groups that include caregivers and researchers had formed the 
Korea Differently Abled Federation (Jangchong) as civil society blossomed 
in newly democratic Korea and state-NGO partnerships came into vogue. As 
umbrella organizations, Jangchongryeon and Jangchong did not cooperate 
but helped realize policy changes like the 1994 Special Education Law and 
the 1997 Convenience Promotion Law to facilitate greater participation by 
people with disabilities in society. Further lobbying for these reforms came 
from the Research Institute for Disability Rights in Korea (Jangae U Gwonik 
Munje Yeonguso, RIDRIK), which lawyers and researchers had founded in 
1987 and which gained direct access to lawmakers after its f irst director was 
elected to the National Assembly in the 1990s. RIDRIK’s 35 or so volunteer 
lawyers led the few early disability-related lawsuits and established a hotline 
for legal counselling. In short, disability-related civic groups flourished in 
3 Gyotong Yakjaeui Idongpyeoneui Jeungjinbeop (Law no. 7382, 27 January 2005). KCC 
2002heonma52.
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the 1990s, but litigation remained costly and time-consuming. While civil 
society organizations increasingly used litigation to pursue policy change in 
other issue areas in the late 1990s (see Shin, in this volume), disability-related 
litigation was limited by the lack of statutory basis for discrimination claims.4
Towards a Korean Disability Discrimination Act
Disability activists overcame internal divisions to realize the historic Act 
on the Prohibition of Discrimination against Disabled Persons, Remedy 
against Infringement of their Rights, etc. (hereafter the Korean Disability 
Discrimination Act, or KDDA) in 2007.5 The movement for the KDDA began in 
2001 when two groups separately published proposals for legislation banning 
disability-based discrimination. One was Open Network (Yeollin Network), 
which a few lawyers, scholars and activists had founded in 1999 as an online 
community to study foreign laws and promote disability rights (Interview AA 
2016). The other organization was RIDRIK. Its draft drew heavily on data about 
common forms of disability discrimination, which RIDRIK had been collecting 
from its counselling activities for over a decade. As in other countries, the 1990 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and foreign disability discrimination 
acts were influential models. One Korean activist explained: ‘We felt frustrated 
because, despite the many reforms of the 1990s, the rights hotline we opened [at 
RIDRIK] in 2000 revealed that horrible things were still happening to persons 
with disabilities. So we organized presentations about the ADA and the British 
and German anti-discrimination laws to catch up with these other countries’ 
(Interview RIDRIK 2017). Encouraged by Open Network and others, Jangchong 
and Jangchongryeon set aside their differences as more than 75 disability 
groups united to launch the Disability Discrimination Act Solidarity of Korea 
(Jangchuryeon, hereafter the Solidarity) in 2003 (Arrington and Moon 2020).
Contemporaneously to the KDDA movement, disability rights were 
spreading globally during negotiations to create the Convention on the 
Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD). Korea signed and ratif ied the 
CRPD at the same time as it enacted the KDDA, and Koreans were active 
in the CRPD negotiations. Korean women with disabilities, for instance, 
co-authored article 6 of the CRPD while helping to draft the KDDA (Kim 
2014). Domestically, Korean activists and their government also embraced 
4 The Korean Special Education Law (rev. 1994) and Law to Promote Employment among 
Persons with Disabilities (rev. 2001) included anti-discrimination clauses but provided no 
specif ics or enforcement mechanisms.
5 Jangaein Chabyeol Geumjimit Gwonri Gujedeunge gwanhan Beomnul (Law no. 8341, 2007).
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the principle of participation that was articulated in article 4 of the CRPD. 
President Roh Moo-hyun’s ‘participatory administration’ (2003-2008) 
launched a joint government-civil society task force in mid-2006 to draft a 
KDDA under the auspices of the Presidential Committee on Social Inclusion 
(PCSI 2007). The Solidarity selected representatives from all factions of 
Korea’s disabilities community for the task force, which included off icials 
from all relevant ministries and the NHRCK (as an observer). For expediency, 
the task force also referenced the draft KDDA bill submitted by a politician 
from the small far-left Democratic Labour Party in September 2005, which 
was ‘90% the same as the Solidarity draft’ (Interview LE 2017).
To craft legislation with a reasonable budget and a high chance of passing 
in the National Assembly, officials on the government-civil society task force 
reportedly focused on moderating the Solidarity’s demands for an independ-
ent dispute resolution body capable of issuing binding orders (Interview 
PCSI 2016). Originally, the Roh administration envisioned enacting general 
anti-discrimination legislation and tasked the NHRCK with designing it. 
Roh’s progressive predecessor President Kim Dae-jung had created the 
NHRCK in 2001 after battling conservatives and the Ministries of Justice and 
Health and Welfare, which saw the new national human rights institution 
as encroaching on their domains (Koo 2011: 79). Creating a workload for the 
fledgling institution might bolster its legitimacy and improve its chances of 
surviving the widely anticipated return of conservatives to the Blue House in 
the presidential election in December 2007. But disability activists demanded 
disability-specific legislation and fought against what they considered tooth-
less remedies through the NHRCK with a two-month sit-in at the NHRCK in 
2006. Indeed, the NHRCK route would contain challenges to the state, since the 
NHRCK lacked the injunctive powers and manpower courts had. Ultimately, 
conservative Christian opposition to LGBTQ rights stymied discussions on 
general anti-discrimination legislation within the NHRCK, and the NHRCK 
switched to recommending disability-specific anti-discrimination legislation.
In subsequent deliberations in the government-civil society task force and 
in the National Assembly, off icials continued to advocate the NHRCK rather 
than an independent disputing mechanism that might overlap with the 
NHRCK functions. The NHRCK route was seen by many lawmakers as faster 
and easier; complaints could be f iled in person at its central off ice or one of 
the four branch offices, as well as online, by fax, or by third parties.6 Disability 
activists ultimately acquiesced to this route because ‘time was running out 
with the relatively more receptive Roh administration’ (Interview AE 2017).
6 Minutes of the Health and Welfare Committee, meeting no. 265, 2 (7 February 2007).
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In a concession to disability activists, however, the government added 
clauses to the KDDA permitting courts to hear discrimination cases and 
order injunctions in cases of non-compliance with the NHRCK’s non-binding 
recommendations (arts 43-46). Furthermore, the KDDA banned four types 
of discrimination – direct, indirect, refusing reasonable accommodations, 
and interfering with aides to disabled persons (art. 4). Litigation, as well as 
complaints to the NHRCK, in the decade since the KDDA was enacted have 
helped clarify the law’s scope.
Thus, the KDDA, the CRPD, and other reforms signif icantly advanced 
disability rights in Korean society in the past two decades and helped open 
legal opportunities. Because the advances occurred not just through the 
courts, the case of disability policy permits us to explore judicial rights-
claiming mechanisms in their broader sociopolitical context. Activists 
were initially disappointed that state actors channelled discrimination 
complaints to the NHRCK, but they have discovered ways of leveraging 
this institution. During the f irst eight months after the KDDA went into 
force in 2008, for example, the proportion of discrimination complaints 
received by the NHRCK that were related to disability leapt from 14% to 61% 
(NHRCK 2016a: 137). Disability activists frequently f ile NHRCK complaints 
simultaneously to lawsuits because doing so ‘can increase publicity’ and 
the ‘NHRCK off icers are very knowledgeable and helpful’ (Interview LKLL 
2015). Beginning with the 2004 National Assembly elections, Korean political 
parties also started nominating candidates with disabilities to proportional 
representation lists, resulting in the election of some from both conservative 
and progressive parties. Jang Hyang-sook from President Roh’s Uri party was 
in a wheelchair, and Jung Hwa-won from the conservative Grand National 
Party was visually impaired.
More open political and legal opportunity structures were not unqualified 
victories for people with disabilities, however. In its f irst review of Korea’s 
compliance with the CRPD, for instance, the UN Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (2014: 2) noted how few complaints had elicited 
NHRCK recommendations and how the NHRCK lacks injunctive powers for 
remedying complaints. Local government-funded Disability Human Rights 
Centres are gradually being established to offer advice in discrimination 
cases and alleviate such backlog. Additionally, the NHRCK established a 
standing committee on disability discrimination remedies and two disability 
rights divisions within its investigation bureau, which have conducted 
on-site inspections of residential facilities. It also recently created a watch 
team of 178 people – two-thirds of whom have disabilities – to check for 
disability discrimination (NHRCK 2016b: 38). Meanwhile, disability activists 
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have capitalized on growing opportunities and resources for recognizing 
and creating legal opportunities to use the courts to monitor and enhance 
implementation of the KDDA and other policy reforms.
Methods
The f indings reported in this chapter are based on interpretive analysis of 
semi-structured interviews that I conducted in Korean with 20 individuals 
who directly engaged with the legal opportunity structure – lawyers, judges, 
plaintiffs, and activists – and of various documents, including judicial rul-
ings, litigation strategy memos, legal scholarship, and movement newsletters 
or websites. Rather than attempting to comprehensively cover all institu-
tional changes, I highlight changes in features generally emphasized by the 
legal opportunity structure literature and by my informants. I adopt the 
law-in-action perspective used in the legal mobilization literature ( McCann 
2004), acknowledging the contingency of judicial interpretations and rule 
application and emphasizing the value of analysing how litigants perceive 
and strategically use such structural factors.
I do not claim that legal opportunity structures are the only factors affecting 
rights claiming by people with disabilities. There are many factors that affect 
citizens’ decisions about when and how to assert their rights. For instance, 
perceived ‘political disadvantage’ may drive groups to the courts, as opposed 
to conventional democratic channels (Cortner 1968; Javeline and Baird 2007; 
Zackin 2008). Learning from international models or the socialization that 
occurs in the context of cooperation in international forums can likewise 
stimulate claimants to use the courts more (e.g. Checkel 2001; Dobbin, Sim-
mons, and Garrett 2007). The presence of lawyers in a movement or the 
structure and network linkages of an organization may also push towards 
judicial remedies (Scheppele and Walker 1991; Vanhala 2018a). I argue, however, 
that any explanation of patterns of legal mobilization needs to consider the 
ways in which seemingly technical or obscure rules and procedures interact 
with lawyers and the infrastructures they utilize for litigation.
The Evolving Legal Opportunity Structure for Disability Rights
As rights claiming through the courts became more common worldwide, 
sociolegal scholars developed the concept of legal opportunity structures 
to explain why some civil society groups adopt legal tactics while others do 
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not. This framework offers a useful lens for identifying and analysing key 
changes in the incentives that Koreans with disabilities face when deciding 
how to assert their rights. The emerging consensus is that the core parts 
of the legal opportunity structure are courts’ procedural rules related to 
access, litigation’s costs and rewards, and the existing body of laws and 
rulings (Vanhala 2018a: 384-385). The legal opportunity structure framework 
built on the concept of political opportunity structures in social movements 
scholarship. Like that concept, legal opportunity structure developed fuzzy 
conceptual boundaries to the extent that it also was ‘in danger of becoming 
a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment’ 
(Gamson and Meyer 1996: 275). Political and legal opportunity structures are 
related concepts but distinguishing them helps avoid conceptual bloat and 
is important because they affect movements’ strategies and issue framing 
in different ways.
Like the concept of political opportunity structures, legal opportunity 
structure includes structural and contingent components but focuses on 
institutions and actors specif ic to the law. Tarrow (1994: 85) def ined the 
structure of political opportunity as ‘consistent – but not necessarily formal 
or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incen-
tives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations 
for success or failure.’ Most political opportunity structure scholarship 
focuses on how movements’ choices are shaped by the accessibility of 
political institutions, presence of elite allies, and the instability in elite 
alignments. The concept emphasizes how subtle institutional changes, 
shifts in state capacity, and changing levels of elite receptivity to claims 
might become resources external to the group. Some legal opportunity 
structure scholars include judicial receptivity, the presence of allies for 
litigation, and even resources for litigation in their conceptualizations of 
the legal opportunity structure (Andersen 2006; Epp 1998; Evans Case and 
Givens 2010; Lejeune 2017).
Rather than stretching the concept by including such factors, I define the 
legal opportunity structure in line with the emerging consensus: the legal 
stock and rules related to access to the courts, adjudication procedure, and 
judicial remedies. First, the legal stock encompasses existing statutes and 
judicial precedents that constrain how people can frame their claims, how 
persuasive those claims are, and how disputes are adjudicated (Andersen 
2006). Although in civil law systems like Korea’s, judicial precedents are 
not binding, courts still do often reference prior rulings. Thus, prior rulings 
are ‘de facto binding’ in Korea (Kwon 2007: 137). Second, procedural rules 
are numerous, but several are signif icant for rights claimants considering 
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litigation: standing rules, fee-shifting rules, the statute of limitations, and 
the burden of proof. Standing rules determine who can bring cases to court. 
Prior studies have shown how liberalized rules on standing facilitated NGO 
litigation in Europe (Alter and Vargas 2000; Cichowski and Stone Sweet 
2003), but Korean courts have resisted suits by interest groups except at 
the Constitutional Court. Statutes of limitations affect when claims can be 
brought, relative to when the alleged injury or rights violation occurred. The 
burden of proof and standards of evidence may be shifted through judicial 
precedent or legislation aimed at increasing access to judicial remedies. 
And rules on who bears the costs of litigation affect the potential risks and 
rewards of legal mobilization.
This section discusses noteworthy changes to the legal opportunity struc-
ture related to disability rights in Korea. It identifies key changes by comparing 
features pinpointed in the legal opportunity structure literature with what 
lawyers and disability activists emphasized. I highlight changes that have 
lowered barriers to entry, improved the adjudication process for claimants 
with disabilities, and set important precedents, as well as facilitated claims 
making through the NHRCK. The section after that explores the development 
of an infrastructure of lawyers with organizational and financial resources 
for taking advantage of or even contributing to such legal opportunities.
Noteworthy Changes
Litigation related to disabilities in Korea began to grow in the 2000s and 
especially after the 2007 KDDA, following decades of petitions to the govern-
ment and a few attempts at litigation. In 1967, for instance, families in Busan 
collected citizens’ signatures on petitions after several schools denied their 
children admittance due to their disabilities. The petitions catalysed policy 
reforms, and a historic but isolated lawsuit was won in 1982 by a student 
with disabilities after he was denied admittance to a prestigious university 
(Hong 2016: 389). But protests and petitioning remained more common than 
litigation until the 1990s. Individual lawsuits were occasionally effective. 
In 1994, for instance, a man successfully challenged a local government’s 
decision not to hire him due to his disability.7 Residents’ resistance to a 
school for people with disabilities being built in their neighbourhood was 
also deemed illegal in a 1996 ruling.8 Then, in 2003, Lee Hee-won f iled the 
f irst disability discrimination complaint at the newly established NHRCK 
7 Daejeon High Court 1994 gu 680 (ruling 14 April 1995).
8 Seoul District Court 1996 gahap 158 (21 February 1996).
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after he was dismissed from a public service job due to his disability. He 
simultaneously f iled a lawsuit, which he won in February 2004. RIDRIK 
supported many such early cases, while also lobbying for the legislative 
reforms discussed above.
Nonetheless, the KDDA’s passage notably opened the legal opportunity 
structure. Article 38 of the KDDA expanded standing to allow organiza-
tions that know about discrimination to f ile NHRCK claims on behalf of 
people with disabilities (KDLA 2017: 328). Litigation and NHRCK complaints 
thereafter sought to clarify who has standing to bring claims based on the 
KDDA. For instance, a 2014 petition to the NHRCK, supported by fourteen 
civic groups, successfully expanded the definition of disabilities to include 
HIV/AIDS after some sufferers of the disease were rejected by hospitals 
(KDLA 2017: 24). NHRCK decisions also clarif ied that the KDDA applies 
when disabled individuals are denied insurance due to disability or have 
their life choices limited in residential facilities.9
In addition, broader reforms (most notably in 2002) to the Korean Civil 
Procedure Act (KCPA) and rulings in cases not related to disabilities had 
ripple effects for disability-related litigation and made the adjudication 
process more amenable to people with disabilities (Kwon 2007). In 2010, for 
example, Korea introduced an electronic litigation system, which has made 
it easier for people with mobility impairments to f ile lawsuits.10 Complaints 
may now be f iled over the internet, rather than just in person. The new 
law’s declared purpose was to ‘enhance the swiftness and transparency [of 
civil procedure] thereby contributing to realizing people’s rights.’ With its 
reduced f illing fees compared with paper-based f iling, it became popular. 
The new system also expanded the range of material admissible in court 
to include images, video, and sounds (Baik 2015: 223-224). The increased 
number of cases, however, raised longstanding concerns about courts being 
overburdened, and thus perhaps also slowing down disability-related claims. 
Filing complaints at the NHRCK remains faster and easier, which is partly 
why lawmakers made it the primary remedy mechanism in the KDDA.
The relatively short duration of the statute of limitations in Korea was 
long seen as impeding claims making. Tort claims must be f iled within three 
years of when the victim becomes aware of the tortious act and within ten 
years of when the tortious act was committed (KCPA art. 766). A landmark 
Supreme Court ruling in 2011, however, waived the statute of limitations 
9 NHRCK 2014 jinjeong 001300 decision, 2015 jinjeong 0610400 decision.
10 Act on the Use of Electronic Documents in Civil Litigation etc. (Minsa Sosongdeungesoeui 
Jeonjamunseo Iyongdeunge gwanhan Beonmul) (Law no. 10183, 24 March 2010).
310  CELESTE L. ARRINGTON 
regarding compensation claims by bereaved families of victims of the police 
killing of thousands aff iliated with the National Guidance League (Bodo 
Yeonmaeng) in Ulsan in 1950 (Kim 2011a). More than 500 leprosy survivors 
who suffered forced vasectomies and abortions through the 1980s cited 
this interpretation of a limitless claim period in cases of state crimes when 
they f iled six collective lawsuits for compensation in 2011 (Arrington 2014). 
The Supreme Court ruled in the leprosy plaintiffs’ favour in 2017 (YN 2017). 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that such looser interpretations have not been 
uniformly applied. However, partially successful litigation by persons with 
mental disabilities who were enslaved in salt farms decades ago cited the 
leprosy ruling to ‘persuade the judges to waive the statute of limitations’ 
(Interview LF 2017). Additionally, disability lawyers argue that the one-year 
statute of limitations for f iling discrimination claims at the NHRCK should 
be loosened because people with disabilities may take longer to become 
aware of discrimination they encounter (KDLA 2017: 330).
For litigation regarding sensitive or stigmatizing issues like disabilities, 
Korean courts have introduced some innovations to protect the parties’ 
privacy (Arrington 2019). Since anyone with a complaint’s number can look 
up plaintiffs’ names and other details online, Korean attorneys often closely 
guard case numbers and ask reporters to conceal their clients’ names. A 
researcher at RIDRIK noted that legal professionals only gradually realized 
the risks of ‘secondary victimization’ for plaintiffs in cases related to dis-
abilities in the early 2000s and began ‘monitoring media interviews and 
developing procedures for getting plaintiffs’ approval before using their 
stories in advocacy related to the lawsuits, such as press conferences or 
demonstrations’ (Interview RIDRIK 2017). Some of the privacy innovations 
began in cases involving people with disabilities. For instance, an activist 
reported: ‘The prosecutor in the recent Dogani case [involving sexual abuse 
of disabled minors] used witnesses’ real names only once, as the judges 
required. After that he called them “witness” in court to minimize their 
exposure. I think he became aware of privacy concerns and stigma through 
his wife’s work as a lawyer with sexual violence victims [which was the f irst 
area to adopt privacy protections]’ (Interview AC 2013). Disability rights 
advocates also observe that some judges are ‘more aware of the issue of 
secondary victimization’ from the court process (Interview AA 2017). The 
Supreme Court began redacting names and addresses from rulings made 
available online starting in 2013 (Won 2016: 82-83). The introduction of such 
measures lowers the disincentives to litigation for people with disabilities.
Enhancing procedural justice and courts’ openness has long been a reform 
goal because, in the past, Korean courts’ adjudication procedures posed 
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numerous hurdles to claimants. The judicial process was like ‘dripping water,’ 
with oral hearings happening only every few months (Baik 2015: 229). Judges 
had to revisit the facts of the case each time, and the sporadic pace clashed 
with the frequent rotation of judges. Korean judges historically weighted 
documents more than witnesses and oral arguments (Kwon 2007: 132). The 
courts’ reliance on paper documents was seen as impeding citizens’ ability 
to understand and participate in adjudication process, particularly for 
people with disabilities. The Korean Civil Procedure Act overhaul in 2002 
aimed at increasing procedural eff iciency, and the Supreme Court began 
recommending more dynamic argumentation (Kwon 2007: 142).
While not necessarily always accessible for parties with disabilities, 
increasingly active discussions in oral arguments signalled greater f lex-
ibility in courtroom procedures and opened up opportunities for people 
with disabilities to participate in various ways. In the intercity bus lawsuits, 
for example, judges agreed to ride the bus to personally observe the chal-
lenges people with disabilities face (Interview RIDRIK 2017). One judge 
explained that many judges are ‘wanting to hear more from the plaintiffs 
and from all parties to the lawsuits in the past ten years to increase public 
trust in the courts. Whereas I used to call one witness, now I call two or 
three’ (Interview JA 2015). He said he explains things more carefully and 
clearly now in oral hearings. The move towards electronic records also 
enabled judges to use PowerPoint in the courtroom and facilitate oral 
debates. Furthermore, disability rights lawyers have fought to enhance 
accommodations for people with disabilities in the courtroom, includ-
ing sign language interpreters, captioning, and simpler presentation of 
points (Interview LKLL 2015). The Korean Supreme Court published – with 
signif icant input from activists and lawyers – a set of Guidelines for Judicial 
Assistance for Persons with Disabilities in 2013, but its implementation 
has been uneven according to the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (2014: 2).
Additionally, provisions to shift the burden of proof away from plaintiffs 
enhanced the prospects for private rights enforcement in Korea. For instance, 
Korea’s Supreme Court has ruled in several cases to relax the KCPA’s high 
bar for tort liability. Article 750 requires proof of (1) intention or negligence, 
(2) an unlawful act, (3) plaintiffs’ losses or injuries, and (4) a (proximate) 
causal relationship between the unlawful act and the injuries. Negligence 
or intention and causation are usually hardest to prove. Hence, article 47 
of the KDDA shifts the burden of proof to the alleged discriminator. And 
in 2014, judges recognized partial liability for the f irst time in determining 
damages awarded due to the rail company’s failure to provide reasonable 
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accommodations in a lawsuit brought by a person with visual impairment, 
who was injured after falling onto the tracks.11
Yet, the challenge of overcoming courts’ propensity to issue narrow 
rulings remains in Korea. For instance, in the f irst lawsuit f iled in 2011 by 
f ive wheelchair users over inaccessible intercity buses, the court ruled in 
2013 that the KDDA prohibited limits, exclusions, or rejections of usage based 
on disability but did not require equipment for equal usage by people with 
disabilities on all forms of transportation.12 In addition, the Constitutional 
Court ruled in 2014 that the Election Law did not require campaign leaflets 
to be printed in Braille, as the plaintiff demanded, because persons with 
visual impairments could get the information from other sources, such as 
TV or the internet.13
More generally, the judicial impact of the KDDA and its enforcement 
decree took time to be felt. The f irst ruling to clearly articulate the judi-
cial remedies available under the law was in July 2014 (Hong 2016: 408). 
It found that Seohae University had discriminated when dismissing the 
plaintiff, who had become disabled after a traff ic accident in 2010.14 A Seoul 
court also ruled in 2014 that the amusement park Everland had violated 
the KDDA with its off icial policy of barring unaccompanied people with 
mental disabilities from rides (RIDRIK 2016: 12-17). Due to the remaining 
challenges of litigation, some disability activists opt more often for protest. 
For example, the Solidarity’s successor organization, Solidarity against 
Disability Discrimination (SADD, or Jeonchangyeon), has protested to 
promote independent living and de-institutionalization based on the Korean 
Constitution’s rights to self-determination (art. 10) and personal liberty 
(art. 12). Nonetheless, disability-related litigation has increased, and courts’ 
accommodations for people with disabilities and their rights are changing 
prosecutors and police behaviour as well.15
Growing Infrastructure for Legal Mobilization
What is driving these changes? While judges’ behaviour and policy reforms are 
part of the explanation, we must not neglect the demand side. An increasingly 
11 Seoul Central District Court 2013 na 39826 (ruling, 29 April 2014).
12 Seoul Central District Court, 2011 gadan 472077 (ruling, 15 July 2013).
13 KCC, 2012 heonma 913 (ruling, 29 May 2014).
14 Jeonju District Court 2013 gahap 2599 (ruling, 3 July 2014).
15 For example, Seoul Central District Court 2009 gadan 99509 (ruling, 10 September 2010).
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institutionalized infrastructure for legal mobilization related to disabilities in 
Korea has spurred some of the changes in legal opportunities and has equipped 
disability activists to recognize and utilize these changes. Epp’s (1998) compara-
tive research demonstrated that groups seeking to use the courts to push for 
sociopolitical change depend on ‘support structures’ comprising advocacy 
organizations, funding, and especially rights-advocacy lawyers. Lawyers supply 
not just legal expertise. Even if legal victories prove elusive, lawyers can also 
help recruit plaintiffs, frame causes, devise movement strategy, build alliances 
with other civil society organizations and pressure state officials (inter alia 
McCann 2004; Jones 2006; Marshall 2006; Shdaimah 2006). More critical assess-
ments argue that lawyers can deter grassroots mobilizing, narrow the scope of 
a cause, or redirect a movement (e.g. Burstein 1991; Handler 1978; Levitsky 2006; 
McCarthy and Zald 1977). While they are not necessary to legal mobilization, 
lawyers with the capacity to mobilize financial and organizational resources 
facilitate strategic litigation (Arrington and Moon 2020).
In the wake of Korea’s democratization, numerous civil society organiza-
tions formed, often with signif icant input from activist lawyers. Many 
of these activist lawyers were also members of Minbyeon (Lawyers for a 
Democratic Society, also Romanized as ‘Minbyun’), which was launched in 
1988 and today includes more than 900 members (about 7% of all lawyers). 
In the 1990s, lawyers and the NGOs they worked with used combinations of 
lobbying, protest, media campaigns, and strategic litigation to sway public 
opinion, advance civil and political rights, and unravel leftover authoritarian 
laws (see Shin, in this volume). The largest NGOs – People’s Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy (PSPD, or Chamyeoyeondae), Citizens’ Council for 
Economic Justice (Gyeongsilyeon), and Korean Federation for Environmental 
Movements (Hwanggyeonyeonhap) – all used litigation in their political 
activism. For instance, PSPD had a Public Interest Law Centre already when 
it was founded in 1994.16 Yet PSPD litigation peaked in 1999 and declined 
after the progressive administration of President Roh Moo-hyun appointed 
many lawyers and PSPD activists to positions in government (Hong 2011). 
By the early 2000s, a key PSPD f igure had moved on to cultivate what he 
called gongik byeonhosa (public interest lawyer), which was imported from 
English to denote a broader and less politicized range of causes than the 
work of human rights lawyers who had represented political dissidents in 
the 1980s (Goedde 2013). Disability rights was one such cause.
Since the early 2000s, more and more legal professionals have been engaged 
in reform litigation by marginalized groups, including people with disabilities. 
16 PSPD Public Interest Law Center, http://www.peoplepower21.org/PublicLaw (9 March 2018).
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For instance, the Korean Bar Association added a separate chapter about 
disability rights in its human rights report in 2001 (KBA 2001). Minbyeon 
also established a minorities subcommittee and began offering small grants 
as seed money for reform litigation (Interview LB 2015; Interview LK 2015; 
Interview LL 2015). The progressive Christian Lawyer Fellowship formed a 
disabilities subcommittee, and one of its members became the lead author 
of the KDDA in the Solidarity. In addition, the revised Lawyers’ Act of 2000 
required all lawyers to perform at least 30 hours of pro bono work per year. 
Consequently, large law firms like Bae, Kim & Lee (Taepyeongyang) founded 
public interest working groups, often with a disability law team. These law-
yers became core nodes in an increasingly institutionalized ‘infrastructure’ 
for disability-related litigation (see also Morton and Knopff 2000: 25).
Since 2004, new organizational forms emerged in Korea to institutionalize 
these networks: public interest law f irms and public interest foundations 
within large law f irms. Lawyers in these f irms and their networks have 
played crucial roles in disability-related cases, brokering reform coalitions, 
improving legal education and in opening legal opportunities by pushing 
judges to innovate or adopt looser interpretations of various rules. They 
have also used the courts in innovative ways to advance various reforms. 
Gonggam was Korea’s f irst public interest law f irm, established in 2004 by 
one of the founders of Minbyeon and PSPD, the lawyer Park Won-soon, who 
became Seoul’s mayor.17 Gonggam was a pioneer, has the broadest focus 
among Korea’s public interest law f irms, and does most in terms of legal 
education and support for NGOs (Goedde 2013: 141-143). Its ten attorneys’ 
original practice areas were disability rights, violence against women, and 
migrant worker rights, but now include sexual minorities, the poor and 
workers. Gonggam helped found several other public interest law f irms. 
For instance, Hope and Law (Heuimangbeop, also called Korean Lawyers 
for Public Interest and Human Rights) was founded in 2011 and has nine 
attorneys who belong to Minbyeon, work closely with Gonggam, and focus 
on disability rights and sexual minorities.18
Public interest law foundations, meanwhile, were pioneered by the large 
law f irm Taepyeongyang when it established Dongcheon as a non-profit in 
2009.19 Dongcheon employs three attorneys and several interns and fellows 
and works closely with Taepyeongyang’s Pro Bono Committee. Disability 
rights is a core practice area and advances its mission to serve the ‘socially 
17 Gonggam, http://www.kpil.org/ (1 March 2018).
18 Heuimang Beop, http://www.hopeandlaw.org/ (1 March 2018).
19 Dongcheon Public Interest Foundation, http://www.bkl.or.kr/ (5 March 2018).
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disadvantaged and minorities’ and foster ‘public interest organizations, 
activists, and pro bono lawyers while engaging in research on public interest 
law, pro bono legal counselling, and legal and policy reforms’ (Dongcheon 
2016). In addition to representing clients, Dongcheon awards grants to public 
interest organizations and scholarships, hosts symposia on public interest 
law, and recently established a legal centre for NPOs. In 2016, it gave its 
Public Interest Law and Human Rights award to the successor organization 
of the Solidarity. More recently, the law f irm Jipyong established Duru as 
its public interest law foundation in 2014.20 Its nine attorneys work on a 
similar range of issues as Dongcheon, as well as cases related to freedom of 
expression and labour (Jipyong 2016). Jipyong provides matching grants to 
NGOs and to the public interest law f irms described above. Duru lawyers 
also drafted the revised article 48 of the KDDA to specify court remedies 
for cases of disability discrimination.
Public interest law f irms and foundations provide important resources 
for legal mobilization beyond legal representation. Their institutionalization 
in the past decade means that the resources for legal mobilization are more 
visible and accessible for potential claimants. They are sources of funding, 
key nodes in networks of legal professionals, and centres for research. In 
2011, lawyers who had helped the Solidarity achieve anti-discrimination 
legislation also founded the Korea Disability Law Association (KDLA) with 
prosecutors, judges and scholars to create a network for identifying test cases 
for litigation, advising on disability cases, researching foreign examples and 
policy advocacy. These groups serve as mobilizing structures for reform 
litigation. For example, KDLA members and several large law firms’ disability 
rights teams are cooperating on litigation over the inaccessibility of intercity 
buses (Interview LI 2017). Such networks have also been writing manuals, 
which are useful for elucidating legal opportunities. The KDLA published a 
manual through the Supreme Court Administration for lawyers and judges in 
2013 (Interview LGLH 2015). Thus, Korea’s infrastructure for more effectively 
recognizing and using, as well as sometimes even creating, legal opportuni-
ties, including disabilities-specif ic ones, has developed signif icantly.
Conclusion
This chapter traced the liberalization of structures of legal opportunity for 
people with disabilities in Korea. It showed how Koreans with disabilities 
20 Duru Public Interest Foundation, http://duroo.org/main/ko/ (5 March 2018).
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have gained access to an increasingly institutionalized infrastructure for 
supporting legal mobilization in the past decade. I highlighted the emergence 
of public interest law f irms and foundations, as well as networks of legal 
professionals with disability law expertise, because they serve as mobilizing 
structures for legal activism and conduits of knowhow that enable claimants 
to better recognize, utilize and sometimes pry open legal and political oppor-
tunities. While the state succeeded in containing litigation by channelling 
most discrimination complaints through the NHRCK, activists (including 
those unrelated to disabilities) have found creative ways of leveraging 
synergies between the NHRCK and courtrooms. Moreover, litigation is not 
the only tactic disability activists use today in Korea. Protests continue in 
conjunction with litigation over accessible intercity buses. Moreover, after a 
1,842-day sit-in at a major metro station in Seoul by people with disabilities, 
President Moon Jae-in – who was elected after his predecessor’s impeach-
ment in 2017 and is a left-leaning former human rights lawyer – pledged to 
further improve disability rights by abolishing the medically-based rating 
system for disability welfare benefits (Ho 2018). Critics of this proposal fear 
ballooning deficits (e.g. KH 2017).
Despite the institutional changes to facilitate legal mobilization and 
the rise of public interest lawyering, societal resistance to people with 
disabilities persists. In 2017, for instance, residents in western Seoul protested 
construction of a special education school, even though a court had ruled in 
1996 that the detriment to neighbours of such schools was outweighed by 
the detriment of denying education to disabled students (Bak 2017, and see 
note 15 above). As recently as 2016, a plurality of Koreans surveyed (42.2%) 
responded that the human rights of people with disabilities were still not 
respected (SSK Human Rights Forum-Hyundai Research 2016). The NHRCK is 
also hardly an unqualif ied ally. Of the 1,638 disability-related discrimination 
complaints the NHRCK handled in 2016, it rejected 1,194 cases and dismissed 
383 (NHRCK 2016b, 65). Just 19 cases received NHRCK recommendations, 
and another 32 were settled or resolved through conciliation. Moreover, 
while Korea has experienced a liberalizing structure of legal opportunities 
for disability rights in the past 20 years, this trend could reverse. Continued 
political activism by people with disabilities will help forestall backsliding 
and continue the trend of increasing participation by people with disabilities 
in crafting and implementing policy.
More broadly, this study contributes to our understanding of what role 
courts play in state-society relations and policy processes. Scholars have 
observed the judicialization or legalization of politics in various policy f ields 
and investigated the spread of US-style ‘adversarial legalism’ (Kagan 2007). 
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Due to the outsized global impact of the ADA, which encouraged disability-
related litigation in the United States (Burke 2004), it makes sense to ask if 
the spread of disability rights in Korea similarly signals the ‘Americanization’ 
of its legal framework (Kelemen 2008). This chapter suggests not. Korean 
activists’ demands for judicial remedies were diluted in negotiations for 
the KDDA, wherein state actors pitched the NHRCK route as an easier 
and more flexible dispute resolution mechanism. The Solidarity’s original 
demands of punitive damages and class action possibilities (both of which 
Korea largely lacks) were also rejected. In exchange, however, lawmakers 
permitted cases of non-compliance with NHRCK recommendations to 
be taken to court. With support from an increasingly institutionalized 
infrastructure for legal mobilization, litigation – albeit often in conjunction 
with NHRCK claims – has become a more and more viable mechanism 
for enforcing disability rights and influencing policy implementation. As 
one Korean researcher noted, ‘creative claims, including harassment, are 
now being pursued in court’ (Interview RIDRIK 2017). On balance, the 
relatively accessible NHRCK, the possibility that courts can halt ongoing 
discrimination and remedy past discrimination via the KDDA, and a growing 
support structure for disability rights claiming has improved the outlook 
for Koreans with disabilities. This research indicates, however, that a full 
understanding of changing state-society relations requires analysing both 
changes in structural constraints and how social groups and professionals, 
including within the state, may interact to stretch or creatively use such 
constraints.
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